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A B S T R A C T
With independence in 1961, the British system of Parliamentary 
government, incorporating the principle of responsible 
government, was formally adopted in Tanzania. But within only 
one year that system was discarded first, by adopting a 
Republican Constitution with an executive President in 1962, and 
then by adopting a one-party state system of government in 1965.
The one-party system reached the height of prominence through the 
concept of "Party Supremacy", and dominated constitutional 
practice for a whole generation before giving way to demands for 
greater freedom and democracy through competitive politics in 
1992. Throughout this time, however, the preambles to successive 
constitutions proclaimed that the government in Tanzania was 
responsible to a freely elected Parliament representative of the 
people.
This thesis traces the constitutional developments in Tanzania 
during the first three decades after independence so as to assess 
the extent to which the principle of "Responsible Government" has 
been maintained. It analyses the adoption of the Republican 
Constitution with an executive President having enormous powers 
even to override the Parliament, and tries to show that the one- 
party system and the concept of Party Supremacy, while appearing 
to replace Parliament with the Party as the instrument of 
democratic responsibility, merely served to legitimise the 
government tendency of holding the people ^responsible to it, 
rather than the other way round.
While acknowledging the contribution of external influence in 
reversing that trend and working towards changes for a more 
responsible and democratic government as signalled by the 
constitutional amendments of 1992, the thesis highlights some 
internal factors which have played very important roles in that 
development. These include the personal contribution of the
ii
first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, who, although very 
dominant, nevertheless had the foresight to reverse his previous 
positions and welcome a Bill of Rights in the Constitution in 
1984, and encourage competitive politics in 1990. The thesis 
welcomes these latest changes, but still insists on greater 
popular participation in making a new Constitution and in all 
future constitution making.
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TANZANIA:
A CHRONOLOGICAL PROFILE OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVENTS
1961 December Tanganyika is granted Independence
1962 January Julius Nyerere resigns as Prime Minister and is
succeeded by Rashidi Kawawa
December Tanganyika becomes a Republic with Julius Nyerere 
as President
1963 December Britain grants independence to Zanzibar
1964 January The Zanzibar Revolution overthrows the one-month
old independent government in Zanzibar
April Tanganyika and Zanzibar unite to form the United
Republic of Tanzania, led by Nyerere as President
1965 July Tanzania formally becomes a one-party state
October The first post-independence general election is 
held and Nyerere is re-elected President
1967 February Announcement of the Arusha Declaration and its
accompanying Leadership Code
1968 March The Leadership Code becomes fully operational
October Eight Members of Parliament are expelled from the 
ruling and only political party, TANU, and lose 
their seats in Parliament as a consequence
1970 October Second general election after independence; 
Nyerere is re-elected President
xxix
1974 November The NEC of TANU meeting in Musoma adopts a formal
resolution on "Party Supremacy"
1975 June The Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965 is 
amended to formally institute Party Supremacy
October Third general election after independence; again 
Nyerere is re-elected President
1977 February TANU and the ASP (the sole political party for
Zanzibar) merge to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
as the only political party for the entire United 
Republic
April A new Constitution of the United Republic of
Tanzania 1977 is adopted and comes into force
1980 October Fourth general election; Nyerere is re-elected 
into what he has already declared is going to be 
his last term of office as President
1984 January Vice-President of Tanzania, Aboud Jumbe, who is 
also the President of Zanzibar, is removed from 
both offices by the NEC of the ruling party, CCM, 
meeting in Dodoma, and he is replaced by Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi
October The Constitution is extensively amended to 
include, among other things, a Bill of Rights and 
a maximum limit to Presidential tenure
1985 October Fifth general election; Ali Hassan Mwinyi is 
elected President to succeed Nyerere who remains 
Chairman of the Party
1987 September Nyerere is re-elected Chairman of the Party
X X X
1990 February Nyerere encourages public debate on changing the 
Constitution to a multi-party system
August Nyerere retires as Party Chairman
1991 February President Mwinyi appoints the Nyalali Commission
to review the political party system
1992 February The Nyalali Commission submits its report to the
President, recommending a multi-party system
July The Eighth Constitutional Amendment Act 1992
comes into force, putting an end to the one-party 
state system and allowing opposition political 
parties
1995 October First multi-party general election; Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi ends his tenure of office as President
xxx i
CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction
1.1: BACKGROUND AND MAJOR PREMISE
In recent years there have been some significant political and 
constitutional changes in Africa, which have attracted world-wide 
attention. Perhaps the most dramatic changes, and those which 
attracted the greatest attention, have been the developments in 
South Africa which culminated in the April 1994 election 
involving, for the first time, people of all races and installing 
a fully democratic government. But elsewhere in the continent, 
the general trend has shown a widening scope of democracy and 
popular participation with the lifting of the ban on opposition 
parties. There has thus been a renewal of the multi-party 
political system in most countries of the continent, inspiring 
a widespread optimism that Africa has seen the dawn of a new 
political era.1
Tanzania was also swept by those same winds of change, and as a 
result the Constitution was amended in 1992 to allow the 
formation of opposition parties. It was in the atmosphere of 
these changes that the undertaking of this study was conceived.
The euphoria with which the return of multi-party politics in 
Africa has sometimes been greeted creates an impression which 
tends to equate political parties with democracy, and to dismiss
1See, for example, some articles in (1991) 35 Journal of African Law.
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as almost eventless or insignificant the entire period of 30 
years of African independent statehood. At the same time, this 
"equation" of political parties with democratic governance in 
Africa suddenly became a major concern of the western countries; 
they began insisting on democratic governance or popular 
participation in the political process, often in synonymous terms 
with a multi-party system, as a pre-condition for continuing 
financial assistance to Africa. To that extent, there is a claim 
that they have contributed to the democratisation process in 
Africa.
But this study proceeds from the premise that the changes that 
ushered in multi-party politics in Tanzania are part of a process 
in constitutional change and development within the country, 
which could be a reflection of the general trend in Africa. This 
process can be traced back to the nationalist movements and their 
demands for independence, in which a central objective was a 
responsible democratic government. In the event, like many of 
the other ideals which the demands for independence sought, 
responsible democratic government proved elusive and may not have 
been achieved fully, or perhaps even at all.
The constitutions adopted at independence in Africa did not 
survive intact for long. They were amended and modified, and 
even completely replaced in most countries; and in some countries 
the new constitutions were replaced yet again. The most extreme 
cases were in those countries where constitutions were abrogated 
by force through military coups. The trend may indicate lack of
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a capacity for permanency in both the independence constitutions 
and their replacements. But also it reflects some kind of a 
failure in achieving the ideals sought at independence. This 
failure is also reflected by some of the slogans and catch- 
phrases like "democratic rights", or "rule of law", and so on, 
which have been employed in the recent campaign for multi-party 
politics in much the same way as they were once used to challenge 
the colonial order. There has been a very similar recurrence in 
the specific demand for a government which is democratic and 
responsible to the people it governs.2
1.2: PURPOSE AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY
This study specifically looks at the principle of "responsible 
democratic government" in the constitutional practice and 
development of Tanzania since independence. It is a principle 
which was sought by the nationalist struggles for independence; 
and the campaigns for multi-party politics thirty years after 
independence appeared to demand the same ideal.
In this study, we seek to make an assessment of the extent to 
which the coming of independence, and the political and 
constitutional developments that followed, succeeded or failed 
in achieving that particular ideal. We also seek to look at the 
1992 constitutional changes which brought a multi-party system, 
and to assess the extent to which these changes are capable of
2See, for example, the proceedings in Mbikusita-Lewanika & Chitala, and 
some of the articles in Bagenda.
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achieving whatever had so far been elusive in terms of a truly 
responsible democratic government.
As a constitutional principle, "responsible government" is 
typified by the Westminster system of parliamentary government. 
A fundamental tradition of this principle is that ministers are 
collectively responsible to Parliament for all government 
decisions and, individually, ministers are also responsible to 
Parliament for the actions or omissions of their respective 
departments. It is an obligation of the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet he leads, which constitutes the government, to account 
to a democratically constituted body, the Parliament. Should a 
minister fail to account before Parliament for some unacceptable 
conduct in his ministry, the principle requires him to resign. 
And should the Cabinet lose the support or confidence of 
Parliament, it should also resign. It is essential for the 
effective operation of this principle that Parliament should have 
supreme legislative authority and should be politically free from 
control or domination by any other organ or institution.
In that sense, "responsible government" has become fundamental 
to the British tradition of parliamentary government; it is 
almost peculiarly British. Over the years, developments 
resulting from membership of the European Union have brought some 
limits to the competence of the British Parliament. And other 
recent developments in the system of government administration 
within Britain itself have made cabinet or ministerial 
resignations as a direct consequence of the operation of this
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principle extremely rare in practice. Still the principle has 
remained indispensable in the British constitutional system
(Turpin) .
But there is need to state the relevance of that principle to 
countries like Tanzania where the constitutions embodying that 
principle which were adopted at independence were soon replaced 
by new ones whose structures were not fully compatible with some 
of the tenets of the Westminster model. In Tanzania, the 
Republican Constitution of 1962 provided for a powerful executive 
President to whom all ministers were responsible, and omitted the 
provisions for ministerial responsibility to Parliament; this was 
a radical departure from the Westminster system. The one-party 
state constitution adopted in 1965 further eroded the authority 
of Parliament and left the government responsible largely to 
itself (de smith 1964:216,231, 247-52) . Yet the principle of
responsible government has never been irrelevant to Tanzania.
To explain the relevance of that principle to Tanzania, and to 
Commonwealth Africa generally, we begin with the nationalist 
campaigns for independence. When the African nationalists 
demanded independence from Britain, a responsible democratic 
government was part of the independence package they envisaged. 
Britain was the model of democracy and that is what they demanded 
for their countries. It is not that the British had much else 
to offer, other than the Westminster model; but even where there 
may have been suggestions or attempts to modify it, the 
nationalists were not going to accept anything other than or
5
short of the Westminster model.3 And, accordingly, independence 
was granted with Westminster model constitutions drawn by 
Whitehall.
The subsequent departure from that model did not quite discard 
that principle. The Republican Constitution still required the 
President to appoint the Cabinet ministers from amongst the 
members of the National Assembly. The Interim Constitution of 
Tanzania 1965 and the Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania 1977 also had the same requirements. Moreover, the 
preambles to all those constitutions declared that the 
constitutions were enacted to provide for a government 
"responsible to a freely elected Parliament representative of the 
people." And, in practice, Cabinet ministers continued to present 
themselves as a team in defence of government policies before the 
National Assembly, although the Assembly had no effective powers 
of censure.
Clearly, there was no intention to discard the system of 
parliamentary government entirely, and in practice many of its 
most apparent features have been retained throughout the period 
reviewed by this study. Finally, the constitutional amendments 
which were enacted in 1984 restored to the body of the 
Constitution express provisions for collective ministerial 
responsibility before the National Assembly. All this justifies 
a study of this principle in relation to Tanzania.
3Remarks by Sir Richard Turnbull, the last colonial governor of Tanganyika, 
in Kirk-Greene:157.
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But there are even more justifications than that. Firstly, this 
study also seeks to look at the principle of responsible 
government in the wider context of its democratic implication. 
In that context, responsible government is relevant as a 
principle which ensures that the government governs with both the 
consent and the support of the people it governs. Great emphasis 
is therefore placed on the representative character and the 
democratic composition of the body to which the government is 
accountable. In this sense, "responsible government" is 
synonymous with democratic government, which even those who 
discarded the Westminster model constitutions claimed they were 
working for.
Secondly, there is also the notion of responsible government 
sometimes used to refer to a "system of government in which the 
administration is responsive to public demands and movements of 
public opinion" (Birch: 17-8) . This is the notion of a government 
willing to listen to the people and to act according to their 
wishes and persuasion, not to bully them; a government willing 
to be a servant of the people rather than their master. It is 
like an extension of the first one because a government 
responsible to "a freely elected Parliament representative of the 
people" is more or less certain to act according to the wishes 
of the people. But it also requires a system that .enables the 
people to make their views heard and their opinion known by other 
means as well, in addition to Parliamentary avenues. It is 
therefore necessary to have autonomous civil organisations, 
pressure groups and a free press, so as to ensure this form of
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responsibility as a necessary manifestation of democratic 
government. There is nothing peculiarly British about this 
aspect of responsible government.
Finally, the principle of responsible government implies a system 
in which the Rule of Law is effectively observed. The Rule of 
Law is itself a vast subject. For our purposes, we may simply 
say that to observe the Rule of Law, a responsible government 
should not have or exercise wide prerogatives and arbitrary 
powers, but it should always be subject to the supremacy of 
regular law, which ensures justice, equality and all basic human 
rights. In this sense, government responsibility also implies 
that the government should be liable before the courts for its 
actions or omissions if they happen to violate any law. In 
short, it means "government according to law." And to ensure 
this, one essential is that the Judiciary should be independent 
of the executive.
Those three notions of responsible government have a 
complementary inter-relationship and it is in that context that 
this study proposes to review the application of that principle 
in Tanzania.
There could yet be another notion of "responsible government", 
which means a "prudent government", one which accepts it as a 
moral duty to pursue policies adjudged wise in the circumstances 
of the day even if the people may oppose them. In many African 
countries, this has been the basis for deliberately overriding
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democracy and the need for popular participation. Army officers 
have used it to justify their overthrow of governments and 
abrogation of legitimate constitutions, claiming to be on 
missions to rid their countries of corruption; in most cases they 
have ended up as leading perpetrators of corruption. In civilian 
governments, political executives have similarly claimed to know 
all the answers to the people's problems, insisting that the need 
for fast economic development and freedom from poverty overrides 
that of democratic participation. This is a controversial 
concept of responsible government which this study wishes to 
deliberately omit from consideration and assessment.
1.3: LITERATURE REVIEW
During the period under review, many scholarly works have been 
written on diverse topics about Tanzania; however, very few have 
dealt with law and legal issues. Most of the legal literature 
consists of articles in diverse journals. There are also some 
which have been written or published specifically to form part 
of collections of articles covering other subjects in the social 
sciences.
Regarding the constitutional developments in Tanzania, one of the 
earliest books was that of Cole and Denison (1964), being part 
of the series on the development of the Laws and Constitution of 
the British Commonwealth. But its coverage ends with the 
transition from colonial rule to independence and the authors 
seem to have been obsessed with some prejudice regarding the
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early post-colonial developments and made no attempt to assess 
them objectively. More objective was the long article by 
McAuslan (1964) , which gave a detailed analysis of the provisions 
of the 1962 Republican Constitution.
The book by Robert Martin (1974) comes very close to the subject 
of this study but it only covers one third of the period under 
review. His main concern was the extent to which personal 
freedom was and could still be maintained under the socialist 
state that Tanzania had just declared itself to be. He also 
wanted to show that socialism and the one-party system did not 
necessarily mean an end to democracy in Tanzania.
The establishment of the one-party state in 1965 did inspire a 
number of writings, including some early articles by Ghai and 
McAuslan, some published jointly and others individually. The 
same inspiration was certainly behind the speeches and writings 
of Mr Telford Georges, Chief Justice of Tanzania, edited by James 
and Kassam (1973) , which were a deliberate endeavour to show that 
the one-party system would not undermine the Rule of Law.
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 also stimulated a number of 
publications as well. But again, only a small proportion of the 
output was in the field of law. There were a few articles which 
looked into the use of law and its role in implementing 
nationalisations and other socialist-oriented policies initiated 
in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. They did not seek to 
question the validity of the powers of the government used in
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implementing some of those measures, possibly because of the 
widespread general optimism towards socialism at the time.
Among the post-Arusha Declaration writings were some by Issa 
Shivji, who has since emerged as the most prolific writer among 
Tanzanian lawyers. A consistent leftist, Shivji has written 
almost as much on political economy and socialist ideology as on 
law. Of particular relevance ' to this study, in 1984 Shivji 
edited a special issue of the Eastern Africa Law Review, which 
collected articles written, and presented in seminars and
conferences, as part of the 1983 Constitutional Debate in 
Tanzania. Shortly after, he edited another collection titled The 
State and the Working People in Tanzania (1986) . Both those 
collections dealt mainly with the way the state used its 
extensive powers to suppress democratic rights and freedoms.
Their main thrust was towards an ideological explanation of the
excessive powers of the government and their use. Only a few 
articles referred in passing to the question of constitutional 
mechanisms for government control and accountability.
Another monograph by Shivji, State Coercion and Freedom in 
Tanzania (1990), continues the same thematical line by
documenting cases in which the government has exhibited its might 
against helpless citizens, quite often in violation of its own 
laws. And his Tanzania: The Legal Foundations of the Union
(1990) deals exclusively with the controversial constitutional 
structure of the United Republic.
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Apart from the wave of writings inspired by the Arusha 
Declaration, there seems to have been a halt in the flow of legal 
literature on Tanzania in the 1970s. More recently, there has 
emerged a category of legal literature which seems to have been 
inspired by the Bill of Rights which was enacted in 1984. They 
include a book and an article by Chris M. Peter (1990, 1992), and 
articles by Mbunda (1988) , Wambali (1990), and Mwaikusa (1991), 
among others. And finally, there are papers written for 
conferences and seminars held as part of the recent debate on the 
transition from^one-party to^multi-party state. They include 
published collections edited by Okema and Mwaikusa (1992), Fimbo 
and Mvungi (1993), and Mtaki and Okema (1994). Most of them are 
relevant to this study in one way or another but none of them 
specifically addresses the question of government responsibility.
Besides that, however, there is a great deal of published 
material about Tanzania which is not on constitutional law 
developments or any other topic in the field of law. Indeed, a 
study like this cannot claim to restrict itself exclusively
to law. Questions of constitutional practice and development are 
as much questions of politics as they are questions of law. 
Therefore they also draw relevant topics from history, economics, 
public administration, sociology and so on. This casts the net 
of relevance rather wide and its precise limits become difficult 
to demarcate; but the bibliography at the end of this study may 
give an indication of the other works whose coverage relates to 
that of this study.
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Of the earlier works, William Tordoff's Government and Politics 
in Tanzania (1967) is thematically closest to this study. Its 
main concern was the changing role and structures of the 
administrative agencies of the government from independence up 
to the formal transition to the one-party state, but does not go 
beyond 1966. The account by Cranford Pratt (1976) is very good 
in its detailed presentation and analysis of facts; but in places 
the author seems to have been obsessed with admiration for 
Nyerere and his search for socialist morality.
Much of the non-legal literature also deals with issues and 
problems related to the one-party state and, even more, to the 
Arusha Declaration and its socialist policies. Besides books by 
individual authors there are collections of articles published 
in specially edited volumes. Perhaps the most comprehensive of 
such collections is contained in the two volumes of Socialism in 
Tanzania edited by Cliffe and Saul (1972 and 1973). The 
diversity of the articles is quite impressive and there are some 
which deal with the institutions of the state but without, 
however, focusing on the executive and its accountability.
Also of relevance are the volumes of election studies which have 
been made over the years, from the first election under the one- 
party system in 1965. The various studies have been edited by 
Cliffe (1967), the University Election Study Committee (1974), 
Othman, Bavu and Okema (1990), and Mukandala and Othman (1994) . 
They make a very good analysis of how far the elections under the 
one-party state in Tanzania, held so regularly, constitute a
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genuine exercise in democracy. But the studies are limited to 
the conduct of the election process itself, and do not seek to 
enquire much about what then happens after polling days.
Another interesting category of published collections include Re- 
Thinking the Arusha Declaration edited by J. Hartmann (1991), 
assessing Tanzania's performance over the twenty-year period 
following the Arusha Declaration; it amounts to an assessment of 
Nyerere's performance as the President of Tanzania committed to 
socialism. Other assessments of Nyerere are in collections
edited by M. Hodd (198 8) and Legum and Mmari (1995) , which 
include some articles which tend to assess Nyerere the man more 
than Nyerere the President. That does not make the collections 
any less relevant; Nyerere has constantly played a decisive role 
in institution building and government practice in Tanzania.
Nyerere's own contribution to the literature on the 
constitutional developments of Tanzania is immeasurable. As the 
architect of modern Tanzania, no realistic study of any aspect 
of the country's constitutional development can be made without 
reference to or reliance on his writings. They span a period of 
40 years, addressed to diverse audiences in diverse places, in 
Tanzania and the world over. It is not possible to categorise 
Nyerere's writings as exclusively belonging to a particular 
discipline; they are as interdisciplinary as the man himself. 
But on certain constitutional questions, they reveal a remarkable 
consistence of views. From his writings and speeches, it is 
obvious that Nyerere was never in doubt about what institutions
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he wanted in and for Tanzania, and why he wanted them.
But the writings are not as open and clear in assessing what was 
actually achieved in establishing a responsible democratic 
government, and his own role in that achievement or failure. 
That is part of what this study proposes to do.
1.4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The material and information for this study were gathered through 
a combined use of three methods: archival or library research, 
interview and personal observation.
The term "library research" is used here as a general reference 
to "reading" as a source of information and material, and as a 
method of gathering -the same for purposes of this study. The 
material or documents read need not necessarily be in a library 
although, as a matter of fact, most of the reading for this study 
was actually done in established libraries. And "library 
research" has been the method most heavily relied upon^source /for 
material.
The libraries of the University of London and its schools, 
colleges and institutes contain most of the known published books 
about Tanzania, and about Africa in general. In doing this 
study, the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
has been a most reliable source of information in published 
books, journals, as well as in some official government reports.
Its periodicals section has even some collections of old Swahili 
newspapers like Ngurumo and Mambo Leo which would be difficult 
to find in Dar es Salaam. Whatever that library did not have was 
certain to be in the other libraries of the University of London.
With specific regard to legal literature, the library of the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies has a good collection of 
published statutes and law reports from Tanzania. It also has 
some law journals which could not be found in some other 
libraries. The British Library of Political and Economic 
Sciences, situated at the London School of Economics, has an 
impressive collection of all the published Legislative Council 
and National Assembly Debates from Tanzania. And the Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies had some publications not commonly 
available in other libraries. On brief occasions, the University 
of London Senate House Library was consulted, and so was the 
British Museum Newspaper Library at Colindale.
But a notable absence from the collections of the libraries in 
London was the original Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania 1977, as originally enacted in 1917, although most of 
the amendments can be found in their respective annual volumes 
of statutes. This could in part be due to the fact that the 
original constitution was published only in the Swahili language; 
a few other useful publications in that language are also absent 
from the London libraries, and have to be sought from Tanzania.
In Tanzania, the library most heavily relied upon was that of the
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University of Dar es Salaam. It met most of the requirements 
missed by the London libraries. The library of the High Court 
at Dar es Salaam provided most of the unreported cases referred 
to in this study. And the National Archives library has a wealth 
of documents, including many unpublished records, although it 
could not be used very extensively for this study because it was 
still being reorganised after a change of premises. There were 
also some brief visits to the library of the Ideological College 
of the Party at Kivukoni, now called the Social Sciences Academy, 
mainly for assurances on Party records.
Besides the established libraries, the offices of the National 
Assembly provided access to some of the most recent statutes as 
well as some of the unpublished parliamentary debates. There 
were also visits to offices of the Permanent Commission of 
Enquiry and of the Commission for the Enforcement of the 
Leadership Code. The visits were necessary partly because these 
commissions no longer publish their annual reports regularly. 
But also the visits were conveniently used to conduct oral 
surveys and interviews with the officers there.
As stated earlier, interviews were another method employed in 
gathering information for this study. People interviewed 
included politicians, party and government officials, lawyers, 
judges, trade unionists, cooperative movement activists, and a 
few leaders of professional organisations and emerging opposition 
parties. The interviews were not conducted by way of 
questionnaire; rather the respondents were engaged in relaxed
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guided conversations in which they were asked about facts, events 
and opinions from their own experiences in politics, in 
government service, or in any other capacity or activity that 
they may have been involved in.
Among those interviewed was Mr Rashidi Kawawa, who was Prime 
Minister for ten months up to December 1962, then Vice-President 
up to February 1977, and for most of the time up to December 
1992, he held one of the top three positions in the Party 
hierarchy. Another prominent politician interviewed was Mr 
Joseph Warioba, Prime Minister and First Vice-President from 1985 
to 1990, who was particularly informative about the crucial 
period of 1975-85 during which his position as Attorney General 
gave him access to all decision making bodies, more as a 
technocrat than a politician. Other people interviewed were 
similarly asked about their respective experiences, either 
present or previous, and about the conclusions they reached from 
those experiences.
In late 1992, a group of Tanzanians made a tour of Germany, and 
the author had the privilege of joining them from London. It 
provided the first opportunity of talking to some leaders of the 
then emerging opposition parties who were in the tour. But it 
was also an opportunity to observe the attitudes of Western 
Europe towards democracy in Africa which were exhibited by some 
officials of the German government who spoke to the Tanzanian 
group. The tour, therefore, was a welcome source of material by 
both interview and personal observation.
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Much of the personal observation, though, was made by way of 
involvement in the diverse activities of the University of Dar 
es Salaam Legal Aid Committee for some time up to 1992. The 
activities created contacts with various groups of people who had 
to be assisted in solving some legal problems relating in one way 
or another to the extent and the use of government powers: 
workers' groups, women's cooperatives, students' organisations, 
professional bodies like the Junior Doctors Association, pastoral 
communities, as well as civil rights activists like James 
Mapalala and his supporters who later redirected their energies 
into active opposition politics.
The contacts with those groups were made well before this study 
started, and they were entirely for purposes of providing them 
with legal advice or legal representation, unrelated to this or 
any other academic research work. But when work on this study 
commenced, it was easy to make the necessary follow-ups on the 
contacts in order to relate the problems and experiences observed 
from there to the objectives of the study.
1.5: SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
As suggested by its title, this study covers Tanzania. 
References to other countries, which are few, are made for 
comparative purposes only. It is hoped, though, that the 
experiences of Tanzania given here may in various ways be 
instructively compared with the experiences in other countries 
of Africa.
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Tanzania is a United Republic, consisting of the former Republic 
of Tanganyika and the former island Sultanate/Republic of 
Zanzibar, which united in April 1964. The structure of the union 
provides for a limited autonomy for Zanzibar, which has its own 
executive, legislature and judiciary for matters pertaining 
exclusively to Zanzibar, which are not under the jurisdiction of 
the union authorities. On the other hand, the Mainland part of 
the union (or Tanganyika) has no such government of its own, and 
the union government is constitutionally the government for 
Tanganyika as well. The overall population of Tanzania is
estimated at 28 million, of which less than 800,000 people are 
in Zanzibar. The geographical area of over 363,000 square miles 
for the Mainland and 1,020 square miles for Zanzibar.
The peculiar constitutional structure of the union remains a 
source of controversy.4 This study will not venture into that 
controversy. Up to April 1964, the date of the union, the study 
covers Tanganyika only, and does not include Zanzibar. After 
that, the exclusion of Zanzibar ends because the study then 
covers the United Republic of Tanzania whose institutions are 
also the institutions of and for Tanganyika, and in which 
Zanzibar is invariably represented. What are excluded, though, 
are those matters peculiar to Zanzibar which, according to the 
Union Constitution, are not "union matters" and are therefore not 
the direct concern of the Union Constitution on which this study 
bases its analysis.
4For details see Shivji 1990a.
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The period covered by the study spans thirty years from 1962 to 
1992. But invariably, there are spill-overs in the events and 
therefore the developments before 1962 are analysed extensively 
because they are necessary in explaining subsequent events. 
Similarly, events which have occurred after 1992 are considered 
in illustrating the arguments and conclusions to be drawn from 
the developments during the period of study.
The study reviews the constitutional developments in Tanzania. 
In examining those developments it would obviously have been 
unsatisfactory to follow a merely chronological sequence. The 
material has therefore been collected and analysed under a series 
of themes, each one the- subject of a separate chapter, with 
overlaps being allowed only for the sake of clarity and 
consistence in the flow of the chapters. The flow does not 
conflict with the chronological order of the main events.
Independence is the starting point and, accordingly, after this 
introduction Chapter Two starts with independence. It reviews how 
the coming of independence was perceived by the various groups 
involved in that process, and the extent to which the 
Independence Constitution established a responsible democratic 
government.
Chapter Three looks at how the nationalist leadership tackled the 
challenges of independence firstly, by strengthening the 
executive through the Republican Constitution of 1962 and, 
secondly, by proscribing political dissent and opposition. The
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argument for a one-party state is considered at the two levels 
advanced by the nationalist movement leadership: the
philosophical rationalisation and the practical justification. 
And the steps taken towards a one-party state are outlined.
In Chapter Four the study analyses the juridical implementation 
of the one-party state, which was effected by the Interim 
Constitution of Tanzania. 1965, and its effect on government 
responsibility. The changing roles of the Parliament and the 
ruling party are considered in relation to the powers of the 
executive. Subsequently, the concept of "Party Supremacy" which 
came with the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 
1977 is discussed, and the role and competence of the Party as 
an instrument of ensuring a responsible government is also 
appraised.
Much of Chapter Five is devoted to reviewing the legal liability 
of the government as a necessary requirement of responsibility. 
It reviews the role and status of the Judiciary and its relations 
with the executive, both in law and in practice. There is also 
an analysis of the possible effects of the concept of "Party 
Supremacy" on the role of the Judiciary. The chapter ends with 
a review of the controlling function of the Permanent Commission 
of Enquiry (or the Tanzanian Ombudsman) and the Commission for 
the Enforcement of the Leadership Code.
Chapter Six goes beyond the relations between state institutions 
and looks at the way the Party, declared supreme by the
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Constitution, was used to consolidate a centralised oligarchy 
with which the state then dominated and controlled popular 
institutions and civil society through and through: trade union 
and cooperative movements, youth and women's organisations, the 
mass media, professional associations, religious organisations, 
and even the less formal village communities. And it is argued 
that this excessive control of civil society was tolerated 
because of the hope for social justice proclaimed by the ujamaa 
socialist ideology to which the political leadership, and 
particularly President Nyerere, were clearly committed.
Chapter Seven starts by pointing out some inherent problems of 
the one-party state system: the Party turned into an exclusive 
elite club and "Party Supremacy" became the pretext for 
disregarding legality in government administration. The system 
could not sustain itself much longer and had to change. In 
analysing the recent changes, the study begins with the Fifth 
Constitutional Amendment Act 1984 which, for the first time, 
incorporated the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. In due 
course, the Bill of Rights was resorted to for support and 
inspiration in challenging the dominating executive and the 
restrictive one-party state system itself. This development was 
marked by a growing assertion of freedom of expression and 
autonomy of popular organisations, which the state was forced to 
concede. Finally, with significant external backing, the 
Constitution was amended to reintroduce a multi-party political 
system, effective from July 1992.
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In conclusion, Chapter Eight tries to make an assessment of the 
developments outlined and discussed in all the preceding 
chapters, considering how far each step in the developments may 
have advanced or hindered effective democratic control of the 
government by the people. The conclusion also tries to assess 
the prospects for a responsible democratic government after the 
1992 Constitutional Amendments, and, in particular, after the 
Presidential and General Elections of October 1995.
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CHAPTER TWO
Adoption of the Principle of 
Responsible Government
2.0: INTRODUCTION
The principle of "Responsible Government" as it is known today 
formally came to Tanzania, as to other countries of East Africa, 
through Britain. Ironically, however, the principle was not 
introduced during the many years of British colonial 
administration, but during the hurried process of colonial exit.
Colonial regimes were unpretentiously authoritarian and not 
subject to any semblance of control by the people they ruled. 
When colonial rule was coming to an end, however, the colonial 
authorities wanted to ensure that the governments they left 
behind in Africa were responsible democratic ones. But views and 
expectations of what would actually constitute responsible 
democratic government varied. In this chapter, we seek to 
highlight those variations: to show that the nationalist leaders' 
conception of responsible government as they demanded it may have 
been different from what some of their supporters perceived it 
while, on the other hand, the colonial authorities may have had 
a somewhat different conception of their own.
At independence many such differences of views and beliefs were
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compromised and played down deliberately for the sake of peaceful 
political transition, or they were drowned in euphoric hopes for 
a politically bright future. But they were nevertheless real and 
they contributed to the constitutional developments at and after 
independence.
2.1: THE COUNT-DOWN TO INDEPENDENCE
Under the colonial state the organisation of the government 
facilitated the subjugation of the people through a hierarchy of 
authorities. At the lowest level, the local organs of 
administration consisted of native authorities who were actually 
local chiefs appointed as "native authorities" by the Governor 
under the Native Authority Ordinance. Above them were District 
Officers and District Commissioners, and above the district were 
Provincial Commissioners, and the Governor was the overall in­
charge. Above the Governor was Her Majesty's Government, 
exercising authority through the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, wherefrom flowed all authority and went through an 
unbroken chain of command down to the lowest level (chidzero:49) .
In governing the territory, the Governor had two important 
councils: the Executive Council whose function was to advise the 
Governor in the government of Tanganyika and he consulted it 
regularly, and the Legislative Council discharged the territory's 
legislative functions. In short, the two councils performed the 
functions of the Executive and the Legislature respectively; but 
their colonial setting had no room for many principles, like
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"Government Responsibility", which operate in a democracy. Those 
councils were nevertheless important in the developments to 
independence because out of them the Cabinet of Ministers and the 
National Assembly ultimately evolved;1 even the nationalist 
demands for responsible government and independence mainly sought 
to change the structure and composition of those two councils, 
and how they related to each other.
Members of the two councils were appointed by the Governor who 
also chaired both councils until 1953 when he left the 
Legislative Council and was replaced by a Speaker. The 
Legislative Council was first established in 1926 by the 
Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1926. Its 
members were in two categories: "official" and "unofficial"
members. "Official" members were "persons holding office of 
emolument under the Crown in the territory" while "unofficial" 
members were not holders of such office. By deliberate design, 
the official members were always the majority. The Executive 
Council, on the other hand, started with official members only; 
a few unofficial^were appointed there later.
Following some changes in the organisation of the government in 
1948, some specified members of the Executive Council were 
designated to be responsible to the Legislative Council for the 
activities of certain government departments. Those so designated 
were made ex officio members of the Legislative Council,
1For the evolution of these institutions in Tanganyika, see, Cole & 
Denison:39-47, 60-5, and Tordoff 1967:189-94.
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responsible for the activities of their respective departments 
before that Council in a way similar to ministers being 
responsible for Government policies and activities before 
Parliament. But these ex officio members were civil servants, 
primarily responsible to the Governor; they were therefore not 
"Ministers" and the term "Members" was used instead. In council 
proceedings they were referred to as "Member for Law and Order" 
or "Member for Finance" or "Member for Native Administration", 
etc., and that system was known to operate in British 
dependencies as the "Member System". It was from this "Member 
System" that both in Tanganyika and elsewhere in the Commonwealth 
(wiseman:60-8i) , the "Ministerial System" of responsible government 
was evolved.
The campaign for independence was led by the Tanganyika African 
National Union (throughout hereinafter referred to as TANU), 
formed in July 1954 under the leadership of Julius Kambarage 
Nyerere. By 1958 it had reached all parts of the country; in the 
very first elections to the Legislative Council which were held 
in two phases in September 1958 and February 1959, all the 
contested seats were won by TANU or TANU supported candidates. 
After the elections the Executive Council became the "Council of 
Ministers", and five of its 12 members were drawn from the newly 
elected members of the Legislative Council.
But TANU was demanding elected majorities in the composition of 
both' councils. By that time, however, even British attitudes 
were changing in favour of independence and by 1960 British
policy in Africa was for independence without delay (de winton: 186-
7 ) . Accordingly, in 1959 it was announced that general elections 
would be held the following year. They were held in 196 0 on a 
wide, albeit limited, franchise. TANU showed the mass support 
behind it by winning 70 out of the 71 contested Legislative 
Council seats; even the single seat lost was actually lost to a 
TANU member who contested as an independent. After the elections 
Nyerere formed a Government with himself as Chief Minister.
In March 1961, the vital Constitutional Conference was held, 
significantly, in Dar es Salaam and not at the Lancaster House 
in London. It has been described as the shortest constitutional 
conference in British colonial history (Listowei:380-90) . 
Evidently, both the holding of the conference in Dar es Salaam 
(instead of London) and its record brevity were possible because 
many issues had already been dealt with in several informal 
meetings between Nyerere and Iain Macleod, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, which took place at the latter's flat in London 
over a period of four months prior to the conference 
(Listowei:383) .
On 1st May 1961, Tanganyika achieved internal self-government; 
Nyerere became Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers and 
the Legislative Council were re-named the Cabinet and the 
National Assembly respectively. On 9th December 1961, Tanganyika 
became independent. Thus the process of transferring power and 
installing in Tanganyika a parliamentary system of responsible 
democratic government similar to that in the United Kingdom was
completed within a short period of about three years.
Notably, though, the changes were not as fast regarding the 
judiciary. Under colonialism, there was a dual court system 
consisting of the High Court and the Local Courts systems. In 
the latter, established under the Local Courts Ordinance and 
having jurisdiction --both civil and criminal-- over Africans 
only, the judicial and administrative functions of the state were 
discharged by one and the same person and, originally, the 
Governor constituted the system's final court of appeal (cole &
Denison:102-10; James & Kassam:12-5) .
There was a long term objective of separating the local courts 
from the executive and incorporating them in an independent 
judiciary under the High Court (Tanganyika 1951) . But at 
independence this objective was far from achieved. Only the 
Governor had been replaced by a Central Court of Appeal presided 
over by a High Court Judge. But Provincial Commissioners still 
had wide powers of hiring and firing local courts officers and 
wide discretion to grant or refuse leave (a mandatory condition) 
for appeal to the Central Court of Appeal. District 
Commissioners also still had wide disciplinary powers over local 
courts officers and extensive revisionary powers over the 
decisions of local courts. At independence, this position was 
handed over intact.
But the speed of political developments defied all predictions 
and expectations. In December 1956, Nyerere had predicted
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independence in ten years' time (Nyerere 1966:44); by 1960 
independence was coming almost too soon. He was actually 
prepared to delay it and wait for developments in Kenya and 
Uganda to catch up so that the three countries could achieve 
independence simultaneously and federate (Nyerere 1966:85-98; 
Taylor:214) . The three were linked in an East Africa High 
Commission which had a Central Legislative Assembly and ran 
inter-territorial services like railways, harbours, posts and 
telecommunications, and customs and excise (chidzero:93-105,- Taylor.- 
106-12) . A believer in African unity, Nyerere hoped for an 
independent East African federation. But the hope did not 
materialise and Tanganyika moved to independence alone.
Unity behind a single movement, TANU, contributed much to the 
fast developments to independence. But also by the time that 
unity manifested itself fully in the 1958-59 elections, British 
policy was already going in favour of independence without delay. 
This provided an opportunity for cooperation, instead of 
confrontation, between the British authorities and the 
nationalist leadership, which ensured smooth progress.
Possibly, Nyerere derived some inspiration from what had happened
/Serru-
in Nkrumah's Ghana which in 1951 had/responsible government and 
in 1954 achieved internal self-government (Rubin & Murray:2-7) , just 
about the time Nyerere was founding TANU; in fact his draft of 
the first TANU Constitution was modelled on Nkrumah's Convention
31
Peoples' Party (Bennett:17; Listowei-.223) . 3 Even in cooperating with 
the British authorities, Nyerere accepted measures which fell 
short of his demands much like Nkrumah had done when he denounced 
the "Coussey Constitution” of 1950 as "bogus and fraudulent" and 
yet cooperated with the British under that same constitution
(Nyerere 1966:67-8; Harvey:18) .
International opinion too was strongly in favour of 
decolonisation; the anti-colonial attitude of the USA often led 
it to deliberately side with the USSR against Britain, much to 
the embarrassment of the latter (Listowei: 124) . International 
opinion was of particular importance to Tanganyika, a Trust 
Territory administered by Britain in accordance with the terms 
of the Trusteeship Agreement between Britain and the UN 
Trusteeship Council. A detailed study of the implications of 
that status for Tanganyika (chidzero) concludes generally that it 
did not make the territory any different from the other British 
dependencies. Indeed, Tanganyika was governed in the same way 
as the other dependencies were. But for Tanganyika, Britain had 
an obligation to prepare the territory for independence and was, 
for that purpose, accountable to the Trusteeship Council.
Tanganyika's international status was obviously a source of 
inspiration for the nationalists. They made use of the right to 
appear before the Council and complain against the administering 
authority; Nyerere appeared there no less than three times, and
3But Iliffe: 511, also mentions the British Labour Party in addition to 
Nkrumah's CPP.
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Kirilo Japhet went there to petition on behalf of the Meru people
dispossessed of their lands (Japhet & Seaton) . In Dar es Salaam,
TANU used to mark United Nations Day rather conspicuously and the
very first meeting of TANU7s National Executive Committee in 
August 1954 had
only one item on the agenda: to draft a memorandum for submission to
members of the UN Visiting Mission, due to arrive in Dar es Salaam in 
September. (Listowei : 22 8 )
On the other hand, Britain was keen to satisfy the Council that
the territory was being treated in accordance with the
Trusteeship Agreement. Thus in June 1957, when Britain's report
on Tanganyika was discussed by the Trusteeship Council, British
authorities went to the deliberate extent of sending to New York,
in addition to two responsible British officials, a conservative
local chief who could put before the Council an African "point
of view friendly to the administration" and counter balance
Nyerere's nationalist view (Listowei:294-7; Taylor: 151-2) . And . in
explaining why the transition to independence was so smooth, 
Nyerere has stated:
Tanganyika was a Trust Territory under British administration. That whole 
phrase must be taken together.... The British are sensitive to public 
opinion and we as a Trust territory had a forum at the United Nations 
where we could exploit that sensitivity. That completes the answer.
(Stahl:7)
Many other Tanganyikans must have regarded their country's status 
of a Trust Territory as quite significant in achieving their 
demands for responsible government and independence. When the 
UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, visited Dar es Salaam in 
January 1960, the airport was crowded with its residents who, in 
their thousands, also lined the roads from the airport to the 
city centre to welcome him (Listowei:371) .
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2.2: THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
The nationalist movement which spearheaded the demands for 
independence was, in various ways, a struggle for responsible 
government. Firstly, it sought to bring an end to foreign 
political domination, which ruled through a government neither 
democratic nor responsible. The colonial government was outright 
authoritarian and owed allegiance and responsibility to a foreign 
colonial power based outside the territory.
Although the Governor governed through councils, those councils 
were neither representative nor democratically constituted; their 
role and function was not to make the government responsible to 
the people it governed. Both the Executive Council and the 
Legislative Council consisted of majorities of "official"
members who were, as a rule required and in practice committed,
to support and defend the government at all times. The 
unofficial members were not so required but, by deliberate 
design, they were a permanent minority and their membership in 
the councils was not intended to enhance government
responsibility. The nationalist movement sought to change that.
Secondly, the nationalists were actually demanding some form of 
responsible government and democratic representation. In his 
farewell letter to Sir Richard Turnbull, the last Governor of 
Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere refers to their 1958 demands for 
"Responsible Government" by which "we meant a majority of Elected
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Members in the Legco,4 and a majority of Elected Ministers in 
the Government" (Listowei:425) .
In any case, it would not have been acceptable, or even possible, 
for the nationalist movement to seek an end to colonial rule in 
order to replace it with a system that did not even have a 
semblance of responsible democratic government. Even if they had 
undemocratic inclinations, the nationalist leaders and activists 
had to promote democracy, at least for strategic reasons. 
Colonialism had distorted and altered the role and functions of 
indigenous institutions and traditional authorities to serve 
colonial purposes (iliffe:3i84i) ; for that reason, those 
institutions would not be accepted to continue in a post colonial 
establishment (Listowei:320-i; Maguire:290-1 ) . Invariably, even the 
sentiments against colonial rule sometimes manifested themselves 
in forms of defiance against tribal institutions and authorities. 
Thus the nationalist leadership had to "legitimise" itself as a 
credible alternative by founding its political base on some form 
of democratic institutionalisation, however rudimentary.
Moreover, the concern of the nationalist leadership was not only 
to bring an end to colonial domination, but also to create a 
nation-state within the colonial boundaries and, conveniently, 
the two objectives had to be fought for contemporaneously (Tordoff 
1984:50-1; Davidson 1992:99-196). The nation-state envisaged had no 
room for traditional authority which was seen as tribal or 
otherwise sub-national, and therefore likely to undermine the
4"Legco" is short for "Legislative Council".
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national integration sought (Listowel:320-i; Bates,D.:278) . It was 
part of the strategy to use the appeal of democracy to champion 
the cause of nationalism and vice-versa.
Finally, part of the irony in the process of colonial exit is 
that even to the colonial power itself, handing over political 
power to successor states in Africa whose governments were 
anything less than responsible democratic ones was inconceivable. 
This attitude was backed by international opinion which at this 
time also supported democratic self-government. Accordingly, all 
policy programmes of the colonial government after 1950 sought 
to achieve just that. Whether that objective was actually 
achieved may be a different matter.
But while there was agreement between the nationalists and the 
colonial authorities that the end of colonial rule would see a 
democratic government in office, there were variations regarding 
how each conceived that responsible democratic government to be.
2.2.1: The Aims of the Colonial Authorities
In considering the nationalist demands for self-government and 
independence, the colonial authorities contemplated a truly 
democratic government which would be subjected to the same 
rigorous controls as known or believed to operate in Britain: a 
powerful democratically elected and representative parliament, 
an independent judiciary, strong political parties competing in 
free elections, a generally knowledgeable public, with a widely
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circulating free press, etc. These were the "infrastructure" 
necessary for a truly responsible democratic government but in 
the colonial states, not having been developed, they were absent.
The colonial authorities considered it dangerous to hand over 
power to a tiny minority of privileged persons, which is what the 
few educated nationalist leaders were regarded to be. The rest 
of the African population was too uneducated and too uninformed 
to be able to exercise checks against any dictatorial practices 
or tendencies which the small elite, once given state power, 
could easily engage themselves in. Thus handing over power to 
the nationalist leaders would be a "road not to democracy but to 
tyranny" (Huxley: 125-6 ; Blundell: 115-6) .
To avoid that, the colonial authorities preferred a delayed 
process towards self-government and independence so as to enable 
some training and education of a reasonable proportion of the 
African population who could then be relied upon to ensure that 
the Government after independence is constantly subject to 
democratic control. The British wanted to increase economic 
interests in Africa while at the same time preparing African 
countries for self-government and independence ultimately. This 
was logical because the increased economic interests could only 
be guaranteed continued security if independence was to be given 
to regimes which were thoroughly trained in, and committed to, 
the principles of western liberal democracy (Huxley: 117-24) .
But there was also concern for the interests, both future and
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present, of the minority immigrant races: mainly European and, 
in Tanzania, Asian as well. They were relatively very few in 
numbers but the economies of the colonial states depended heavily 
on them. In Tanzania, for example, in 1958 the population was 
made up of about 9 million Africans, 100,000 Asians and 25,000 
Europeans; but the Europeans and Asians were contributing about 
60% of the territory's revenue (Twining:15,21) . Thus, while the 
nationalists demanded responsible self-government and 
independence almost immediately, the colonial authority sought 
to delay it in order to protect the interests of those immigrant 
races. The argument was that a fully democratic government 
as demanded by the African nationalists would completely exclude 
the immigrant races from positions of political power and 
influence, their economic importance notwithstanding.
To avoid that, the colonial authorities preferred a very gradual 
process of step-by-step reforms in the developments towards full 
democracy (Twining:20-2; Blundell: 115-6 ) , with a system in which the 
minority races who dominated the economy would also have a 
politically influential position. This became an aim vigorously 
sought by the colonial authorities in Tanzania, and they sought 
to achieve it through the local government system.
Conscious of the growing post-war nationalism in Africa, and an 
increasingly anti-colonial international opinion, Britain 
designed some strategies to prepare her colonial possessions for 
democratic self-government. One strategy recommended by the 
Colonial Office was the democratisation of local government
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institutions as a way of ensuring a democratic political system 
at the centre (Pratt 1976:14-5). Partly in response to that 
recommendation, the colonial government in Tanzania started a 
gradual process of "democratising" the native authorities by 
encouraging the formation of councils to advise the native chiefs 
who were the ones designated as the "Native Authorities" under 
the Native Authority Ordinance.5
But democratising the native authorities could not secure a 
politically influential position for the minority races since the 
Native Authority Ordinance did not apply to non-natives. More 
reliable was the Local Government Ordinance, enacted in 1953 with 
the aim of ultimately replacing the former. The colonial 
government sought to secure the position of the minority 
immigrant races in the local government system by promoting a 
policy which was called "multi-racialism. " By "multi-racialism, " 
the colonial government sought to secure the political 
representation of racial communities, irrespective of their 
sizes. Thus in the 1958-59 elections to the Legislative Council, 
each voter was required to vote for three candidates, one from 
each racial group, so that the Council's composition was 10 
Africans, 10 Asians and 10 Africans. Strongly opposed to that 
tripartite system, TANU nevertheless took part in the elections, 
won all the seats (for all the races), and then went on to use 
the victory to upset the plans of the colonial government (iiiffe:
555-62; Listowei:303-11, 343-67) .
5For this development see, generally, Taylor:97-106, Montague & Page-Jones, 
and Kingdon.
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The contest over "multi-racialism" was even greater in local 
government (Pratt i960; Stephens: 127-9) . The law did not require that, 
all local councils should have a multi-racial composition, but 
the colonial government used "multi-racialism" to insist on a 
multi-racial composition as a pre-condition for the establishment 
of any council. The Government then tried to forcefully 
establish a few multi-racial councils, provoking enormous 
opposition which was so protracted in some districts (Maguire:196- 
234) that the whole policy had to be abandoned, and the councils 
established were dissolved by legislation.6
Apart from preoccupation with "multi-racialism, " the colonial 
authorities certainly conceived a "responsible government" 
suitable for Africa as a weak central government, in stark 
contrast with "Government" as it was in the colonial state (Ghai 
1972:410-3; Pratt 1976:49; Okoth-Ogendo: 9) . In Kenya, that attitude led 
to an independence constitution with provisions safeguarding 
regional authorities which it created. Ghana's Independence 
Constitution also contained similar provisions guaranteeing 
"regionalism". In a remarkable parallel, Ghana repealed those 
provisions less than two years after independence (Rubin & Murray:
8) while Kenya did the same thing without even attempting to 
implement those provisions (Ghai & McAusian 1970:196-215) .
In Tanzania, a somewhat similar constitutional arrangement was
6 The Local Government (Geita, Kondoa, Manyoni and Pangani District 
Councils) (Dissolution) Ordinance 1959, and the Local Government (South-East Lake 
County Council) (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1959.
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contemplated. In 1958, E.G. Rowe was relieved of all his 
responsibilities as a Provincial Commissioner and charged with 
designing an appropriate scheme of decentralisation. 
Accordingly, he recommended the setting up of very strong 
regional institutions, complete with their own governments, 
treasuries and representative assemblies, and with extensive 
jurisdiction that would take many administrative matters away 
from the central departments and the political ministers who 
would head them after independence (Pratt 1976:48-9) . But then the 
pace of change became so fast after October 1958 that no time was 
left for experimenting with Rowe's recommendations.
This fast pace was mainly due to the cooperation and 
understanding which developed during this period between the 
Government and the nationalist leadership, especially its overall 
leader, Mr Julius Nyerere,7 whose brilliance, astute personality 
and charismatic leadership ensured peace between the colonial 
establishment and some of his less sophisticated followers.
2.2.2: The Expectations of the Indigenous Population
Regarding anti-colonial nationalism in Africa generally, Tordoff 
identifies seven different interest groups: traditional chiefs 
wishing to preserve their privileged positions; professionals and 
merchants seeking African enfranchisement and political power; 
a petty-bourgeoisie of teachers, clerks and petty businessmen 
wishing to change places with the advantaged colonial elite;
7See, generally, Listowei: chapters 35 - 36, and Pratt 1976: chapter 3.
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African members of the bureaucracy expecting to profit from 
anticipated Africanisation policies; an urban workforce hoping 
for self-improvement through trade unionism; an urban based 
informal sector often getting inadequate incomes; and cash crop 
farmers organised in powerful associations (Tordoff 1984:51-2 ).
The respective significance of the various groups, in terms of 
their contribution to the nationalist cause, varied from country 
to country. But for Tanzania, one group missing from Tordoff7s 
categories and yet of crucial significance is that of peasants 
(and pastoralists) sustaining themselves exclusively on a 
subsistence economy; at independence they possibly constituted 
more than 6 0% of the adult population (Stephens:38) . Their 
numerical strength and unity behind TANU, as shown in the 196 0 
elections, was very significant in Tanzania's progress to self- 
government and independence.
The united support behind TANU had only one objective: an end to 
colonial rule. Significantly, TANU's mass membership and support 
did not consist of very sophisticated minds that could articulate 
the evils of colonialism as a system, or what they wanted it 
replaced with. Rather, most of them saw colonialism in simple 
factual terms of a rule by foreigners, which was humiliating 
(Listowei:240-i; Kirk-Greene: 160) . TANU organisers campaigned for 
support by invoking the indignation of being ruled by foreigners 
(Listowei :270-i; Tordoff 1984 :5i) and many supported TANU simply to end 
that rule; whether that end would bring a more egalitarian rule 
with a government responsible to the people did not preoccupy
their minds (Temu:203)
Because the resented rule was perpetrated by Europeans and 
because colonial policies often accorded favours and privileges 
to European settlers and, to a lesser degree, Asian immigrants, 
many supported TANU also as an expression of anti-European and 
anti-Asian sentiments generally. Thus there were some who 
thought that the coming of self-government would see the 
automatic departure of all Europeans and Asians from the 
territory, leaving all the privileges enjoyed by them and all the 
good land held by them to revert to the Africans (Taylor: 142) . 
Certainly, anti-European feelings inhibited many people's 
contemplation of responsible government and many simply looked 
forward to the replacement of the "whiteman" with TANU stalwarts 
and enthusiasts in the entire government structure.
There were yet others who saw in responsible government an 
opportunity to avenge their humiliation by removing all 
Government officers and agents, and TANU taking over all 
functions of the state and they, as TANU members and supporters, 
assuming all the powers of Government officers. Some imagined 
themselves elevated above the law; this was manifested by acts 
of disrespect for law and order, and contempt for established 
authority (Taylor: 149-50,• Listowei:355) , including illegal attempts to 
usurp public functions and even to purport to constitute "TANU 
courts" and try cases! (Taylor: 148-9; Kirk-Greene: 145-6)
Such acts were certainly not on the nationalist agenda. But in
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the early stages the TANU leadership could do little more than 
condemn such acts and strongly appeal against their occurrence; 
the TANU enthusiasts responsible for the acts could not be 
completely "disowned" by the leadership because their support 
was, at least in numerical terms, still needed. But after 
victory was assured, Nyerere started giving strong warnings to 
his own supporters who were disrespectful of the law and 
established authority, and those who thought that TANU and the 
coming of responsible government would condone lawlessness
(Taylor:176-7,192; Listowel:376-7, 380-1; Maguire 249-57). He Was thus
telling them that their view of responsible government was 
certainly different from his.
Other views at variance with Nyerere's became increasingly 
manifest with independence drawing closer. Some imagined the 
coming of independence as the fall of a hunted bull buffalo and 
themselves as the hunters with drawn knives ready to move forward 
and cut away their pieces of the meat (p'Bitek: 188-9) ; they talked 
of the "fruits of independence". Yet others imagined their share 
to be part of the relative wealth of the immigrant minority races 
who had been enjoying far better living standards. Thus they 
gave their desire for self-improvement through responsible 
government and independence a racial dimension.
Those elements must have given backing to the extremist TANU back 
benchers elected in the 1960 elections who demanded a rapid 
"Africanisation" of the civil service, an immediate integration 
of the school system (with a view to sending their children at
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once to the better equipped European and Asian schools), liberal 
expenditure of government funds, and Tanganyika's withdrawal from 
the East Africa High Commission (with a view to an immediate 
"Africanisation" of the Tanganyika share of the Commission's 
services) , and so on (Taylor:i94-5, 198-9, 214-5 ) . In their demands 
they exploited crude emotions of African racialism and this 
became very obvious when discussing the Citizenship Bill in 
October 1961; they strongly pressed an argument that citizenship 
should primarily depend on race. Nyerere reacted very strongly 
against this argument; he threatened to resign.8
2.2.3: The View of the Nationalist Leadership
Julius Nyerere, the TANU leader, had a very clear vision of the 
responsible government he sought to achieve and he articulated 
his demands with passionate eloquence. To him, the nationalist 
movement was "a struggle for human rights," as much opposed "to 
one country ordering the affairs of another country against the 
wishes of the people of that other country [as] to the idea of 
a small minority in any country appointing itself the masters of 
an unwilling majority" (Nyerere 1966:76) . His principle was that:
Government belongs to all the people as a natural and inalienable 
possession, it is not the private property of a minority, however elite or 
wealthy or educated and whether uniracial. Government is properly 
constituted....not to secure the....advantages of the few, but to promote 
the rights and welfare of many. Therefore the many must inevitably be 
genuinely consulted, and the just powers of government derived from them. 
(Nyerere 1958:87) [emphasis added]
In modern conditions such a government must be democratically
8Parliamentary Debates, October 18, 1961: cols.333-6; also see Listowel: 
xvii-xix, 403-4, Leys 1972: 191-2, and Pratt 1976: 64-5, 112-3.
45
elected. According to the British parliamentary system, which 
apparently both Nyerere and the British colonial authorities had 
in mind for Tanganyika, the government must also be responsible 
to a legislature which is representative of the people. Thus, 
when the arrangements for responsible government were announced 
in the Legislative Council in 1959, Nyerere remarked:
....unlike the present Government which....is responsible to the Governor 
and through the Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
...the new Government would be responsible to this Council and through 
this Council9 it will be responsible to the people of Tanganyika. . . . [It] 
will truly be a responsible Government, a Government responsible to the 
people of this country.
(Nyerere 1966:75-6)
And he was committed to the achievement of such government. By 
his own admission, his impatience was more for responsible 
government than for complete independence and after achieving 
responsible government he felt confident enough to say that the 
people of Tanganyika were "free already" because they now had the 
power to decide what was going to happen and when it was going 
to happen (Pratt 1976:84,85); independence would simply perfect 
what, substantially, had already been achieved.
In the endeavour to achieve responsible government, Nyerere 
always insisted upon certain basic principles which illustrated 
his vision of a responsible democratic government. From the very 
beginning, soon after the founding of TANU in 1954, Nyerere 
repeatedly demanded an official statement declaring that 
Tanganyika, despite its multi-racial population, was primarily 
an African country and was to be developed as such (Taylor:96-7, 
129, 146). When that statement was finally given in October 1958
9Refers to the Legislative Council.
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by the Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull, it removed the African 
fears of continued European domination, fears which Nyerere 
shared with his colleagues in TANU (iiiffe:479-8i) and with other 
nationalists in neighbouring countries. They feared that the 
minority European and Asian inhabitants, being far more educated 
and wealthier than the Africans, could easily dominate political 
life to the exclusion of the majority Africans, a development 
which had already taken effect in Southern Rhodesia with the 
grant of self-government to the settler minority in 1923.
Indeed, many serious minded African nationalists were even ready 
to delay steps towards self-government and independence if such 
steps fell short of guaranteeing the absence of political 
domination by European settlers or other immigrants. In 1950, 
Malawi's Dr Kamuzu Banda warned against imminent self-government 
in Central Africa because it would simply deliver "the Africans 
into hands of white minorities inspired by the same Herrenvolk 
ideas as the South African Nationalists" (Davidson 1992 :i67) . And 
in 1954, Nyerere and other nationalists deliberately wanted to 
avoid introducing a majority of unofficial members into the 
Legislative Council at that early stage because such a majority 
would have given non-African members a dominant position (Pratt
1976:84; Iliffe:480) .
Fear of domination by the European settlers based in Southern 
Rhodesia made the Africans of Malawi strongly oppose the Central 
African Federation (Banda,- chiume) , while fears of a similar 
domination by Kenya-based settlers was behind the Tanganyika
African opposition to the East African High Commission (Twining: 
17-8 ; Taylor: 107-10) . Other reflections of that fear were the 
opposition to the policy of "multi-racialism" in the form of 
racial parity mentioned earlier, and the strong opposition to a 
limited franchise because the high qualifications set, based on 
wealth and education, were easily met by practically all 
Europeans and Asians, but they disenfranchised almost all 
Africans (Pratt 1976:37) .
Another reflection of that same fear is the fact that non- 
Africans were not admitted into TANU membership until well after 
independence. Apparently, this contradicted Nyerere's belief in 
equality as an essential corollary of democracy. But he had to
maintain an appearance which assured his members and followers
that TANU was indeed their own organisation, and not just another 
institution which the Europeans could use to continue dominating 
them. Any such domination, or appearance of domination, would 
fail to constitute the truly responsible government that Nyerere 
and TANU were so keen to achieve.
Nyerere has always opposed racial discrimination, both in
principle and in practice. Such discrimination would fail to 
constitute the ideal government belonging "to all the people" 
which he had in mind as it would exclude some people from 
participating in it. Thus he had always insisted that race is 
irrelevant in considering a person's political rights (Nyerere 
1966:64,76,79, 126-9) . Yet, in appreciation of the racial prejudices 
and suspicions prevailing in his country at the time of
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independence, he accepted an arrangement with reserved seats for 
European (10) and Asian (11) members in the 71 member 
legislature. This was to assure the minority races that there 
was no intention to exclude them, on the basis of race, from 
participating in the government of the country (Nyerere 1976:78-9, 
i o o -i ) . But this, arrangement was, like the exclusion of non- 
Africans from TANU membership, only temporary.
Finally, an important aspect of responsible government which 
Nyerere saw ahead of most of his nationalist colleagues, was the 
economic factor. He knew that the Africans were expecting 
independence to improve their incomes and welfare services. He 
knew that if no effort was made to try and meet those 
expectations, there would be serious discontent which, 
inevitably, would be expressed in terms of racial hostility to 
the better off non-African minorities (Tayior:202) . Thus his view 
of responsible government was that the government should 
effectively work to improve living standards. In an article 
published only two days to independence, he wrote:
....we have also a responsibility to improve the well-being of the people 
of Tanganyika... Our people must have healthy bodies and healthy minds. 
They must have sufficient control over the forces of Nature to avoid the 
constant recurrence of disastrous famines. All these things are now our 
responsibility. It means that the Government of Tanganyika must lead the 
people in an all-out fight against poverty, ignorance, and disease. It 
must lead them forward to economic development, to an expansion of 
production, and to a fair distribution of the fruits of production, so 
that every individual really stands a chance to develop himself. (Nyerere 
i96ic:34o) [emphasis added]
That, in Nyerere's view, was a very important aspect of 
responsible government, and he returned to that theme now and 
again after independence. A government not capable of "lifting"
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the people out of their poverty, ignorance and disease, and 
leading them "forward to economic development" could not, 
according to him, claim to be responsible. The problem he faced 
at independence was that his government did not have enough 
resources for the discharge of this particular responsibility.
Nyerere was also worried about inefficiency in the government 
machinery resulting from the likely mass departure of British 
civil servants after independence; there were hardly any 
competent and qualified Africans to replace them (Pratt 1976:91-4 ) . 
An inefficient government cannot provide any of the expected 
benefits of a responsible government. For those reasons Nyerere 
was even inclined to delay full independence so that with British 
support and assistance, he could improve economic development and 
train a minimum proportion of local civil servants during an 
extended period of responsible government (Pratt*1976:83-5 ) .
But not all his supporters and colleagues in TANU agreed with 
him. They were so committed to the general demand for 
"independence now" that when in 1960 Nyerere offered to delay 
Tanganyika's independence so as to achieve it simultaneously with 
Kenya's and Uganda's, with a view to federation, he was "sharply 
criticised" in TANU's National Executive Committee (Leys 1972:191; 
Taylor:214) . And there were many more in TANU who demanded
immediate "Africanisation" of the civil service and liberal 
government expenditures so as to enjoy the "fruits of 
independence" (Taylor: 194-5, 198,215); they would not agree with 
Nyerere and his inclination to delay independence. In the event
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Nyerere acted according to their wishes and welcomed immediate 
independence. But their demands indicated some of the 
differences in attitude and outlook which he had to contend with 
at independence, as well as after.
2.3: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
The framework of government after independence was established 
by the Constitution of Tanganyika, 1961 (also referred to as the 
Independence Constitution), which came into force on December 9, 
1961, with Britain's cessation of responsibility to govern 
Tanganyika.10 But this constitution did not present an abrupt 
change in the structure of government; much of it had been 
introduced with responsible government in 196 0, and independence 
merely completed the process (colonial office:i-7; Dale:68) .
Section 14 of the Constitution established a Parliament 
consisting of "Her Majesty and the National Assembly." Like 
other British colonies on achieving independence, Tanganyika in 
effect became a monarchy (Dale:69) headed by Her Majesty, to be 
represented by the Governor-General whose office was established 
by s.11. The Governor-General, who was also Commander-in-Chief, 
was appointed by Her Majesty and held office during Her Majesty's 
pleasure. Section 29 gave legislative power to Parliament, to 
be exercised, as per s.36(1), by "bills passed by the National 
Assembly and assented to by the Governor-General on behalf of Her
10Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council,1961, s.1(2) and Tanganyika 
Independence Act, 1961, s.l.
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Majesty." Parliament could also amend the Constitution and, in 
so far as if formed part of the law of Tanganyika, the Tanganyika 
Independence Act, 1961 of the United Kingdom, but the bill for 
the amendment had to be supported by a two-thirds majority of the 
National Assembly on the second and third readings [s.30(l)]-11
On the composition of the National Assembly, the Constitution 
merely re-stated the then existing composition of 71 elected and 
10 nominated members and left it to Parliament to change, for 
future elections, the number of elected members and the manner 
of electing them [ss.16 and 17] . There was no mention of 
reserved seats for minority races, and franchise was extended to 
include all citizens aged 21 years or more.
Executive authority was vested in Her Majesty, to be exercised 
in that behalf by the Governor-General. But, typical of all 
Westminster models (de smith i96i) , the Governor-General' s 
authority was no more than formal. Actual authority was in the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet which he headed. Section 46(1) 
of the Constitution was a general requirement for the Governor- 
General to act according to the advice of the Cabinet or the 
Prime Minister in practically all cases. Even the exceptions 
listed in that section did not give the Governor-General much 
discretion. They included the power to appoint the Prime 
Minister who, in any case, had to be a person "likely to command 
the support of the majority of the members of the National
^Throughout in this section, references in square brackets refer to 
provisions of the Independence Constitution.
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Assembly"[s.42(3)] . The other exception involved the power to 
dissolve Parliament, or to replace the Prime Minister without 
dissolving Parliament, if the incumbent did not resign within 
three days after a National Assembly resolution of no confidence 
in the Government [s.40(3)].
In addition to the general requirement, numerous provisions 
required the Governor-General to act "in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister," in practically everything. In 
short, the Governor-General was not expected to do anything on 
his own, and he was certainly not to be responsible for whatever 
he did: the question whether he actually received advice or acted 
according to it was "not to be enquired into in any
court"[s.46(2)]. But the Prime Minister was duty bound to keep 
the Governor-General fully informed of the conduct of the
government [s.47], and to give him advice according to which he, 
the Governor-General, was required to act. The advice of the 
Prime Minister was given under the authority of the Cabinet whose 
duty and function was "to advise the Governor-General in the
government of Tanganyika"[s.43(2) ] . The clear purpose was to
approximate the role of the Governor-General, as closely as 
possible, to that of Her Majesty in the United Kingdom.
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet were "collectively responsible 
to Parliament for any advice given to the Governor-General," and 
"for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister 
in the execution of his office" [43 (2)] . That provision 
encapsulated the core element of government responsibility under
53'
the Westminster system. In effect, therefore, the Ministers were 
responsible not only for the advice given to the Governor- 
General, but also for whatever he did, and for whatever they did. 
This responsibility was not to him, the one who appointed them, 
but to Parliament. The overall effect was that the Cabinet 
Ministers were both collectively and individually responsible to 
Parliament for the entire business and conduct of the government.
The Parliament represented the interests and the general will of 
the people, and its supremacy was reflected by its overall 
authority over the Cabinet; the National Assembly could remove 
the entire Cabinet from office by passing a resolution of no 
confidence in the Government [s.40 (3)] . In the event of such a 
resolution the Prime Minister was required to resign or to advise 
the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament; if he did not resign 
within three days, the Governor-General was bound to dissolve 
Parliament or to remove the Prime Minister without dissolving 
Parliament if the resolution was passed within 14 days after a 
general election and the Governor-General considered it possible 
to simply replace the Prime Minister without dissolving 
Parliament. In either case the other Ministers were to vacate 
their offices because removal of the Prime Minister from office, 
or a change in the holder thereof, led to automatic loss of 
office by the other Ministers [s.42 (6) (b) and (c) ] . These 
provisions emphasised the doctrine of collective ministerial 
responsibility stated expressly in s.43(2).
The Constitution also re-established the High Court, as "a
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superior court of record" with "all the powers of such a court," 
which thus included the power of judicial review.12 The High 
Court was headed by the Chief Justice who was appointed by the 
Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Prime Minister. Other judges of the High Court were appointed 
by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of 
the Judicial Service Commission (not the Prime Minister). Once 
appointed, the judges enjoyed security of tenure: they could not 
be removed except for inability to perform the functions of their 
office or for misbehaviour and this could only be done following 
an elaborate procedure of investigation, by a competent judicial 
tribunal, into the conduct of the judge sought to be so removed.
For other judicial officers (the Registrar and Deputy Registrar 
of the High Court, Resident Magistrates and other magistrates), 
the powers of appointment, disciplinary control and removal from 
office were vested in the Judicial Service Commission [s.65], 
established under s. 64 of the Constitution. Thus, judicial 
officers were not placed under the direct control of the 
Government. This was, like the entrenched security of tenure for 
judges, intended to make the judiciary independent of the 
executive so as to ensure impartiality.
Two other important public officers should be mentioned here: the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and the Controller and Auditor 
General. Their tenure of office was secured by the Constitution
12By virtue of the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance 1961, which 
was passed on independence eve.
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[ss.79 and 80] in terms similar to those for the tenure of High 
Court judges. Further, in the performance of their functions, 
they were to be guided by the Constitution and other laws, and 
were expressly not subject to the direction or control of any 
other authority or person [ss.53(6) and 73(6)]; they were thus 
free from executive control. Their salaries and allowances, like 
those of the Governor-General and judges of the High Court, were 
charged on the Consolidated fund.
In addition to the Judicial Service Commission, the Constitution 
also established the Public Service Commission and the Police 
Service Commission. The former was empowered to appoint, control 
and remove from office all officers in the public service (other 
than judicial and police officers), and the latter was given 
similar powers in respect of police officers. The purpose of 
this arrangement was to keep the police officers and civil 
servants free of political pressure and avoid subjecting them to 
the whims of the executive.
One early remark about the Independence Constitution was that 
its preamble, with its emphasis on equality, freedom and justice, 
was so reflective of Nyerere's general attitude to political 
questions that he may well have written it himself (Bates,m .L:448) . 
This, we think, was mere speculation; the Constitution of 
Tanganyika, 1961, was just another of those "Whitehall 
Constitutions" made, almost as a routine exercise, for every 
British colony becoming independent. Like other such
constitutions, it sought to set up a parliamentary system of
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government similar to that obtaining in Britain (de smith i96i) ; 
its provisions were intended to reproduce, by express enactments, 
the unwritten conventions operating in the United Kingdom.
Significantly, though, the strongly appealing words of the 
preamble were not strictly part of the Constitution because of 
the rule that preambles do not form part of the laws they 
introduce.13 Thus the cherished principles of equality, freedom 
and justice, not being in the body of the Constitution, could not 
be enforced on the basis of the declarations in the preamble. 
In that regard, the Constitution of Tanganyika, 1961, was a 
conspicuous exception among the "Whitehall Constitutions" of its 
period; all others incorporated those principles in elaborate 
detail in entrenched provisions known as "Bill of Rights".
There has been no official explanation for this exception but 
considering Nyerere's opposition to a Bill of Rights in 
subsequent developments, most likely the omission at independence 
was also a result of his deliberate wish. Prior to the 
Constitutional Conference (whereat the constitutional framework 
to be adopted at independence was agreed upon), Nyerere had 
several informal meetings with Ian Macleod, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, and it was at these meetings that most 
issues were actually resolved and settled (Listowel:383) . 
Significantly, the issue of a Bill of Rights did not even feature 
as an item for discussion in the Constitutional Conference.
13Hatimali Adamji v. E A Posts & Telecomms Corporation, 1973 L.R.T.,n.6.
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No doubt that Nyerere knew exactly what he wanted, and how best 
to negotiate for it. Constitutional Law and British History were 
among his subjects at Edinburgh University (Hatch:27) . He knew 
the British system. The British had confidence in him. He was 
certainly in a position to convince Macleod in their pre­
conference informal meetings that the absence of a Bill of Rights 
would be as harmless for Tanganyika as it was for Britain. And 
accordingly Tanganyika was given a Constitution which, like 
Britain, had no Bill of Rights. This arrangement was in perfect 
agreement with Nyerere's view of a good government for Africa 
which was that "once freely elected," the government "must also 
be free to govern...without fear of sabotage," and have ability 
to "deal firmly and promptly with trouble makers" (Nyerere i96ia: 
8,9)14 and further that the executive must be enabled "to 
function without being checked at every turn."15 The absence of 
a Bill of Rights gave him that kind of government.
Regarding the judiciary, the Independence Constitution did not 
alter the dual court system; in fact s.65 (3) of the Constitution 
gave it legitimacy by excluding local courts officers from the 
jurisdiction of the Judicial Service Commission. As such, the 
ideal emphasised by Nyerere in October 1961, that the judiciary 
"at every level must be independent of the executive arm of the 
State" (Nyerere 1966:131) remained a far cry.
14Significantly, Nyerere still had this view in the 1990s, defending the 
need to empower the government fully so that it could safeguard certain basic 
principles, like national unity, if these were to be threatened by the coming of 
multi-party politics.
lsThe Observer, June 3, 1962.
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2.4: INDEPENDENCE: A PACT OF CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISES
The Constitution of Tanganyika, 1961, in both its promulgation 
and its content, constituted an aggregate of concessions and 
compromises by the various parties involved in the process of 
Tanganyika's decolonisation. The colonial authorities, the 
nationalist leaders, their followers and supporters, each had 
their own respective principles, beliefs, desires and aspirations 
regarding independence. Ultimately, in attaining independence 
at the time and in the manner it was, each had to make 
concessions and compromises. Herebelow we highlight some of 
those compromises by the colonial authorities and by the 
nationalist leader, Julius Nyerere.
2.4.1: The Colonial Compromises
As already pointed out (supra, section 2.2.1), the colonial 
authorities would have preferred a deliberately delayed process 
towards responsible government and independence. The British 
ambition in Africa generally was to increase British investment 
and allow some time to build up a sound and healthy economy while 
at the same time training and educating as many Africans as time 
and resources would allow, so as to build up a well informed 
public which is necessary for democratic institutions to work 
effectively (Huxley:i24; Blundell: H5-6) . The idea was that state 
institutions like Parliament, even if constituted through some 
democratic process, were not enough to ensure a living democracy 
if the general population was uneducated and ignorant of their
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operational dynamics.
In the end, however, those British ambitions were never realised 
and the beliefs and principles behind them were compromised: 
independence was granted without them. In fact the British 
compromised even the need to build up structures and institutions 
necessary for effective democracy. They just "stumbled out of 
Africa" without a sufficiently "planned and prepared transfer of 
power", thus handing over the colonial legacy almost intact 
(Davidson 1987:7-8) . Lord Twining, Governor of Tanganyika from 1949 
to 1958, mooted the idea that the Westminster model of 
constitution could be unsuitable for the conditions of Africa 
(Twining:23) ; but it was not followed up. Instead, another 
"Whitehall" constitution was adopted for Tanganyika even before 
the institutional structures necessary for its effective 
operation had been sufficiently developed.
In the British system of parliamentary democracy which was being 
established in Tanganyika, political parties were an essential 
institution for the system's effective operation. But the 
Constitution of Tanganyika 1961 did not reflect that fact; it 
merely assumed the existence in Parliament of a government party 
and an opposition party, an assumption absurdly removed from 
reality (Nyerere 1961c:339; Mwakyembe 1986:16-7). With that
constitution, the British could indeed hope to deliver to the 
successor state a Parliament, a Government and a Judiciary; but 
unfortunately, they could not deliver political parties able to 
compete effectively in elections as envisaged by the
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Constitution. As a result, the independence government was a 
one-party government.
Institutions like the legislature were indeed set up but had not 
fully taken root in the political society; only in 1958 were the 
first ever elections held, followed by the pre-independence 
elections in August 1960. There had been virtually no experience 
with the system of parliamentary democracy, and the government 
knew next to nothing about organised opposition in Parliament; 
the National Assembly consisted of only one party, TANU. Even 
the principles of "separation of powers" and "independence of the 
judiciary" were compromised. The colonial legal system, with its 
local courts still presided over or controlled by government 
administrators, was left intact. Further afield, even the 
decentralisation scheme, regarded as a restraint upon central 
government power, was abandoned: apart from 11 town councils, the 
Local Government Ordinance was, at independence, in application 
in only 6 out of the country's 52 districts.16
Obviously, if the British ambitions had to be achieved and those 
institutions be built up first before handing over power, 
independence would have been delayed. But by 1960 the British 
did not want to delay independence. And for fear of delaying 
independence, they compromised almost everything: the need to
build up a sound and healthy economy, the need to train and 
educate the African population, and the need to build up 
institutions of democracy which would be effective in fact, and
16The districts were Kilwa, Lindi, Mafia, Masasi, Mtwara and Newala.
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not just in theory.
The philosophy behind this new strategy of compromise was, 
according to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Mr Ian Macleod, 
that although it may have been dangerous to give "independence 
too soon", it would have been "much more dangerous to give it too 
late" (Listowel:390) . In 1959 the waves of African nationalism had 
led to chaos and violence, with loss of lives, in neighbouring 
Congo (now Zaire) and Nyasaland (now Malawi), while Kenya had 
been under a state of emergency since 1952. In Tanganyika, by 
contrast, Nyerere and TANU had managed so far to demonstrate an 
impressive commitment to constitutional (and, in any case, non­
violent) means in pressing forward with their demands. There was 
fear that further delays in meeting the nationalist demands might 
exhaust the patience Tanganyikans too and the country might erupt 
into chaos.
On the other hand, cooperation with the nationalist leadership 
seemed to offer a better promise of further cooperation after 
independence.17 It was hoped that after taking over political 
power, the nationalists would continue to be in alliance with 
British officers in the civil service who would continue to be 
relied upon, thus ensuring continued dependency upon Britain 
(Pratt 1976:90-8; 1982:279-80) . This hope was largely based on the 
confidence that the British had in Julius Nyerere, who was 
described variously as "the ablest African politician of our 
day", the "most poised, confident, extrovert and radiant of all
17See Pratt 1976: chapter 3, particularly at pp.57-9.
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the African leaders", and "no ordinary man" but "a leader to whom 
not only the people of Tanganyika but many others in all parts 
of the world can look to with confidence.. .", and "a man of high 
principles and strong convictions, ...an outstanding political 
leader...", and so on.18
This trust and confidence was so immense that the last governor 
of Tanganyika, Sir Richard Turnbull, was to recall in 1978 that 
in forming the first government they "were prepared to give way 
on certain lines" but:
...one point upon which we had to be insistent was that Julius Nyerere 
should be at the head of the administration. The administration must be 
directly under him, ...down to the most newly recruited district officer.
(Kirk-Greene:159)
It would seem that independence was granted, not to Tanganyika 
as such, but to Julius Nyerere on account of the trust and 
confidence the British had in him, rather than in the people 
generally or in any of the institutions set up before or at the 
time of independence.
2.4.2: Nyerere's Compromises
Nyerere, on the other hand, compromised some of his own beliefs 
too. He saw the need to delay full independence so as to improve 
the economy and local staffing in the civil service during an 
extended period of responsible government; but he never tried 
seriously to pursue that line because it could lead to a rift
18See the various remarks in Listowel:284-5; Perham:53; Colonial Office:ll; 
Bates,D .:293; Taylor:220-1; Pratt 1976:58-9, etc.
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between him and some of his colleagues and followers. Possibly 
for the same reasons he made compromises by giving in, albeit 
cautiously, to those elements in TANU whose demands for an 
immediate "Africanisation" of the civil service (Pratt 1976:105-7)-, 
instead of "localisation" as Nyerere himself thought was the 
correct principle,19 liberal government expenditures and 
enjoyment of the "fruits of independence" had racialist tones; 
he even bowed to their pressures to expel some Europeans for 
alleged racial discrimination, and failed to stop the racialist 
tones in some lead articles of the TANU newspaper, Uhuru.20
But Nyerere's most glaring compromise was in respect of his 
beliefs on democracy and how best it could operate in Africa. 
He argued that it was erroneous to equate democracy with the 
forms or institutions of democracy known in the United Kingdom 
and other western countries, and that those forms were not 
necessarily the best for Africa.21 But he did not attempt to 
have his views adopted, even minimally, in the framework adopted 
for Tanganyika. More surprising is that Nyerere did not only 
accept the Whitehall designed parliamentary system of government 
but also he cooperated with the British with remarkable 
commitment in installing that system in Tanganyika. On assuming 
office as Chief Minister, he wrote a circular outlining the 
respective functions of, and relationships between, the central
19See his view of "Africanisation" in Nyerere 1966:99-102.
20East Africa and Rhodesia, January 25, 1962; also see Taylor:194-5, 198, 
200-1, 215, 226-7, Leys 1972:187 and Pratt 1976:113-5.
21See Nyerere's 1961 publications (1961d excepted) listed in the 
bibliography, and Nyerere 1966:103-6, 133-4, and 195-203.
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government, the civil service, the politicians, and the party
(Nyerere i96id) . The circular was intended to make his colleagues
understand and accept the traditional conventions of the
parliamentary system for its effective operation in Tanganyika
(Pratt 1976:97) .
Many explanations have been given for constitutional changes 
subsequent to independence, but none explains Nyerere"s happy 
acceptance of, and apparent commitment to, the British
parliamentary system in 1961. Nyerere"s own belief about 
political institutions has been that "we must grope our way 
forward" (Nyerere 1966:121-2; 1968:37) . Possibly, the British offered 
the parliamentary system because it was the only system they 
knew, and Nyerere accepted it as "a platform from which to grope 
forward" and not necessarily because he believed in it as the 
best system (de Winton:186-8) .
But perhaps Nyerere"s acceptance of the Independence Constitution 
was logical at that time because of the need, as he saw it, for 
continued cooperation with Britain. He looked forward to British 
assistance in the implementation of the Three Year Development 
Plan (1961-64) and in the continued use of British officers in 
the civil service (colonial Of f ice: 12-3,16; Listowel: 391-8; Pratt 1976: 96- 
103) . Thus the British parliamentary system was adopted so as to 
inspire the confidence of the British authorities and the British 
people which must have been necessary in order to get the much 
needed British assistance.
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That could also explain even the acceptance of the transformation 
from a "Trust Territory" to a "British Dominion" with the Queen 
of England as the Head of State, a position which today's 
attitudes would find absurd and unacceptable. At the 
Constitutional Conference in March 1961, Nyerere had actually 
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Tanganyika 
become a republic immediately on independence. But Mr Macleod 
could not agree without referring the matter to the Cabinet. So 
as not to delay progress, Nyerere dropped the idea (Listowel:386) .
In his compromises, Nyerere was nevertheless not prepared to 
abandon certain basic principles. On racialism, for example, he 
was uncompromising. Shortly before the Dar es Salaam 
Constitutional Conference, he risked the much needed British 
cooperation and even Tanganyika's independence by demanding the 
exclusion of apartheid South Africa from the Commonwealth as a 
condition for Tanganyika's (anticipated) membership of that body 
(Listowel:40i-2; Nyerere 1966:108-13) . And in the heated debate on the 
Citizenship Bill in October 1961, he did not restrain his anger 
and impatience with the TANU back benchers who put up a racist 
opposition to the government proposals, and they were finally 
endorsed.
Perhaps we should mention that those extremist elements in the 
nationalist ranks compromised some of their beliefs too; their 
defeat on citizenship was only part of the things they had to 
concede. Although Nyerere gave in to some of their demands, he 
never gave lAJ^ y to the full extent they demanded on
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"Africanisation", or on radical integration of schools, and he 
did not give in at all to their demand for a disintegration of 
the East African High Commission. Much as they may have felt 
very strongly about their demands and beliefs, they accepted 
defeat without opting out of TANU and forming an opposition.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Government Under Nationalist Leadership 
3.0: INTRODUCTION
Barely six weeks after independence, on 22 January 1962, Nyerere 
resigned as prime minister; the reason given was that he wanted 
to devote himself fully to reorganise and revitalise TANU in the 
new circumstances of independence. He was replaced as Prime 
Minister by Rashidi Kawawa. The resignation was announced at the 
end of a meeting of TANU's National Executive Committee 
(hereinafter referred to as NEC) . At the same meeting it was 
announced that TANU had recommended that Tanganyika become a 
Republic, and that the Government had accepted the 
recommendation.
The following month a motion was passed by the National Assembly 
inviting the Government to draft necessary amendments to the 
Constitution to enable Tanganyika become "a Republic within the 
Commonwealth." Subsequently, a Government Paper on "Proposals 
for a Republic" was published, and then discussed and endorsed 
by the National Assembly in June 1962. In September the 
Constituent Assembly Act 1962 was passed to enable the National 
Assembly to turn itself into a Constituent Assembly, capable of 
enacting a "Republican Constitution" and other laws related to 
it without the otherwise necessary Royal Assent.
In November 1962, the National Assembly constituted itself a
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Constituent Assembly and passed the Constitution of Tanganyika 
1962 (also referred to as the Republican Constitution) , along 
with 13 other related bills. They all became effective on 9 
December 1962, making Tanganyika a Republic. Julius Nyerere was 
sworn in as the first Executive President, thus ending his period 
of absence from Government. He had been elected President in 
November, by universal adult suffrage, under the President 
Designate (Election) Act 1962, a transitional law repealed at the 
commencement of the Republic.10
In January 1963, the NEC resolved that Tanganyika should become 
a one-party state, and the Annual Conference, TANU's highest 
organ, endorsed this resolution. A year later the President set 
up a Commission11 to recommend the form and institutions that 
the one-party state should adopt; it submitted its report in 
1965. On the basis of its recommendations, a new constitution 
was drafted and adopted in July 1965 as the Interim Constitution 
of Tanzania 1965, formally making the country a one-party state.
The change to Republican status and the formal adoption of the 
one-party state constitution were closely related and we look at 
them together in this chapter, as we seek to analyse the changes 
from independence through to the adoption of the one-party 
system, particularly focusing on how they affected or related to 
the powers of the executive.
10Republic of Tanganyika (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1962, s.34 and 1st Schedule, Part II.
llGovernment Gazette, February 7, 1964: General Notice No.300.
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3.1: TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGES OF INDEPENDENCE
Two important events occurred in close succession in 1964, which 
must be mentioned here: the army mutiny in January, and the Union 
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April.
The army mutiny began in the early hours of 20 January 1964. The 
demand was for higher pay and for "Africanisation" of the army 
ranks. It was the latter, especially, which prompted the mutiny; 
Nyerere had just announced, on 8 January 1964, that the 
government was abandoning the policy of "Africanisation" it had 
since January 1962. Besides that the mutiny had no political 
agenda. But it revealed the extreme weakness and vulnerability 
of the state and its institutions: it was after five days that 
the mutiny was put down, by 60 British marines who came in at 
Nyerere's request. He has referred to this incident as the most 
humiliating experience in his career.12 Following the mutiny he 
disbanded the army and went on to recruit and build a new one on 
the basis of loyalty to TANU (Martin,R:22; Lee:149; Bienen 1965:44-5) . 
He was later to say, rather proudly, that while many other 
institutions were inherited, the army "we built ourselves."13
The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was swiftly executed. 
Zanzibar was granted formal independence from Britain on 10 
December 1963. But, contrary to popular opinion and wishes as 
expressed in pre-independence elections, the independence pact
12Interview with Africa Now, December 1983.
13Smith:121, and the whole of chapter 8 for an account of the mutiny.
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granted power to an Arab sultanate which had dominated the 
African majority for well over a century. On 12 January 1964 the 
Arab sultanate was overthrown in a bloody African uprising. A 
Revolutionary Government headed by Abeid Amaan Karume of the 
Afro-Shirazi Party took over. There are no details of any 
negotiations leading to the union but Karume is said to have 
declared to Nyerere in March 1964 that Zanzibar was ready to 
unite, apparently in an East African Federation (smith: 127) . The 
Federation never materialised but on 22 April 1964, Nyerere and 
Karume signed the "Articles of Union" to form the United Republic 
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later renamed "Tanzania". Nyerere 
became President of the new United Republic of Tanzania with 
Karume becoming First Vice-President. But under the structure 
of the union Zanzibar retained much of its autonomy, with Karume 
continuing as Zanzibar's President, except for a few key 
departments, like Defence and External Affairs, designated as 
"Union Matters".14
Those two events of early 1964, the army mutiny and the union, 
led to some rather peculiarly Tanzanian features in African 
political and constitutional history. The structure of the union 
has often been questioned and sometimes led to controversies but
i»<kpt»*tent Juctassfvitj
it makes Tanzania the only case of two^ countries^uniting in 
Africa. And after the mutiny, Tanzania built up the most 
politicised army in Africa, probably the only such politicised 
army under a purely civilian African government.
14For the legal framework of the union, see Shivji 1990a.
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Those events and the way they were handled presented significant 
challenges to the new state and its leadership. They were part 
of the many challenges that the political leadership had to face 
and resolve in the unfolding process of political developments 
analysed in this chapter.
3.1.1: The Alienating Effect of Independence
Independence was the single objective around which revolved the 
unity of almost the entire population of Tanganyika in support 
of TANU. For the sake of achieving independence as early as 
possible even the nationalist leadership deliberately avoided 
considering other policy issues for fear of uncovering 
disagreements amongst them and lessening their unity (stahi:9). 
But the rapid achievement of independence, itself largely 
facilitated by that unity, removed that unifying factor and TANU 
faced a likely disintegration and even possible demise due to 
loss of purpose (Bennett:29; Leys 1972:190,192). There was need "to 
define for the nation as a whole a new set of general aims to 
replace Uhuru itself" and to provide a "fresh definition of 
TANU's role" in achieving the new aims (Leys 1972:193) .
Nyerere had a very clear vision of the new objective which TANU 
and its government had to pursue with the utmost commitment and 
devotion: the need for economic development and for the TANU
Government to "lead the people in an all-out fight" for the same 
(Nyerere i96ic:34o) . For this goal, he insisted, there was need for 
a "maximum united effort by the whole country" just as much as
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(if not more than) there had been for achieving independence 
(Nyerere i96ia:8) . But with independence, the unity he so desired 
was threatened because:
independence brought... also a nagging sense of uncertainty about the 
substance of freedom. It raised the possibility that the nationalist 
elite, who had taken control of the political process in order to provide 
superior rewards and opportunities to Africans, might lose the support of 
those in whose name they had acted. (Stephens : 155 )
With responsible self-government and then full independence, many
A-ncf
TANU leaders were absorbed into government/lost touch with their 
members and supporters; even party organisation suffered. To 
make it worse, "except for the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and 
an expanded legislature," the apparatus of both central and local 
government after independence remained much the same as it had 
been before (Stephens: 159; Pratt 1976:108-9) .
The TANU members and supporters, sometimes tauntingly reminded 
that independence had brought them nothing after all,6 were 
being driven into desperate frustration. Nyerere saw this 
problem each time he visited districts as Prime Minister:
I am met by the provincial commissioner and by the district commissioner 
both of whom are likely to be colonial officers, the very men who TANU 
fought but a few years ago. I am introduced by them to the other 
government officers who are also usually expatriates. I am then 
introduced to the chiefs and to the officials of the native authority and 
again I am meeting men who either opposed TANU or who carefully stayed out 
of the political struggle. Then off to one side I notice a few chaps in 
torn green shirts7 wielding banners but looking somewhat forlorn. 
(Pratt 1976:108)
Thus TANU, now in Government, was drifting away from its members 
and supporters, and a gap was growing between the two.
6Africa Report, February 1962; also see Pratt 1976: 118.
7Green shirts were the uniform for the TANU Youth League.
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Nyerere resigned so as to bridge this gap by creating a new role 
for TANU which would provide a link and an understanding between 
the state institutions and the people by acting
like a two way all-weather road along which the purposes, plans and 
problems of the Government can travel to the people, at the same time as 
the ideas, desires, and misunderstandings of the people can travel direct 
to the Government. (Nyerere 1966:158)
Following his resignation, Nyerere devoted time and effort in 
explaining the role and function of the independence government 
and TANU's role in it; on the one hand, he urged the TANU 
leadership at all levels to continue identifying themselves with 
the aspirations of the people.8 But he did not change the 
organisational structure of the party.
3.1.2: Growing Intra-Party Rift
Nyerere's resignation in January 1962 was also prompted by a 
growing rift between himself and some of the activists within 
TANU, including many in its middle level leadership, some of whom 
had won seats in the 1960 elections. With independence, 
differences within TANU became more pronounced and difficult to 
compromise. Indeed, at independence Julius Nyerere was the 
undisputed national leader but among his colleagues in TANU were 
some individuals with real political influence in their own right 
either through their leadership in the trade union or cooperative 
movements, or by their influence in populous tribal groups (pratt 
i97i:95) . Some of them started making demands which were not
8He published two pamphlets in the Swahili language: TANU na Raia, intended 
for the people, and Tujisahihishe, intended for the leadership.
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entirely compatible with Nyerere's ideals and principles.
Nyerere was keen to retain the nationalist unity that TANU had 
forged during the campaign for independence. So, when radicals 
within TANU insisted on an "Africanisation" of the civil service, 
he cautiously gave in, albeit to a limited extent, by according 
preferential treatment to Africans in appointments to the civil 
service, and he justified this concession with the argument of 
redressing past wrongs and giving the civil service a "local 
look" such as the legislature had. With that concession he hoped 
to avoid splitting TANU into factions while, in the meantime, 
waiting for the definition of Tanganyika citizenship to clarify 
the question of the rights of citizens, irrespective of their 
different races.9 The same radical elements came out strongly 
against Nyerere and his Government debating a Government Motion 
to abolish the previous system of separate schools for each 
racial group. The radicals criticised the Government for being 
too moderate and gradualist in implementing its policy, which 
they did not oppose, of integrating the school system. Nyerere's 
impatience in his response to them was unmistakable.10
But the rift between Nyerere and the TANU radicals was most 
glaringly manifested in the Citizenship Debate in October 1961. 
The Government proposals emphasised loyalty to the country by 
rejecting dual citizenship; but they sought to grant automatic
9Legislative Council Reports, October 19, 1960: cols.375-7; also see
Nyerere 1966:100-1.
10Legislative Council Reports, December 7, 1960: cols. 97-9 and 115.
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citizenship to any person born in Tanganyika provided that at 
least one parent of such person was also born in Tanganyika. 
This proposal reflected TANU'S belief in human equality
irrespective of race, but it provoked strong opposition from the 
TANU radicals simply because it would give automatic citizenship 
even to the non-African residents of Tanganyika. They attacked 
the proposals so vehemently that they generated considerable 
tension in the National Assembly.
The strongest peroration against the proposals was by John
Mwakangale, the Member for Mbeya, who charged that the European 
and Asian races in Tanganyika still regarded the Tanganyika 
Africans, whom they had been dominating "both economically and 
politically", as inferior human beings. For that reason, the 
majority African population would not agree to have equal rights 
with the non-Africans. He demanded that registration of non- 
Africans as citizens "should commence' 5 years after
independence / " after they had proved their loyalty to Tanganyika; 
that "foreigners" living in Tanganyika who had transferred their 
money out of Tanganyika should bring it back within the 5 year 
period; that those "foreigners" who were rich should contribute 
15% of their money reserves to a Tanganyika National Fund; and 
that all non-African members of the Cabinet should resign on 
independence day "because we cannot be governed by
foreigners !1,11
In a bitter intervention, Nyerere called Mwakangale and his group
11 Parliamentary Debates, October 18, 1961: cols.329-32.
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"potential Verwoerds... drunk with the atmosphere of the House" 
and talking rubbish, "like Hitlers," glorifying their race, "like 
Hitlers." He reminded that racial discrimination was what TANU 
had been fighting against, attacked the apologetic "special 
circumstances" argument often employed by racists, emphasised his 
Government's commitment to non-racialism, and then ended with the 
threat:
...the vote here is going to be a completely free vote. No...whip here.. . 
The views of those Hon. Members and those of the Government could not be 
further apart...and the moment the majority of the representatives of our 
people show that their views are different from ours, we resign at that 
point.12
Richard Wambura got up to reply at once, challenging the 
government to a referendum.13 But Nyerere's angry intervention 
and threat of resignation had the desired effect; the National 
Assembly endorsed the citizenship proposals.
That victory in the National Assembly, however, was not victory 
within TANU or in the country generally, where nationalist 
activists and their followers wanted tangible benefits to count 
on as gains from their involvement in TANU. They wanted some 
immediate manifestations of the independence they had achieved. 
In the run-up to independence some of these activists had 
promised their followers benefits of independence which the TANU 
government could in no way honour, thus leading to tension 
between the leaders in "the new cabinet... responsible for the 
limitations of the government, and those outside, including some
12Parliamentary Debates, October 18, 1961: cols.333-5; also see Nyerere
1966:126-9.
12Parliamentary Debates, October 18, 1961: cols.335-6.
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who had made the largest promises to their followers" (Leys
1972:189) .
That tension was explicit in the Citizenship Debate. The 
opposition to the Government proposals was actually an expression 
of the frustration which many TANU followers felt upon seeing 
that independence was giving them no immediate benefits. Their 
frustration was expressed by hostility to the racial minorities 
(Pratt 1976:113-5) who were relatively richer. They wanted a 
"wholesale dismissal of British expatriates" to facilitate an 
immediate "Africanisation" of the civil service, they demanded 
a republic, and complained about "TANU's tolerant attitude 
towards non-Africans" (Stephens: 169-1) . These demands and 
complaints were expressed at the January 1962 meeting of the NEC. 
Nyerere was faced with a dilemma; he decided to resolve it by 
resigning as prime minister.
3.1.3: Nyerere's Resignation: A Tactical Appeasement
Nyerere had made up his mind to resign before the NEC meeting
commenced; it was not a reaction to his critics in the
meeting.14 For three days, he insisted on his decision to
resign and for three days his senior colleagues resisted; in the
end "he just announced his resignation and we had to accept
avoiA
it."15 By resigning, Nyerere managed to/further serious strains
l*Africa Report, February 1962, and Nyerere 1966:157 (introductory note), 
contrast with Listowel:409, and Leys 1972:192-3.
15Interview with Mr Rashidi M Kawawa, Songea, August 25, 1994.
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in relations with the radicals and thereby saved TANU from a 
split, and also succeeded in retaining the moderates' control of 
the organisation (Stephens: 161; Leys 1972:192-3) .
Nyerere also wanted to counter the attitude, apparently common 
among some expatriate civil servants, of regarding Tanganyika as 
synonymous with him personally;16 "expatriate resignations 
jumped from 15% to 40%" immediately after Nyerere's resignation 
(Stephens: 160; Leys 1972:194) . That may have helped to "appease" the 
radicals who demanded "Africanisation" of the civil service 
because Africans were given priority consideration in filling 
vacancies in the service. In fact the Government under Rashidi 
Kawawa, who succeeded Nyerere as Prime Minister, carried out a 
policy of "Africanisation", and took a number of rather high­
handed and apparently racist actions some of which Nyerere, by 
his own admission, would have resisted (Pratt 1976:121) .
By those actions the Government "sought to demonstrate African 
political control" (Cartwright: 168) and a show of power, it seems, 
was a way of making the demonstration. There were impatient 
demands for an almost worshipful respect for national symbols and 
institutions, and even personalities, and when some Europeans 
failed to show the expected respect, they were summarily 
expelled.17 Although the expulsions were effected by Nyerere 
shortly before he resigned, he was clearly pushed to that 
decision by elements within TANU (Pratt I976:ii5-e). After his
l6East Africa and Rhodesia, February 8, 1962.
11East Africa and Rhodesia, January 25, 1962.
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resignation the Government went on to harass emerging opposition 
parties out of existence.
Zuberi Mtemvu's African National Congress (ANC) had contested the 
1960 elections in only two constituencies and lost deposits in 
both. But after independence Mtemvu managed to open a few more 
branches of his party. Another party, the People's Democratic 
Party (pDP) was formed in 1962. It was led by C.S.K. Tumbo, a 
trade unionist who had been elected to the National Assembly in 
1960 and had been one of the TANU radicals in Parliament for a 
while before being appointed Tanganyika's first High Commissioner 
to London. It was a way of getting him out of the way; he 
resigned after a few months and was back in the country to lead 
the PDP.
Certainly, these small parties were not strong in any way that 
could challenge TANU's hegemony. In a few areas they exploited 
some local dissatisfactions with TANU and attracted some 
followers with whom they could genuinely hope to make Some 
political headway. But the TANU Government suppressed these 
opposition parties with impatience reminiscent of the treatment 
sometimes meted out to TANU itself under colonial rule.18
The Government19 used the same colonial enactment, the Societies 
Ordinance 1954, to require separate registration for every new
18There are various accounts to that effect: Pratt 1976:185-7, Maguire: 
338-60, Mwakyembe 1986:37-9, and Mlimuka & Kabudi:59-63, among others.
19The account in this paragraph is based on Maguire: 338-60.
80
branch of the already registered parties. Individual ANC members 
who were elected to District Councils, only one each for Kwimba 
and Mwanza districts, were subjected to continuous harassment and 
frustration, to force them to resign. Government servants were 
threatened with dismissal if they left TANU and joined the ANC 
or PDP (Maguire:350) . A number of chiefs appearing sympathetic to 
the opposition were deposed from their offices.20 One of them, 
Chief Francis Masanja of Usimao was also MP for Kwimba District. 
After a somewhat insulting speech by the new Regional 
Commissioner, Richard Wambura, Chief Masanja angrily resigned 
from TANU and joined the ANC. He was immediately deported to 
Geita where he was restricted for several months (Maguire:351-2 ; 
Tordoff 1967:13) . Kidaha Makwaia, a former chief and Member of the 
Legislative Council in the 1940s was deported to remote Tunduru 
in October 1962, after only one week of aggressive recruitment 
for the PDP in Shinyanga; the then chief of Usiha in Shinyanga 
District, Hussein Makwaia, was somehow seen as an associate of 
his brother and was at the same time deported to remote Chunya
(Maguire:3 53-5) .
Apparently, the deportations were effected under the Deportation 
Ordinance 1921 which enabled the executive to order the 
deportation of any person to a particular area of Tanganyika, to 
remain there for as long as the order was not revoked. After 
independence a new law, the infamous Preventive Detention Act 
1962, was added in September 1962, enabling the executive to 
detain any person indefinitely without trial or charge.
20By G.N. 39, 347, 380, 467 and 489, all of 1962.
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One overall result of the high-handed actions of the Government 
was to reduce the rift between itself and some of the TANU 
radicals. As for those opposed to Government policies, the 
actions reminded them of the extent of the powers of the 
government and its ability and willingness to use them if its 
patience ran out. This silenced them. But the fact that Nyerere 
had resigned when these actions were taken does not mean that he 
had no responsibility at all for them. Kawawa had obviously been 
groomed as Nyerere's assistant and most trusted lieutenant; on 
succeeding Nyerere, he was unlikely to do anything without 
consulting him.21 But even after resigning Nyerere was revered 
as "Father of the Nation"; he "remained the effective national 
leader as President of TANU" and occasionally he even attended 
cabinet meetings! (Bennett:29; Leys 1963:136; Pratt 1971:99). 
Apparently, even Nyerere was conscious of his overriding 
influence. When discussing the Government proposals for a 
Republic, once again John Mwakangale attacked the proposal that 
Tanganyika would remain in the Commonwealth; that, he argued, 
would undermine African unity by encouraging the formation of 
blocks in the continent. Nyerere intervened and, though speaking 
as a back bencher, spoke with authority:
I want to assure the Hon Mr Mwakangale that if it appeared, even at this 
moment, that our membership of the Commonwealth was not in the best 
interests of our efforts to advance the unity and welfare of our continent 
we would pull out of the Commonwealth.22 [emphasis added]
His overall authoritative tone was unmistakable.
21Africa Report, February 1962.
22Parliamentary Debates, February 15, 1962: col.175; also see Nyerere
1966:172.
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Nyerere's position is emphasised here because it was during 1962, 
with Rashidi Kawawa as Prime Minister, that radical changes in 
the constitutional pattern and practice were initiated. They 
included the replacement of the purely administrative heads of 
the provinces and districts with political heads called 
"regional" and "area" commissioners respectively (Tordoff 1967:96- 
100) . The first new commissioners were personalities with strong 
TANU connections; they became both Government executives and TANU 
Secretaries for their respective regions and districts. 
Officially, it was Kawawa, the Prime Minister, who appointed 
them; but as TANU secretaries, they also reported directly to 
Nyerere, the TANU President, who also had a direct hand in their 
appointment (Listowei:4i2; Hopkins:29) . This move greatly enhanced 
the position of TANU and its leaders in the regions and 
districts. To the ordinary peasants, it completed the apparent 
fusion between the Government and the Party. Significantly, the 
first appointments included some of the TANU radicals who had 
attacked Nyerere's moderate policies.
Those changes culminated in the Republican Constitution, which 
greatly increased the powers of the executive, concentrating them 
in the President who, predictably, was to be Julius Nyerere. 
Certainly, it was him and not Kawawa or any other person, who was 
behind those developments; they reflect his thinking and belief 
in the need for a strong government. He publicly defended the 
Preventive Detention Act 1962 when it was passed (Martin,r:91; 
Nyerere 1966:312), and in the National Assembly he defended the 
extensive powers of the proposed presidency so convincingly that
he may well have drafted the Government Paper himself.23 The 
one advantage he exploited by being officially out of the 
Government while the changes took place was that TANU was able 
to satisfy its activists while he managed to distance himself 
from its government's excesses (Cartwright: 168) .
Rashidi Kawawa has acknowledged that the 1962 changes were 
largely dictated by the political mood of the time; there was 
need to defuse tensions within TANU and the country generally. 
But there was nothing that he did as Prime Minister without the 
full knowledge and the sanction of the TANU President:
I was the Prime Minister. But I was a TANU Prime Minister and TANU was in 
full control. In everything that I did I consulted with TANU President 
and everything was done with TANU approval. TANU and the Cabinet were 
very close and agreed in all decisions.24
Apparently, Kawawa's tenure as Prime Minister provided a useful 
interlude during which some significant changes were made under 
Nyerere's directions before he came back to command the 
government as President in December 1962; he appointed Kawawa as 
Vice-President.
3.2: THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF TANGANYIKA
The decision to adopt a republican status for Tanganyika raised 
no controversy. It was explained in very straightforward terms: 
in view of Tanganyika's previous status as a UN Trust Territory,
23See "Appendix A" to this study.
24Interview with Mr Rashidi M Kawawa, August 25, 1994.
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the proclamation of Her Majesty Elizabeth II as "Queen of 
Tanganyika"25 was not only odd but also an embarrassment, and 
not easily understood by the people.26 The motion introduced in 
the National Assembly in February 1962 was simply for the 
Government to draft amendments to the Independence Constitution, 
thus implying no more than mere severance from the British Crown.
But when the republic came, it brought an entirely new 
constitution, radically changing the structure of power. The 
Constitution of Tanganyika 1962 (also referred to as the 
Republican Constitution) created the President as the new Head 
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces [s.3 (l)],27 
and also vested him with all executive power [s. 3(1)], to be 
exercised by himself directly, "or through persons holding office 
in the service of the Republic" [s.lO(l)]. He was not a member 
of the National Assembly [s. 21 (2)] ; but he was a constituent part 
of the Legislature [s. 20], with power to assent to all Bills 
before they became law [s.34(l)]. He also had power to appoint 
up to ten members to the National Assembly [s. 23] , and to address 
it at any time either in person or through a Minister [s.37] . 
Unlike the Governor-General, he could not prorogue Parliament, 
but he could at any time dissolve it [s.44(2)].
25See G.N. 9 OF 1962.
26Parliamentary Debates, February 15, 1962: col.167; East Africa and
Rhodesia, June 7, 1962.
27References in square brackets throughout this section refer to provisions 
of the Republican Constitution.
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The Constitution omitted the Prime Minister but established the 
office of Vice-President, to be the "principal assistant of the 
President in the discharge of his executive functions and the 
leader of Government business, in the National Assembly" 
[s.11(1)]. Other "offices of Minister" were to be established 
by the President [s.11(2)]. The Vice-President and the Ministers 
were appointed by the President from among the members of the 
National Assembly; specifically, the Vice-President had to be an 
elected member of the Assembly [s .1 3 (1 ) ]. The President could 
at any time remove them from office [s. 14 (a)] . The Vice- 
President and the other Ministers comprised the Cabinet but its 
meetings were chaired by the President. The Cabinet was to be, 
"subject to the powers of the President, ...the principal 
instrument of policy" advising the President "on such matters as 
may be referred to it" by the President [s.15].
The number of ministries was now to be determined by the
President [s.11(2)] without any reference to Parliament as 
previously. The President was also given powers of constituting 
and abolishing offices in the service of the Republic, "making 
appointments to such offices, and of promotion, termination of 
appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control" of the persons
so appointed [s.18]. But, save for the appointment of the most
senior officers, like principal secretaries, these powers of the 
President were in effect delegated to the Civil Service 
Commission under the Civil Service Act 1962 which established it 
in place of the former Public Service Commission, established 
under the Independence Constitution.
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The President also appointed the Chief Justice and, after 
consultation with the Chief Justice, the other judges of the High 
Court [s.47]; but once appointed, their tenure of office remained 
secure. The President's power of appointing other judicial 
officers [s.53(1) (a)] was delegated to the Judicial Service 
Commission (re-established by s. 52 of the Constitution) under the 
Judicial Service Act 1962. The members of both the Judicial 
Service Commission and the Civil Service Commission were 
appointed by the President.
This Constitution did not change the position of the Controller 
and Auditor-General; but the Director of Public Prosecution lost 
his security of tenure and, by an amendment to the Criminal 
Procedure Code effected by a Constituent Assembly Act, the 
exercise of his powers became subject to directions of the 
President.28 The President was also given the powers of 
prerogative of mercy [s.19] and, while still in office, he was 
immune from criminal proceedings and civil proceedings against 
him were subject to procedural restrictions [s.9].
Apart from the role of "Leader of Government Business in the 
National Assembly", previously the Prime Minister's and now the 
Vice-President's, all the other functions and powers of the 
previous offices of Prime Minister and Governor-General were now 
fused in the President. Besides the Constitution, consequential 
provisions vested all "rights, powers, privileges, duties or
28The Republic of Tanganyika (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1962, Fourth Schedule, Part I (added S.80A of the Criminal 
Procedure Code).
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functions" of the Governor-General or of the Prime Minister in 
the President; they empowered the President "to do all things 
necessary for the exercise or performance" of "rights, 
prerogatives, powers, privileges, duties or functions" formerly 
vested or imposed on Her Majesty the Queen in respect of 
Tanganyika; and they directed all references in the existing law 
to the Governor-General and to the Prime Minister to be read as 
references to the President.29
That gave the President vast powers under some colonial laws 
specifically designed for a repressive regime. He acquired 
powers of deportation, inflicting collective punishment, 
expulsion (of non-citizens) from the country, and abolition of 
associations.30 Under the Emergency Powers Order in Council 
1939 the President inherited extensive powers to issue Emergency 
Orders and Regulations suspending the application of any law and 
the jurisdiction of any court so that in effect, he had power to 
suspend the Rule of Law. To those were added detention powers 
under the post-independence Preventive Detention Act 1962. And 
with all that, s.3 (3) of the Constitution stated:
...in the exercise -of his functions, the President shall act in his own 
discretion and shall not be obliged to follow advice tendered by any other 
person.
The remark that the Republican Constitution "gave the Tanganyika 
President even more sweeping powers than those of the American
29Ibid., ss.7 and 8.
30He got those powers under, respectively, the Deportation Ordinance 1921, 
the Collective Punishment Ordinance 1921, the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance 
1930, and the Societies Ordinance 1954.
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President" (Listowel :4i3; Leys 1963:137) was not a baseless 
exaggeration.
The Preamble to this Constitution also proclaimed its commitment 
to a "democratic society where the government is responsible to 
a freely elected Parliament representative of the people." But 
whereas the Independence Constitution required the Cabinet to be 
collectively responsible to Parliament for the conduct of the 
Government, which could be removed from office by a Parliamentary 
vote of no confidence, the Republican Constitution had no such 
provisions. Section 11(3) of this Constitution merely stated:
The Vice-President and the other Ministers shall be responsible under the 
direction of the President for such departments of state or other business 
of the Government as the President may assign them.
Plainly, they were responsible to the President, not to 
Parliament. Although it was said that their membership of the 
National Assembly made them responsible to the Assembly as well 
(McAusian 1964:509-10), that responsibility to the Assembly was 
constitutionally limited because their duties as Ministers were 
to do what the President assigned them and according to his 
directions. It was only the President who could effectively hold 
them to account and who, strictly speaking, was ultimately 
responsible for what they did. But the President was not a 
member of the National Assembly, and not responsible to 
Parliament, justifying the claim that in 1962 the government 
ceased to be accountable to Parliament (srivastava:ios) .
But deliberately, the Constitution sought to avoid conflicts or
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serious differences between the President and the National 
Assembly. This was done by tying Presidential elections to 
Parliamentary elections in a scheme, adopted with modifications 
from Ghana, which ensured that the President would have the 
support of the majority party in the National Assembly.31 But 
the scheme was never used; Nyerere was elected^by universal adult[?*■ 
suffrage under a transitional law, and the constitution changed 
before another election could be held.
But if there was a disagreement in the legislative process with 
the President persistently refusing to assent a Bill passed by 
the National Assembly, the impasse could result in a dissolution 
of Parliament. If the President refused to assent to a Bill, he 
had to return it to the National Assembly with his reasons for 
refusal. Such a Bill could not be presented to the President for 
assent again within 6 months after the refusal unless it was re­
passed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly. 
And if presented with such a majority within 6 months after the 
first refusal, the President had to assent to the re-passed Bill 
within 21 days or dissolve Parliament [s.31(2), (3) and (4)],
implying his own resignation [s.4(1)(a)], and the calling of 
general elections.
That was all the power that the National Assembly could have 
against the President. But Nyerere's popularity reduced it to 
nil; his re-election as President was almost always assured while
31Constitution of Tanganyika 1962, s.4 (4) (a) read with the Presidential 
Elections Act 1962.
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even the most popular MPs could not hope for nomination to 
contest their seats without his support as TANU President. That 
support would be unlikely if the dissolution of Parliament was 
occasioned by their differences with him. In fact this 
provision, and the power to dissolve Parliament at any time, 
became tools with which the President could threaten the National 
Assembly and force it to comply with his wishes. In fact even 
the life of Parliament, within the constitutional five year term, 
further depended upon the President's pleasure. Thus a 
government "responsible to a freely elected Parliament" as 
declared in the Preamble had no firm place in the Constitution.
It is intriguing that the granting of such enormous powers to the 
President was hardly opposed. In Parliament, some reservations 
were timidly expressed by Mr Sarwatt (the only MP elected as an 
independent), Mr Tunze and Mr Mtaki: that the enormous powers 
could easily be misused, and that the sovereignty of Parliament 
was being compromised by the overriding powers of the 
President.32 And Mr Mtaki specifically warned against basing 
the Constitution on "today's good leaders... like Mr Nyerere or 
the Prime Minister" who would go, while the constitution would 
remain "for years to come."
But Nyerere, then a back bencher, stood up and defended those 
powers in what may have been his strongest parliamentary speech. 
He eloquently expounded on the need for what he called the 
"National Ethic" as the only sure "safeguard of a peopled right,
32Parliamentary Debates, June 28, 1962: cols.1092, 1096 and 1101.
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the peopled freedom and those things which they value." The 
speech underlines Nyerere's philosophy about the need for power, 
its proper use and safeguard against abuse, which was also the 
basis for rejecting the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. Extracts of the speech are appended to this study 
as Appendix A.
From the beginning of the plans for a Republic, it was clear that 
Julius Nyerere would be the first President.33 It was apparent 
even in the parliamentary debate; members desisted from speaking 
out against the powers proposed for the President because it 
would sound like doubting his wisdom and ability. It was his 
personality which alleviated fears of likely misuse of power by 
the President. It cannot be known whether without him those 
provisions would still have been approved, or even at all 
proposed in the first place.
3.3: THE EMERGING PATTERN AND CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
In addition to setting new aims and objectives that would keep 
it a party in power after independence, TANU also had to show 
that it was capable of governing democratically. This was a 
serious challenge. The struggles for independence in Africa did 
not address the question of democracy; the demands for political 
independence were not synonymous with demands for democracy 
(Mushingeh: 106) . And TANU, from its origins until independence:
33Mr Kawawa confirmed this in an interview, Songea, August 25, 1994.
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was a highly centralised, primarily bureaucratic organisation; its 
democratic constitution was partly inoperative, because the issues to be 
decided were largely tactical, and partly fused in the charismatic 
authority of Mr Nyerere... (Leys 1972:191)
Indeed, the single pre-occupation then, achieving independence, 
united all TANU members and the entire population behind TANU.
But the coming of independence raised the question whether 
democracy could and would actually work in Africa. Specific to 
Tanganyika, there was a need to explain the problem of the 
political pattern that emerged at independence failing to fit 
into the assumptions of the Independence Constitution. The 
constitution assumed a Government party and an Opposition party 
in Parliament; but there was an entirely one-party parliament, 
a peculiar situation not envisaged by the Westminster Model of 
constitutions. It invited fears, and charges, that Tanganyika 
was becoming a dictatorship.
It was in effect a charge directly against Nyerere, who was proud 
of the sweeping electoral victory of his party. He replied by 
pointing out that the charges equated democracy with political 
parties, which was absurd. He picked on this absurdity to attack 
the relevance of the multi-party system of democracy to 
Tanganyika and to Africa generally, and to defend his (and 
TANU's) achievement.
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3.3.1: Democracy and the Role of Political Parties
Nyerere's arguments then about democracy and political parties 
were articulated in some of his writings.34 No model or form of 
democracy as known to the world was faultless, he said; the 
ancient Greeks, despite "slave-owning and women-ignoring", are 
accredited with "inventing" democracy.35 He wrote:
It was possible for the ancient Greeks to boast of "democracy" when more 
than half the population had no say at all in the conduct of the affairs 
of the state. It was possible for the framers of the Declaration of 
Independence to talk about "the inalienable rights of Man" although they 
believed in exceptions; it was possible for Abraham Lincoln to bequeath to 
us a perfect definition of democracy although he spoke in a slave-owning 
society; it was possible for my friends the British to brag about 
"democracy" and still build a great empire for the glory of the Britons. 
These people were not hypocrites. They believed in democracy. It was 
"government by discussion" which they advocated, and it was discussion by 
equals; but they lived in a world which excluded masses of human beings 
from its idea of "equality" and felt few scruples in doing so. (Nyerere 
1961b:3 0-1)
And he went on to say that the critics of "African democracy" 
have in mind not democracy but the particular form of democracy 
they knew best: that which is organised through contending
political parties, and he called it the "Anglo-Saxon form of 
democracy."
He argued that it was not necessary to adopt the "Anglo-Saxon 
form of democracy" in order to be democratic, and that the 
circumstances of Africa at the time of independence were 
extremely unlikely to lead to a pattern of democracy "familiar 
to Anglo-Saxon countries." The African countries were led not
34See Nyerere's works: 1961a, 1961b, 1961c and 1963, all listed in the
Bibliography. The first mentioned was also published in Transition (Kampala), 
December 1961, pp.9-11, and the others are also reproduced, substantially 
abridged, in Nyerere 1966, at pp.103-6, 133-4 and 195-203.
35He repeated this three decades later; see Sandbrook & Halfani: 16.
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by political parties as such but by nationalist movements which, 
during the struggles for independence, had succeeded in uniting 
the people behind them. It was these movements which formed the 
first governments of the new states and it was unimaginable "that 
a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide 
itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of 
conforming to...the Anglo-Saxon form of democracy at the moment 
Of independence" (Nyerere 1961b:33) .36
His further argument was that while the two-party tradition 
emerged as a reflection of the class divisions into "haves" and 
"have-nots" in society, such divisions were generally absent in 
Africa, and they were to be deliberately avoided in Tanganyika 
(Nyerere 1961c:339-40) . After their formation, the first governments 
of independent Africa were always faced with the enormous task 
of building up the economy "so as to raise the living standards 
of the people" and that task left "no room for difference or 
division," making it a situation comparable to those of war-time 
coalitions or emergency governments in the liberal west (Nyerere
1961a:8-9 ) .
What then did he consider to be the essentials of democracy? 
These, he said, were: discussion, equality and freedom.
Democratic government simply meant "government by .discussion" 
provided that the people involved were all free and equal in 
their freedom because "there can be no true discussion without 
freedom, and equals must be equal in freedom, without which there
36For a similar argument, see Mboya:335-7.
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is no equality" (Nyerere i96ia:7; 1961b:29) . Thus pure democracy
would require participation by all the people in discussions and 
decisions on the affairs and conduct of the government. But such 
an arrangement would be "too clumsy" and unworkable in
"conducting the affairs of a modern state." Therefore democratic 
government in modern day conditions had to be government by 
representation (Nyerere i96ib:34; 1963:l) , without ever sacrificing 
the freedom of the individual:
When, then, you have the freedom and well being of the individual; and 
where the individual has the right freely and regularly to join with his 
fellows in choosing the government of his country; and where the affairs 
of the country are conducted by free discussion, you have democracy.
(Nyerere 1961a:8) [emphasis from original]
Nyerere's argument was that those essentials of democracy were
traditionally present in African society: a society of equals, 
undivided into classes of aristocrats and commoners, which had 
always conducted its business by discussion. As such the African 
was "a natural democrat" (Nyerere i96ia:8; i96ib:30) and it was absurd 
to think of him as unable to put up and maintain a democratic 
government!
Regarding Tanganyika, Nyerere insisted it was "thoroughly 
democratic" despite having "a one-party Government" and a 
National Assembly with only TANU members "facing, as well as 
behind, the Government benches." This was democratic because it 
was the result of a democratic election in which:
TANU did just what the Conservative and Labour parties do in Britain --it 
contested every seat. The only difference seems to us to be that whereas 
the two British parties always lose a large proportion of the contests, we 
won all except one. Is it seriously suggested that a Government can be 
democratic only if it is rejected by nearly half the people? (Nyerere 
1961c:339)
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He defended the one-party Government then not because of 
ambitions to set up a one-party state, but because already he was 
Head of a one-party Government not arrived at by deliberate 
design, but emerging in a constitutional framework designed for 
a multi-party system. That was the reality.
Nyerere's views may have been in response to charges of his 
Government being undemocratic because it was a one-party 
government. He was defensive and seeking to disprove such 
charges. Apparently, he was arguing to European critics and 
others who, like himself, were trained in and moulded by western 
parliamentary tradition and its concepts of democracy and 
democratic institutions. He felt a need to explain how he could 
reconcile his proclaimed commitment to democracy, as they all 
knew it, with his headship of a government with absolutely no 
opposition. Pratt states that Nyerere was actually "debating 
with himself":
Nyerere had already absorbed much of the conventional wisdom of Western 
liberal democracy. He had not rejected these values. He was not 
discarding the ethical and political heritage which he had acquired from 
his church, his education and his reading. Rather he was examining the 
relevance to Africa of a number of constitutional arrangements which 
Western thinkers had long assumed were essential corollaries of these 
values. . . If there was to be democracy in Africa it would need to receive 
a different institutional expression than that normally associated with 
it. (Pratt 1976:67)
And he concluded that democracy required merely the freedom to 
form an organised opposition, "not the existence of it."37
21East Africa and Rhodesia, June 9,1960.
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3.3.2: The Justifications for a One Party System
Soon after independence, Nyerere took deliberate steps to remove 
that freedom to form an organised opposition. The NEC resolved 
in January 1963, and TANU's Annual Conference endorsed the 
resolution, to adopt a one-party state constitution (Msekwa:2o) . 
Now this needed an explanation, not just to defend a situation 
already there, but to justify the new initiative being taken.
To explain that, Nyerere advanced a thesis38 incorporating all 
his previous arguments and emphasising further that not only was 
organised opposition unnecessary in the newly independent states 
of Africa, but that its presence there could be dangerous. 
Pressing forward the view that the one-party system would make 
Tanganyika more democratic, he actually asked: "How can you have 
democracy with a two-party system?" (Nyerere 1963:12)
Nyerere always emphasised free discussion and, for the sake of 
free discussion, he urged doing away with party discipline in 
parliamentary debates. Indeed in a one-party parliament, party 
discipline no longer made much sense and it was rather awkward 
for the TANU parliamentary party to continue with private debates 
(at which members spoke their minds freely) and adopt a party 
line before going to Parliament where members had to toe the 
party line: Parliament and the parliamentary party were
constituted alike. As a result, Parliamentary debates were dull
38Nyerere 1963; extracts of the thesis, about half the original length, are 
in Nyerere 1966: 195-203; it was also published in Spearhead, January 1963, which 
is what this study refers to.
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and stifled. In the absence of an Opposition party, continued 
observation of such party discipline could not be defended.
But he went further and sought to show that party discipline was 
not very meritorious even in multi-party systems. He argued that 
requiring "members to oppose a rival party's policies must force 
them, at times," to do so against their conscience, thereby 
stifling "not only freedom of expression but, indeed, honesty of 
expression" as well. This, he suggested, must have been 
responsible for the phrase "politics is a dirty game", which need 
not be the case in Tanganyika (Nyerere 1963:16) . He accused the
two-party system of reducing democracy to the level of football
games and the government of a nation to a "Football Cup":
Each party constantly aims at bringing about the defeat of the other. So, 
of course, do football teams. But, admirable though it may be for a 
soccer team to thwart its rivals' attempts to score a goal, parallel 
success on the part of a political party in obstructing the Government's
efforts to do the job it was elected to do is of more dubious merit.
(Nyerere 1963:15)
Nyerere based his concept of what he called "football politics" 
on the assumption that all serious political parties should aim 
at providing those things which are essential for the welfare of 
the people as a whole. As such, party differences will be on 
minor issues only, like matters of details, of what they all 
agree should be done. With parties thus agreed on the 
fundamental issues, Nyerere saw sense only in the two sides 
disbanding "their football teams and let[ting] the electorate 
choose the best individuals from them all" (Nyerere 1963:15; 
1966:196). The individuals so elected should then meet in 
Parliament for a free discussion of the details of what they will
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then cooperate in doing. This is what he wanted the one-party 
system for, because he believed that differences over minor 
issues of detail did not need to be expressed in a two-party 
system (Nyerere 1961c:340) .
Disagreement over fundamental issues was the only justification 
he saw for a two-party system. But such fundamental differences 
in a nation will necessarily divide it into hostile camps and 
bring about a "civil war situation", often leading to disastrous 
bloody conflicts (Nyerere 1963:14; 1966:196) which no sane person 
should encourage. And in the new states of Africa there were, 
rationally, no issues on which could be based any fundamental 
disagreements. The sheer poverty of the people, the abject 
living conditions, the backward economy and infrastructure, all 
left only one priority objective: economic development in order 
to improve the people's living standards. For any meaningful 
progress, Nyerere always argued, there was need for total unity. 
Ethnic divisions in African states, themselves demarcated by 
artificially based boundaries, made them susceptible to intra­
state conflicts, rendering dangerous the encouragement of 
political differences among the inhabitants. The Katanga crisis 
of the Congo was there to illustrate this.
The differences along which political parties are divided in the 
liberal democracies are not fundamental, according to Nyerere, 
otherwise their systems would have failed to work (Nyerere 1963 :i5- 
6) . He repeated this argument in 1991, referring to America as:
A plutocracy, but the native gets the vote; so it's a democracy! . . . There
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are two parties... Both parties agree on the basic national objectives. ' 
Internally, both of them are highly capitalist. Externally, both of them 
are imperialist.... So they basically agree. The problem comes when the 
two parties don't agree on the essentials. When the difference in 
national objectives between the two parties is too great, it can't work. 
(Sandbrook & Halfani:27)
Hence his reference to their differences as "football politics", 
which he considered a luxury not affordable by his country.
3.3.3: The Twin Objectives: Democracy and National Unity
Nyerere's rejection of what he called "football politics" was 
also linked to his pre-occupation with the need to build up and 
maintain national unity. It may thus be correct to say that 
democracy and national unity were the twin issues which dominated 
in his mind up to the adoption of the one-party system.
He may have indeed sounded convincing when he argued that 
democracy did not necessarily require an opposition party. Even 
the argument that his one-party government was democratic because 
TANU had contested and won all seats may have sounded convincing 
as well. The reality, however, was that the absence of an 
effective opposition party in the framework of the Independence 
Constitution, which envisaged such an opposition, reduced 
Tanganyika to a near mockery of democracy.
The claim that TANU had contested every seat was true in purely 
theoretical terms only. In the 1960 elections, upon which the 
independence government was formed, of the 71 seats open to 
contest, only 13 were actually contested; the remaining 58 were 
simply taken by TANU candidates returned unopposed. Similarly
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in the local government elections after independence, of the 356 
seats open for election to urban councils, only 6 were actually 
contested and 350 had TANU candidates returned unopposed! This 
was the awkward outcome of the institutional framework adopted 
at independence, and it served to advance the case for a one 
party State (Bomani-.495-6) .
In the 1960 elections most voters had only become eligible for 
the first time, the previous election having been on a very 
restricted franchise; they were nevertheless unable to vote 
because, technically, there were no "contestants". In the event 
they were given representatives selected for them by TANU. With 
a TANU membership then of about one million (Bennett: 29; Leys 1972: 
190) out of a total population of about 9 million, one can safely 
say that the only sure support behind the 58 candidates returned 
unopposed was that of TANU members, or 11% of the population.
This outcome met the standard principle of responsible
government, stated by Nyerere himself in 1958, that Government 
ought to "belong to all the people" and its powers to be derived 
from the majority (Nyerere 1958:87) .
Besides the question of mere numbers, TANU's highly centralised 
organisation did not make it particularly democratic, and the 
196 0 elections were not a very remarkable demonstration of 
democracy by TANU. The selection of the TANU candidates,
including the 58 who were unopposed was strongly controlled by
the party's central executive which frequently overruled local 
preferences. Local TANU opposition to official candidates
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endorsed by TANU headquarters was severely punished, often with 
expulsion from party membership (Bennett: 24; Pratt 1976:80; 
Maguire:354) . It was in reaction to this that in Mbulu District 
Mr Sarwatt, until then an active TANU member, stood as an 
independent and challenged the official TANU candidate who, in 
the event, earned TANU its only defeat. In Rungwe, a similar 
rejection of the local preference by TANU headquarters led to a 
very low turn out of voters (Bates,m.L:459) . Thus even the 
assumption that the 58 returned unopposed had the support of TANU 
members could be erroneous; rather, the proven support they had 
was that of TANU headquarters.
But Nyerere did not attempt to reduce the authority of the 
central organs of either the party or the state. Instead, the 
post-independence years saw a progressive centralisation of 
power, a trend noted as common all over Africa (Tordoff 1984:4-10) .
That trend was motivated by fear of risking the fragile national 
unity whose beginnings the nationalist movements had forged 
during the struggles for independence. That unity was constantly 
threatened by a number of factors, including ethnic divisions and 
identities within the boundaries of the new state. Nyerere was 
so committed to national unity, at any cost, that it is hard to 
dispute conclusions attributing his adoption of the one-party 
system solely to that commitment (Hopkins:25) . It led him to 
ensure the disbanding of the Sukumaland Federal Council, and 
other similar tribally based organisations, because: "We can't 
have another Katanga here" (Maguire:281-2 ; Bennett:28) . He referred
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to Katanga again when he warned Kenyan nationalists against 
accepting a federal state structure.39
Even before deciding to adopt a one-party system, he used the 
need to preserve unity to justify restrictions on opposition 
groups and their activities. And he warned of the "intrigues of 
the international diplomacy of rivalry" and their divisive 
effects, often working through "irresponsible individuals" 
claiming to be the opposition. It was the fragile unity within 
the new, poor and unstable African states which led him to 
compare the situation in his country to an emergency situation, 
like that of a country at war; in such a situation, he said, even 
the opposition had to act more responsibly than does an 
opposition in a more developed, stable, unified and well equipped 
country in times of peace. And, claiming there was no such 
responsible opposition, he believed the government had the right 
to "deal firmly and promptly" with the irresponsible individuals 
claiming to be the opposition, whenever they threatened national 
unity (Nyerere i96ia:9) . For, he conceived it a duty of the 
government to "safeguard the unity of the country from 
irresponsible or vicious attempts to divide and weaken it, for 
without unity the fight against the enemies of freedom cannot be 
won" (Nyerere i96ia:8) . The enemies of freedom were summed up as: 
ignorance, poverty and disease.
29East Africa and Rhodesia, October 19, 1961.
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3.4: THE SEARCH FOR A ONE-PARTY FRAMEWORK
Nyerere's ideas had supported the one-party system well before 
independence; but even after the January 1963 decision to adopt 
a one-party state system, it took more than two years for the 
decision to find statutory expression in the Constitution. He 
obviously had good reasons for the apparent hesitancy (Nyerere 
1966:261; Tordoff 1967:2; Msekwa:20n.) . But also some elements in the 
TANU leadership may have supported the one-party system simply 
to assure themselves of continuing to enjoy their high offices. 
Many of the deportations of opposition party activists were 
initiated by the new Regional Commissioners who felt their 
authority being challenged, and Oscar Kambona, the TANU
Secretary-General, is said to have even argued against the need 
for elections! (Pratt 1976:187-8)
A rushed implementation might have given those elements a measure 
of influence. If Nyerere was to maintain his credibility as a 
leader committed to democracy, he had to ensure that undemocratic 
elements did not dominate or influence the course of
developments. And it appears that he resolved to be himself in 
firm control of the developments after 1962, making effective use 
of the powers he assumed as President. In defence of those
powers, he had written to the London Observer:
Our constitution differs from the American system in that it... enables 
the executive to function without being checked at every turn... Our need 
is not for brakes to social change.. . - our lack of trained manpower and
capital resources, and even our climate, act too effectively already. We 
need accelerators powerful enough to overcome the inertia bred of poverty, 
and the resistances which are inherent in all societies.40 [emphasis 
added]
40Ohserver, June 3, 1962; also reproduced in Africa Report, July 1962.
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Clearly, he knew what he wanted: enough powers to govern without 
being checked at every turn.
Over the years of his leadership of TANU, he grew confident that 
he knew the problems of his country well; that he knew the right 
answers to its problems; and that he had the correct principles 
to follow (Cartwright: 172) . And in defence of those principles he 
was ready to steamroll and proceed like a dictator. During the 
citizenship debate he had declared: "I never like being
challenged on a matter of principle" (Nyerere 1966:129) . That was 
true of him. An early manifestation was in 1958 when the leader 
of the Elders Section of TANU, Sheikh Sulemani Takadir, 
questioned the absence of Muslims from the list of TANU 
candidates for election to the Legislative Council. Nyerere 
would not tolerate religious partisanship in TANU and summarily 
expelled Takadir from the party, a step which was 
unconstitutional (Bennett :24; Bienen 1967:69; Pratt 1976:79-80) .
The challenge of the citizenship debate to his principles had 
driven his patience to the limit. His threat to resign had 
worked well then; but would he happily repeat that defeatist 
strategy? By putting up and adopting a Constitution that gave 
him such extensive and unchecked powers, Nyerere demonstrated his 
preference for "positive" rather than "negative" action in the 
event of a similar challenge to principles. Rather than risk 
being "pushed" to the corner again, as had happened over 
citizenship, he chose a position that enabled him to do the 
pushing instead. Thus, following the January 1963 decision he
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took his time to set up a Commission and he owed nobody an 
explanation. And after setting up the Commission he took a 
number of steps putting into effect some aspects of a one-party 
state without even waiting for the recommendations of his own 
Commission. In a way, Nyerere was like preparing the ground for 
the formal adoption of the one-party state which followed.
3.4.1: Laying the Ground for the One-Party State
The timing of the appointment of the Commission, officially known 
as the "Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a 
Democratic One-Party State", was most probably prompted by the 
army mutiny; it was appointed on January 28, 1964, only three
days after the British Marines had put down the mutiny.
As the Commission started its work, the Preventive Detention Act 
1962 was used extensively for the first time, detaining well over 
500, of whom more than half were trade unionists (Tordoff 
1967:147,163) . The trade union movement was the only organised 
group which appeared sympathetic to the mutineers' demands; in 
fact some disgruntled trade unionists may have sought to take 
political advantage of the uncertainty and doubtful stability 
during and immediately after the mutiny (Listowel:437-8; ciiffe:ii) . 
But the sheer number of trade unionists detained, picked from all 
parts of the country (including areas which had only heard of the 
mutiny), indicates a deliberate action to silence political 
opposition, however minor or remote.
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After independence the trade union movement emerged as the most 
coherent and well organised independent pressure group, and the 
Government sought to contain it with both patronage and 
harassment of its leadership (Tordoff 1967:144-7 ) . In 1962 the 
President of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), Michael 
Kamaliza, was appointed Minister for Labour and had, therefore, 
to resign his union post. His successor, Victor Mkello, and 
another prominent trade unionist were deported to a remote 
district for three months.
Another trade union activist and consistent critic of Nyerere's
moderate policies was Mr C S K Tumbo; in early 1962 he was
appointed High Commissioner to London. He resigned in August
1962 and went into opposition as leader of the People's
Democratic Party (PDP). He criticised the Preventive Detention
Act 1962,41 and, in apparent fear of it, he fled to Mombasa in
Kenya. In late 1963, instigated by Nyerere's Government, the
,*?
Kenya police picked him/and took him to a Tanganyika border post 
where he was immediately arrested and detained (Pratt 1976:186). 
Victor Mkello, the TFL President, joined him in detention soon 
after the mutiny.
Apparently, political opposition was finding expression through 
the trade union movement; one MP even referred to the TFL as "a 
party" in a tug of war with TANU (Tordoff 1967 :i48) . And Nyerere 
used his detention powers to silence political opposition even 
before such opposition had been outlawed. In February 1964, with
41The Standard, September 28, 1962.
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all trade union leaders in detention, a Bill was introduced in 
Parliament and was, in a day, passed as the National Union of 
Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act 1964. The Act dissolved 
the TFL and its member unions and established a new central union 
instead, making it the only lawful trade union in the country, 
and affiliating it to the ruling party, TANU.
The new union, the "National Union of Tanganyika Workers" was 
deliberately given (the inaccurate) NUTA as its official acronym 
so as to emphasise its affiliation to TANU. The objects of NUTA, 
as stated in the schedule to the Act, included the promotion of 
TANU's policies and encouraging its members to -join TANU. The 
Secretary-General of NUTA and his deputy were appointed by the 
President of the Republic who could also dissolve the Union at 
any time, and replace it with another body of employees. Nyerere 
immediately appointed his Minister for Labour, Michael Kamaliza, 
as NUTA's first Secretary-General. This outlawing of trade union 
activity except through a single organisation statutorily 
affiliated to the ruling party and committed to promoting its 
policies was, in our view, implementing the one-party state 
system well in advance of its formal adoption.
Another such advance step was in respect of the army. After the 
mutiny, which was regarded as an act of betrayal of the people 
and, particularly, of Nyerere and TANU (Bienen 1965:44), Nyerere 
disbanded the army and started building a new one that would be 
loyal. And loyalty to TANU became the new criterion for 
recruitment into the armed forces. The TANU Secretary and
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commissioner for Coast Region, Mr S Kitundu, was commissioned 
into the army with the honorary rank of colonel and appointed 
political commissar of the People's Defence Forces, as the new 
army was styled. TANU was also infused into the Police Force, 
thus projecting TANU as the single national institution loyalty 
to which was loyalty to the country and its people (Bienen 1965:44- 
45; 1978:155-9; Tordoff 1967:164) . Civil servants were similarly 
invited and encouraged to join TANU.
All that took place in 1964 while the Presidential Commission on 
the Establishment of the One Party State was yet to complete its 
work and report to the President.
3.4.2: The Presidential Commission for the One-Party State
In the Terms of Reference given to the Commission, the President 
emphasised a number of principles: Tanganyika to remain a
Republic with an executive president, equality for all citizens, 
maximum political freedom within the context of "a single 
national movement", people's free choice of their representatives 
in the legislature, people's participation in the Government and 
their ultimate control over state organs, and observance of the 
Rule of Law and independence of the Judiciary. He amplified 
those principles in two accompanying documents: The National
Ethic and Guide to the Commission on a One-Party State.42 The 
former included, in a condensed form, Nyerere's ideas lucidly 
explained in his June 1962 speech in the National Assembly.
42See Tanzania 1965:2-4, paragraphs 7, 12-16, and Nyerere 1966:262-5.
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The Commission was required to consider a number of things. They 
included the kind of representative institutions necessary in a 
one-party state; whether party membership should be open to all 
irrespective of differences of opinions; whether the National 
Assembly and the NEC should continue as separate entities; the 
appropriate party organs for policy formulation, popular 
expression, peaceful change of leadership, and preventing 
corruption and abuse of power; qualifications and procedures for 
elections to representative bodies and to the presidency; the 
need to avoid conflict between the legislative body and the 
President; whether there should be any system of discipline over 
members of the Government and of the legislature; the 
participation of civil servants in political institutions; the 
need to ensure people's freedom to form pressure groups; and the 
role of trade unions and other specialised organisations. The 
list was not meant to be exhaustive.
The Commission was given a fairly wide scope in its 
deliberations. No time frame was given for it to submit the 
report although the President had made it clear that he wanted 
it to expedite its work. But in addition to the principles which 
the Commission had to observe, the decision whether Tanganyika 
should be a one-party state was not for the Commission's 
consideration; it had already been taken, and was not to be the 
subject of further debate. That is probably why President 
Nyerere went ahead with changes in the organisations of the trade 
union movement and the armed forces without waiting for the 
Commission's recommendations or a new constitution.
In the course of its work, the Commission received submissions 
from organisations as well as individuals suggesting various 
ideas for consideration by the Commission in recommending the 
form and institutions of the one-party state to be established. 
In its submission to the Commission, the Tanganyika Law Society 
emphasised the need for a Bill of Rights in the proposed one- 
party state (Martin,R:42) , a suggestion which was not accepted.
Ghai and McAuslan, then lecturers in the Faculty of Law at Dar 
es Salaam, proposed a reorganised Executive to be formed out of 
a merger of the Cabinet and the Central Committee of TANU. The 
merger, they suggested, should form a National Political Bureau 
of up to 45 members to include the President, Ministers, leaders 
of national organisations like the Trade Union, Youth League, 
Women's Union, etc., senior TANU leaders, and a few members 
nominated by the President. From amongst the members of this 
Bureau the President should select a Central Executive Committee 
(or Cabinet) of about 10 to 12 members, headed by the President 
himself, which would meet weekly to "keep under constant review 
the policies of the nation, and their implementation," while the 
Bureau would be responsible for the general direction and control 
of the Administration (Ghai & McAuslan 1965:128-9) .
To ensure government responsibility they suggested that the 
members of the National Political Bureau should be responsible, 
both collectively and individually, to the National Assembly, 
which should include all members of the Bureau; but directly 
elected members, they insisted, should always constitute a clear
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majority of the National Assembly (Ghai & McAuslan 1965:140-1 )
The suggestions submitted to the Commission were in no way 
similar or uniform. Thus, while Ghai and McAuslan proposed a 
merger of the National Assembly and the NEC of TANU into a single 
body to constitute the legislature (Ghai & McAuslan 1965:137-8), 
Ronald Blanche, then an expatriate Assistant Controller and 
Auditor General, proposed in his submission that the two bodies 
should retain their separate existence because they had 
essentially different functions.43 In the event it is the 
latter suggestion which was adopted.
Finally, the Commission submitted its report in March 1965. In 
the Terms of Reference, and in the President's Guide to the 
Commission, the idea of a system whereby elected leaders could, 
if proved unsuitable, be removed by the people without having to 
wait for their terms to expire was not put forward as clearly as 
it was in the President's One-Party Thesis (Nyerere 1963:23; 1966: 
202) . As a result no views were invited on that suggestion and 
the Commission does not even mention it in its report.
On removing Party discipline the recommendations of the 
Commission were far short of Nyerere's arguments, in his thesis, 
that elections should be free and open to any member of the party 
to contest. It is worth noting that in elections to the Bukoba 
District Council held after the publication of Nyerere's thesis,
43Ronald B. Blanche, A Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential 
Commission," Dar es Salaam, March 31, 1964, paragraphs 10, 24 & 24.
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a number of councillors, though TANU members, were elected as 
independents; they had been encouraged by Nyerere's argument for 
open elections. Once in the council they were joined by a few 
TANU councillors, again encouraged by Nyerere's argument on free 
discussion, in resisting the TANU whip. The council was divided. 
Following that experience the NEC decided to retract Nyerere's 
argument when it came to implementation (Tordoff 1967:114-5 ) .
In the event, the Commission recommended that in elections to 
Parliament, only TANU candidates may seek nomination and go 
through a pre-selection process in which the NEC should have the 
final authority of selecting up to a maximum of three candidates 
in a constituency, from among whom the voters would then elect 
one. A similar arrangement was recommended for elections to 
local government authorities, with the District Executive 
Committee of TANU making the final selection of three candidates 
to be presented to the voters. Regarding the Party whip the 
Commission said it served no useful function, but failed to make 
any clear recommendation. While emphasising "complete freedom 
of discussion in the National Assembly" the Commission still 
insisted that MPs should "remain loyal to the basic principles 
of the Party," which left it rather ambiguous. On party
membership the Commission recommended that it should be open to 
any person who accepted the basic principles and beliefs of the 
party. This would not be restrictive because TANU principles 
were not narrow ideological formulations, but "a broad statement 
of political faith" supported by "the vast majority of the people 
of Tanganyika" and all people "of goodwill in every civilised
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country in the world" (Tanzania 1965:16)
The Commission recommended against merging the National Assembly 
and the NEC, and that instead of the TANU Parliamentary Party 
(TPP), all MPs should constitute a Standing Committee of the 
Annual Conference (the highest organ) of TANU, of which they 
should be ex-officio members. Other recommendations needed no 
consideration because they had already been effected: allowing 
civil servants and members of the armed forces to join TANU, and 
affiliating the trade union and cooperative movements to TANU.
The overall framework recommended by the Commission was adopted 
and effected by the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965, which 
we see in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Government Responsibility Under the 
One Party System
4.0: INTRODUCTION
Section 3 of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965 
(hereinafter the Interim Constitution) which was adopted on July 
11, 1965, declared that "there shall be one political party," and 
that "all political activity in Tanzania, other than that of the 
organs of State... shall be conducted by or under the auspices 
of the Party." The Constitution of TANU was, as the only lawful 
political party, appended to the Interim Constitution as its 
First Schedule.
The proposals for the Interim Constitution were based on the 
recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the 
Establishment of a Democratic One Party State (hereinafter the 
"Presidential Commission"), and they were presented to the 
National Assembly by President Nyerere on June 8, 1965,
exercising his right to address the National Assembly in person 
under s.37 of the Republican Constitution. In his address, the 
President repeated his belief in "groping forward" in search of 
structures and institutions that could most suitably serve 
Tanzania's conditions. So he insisted that while a constitution 
should "not be treated lightly", neither should it be regarded 
as a "sacred text" which cannot be criticised or amended (Nyerere
1968:37-8) .
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Yet this constitution was deliberately styled "interim" because 
of some features in it which needed explanation; they all related 
to some of the consequences of the union of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, which had created Tanzania. Firstly, although 
establishing a one-party state the Interim Constitution 
acknowledged, in s.3(2), the existence of two parties, TANU for 
Tanganyika and the Afro-Shirazi Party (hereinafter ASP) for 
Zanzibar. This position was to remain transitional only, pending 
the union of those two parties, after which there would then 
indeed be only one political party for the United Republic.
Secondly, to make a new constitution for the United Republic, the 
Articles of Union (1964)1 required a constitutional commission 
and a constituent assembly to be appointed and summoned for that 
purpose by the President acting in agreement with the Executive 
for Zanzibar. This was hot done in 1965; the only justification 
for the course adopted then was that the constitution was interim 
only, like the arrangement that had been there since the union 
in April 1964.
Finally, following the January 1964 revolution which had put the 
ASP in power in Zanzibar, there were no elections in the isles. 
It was generally understood that democratic processes had been 
suspended as a necessary and temporary consequence of the violent 
overthrow of the previous order, and the new constitution did not 
seek to alter that position yet. There were thus a number of 
reasons for styling this Constitution as "Interim".
1Schedule to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act 1964.
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But this 1 Interim" Constitution remained in force up to 1977 when 
it was replaced by another Constitution. During that period of 
12 years under the Interim Constitution, the one-party state 
system was established and strengthened, and reached the peak of 
its consolidation. This chapter looks at the effect of the one- 
party system and its consolidation on government responsibility.
4.1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF TANZANIA 1965
Generally, the Interim Constitution re-enacted most of the 
essential features of the Republican Constitution as outlined in 
Chapter 4. Provisions of the Interim Constitution specifically 
relating to the one-party system made little visible impact 
because there was a de facto one-party state even before the new 
constitution. A completely new innovation, though, related to 
the electoral process which was designed mainly in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Presidential Commission [s.28],2 
and was used for the first time in the general elections in 
September 1965. An aspiring candidate for election to the 
National Assembly had to be a TANU member nominated by securing 
25 signatures of persons registered as voters in the constituency 
he wished to contest. The nomination papers bearing the 25 
signatures were then submitted to the Returning Officer for the 
area.
Then came the pre-selection process: all those who had submitted
throughout this section, references in square brackets are provisions of 
the Interim Constitution.
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their nomination papers appeared before the TANU District 
Conference which interviewed them and then recorded its order of 
preference amongst the candidates (by way of preferential votes 
cast by the delegates to the Conference in a secret ballot) . The 
District Conference then forwarded the entire record of its 
meeting to the NEC which made the final selection of two 
candidates to be presented to the electorate. In its final 
selection, the NEC was not bound by the preferential order of the 
District Conference. The Presidential Commission had actually 
recommended that three candidates be selected and presented to 
the electorate but this was reduced to two to ensure nobody could 
be elected by a minority vote.
Next came the campaigns. The new law3 required all campaigning 
to be organised by TANU's District Executive Committees, always 
ensuring a fair and equal opportunity to each of the candidates 
and, specifically, that candidates incurred no expenses of their 
own in furtherance of their campaigns for election. Accordingly, 
campaigns were made through public meetings organised by TANU 
District Committees, at which the two contending candidates took 
turns to address the audience and answer questions, sharing the 
same TANU platform. Finally, the people voted by secret ballot; 
for most voters, the 1965 General Election gave them their first 
opportunity to vote.
These elections, being the first under the one-party system, were
3The National Assembly (Elections) Act 1964, as amended by the National 
Assembly (Elections) (Amendment) Act 1965.
119
observed with great interest, both within and outside the 
country. A number of incumbents, including a couple of cabinet 
ministers, lost their seats. Generally, the elections were 
acclaimed as a success in democratic practice.4
Presidential elections were held at the same time as 
parliamentary elections. But the Presidential candidate had no 
competitor. Section 7(3) of the Interim Constitution provided 
for nomination of only one candidate by the Electoral Conference 
of the Party. The Conference was constituted by members of the 
Annual Conference of TANU, re-named "National Conference" in 
1965, in a joint meeting with delegates of the ASP.5 The 
candidate so nominated was then presented to the electorate to 
be voted "For" or "Against". The President was declared elected 
if he obtained more than 50% "Yes" vote.
For the Presidential election the Party was, as recommended by 
the Presidential Commission, required to campaign actively for 
its sole candidate. Campaigning for the Presidential candidate 
was done by TANU regional and district leaders in the same 
parliamentary election campaign meetings which they organised and 
supervised. The people of Zanzibar also took part in the 
election of the President of the United Republic; there, the 
campaign for the Presidential candidate was vigorously conducted 
by the ASP leadership and the "Yes" vote was proportionally far 
much larger than on the Mainland (ciiffe:359) .
4For a detailed account, see Cliffe.
5Article E.3(2) of the TANU Constitution.
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As hinted above, apart from the election of the President of the 
United Republic, the Interim Constitution provided for no 
elections at all in Zanzibar and none were held until 1980. 
Zanzibar's representatives to the union legislature, whose number 
was 52, were all appointed by the President [s.24(1) (d), (e) , and 
ss.31,32] .
The National Assembly thus consisted of four categories of 
members [s. 24] . The first consisted of 107 (increased to 120 
later6) directly-elected constituency members. Secondly were 20 
Regional Commissioners who were ex officio members; their number 
grew to 21, 23 and 25 in 1971, 1972 and 1974 respectively.7
Thirdly were members appointed by the President: 32 from amongst 
the members of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar, 2 0 from 
Zanzibar (not being members of the Revolutionary Council), and 
10 from any part of the United Republic. The fourth category 
consisted of 3 0 members, designated "National", who were 
indirectly elected by all the MPs of the other categories, from 
a list submitted by institutions designated by the President as 
"national institutions."8 As Regional Commissioners were 
appointed by the President [s.20], the National Assembly included 
up to 82 MPs appointed by the President, and the elected members
6By the National Assembly (Alteration of the Number of Constituency 
Members) Act 1968.
7Interim Constitution (Increase in the Number of Regional Commissioners) 
Act 1971, and similarly short-titled Acts of 1972 and 1974.
8In the 1965 election, the President designated the following institutions: 
the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), the Cooperative Union of 
Tanganyika (CUT), the Tanganyika Women's Union (UWT), the TANU Youth League 
(TYL), the Tanganyika African Parents' Association (TAPA), the Tanganyika 
Association of Chambers of Commerce, and the University College of Dar es Salaam. 
For the 1970 elections, the last two were omitted.
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had only a narrow majority.
Apart from those changes in elections to the National Assembly 
and in its composition, other provisions remained as they were 
previously. Even relations between the legislature and the 
executive remained much the same as they were under the 
Republican Constitution.
But one significant pre-occupation of the Interim Constitution, 
especially with regard to the executive, was the structure of the 
Union. Thus while executive power continued to vest in the 
President, it was in respect of Union matters only; for non-union 
matters the President's executive authority was limited to 
Tanganyika [s.12(1)]. Executive power for non-union matters in 
and for Zanzibar was vested in the President of Zanzibar 
[s.54(1)]. The constitution provided for two Vice-Presidents: 
the First Vice-President was the principal assistant of the 
President in relation to Zanzibar and the Second Vice-President 
was such assistant in relation to Tanganyika; but the former was 
also the President of Zanzibar [s.13(1)], vested with executive 
power in and for Zanzibar in all matters other than union matters 
[ss.53 & 54(1)]. The Second Vice-President was in effect the 
same as the Vice-President under the Republican Constitution: 
Leader of Government Business in the National Assembly [s.13(1)], 
of which he had to be an elected member as a pre-condition 
[s.15(1)] .
All ministers, which expression included both vice-presidents
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[s.85(1)], were appointed by the President [s.15]; but the 
appointment of the First Vice-President was no more than a 
"formal endorsement", by the President, of the position of the 
head of Executive for Zanzibar in whose election or appointment 
neither the President nor the Interim Constitution had anything 
to do whatsoever. But a simultaneous effect of this "formal 
endorsement" was to make the President of Zanzibar a member of 
the National Assembly, a necessary qualification for the vice­
presidency and membership of the Cabinet [ss.15 & 17(1)].
But all in all, the powers of the President were not derogated 
from by the Interim Constitution. His absolute discretion and 
power to disregard advice were retained [s.6(2)]; the Cabinet 
remained his "principal instrument of policy" primarily 
responsible to him "for such departments" as he "may assign them" 
[s. 13 (3)] and for such matters as he chose to refer to them 
[s.17(2)]. And the relationship between the President and the 
National Assembly, as well as provisions relating to the civil 
service and the judiciary, remained as they had been under the 
Republican Constitution.
Another notable innovation of the Interim Constitution was the 
introduction of the Tanzanian Ombudsman, in the form of the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry (hereinafter the PCE) . This had 
been recommended by the Presidential Commission as a way of 
safeguarding the rights and freedom of the individual, a subject 
strongly emphasised by the President himself. A Bill of Rights 
was considered for that purpose by the Presidential Commission
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which had even received a submission by the Tanganyika Law 
Society urging the adoption of a Bill of Rights (Martin,R:42) . But 
a Bill of Rights was rejected by the Presidential Commission, 
amplifying reasons given earlier in the 1962 "Proposals for a 
Republic", and in Nyerere's "National Ethic" statements.
A Bill of Rights, said the Presidential Commission (Tanzania 
1965:30-2) , was unsuitable for a young nation. Quoting Nyerere 
about the absence in Tanzania of both a "long tradition of 
nationhood" and "strong physical means of national security which 
older countries take for granted" (Nyerere 1966:312), the 
Presidential Commission warned that a Bill of Rights would limit 
"in advance of events the measures which Government" could 
otherwise take against the threat of subversion and disorder. 
The Commission also saw that a Bill of Rights would "invite a 
conflict between the Judiciary and the Executive and Legislature" 
by drawing the courts "into the arena of political controversy", 
and into political decision-making which is not a judicial 
function.
The Presidential Commission therefore adopted Nyerere's argument 
that a "National Ethic", not the cold print of the law, was 
ultimately the best safeguard of the rights of the individual. 
It cited the United Kingdom as "a striking example" of the 
effectiveness of "a national ethic in controlling the exercise 
of political power":
A Government in Britain... could legislate to abolish elections, detain 
political opponents without trial and establish a censorship of the Press, 
radio and television. Indeed most of these things were done by Parliament 
when the British people stood on the brink of disaster in the Second World
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War. They are not done in peacetime; not because there is anything in the 
law... but because they are unthinkable. In other words there is a 
consensus between the people and their leaders about how the process of 
Government should be carried on. It is on this that the traditional 
freedoms of the British people depend.9
And the Presidential Commission urged a deliberate effort to 
build such a tradition on the basis of ethical principles to be 
declared in the preamble. The Presidential Commission's was 
possibly the most comprehensive, reasoned public rejection of a 
Bill of Rights in Tanzania.
But appreciating the need to safeguard individual rights, the 
Commission recommended the establishment of the PCE and the 
recommendation was adopted. The role and function of the PCE are 
given in detail in Chapter Five below.
4.2: CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
The Independence Constitution incorporated the principle of 
separation of powers, and the system whereby the Government, 
through the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, was responsible to 
an elected Parliament whose authority over the Cabinet was 
supreme. This position was derogated from by the Republican 
Constitution which established an executive president who was 
also part of the legislature but was not accountable to it. Then 
the Interim Constitution elevated the Party . to a new 
constitutional position.
This development had a number of effects and implications
9Tanzania 1965, paragraph 104 at p.32.
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regarding the key organs of the state, their powers and their 
inter-relationships in discharging their respective functions. 
In this section we look at the changing roles of the Parliament 
and the Party, and their inter-relationship with the Executive. 
While Parliament lost much of its power and authority, the Party 
correspondingly gained importance. Meanwhile, the Executive 
certainly stabilised its position of unchallenged dominance.
4.2.1: The Decline of Parliament
The progressive erosion of the powers of Parliament brought by 
the Republican Constitution illustrates how illusory the cold 
print of the law can be where the actual conditions are different 
from what the law envisages. Certainly, the Independence 
Constitution sought to set up a "government responsible to a 
freely elected Parliament" as its preamble declared; yet it soon 
proved so easy to replace it with the Republican Constitution 
under which the government ceased to be responsible to Parliament 
while retaining the preambular declaration of a "government 
responsible to a freely elected Parliament." The preamble to the 
Interim Constitution also retained that declaration.
The fact, however, is that in spite of express provisions in the 
Independence Constitution for Parliament to censure the 
government, the Independence Parliament was nevertheless a weak 
one, and was not fully capable of exercising the effective 
control envisaged by the constitution. The fact that the 
Government Party held all seats in the National Assembly was, in
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itself, a weakening factor; the Government could easily use the 
leadership of the Party to ensure that the National Assembly 
approved every proposal presented before it. After all, 
Government policies and proposals were all based on the beliefs 
of the party, of which all MPs were members. That relative 
weakness of Parliament was evident in 1962 when Nyerere, the 
party leader, had resigned as Prime Minister; the focus of public 
attention shifted from Parliament to TANU as the maker of major 
policy decisions (Leys 1963:136). Even the decision that 
Tanganyika should become a Republic was made by TANU, and only 
brought to Parliament for implementation.
The Republican Constitution eroded the authority of Parliament 
by stripping it of its power of censuring the Government. It 
also undermined the principle of separation of powers by making 
the President, in whom was concentrated so much power, a 
constituent part of the legislature. And in s.44 (2), it 
underscored the subservience of Parliament to the Executive by 
empowering the latter to dissolve Parliament at any time. All 
this added to the already weak position of Parliament on account 
of it being an entirely single-party Parliament.
It even enabled the President to go forward with plans to 
establish a one-party state simply on the basis of a party 
decision and without any reference at all to Parliament. Unlike
LeaJinj
the 1962 developments^ to a Republic, in which the National 
Assembly was first asked to approve a Government Motion in 
February and then a Government Paper in June before passing the
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constitution in November, in June 1965 the National Assembly was 
presented with the proposed one-party state constitution as a 
fait accompli.
Subsequently, under the Interim Constitution, even the 
legislative supremacy of the Parliament was lost. In January 
1967 the NEC of TANU met at Arusha and passed a resolution, since 
known as the Arusha Declaration,10 committing Tanzania to 
socialism. President Nyerere first announced it, explaining at 
length, at a public rally on February 5, 1967. The declaration 
specifically mentioned "public ownership of the major means of 
production and exchange" as an essential aspect of socialism. 
Almost immediately after the President's announcement of the 
Arusha Declaration the Government nationalised all banks, the 
insurance business, and well over ten private firms engaged in 
various businesses (Nyerere 1968:251-6) . When the National Assembly 
subsequently met on February 14 and 15, 1967, it was presented
with Bills which it dutifully passed and retrospectively 
legalised the nationalisations.11 It was not imagined that the 
National Assembly could reject the Bills. Parliament had thus 
changed from a legislating authority to a rubber stamp giving 
legitimacy to decisions made elsewhere.
Following those "Arusha Declaration" enactments, a question was
10For the text of the Arusha Declaration, see Nyerere 1968: 231-50.
i:iNational Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and 
Liabilities) Act 1967, State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of 
Interests) Act 1967, National Agricultural Products Board (Vesting of Interests) 
Act 1967, Insurance (Vesting of Interests and Regulation) Act 1967, and 
Industrial Shares (Acquisition) Act 1967.
128
raised in Parliament in 1967: which was supreme, Parliament or 
the Party? (Msekwa:40; Mwakyembe 1986:42) The question was apparently 
played down then, only to resurface in the 1968 "Supremacy 
Debate." During the June-July 1968 session of the National 
Assembly, some MPs questioned the Government on a number of 
issues, including the role of Regional Commissioners in the 
Assembly, the absence of elections in Zanzibar, why TANU and the 
ASP had not merged, and so on. Mr Chogga, the MP for Iringa 
South, particularly called for the formation of other political 
parties to be allowed and also sought to amend the constitution 
in order to compel the President to act only according to the 
advice of Parliament which, he insisted, was supreme.12
The Second Vice-President sharply criticised the attempts to 
question the authority of the Party, emphasised that the role and 
function of the National Assembly was actually no more than 
ensuring that the Government implemented the policies of the 
Party, and called for the resignation of any MPs opposed to the 
policies of TANU or the ASP.13 In that same session, a private 
member's motion tabled by Mr Ndobho, MP for Musoma North, wanted 
the Government to abandon its decision to pay generous gratuities 
to Ministers, Regional Commissioners and Area Commissioners, 
contrary to the spirit of the Arusha Declaration. The motion was 
carried.
The success of the Ndobho Motion was seen as a sign of the
12Majadiliano ya Bunge, July 22, 1968: cols.2469-72.
13Ibid., cols.2533-4.
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National Assembly regaining its authority.14 It was a false 
sign. In the October 1968 session of Parliament, the contest for 
supremacy between Parliament and the Party came up again through 
Mr Masha (Geita East), Mr Mwakitwange (National) , and again Mr 
Chogga (Iringa South), amongst others.15 Once again, the Second 
Vice-President, Mr Kawawa, and a Deputy Minister in his Office, 
Mr Richard Wambura, insisted that Parliament belonged to TANU, 
which had picked the MPs in nominations and had the right to 
discipline them and to dictate their tasks, and that the 
supremacy of the Party had to be accepted and understood once and 
for all.16 And indeed it was soon so understood by everybody. 
A couple of weeks after the National Assembly debate, the NEC of 
TANU met in Tanga and expelled seven MPs from the party for, 
among other reasons, "gross violation of the Party creed and 
opposition to its policies."17
Their expulsion from the Party meant automatic loss of their 
parliamentary seats: according to ss.27(l) and 35(1)(a) of the 
Interim Constitution, membership of the Party was a necessary 
qualification both for election to and for continued membership 
of the National Assembly. It became immediately clear that the 
expulsion was intended to be both a punishment for, and a warning 
against, questioning the superiority of the party over 
Parliament. All except two of the expelled MPs were those who
14Thoden van Velzen & Sterkenburgh 1972(a):248-53, especially at p.252.
lsMajadiliano ya Bunge, October 1, 1968: cols.30-42.
16Ibid.: cols.23, 47-8.
17See Thoden van Velzen & Sterkenburgh 1972(b), and Msekwa:48.
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had insisted on Parliamentary supremacy. The only two exceptions 
would have nevertheless lost their parliamentary seats due to 
absence: they were Oscar Kambona who was in self exile in London, 
and Eli Anangisye who was in detention. Following that expulsion 
the National Assembly's public esteem and its importance as a 
national institution were severely eroded (Kjekshus:79) .
While in 1968 the attempts to assert parliamentary supremacy were 
made by only a few MPs, a similar attempt in November 1973 was 
made by a majority of the Assembly when they rejected the 
Government's Income Tax Bill. Immediately upon rejection, the 
President exercised his right under s.46 of the Interim 
Constitution and made an unscheduled address to the National 
Assembly. In his address, he threatened to exercise his powers 
to dissolve Parliament under s.40 (2) of the Constitution if the 
MPs persisted in rejecting that Bill. It was soon presented 
again and the Assembly passed it unanimously as the Income Tax 
Act 1973, proving its utter powerlessness.
In 1975, even the representative character of the National 
Assembly seemed to have lost its importance. A constitutional 
amendment18 reduced the number of directly elected constituency 
members from 120 to 88 (it was shortly raised to 9619) , and 
increased by 20 the number of indirectly elected members. These 
developments were part of the process of the formal entrenchment
18The Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act 1975, s.5.
19The Interim Constitution (Increase of the Number of Constituency Members) 
Act 1975.
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of the concept of Party Supremacy which we look at in a separate 
section below. They culminated in the Constitution of the United 
Republic of Tanzania 1977 which virtually stripped Parliament of 
its sovereignty by reducing the National Assembly to a committee 
of the National Conference of the Party which was declared by the 
same constitution to be supreme and having "final authority in 
all matters." Parliament came close to losing its identity.
4.2.2: The Ascent of the Party
TANU's pre-dominance in the nationalist struggle and its sweeping 
electoral victory laid the foundations of its future claim to 
political monopoly as its right. Before independence, opposition 
to TANU amounted to betrayal of the cause of nationalism. After 
independence, opposition to TANU was almost similarly regarded 
as treachery or treason, mainly (if not only) because of TANU's 
role in achieving independence. As the only -basis for such 
negative regard to opposition may have been utterly implausible 
and misconceived according to liberal democratic standards; but 
it was nevertheless there, and it accounted for the abject 
weakness or near absence of opposition at independence.
Nyerere's popularity and astute personality were other factors 
behind TANU's ascendancy to a position of unquestioned authority. 
Thus, when in January 1962 TANU decided that Tanganyika should 
become a Republic, the legitimacy of that decision was not 
questioned. And the subsequent merging of the offices of state 
President and TANU President in Julius Nyerere added to TANU'S
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pre-eminence; TANU's decisions were taken for granted as final. 
Thus the decision of TANU was, alone, enough to change the state 
constitution and adopt a one-party system. Significantly, even 
the recommendation of the Presidential Commission that members 
of the NEC who were not already MPs should be paid the same 
salary and benefits as MPs is said to have been implemented 
immediately by the Speaker's Office (Tanzania 1965:17; Msekwa:34-5) , 
without further authorisation!
But really it was the Interim Constitution that enhanced the 
status and importance of the Party. The role of the NEC in the 
electoral process could be used to ensure that only those who 
support the Party in all things had access to Parliament. And 
the power of the NEC to terminate the parliamentary tenure of a 
member by mere expulsion from the Party ensured that an MP, once 
elected, supported the Party at all times. Thus where both 
Nyerere and the Presidential Commission had recommended doing 
away with the Party whip, its substitute was in effect far worse 
than the whip. Significantly, after the 1965 general election, 
the very first law that was passed by the new Assembly was the 
National Executive Committee (Powers and Privileges) Act 1965 
which, as recommended by the Presidential Commission, gave to the 
NEC the same powers of summoning witnesses and calling for papers 
as those of the National Assembly.
By annexing the Constitution of TANU as a Schedule to the state 
constitution, with unfettered freedom to TANU to amend its 
constitution, the Party was in effect authorised to dictate
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amendments to the state constitution. This did in fact occur in 
1967. Among other things, the Arusha Declaration also adopted 
some rather stringent qualifications for offices of political 
leadership, to conform with socialist objectives.20 The 
qualifications prohibited TANU and Government leaders, including 
MPs, from holding shares in companies, being directors in 
privately owned enterprises, owning houses for rent or receiving 
more than one salary. Following that declaration of the Party, 
the Interim Constitution was extensively amended by adding to the 
qualifications for membership of Parliament the leadership 
qualifications of the Arusha Declaration and requiring all MPs 
to comply with them within a year and a month after the 
announcement of the Arusha Declaration.21
In another manifestation, also through the Arusha Declaration, 
TANU in effect issued what amounted to a directive straight to 
the Government to implement the policy of socialism "without 
waiting for a Presidential Commission on Socialism."22 
Apparently, the Government took this "directive" as the basis for 
nationalising banks and other privately owned business^ and only 
legalising the nationalisations after the event.
Certainly, the 196 8 expulsions from the Party, and thereby from 
Parliament, graphically demonstrated the Party's superior might. 
The expulsions were followed by a directive that all major policy
20The Arusha Declaration, Part V(a).
21The Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1967.
22The Arusha Declaration, Part V(b)(2).
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issues should be submitted to the NEC of the Party first for 
consideration and approval before being taken to Parliament. 
Subsequently, that became the procedure for all development 
plans, both annual and five-year plans; the Second Five-Year 
Development Plan 1969-74, and the Decentralisation Programme of 
1972 (which abolished local government) were carried out in that 
order (Msekwa 49-52) .
A number of such decisions have actually originated from the 
Party itself, and the Government has simply been directed to 
implement them, Parliament coming in only to enact laws where 
necessary for such implementation. They include the decision to 
transfer the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, the decision 
on the Villagisation Programme23 under which huge numbers of 
rural peasants were moved from scattered homesteads to village 
settlements. Meanwhile, the powers of summoning witnesses and 
calling for papers given to the NEC in 1965 was used for the 
first time in February 1973, when heads of some parastatal firms 
and one Minister and his Principal Secretary were summoned to 
explain problems pertaining to their respective bodies before the 
Central Committee of the Party, acting on behalf of the NEC.
Generally, it became the norm that issues of policy were the 
preserve of the Party and Parliament remained with the technical 
function of passing legislation to facilitate Government 
implementation of Party policy and decisions. It was further
23There is a lot of literature on this subject: Lofchie, McHenry 1979,
Mwapachu, de Vries & Fortmann, Mwansasu & Pratt:93-165, Hyden 1980, etc.
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understood that once the Party had decided anything, everybody 
else was to conform with that decision without further debate. 
It was a pattern which ultimately developed into the concept 
expressed as "Party Supremacy."
The formal incorporation of Party Supremacy in the constitution 
began in 1975 when s. 3 of the Interim Constitution was amended24 
so as to require not only "all political activity" as was 
hitherto the case, but also the "functions of all the organs of 
State" to "be performed under the auspices of the Party." 
Shortly after this amendment Nyerere proposed to TANU and the 
ASP, in a joint meeting as an Electoral Conference, that the two 
should merge. Subsequently, the proposal received overwhelming 
support and in February 1977 TANU and the ASP merged to form one 
political party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Following this 
merger, a new state constitution was adopted and came into force 
on April 26, 1977, asserting Party Supremacy more categorically.
Before looking into the details of that constitution and the 
implications of the supremacy it declared so categorically, we 
first look at the position of the executive.
4.3: THE DOMINANCE OF THE EXECUTIVE
As the power and authority of the Party in relation to Parliament 
increased, the power and dominance of the executive, which had 
begun rising under the Republican Constitution, grew even further
24By s.3 of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act 1975.
136
under the Interim Constitution. As the instrument for 
controlling the government, Parliament was weakened in two ways. 
Firstly, was the power of the President to appoint some MPs and, 
from amongst the MPs, to appoint ministers and junior ministers. 
Secondly, was the complete lack of censorial powers on the part 
of the National Assembly. The result was a position of unchecked 
dominance for the executive.
4.3.1: Effect of Presidential Appointments
The Interim Constitution strengthened the Executive over the 
legislature in one significant way: by increasing the number of 
MPs appointed by the President to 82, from a mere 10 under the 
Republican Constitution. Now, in addition to the original 10 
members, the President also appointed 32 from amongst the members 
of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, and another 2 0 to 
represent Zanzibar. In addition, there were 20 regional 
commissioners, also appointed by the President, who became ex 
officio MPs under the Interim Constitution. Therefore, out of 
a maximum capacity of 204 members of the National Assembly (with 
107 elected and 15 indirectly elected members), the President 
appointed up to just over 40% of the Assembly. Indeed, a 
majority of this group consisted of MPs from Zanzibar where, as 
a temporary measure, there were no elections; but the said 
"temporary" arrangement was in force for well over 15 years 
during which the President continued to nominate MPs from 
Zanzibar.
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The assumption that such nominated members played to the tune of 
the Executive cannot be dismissed. The President's power to 
appoint MPs does not seem to have been constrained by a strict 
requirement to observe the qualifications of membership which 
bound the elected members, enabling the President to appoint to 
Parliament even a person disqualified for election. Thus in 
1965, the President appointed Chief Abdulla Saidi Fundikira to 
Parliament although the latter was no longer a TANU member, a 
necessary qualification, having resigned from TANU in protest
President used this power to bring electoral casualties back to 
Parliament: Paul Bomani was appointed to Parliament (and to the 
Cabinet) after his 1965 election defeat; Johnston Kihampa was 
appointed regional commissioner after a similar defeat in 1970;
Parliament in 1981 and to the Cabinet in 1982; Chrisant 
Mzindakaya lost his parliamentary seat through a successful 
election petition in 1981, contested the by-election that 
followed and lost, but returned to Parliament on appointment as 
a regional commissioner.
That appointed MPs owed their loyalty to the Executive was not 
merely theoretical: the President also had the power to revoke 
his appointment and thereby terminate prematurely the 
parliamentary tenure of his appointed members. Such premature
25Bagenda: 108; Fundikira's 1964 letter of resignation from TANU, addressed 
to Nyerere, and Nyerere's reply accepting the resignation were read out at a 
seminar of the Tanganyika Law Society on "Democracy and Political Pluralism" held 
in Dar es Salaam in September 1990.
state system.25 And on occasions the
Daud Mwakawago 1980 elections but was appointed to
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termination of tenure was not very common but in the early years 
of the Interim Constitution it must have occurred, specifically 
with members from or representing Zanzibar. As there were no 
elections in Zanzibar, membership of the Zanzibar Revolutionary 
Council was by appointment of the First Vice-President and 
President of Zanzibar, who was the Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Council, in whom the Constitutional Government and Rule of Law 
Decree 1964 vested all powers: executive, legislative and
judicial (othman & shaidi: 194-6) . An MP appointed to the Union 
Parliament on the basis of his or her membership of the 
Revolutionary Council could not continue as an MP if he or she 
ceased to be a member of the Council for whatever reason, 
including removal by the Zanzibar President.
It would seem that when such cessation of membership occurred, 
hardly any information was given to the public, or even to 
Parliament. Thus in 1968 the MP for Geita South, Mrs Milembe 
Ng'winamila, was prompted to complain in Parliament:
Why is it that each time we meet in this Parliament we always see new 
faces from Zanzibar? Where have all the old ones gone? ...And even if 
they have been replaced by whatever methods used in Zanzibar, why aren't 
we informed? ...We all understand that these are our fellow MPs, and they 
disappear just like that! We must be informed...26
She went on to complain about the MPs from Zanzibar (all of them 
nominated) for their unjustified silent complacency and total 
reluctance to criticise the government even mildly, and concluded 
that they maintain silence in the Assembly because they feared 
their appointments would be revoked if they spoke their minds.
26Majadiliano ya Bunge, July 22, 1968: col.2502. [Translation from Swahili 
is my own]
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Mrs Ng'winamila's complaint may have implied far more than the 
mere composition of the National Assembly. Following the January 
1964 revolution the Karume regime in Zanzibar was reputed for its 
brutal suppression of -freedom and consistent violation of human 
rights. Karume ordered indiscriminate arrests, detentions, 
tortures and executions of his political rivals, real and 
imagined. The union with Tanganyika provided him with an 
opportunity to transfer some of his rivals to the mainland in 
various capacities, including membership of the National 
Assembly. But such transfers may not have reassured Karume 
enough, and a few of those so transferred may have still fallen 
foul of his indiscriminate orders which, being issued by word of 
mouth, were carried out unrecorded (Mlimuka:2i7) .
Apparently, one of Karume's perceived rivals was Kassim Hanga. 
Until the union, he was Vice-President of Zanzibar. After the 
union he became a minister in the union Cabinet; but in a 
reshuffle made on June 7, 1967, he was dropped from the union
Cabinet. Two months later it was announced in Zanzibar that his 
tenure as member of the Revolutionary Council and the Zanzibar 
Cabinet had been terminated. And in December 1967, it was 
officially announced in Dar es Salaam that Hanga was detained.27 
Karume then demanded that Hanga be returned to Zanzibar to stand 
trial for an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the Zanzibar 
Government. Nyerere obliged and subsequently Hanga was 
atrociously killed, by Karume's orders, without even a semblance 
of a trial (Babu:98-9; Mvungi 1989:20; Smith:i88) . The complaint of Mrs
27 (1967) 4 Africa Research Bulletin: 795BC, 836B and 934B.
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Ng'winamila fitted quite well into the context of Kassim Hanga's 
disappearance, and possibly of others like him.
Another weapon of the Executive in reinforcing itself over the 
legislature was the power of the President to create as many 
ministries as he wished, and to appoint, from amongst the MPs, 
ministers to head them with as many junior ministers as he 
thought fit. There is an argument that by their membership of 
the National Assembly, ministers were also responsible to the 
Assembly, in addition to their responsibility to the President 
(McAuslan: 518-9) . But by appointing as many of the MPs ministers 
and junior ministers (and in later years regional commissioners) 
as he wished, the President easily reduced the size of the 
Assembly to which the ministers were supposed to be responsible.
Appointing MPs ministers or junior ministers or regional 
commissioners is a common (and certainly old) technique of 
silencing vocal independent MPs. In 1962 Richard Wambura and in 
1963 John Mwakangale, until then known to be back bench radicals, 
were appointed regional commissioner and junior minister 
respectively, and at once turned to defending the government. 
The Official Oaths Act 1962 to which all ministers and junior 
ministers became subject not only bound them to secrecy but also 
reinforced "the conventions of collective ministerial 
responsibility" before the National Assembly (McAuslan:518-9) . But 
in the circumstances of Tanzania those conventions guaranteed the 
practical reality of "ministerial solidarity," whereby ministers 
stand firmly together in defence of each other's positions
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(Turpin: 146-8) , more effectively than responsibility.
That the power of the President to appoint ministers could weaken 
the authority of the National Assembly can be illustrated by 
looking at the 1978 composition of the Assembly in relation to 
the Cabinet. Of the Assembly's maximum capacity of 228 members, 
96 were elected constituency members and up to 97 appointed 
members (including 25 regional commissioners) . The remaining 35 
were members indirectly elected to the Assembly. While the 
constituency members, at 96, were not the majority, the President 
reduced their voice further by appointing 19 of them to the then 
4 0-member cabinet, including junior ministers (Mwakyembe:44) .
Besides appointing ministers, the President also had powers of 
appointment in respect of all other important posts; he appointed 
all the directors of parastatal corporations and heads of all 
important public institutions. Some of these posts could be 
fairly lucrative and the President sometimes used them as the 
carrot with which to silence outspoken MPs (shivji 1984:6). One 
such classic case was in 1982 when Edward Mwesiumo, the MP who 
had led an unsuccessful opposition to the Government Bill to 
establish a National Urban Water Authority, was appointed 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of that same Authority 
immediately after it was established!
Another factor adding to the dominance of the Executive was 
possibly the low level of political sophistication and general 
understanding of many of the MPs. Even the callous demands for
142
a multi-party system and for compelling the President to act 
according to parliamentary advice as made by Mr Chogga, the 
champion of parliamentary supremacy, revealed his limited 
appreciation of the country's recent constitutional history and 
his own position as an MP lawfully elected under the one-party 
system. The debate following Chogga's motion seemed to get into 
some apparent confusion, with members defending the one-party 
system in purported support of Chogga's motion for a multi-party 
system.28 President Nyerere may have been aware of this factor 
when he opened the new National Assembly following the 1965 
elections and lectured the MPs on their responsibilities (Nyerere: 
93-6) . He insisted, among other things, on the MPs' right to 
question ministers and demand explanations about issues 
concerning their respective departments, and about the policies 
of the Government in general.
4.3.2: A Powerless National Assembly-
Even if the President's powers of appointment were removed, or 
the quality and political sophistication of the MPs improved (as 
it increasingly did in subsequent elections), the executive would 
still remain dominant in relation to Parliament. This is because 
Parliament had no powers over the executive; even the right of 
MPs to question ministers and demand explanations did not entail 
any censorial powers over the ministers. Even where a minister 
failed completely to answer questions satisfactorily or to
26Majadiliano ya Bunge, July 22, 1968: cols.2484-2505, especially Mr
Kapilima's interjection at col.2489.
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explain problems in his department, the National Assembly has 
been unable to take any action against the minister.
There have been cases where MPs called for particular ministers 
to take political responsibility for affairs in their departments 
and resign. In 1983 the Minister for Home Affairs, Saidi Natepe, 
resigned upon such parliamentary pressure following the escape 
of two remand prisoners (facing treason charges) from Ukonga 
Maximum Security Prison in Dar es Salaam. But had he refused to
resign, there is nothing that the National Assembly could have
done. Only the President has had the power to take action
against his ministers.
Individual ministers have resigned in Tanzania but Saidi Natepe's 
is the only known resignation upon immediate parliamentary
pressure. Oscar Kambona resigned from the Cabinet and as
Secretary-General of TANU in 1967 on alleged grounds of ill
health; but he soon fled the country and it became clear that he 
resigned on account of differences with the President. Edwin 
Mtei resigned as Minister for Finance in 1979, also because of 
differences with the President over economic strategies and
dealing with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The most prominent resignations, almost without precedent in 
Africa, were in January 1977 when Ali Hassan Mwinyi, then
Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Saidi Siyovelwa, Minister of 
State in the President's Office (responsible for state security), 
and Marco Mabawa and Peter Abdalla Kisumo, commissioner for
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Shinyanga and Mwanza Regions respectively, all resigned in one 
day taking political responsibility for deaths that had occurred 
in those two regions at the hands of police and security officers 
conducting investigations and interrogations. Those ministers 
and regional commissioners were never questioned about those 
deaths in Parliament; in fact only a few MPs had heard about 
them. The four were advised to resign in order to appease the 
President who was extremely furious when he heard about the 
murders. All the resignations, therefore, demonstrate the 
authority of the President, not of the Parliament.
On the other hand there have been cases which have shown that the 
National Assembly is utterly powerless over the executive. In 
1981 the local media found large quantities of sugar mouldering 
in some Dar es Salaam warehouses while the commodity was in 
extremely short supply in the country. The MPs angrily demanded 
the resignation of the minister responsible, Mr Joseph Mungai, 
but he defiantly refused. Even after the government admitted 
negligence and impropriety in various areas in the sugar 
industry,29 the minister did not resign. He was only removed by 
the President in a major cabinet reshuffle in 1982.
In the National Assembly, ministers have actually felt like 
delegates of the President whose authority and wisdom, the MPs 
are sometimes reminded, should not be questioned. In the July 
1968 session of Parliament, MPs questioned the paying of
29See (1981) 62 The Parliamentarian: 309-10, and (1982) 63 The
Parliamentarian: 119.
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gratuities to ministers, junior ministers and regional and area 
commissioners, as intended by the Government. The Minister of 
State responsible for Central Establishment warned the Assembly 
not to discuss terms and conditions of service for ministers (of 
which the gratuities were part) because that was solely the 
responsibility of the President.30
Apparently, the MPs' right to question ministers and demand 
explanations from ministers as encouraged by the President in 
1965 did not envisage their right to resist or block Government 
measures. To that extent, then, parliamentary debates were to 
be of little more than academic value. One is reminded of 
another address to the National Assembly in July 1982 when the 
President warned that although democracy was good for giving 
everyone the right to express his views, it could nevertheless 
be problematic because it gave that same right even to a fool I 
The address came shortly after a fairly bold attempt by Rev P 
Misigalo, MP for Tabora Urban, to block the budget estimates for 
the Ministry of Education because the Minister could not explain 
satisfactorily the pervious year's poor performance by his 
ministry. The President's warning was widely interpreted as 
intended to caution the likes of Rev Misigalo.
The private motion mentioned above was, in the event, successful 
and the gratuities proposed by the Government were abandoned. 
But this, apparently, was simply because the President, with whom 
lay the final decision, agreed in principle with the MPs' views
20Majadiliano ya Bunge, July 10, 1968: col.1614.
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against the gratuities. Otherwise, in an event of serious 
disagreement between the Government and the National Assembly, 
the threat of dissolution easily came in. Even in his lecture 
to the new Assembly in 1965, Nyerere had said:
There will be no Whips operating in this House; Government will submit 
Bills for you to consider and pass or reject. Occasionally, on major 
issues -- the Budget is an obvious example -- the Government will inform 
the Members that the Government is committed to a Bill and will appeal to 
the people if the Assembly rejects it. (Nyerere 1968:94)
He was not referring to a situation where the National Assembly 
passes a Bill and the President refuses to assent to it, an 
unlikely event since practically all Bills are Government Bills. 
Rather he was referring to a situation where a Government Bill 
or other measure is rejected by the Assembly. This is precisely 
what s.40 (2) of the Interim Constitution,31 empowering the 
President to dissolve Parliament "at any time", was intended for. 
The use of that power was threatened for the first time in 
November 1973 when the National Assembly rejected the Income Tax 
Bill, and the President threatened the Assembly with dissolution 
if the MPs refused to change their mind; the Bill was 
subsequently passed.
Had the National Assembly persisted in rejecting the Bill and the 
threat of dissolution carried out, fresh elections would have 
been called for both the National Assembly and the President 
because each time Parliament is dissolved, for whatever reason, 
the President also vacates office. But in a one-party state in 
which the President is also head of the party, the President is
31Previously s.44(2) of the Republican Constitution.
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usually certain to be re-elected while the MPs he differed with 
are not even likely to be nominated to contest for Parliament in 
the snap elections.
After that threat, the lesson was probably learnt and serious 
disagreements became rare and in no case did they come close to 
the 1973 stalemate. The Executive has always had its way. Thus 
at the end of 1982 the Ministry of Finance unexpectedly announced 
some new tax measures in what was then nick-named the "Mini- 
Budget". And in the customary New Year's Eve Presidential 
Address to the Nation, President Nyerere said:
You will already have heard of the new taxes which come into force 
tomorrow. These tax measures will be debated in Parliament at its next 
sitting, but in the meantime they have to be paid by everyone.32
The President was certainly confident that the National Assembly 
would approve the measures.
By this time, in fact from 1967, the Executive could and actually 
did justify its disregard of Parliament in many of its actions 
and measures by claims of having obtained legitimacy or other 
mandate for its actions from the Party which had become supreme. 
The nationalisation measures following the Arusha Declaration in 
1967 were the first indication of this attitude of the Executive.
But claims that all Government measures were mandated by the 
Party were, in many cases, exaggerated. Even the formal 
proclamation of Party Supremacy sought no more than to emphasise
22Daily News, January 1, 1983, and Uhuru, of the same date.
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the role and function of the Party as the supreme organ of 
policy. But the Executive conveniently used the concept of Party 
Supremacy to manipulate the National Assembly into approving, or 
at least acquiescing In, all Government measures. Tax measures 
like the "Mini Budget" mentioned above were certainly not policy 
decisions.
4.4: PARTY SUPREMACY AND THE 1977 CONSTITUTION
On April 26, 1977, the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965 was 
replaced by the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 
1977 (hereinafter the Constitution 1977). Subsequently, the 
latter underwent various amendments, some of them so fundamental 
that calling it "permanent" was almost misleading. But at least 
the temporary arrangement of two political parties in a one-party 
state had come to an end with the merger of TANU and ASP to form 
Chama cha Mapinduzi (hereinafter "CCM") as the sole political 
party for the entire United Republic.
The requirement of appointing a constitutional commission and 
then summoning a constituent assembly as provided by the Articles 
of Union33 was technically complied with in promulgating the 
Constitution 1977 (shivji i990a:56-60) . But the new constitution 
still provided for no elections in Zanzibar and the President 
continued to nominate MPs from there.
The Constitution 1977 has often been associated with the concept
33Schedule to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act 1964.
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of "Party Supremacy". That association could be misleading 
because as a constitutional fact, party supremacy was first 
introduced in 1965 by the Interim Constitution; it was 
prominently manifested by the 1967 Arusha Declaration and its 
subsequent nationalisations; and it was conclusively established 
in 1968 with the termination of the parliamentary tenure of seven 
MPs by simply expelling them from the Party. As we see below, 
formal constitutional provision for "Party Supremacy" was first 
made in 1975 through amendments to the Interim Constitution.34 
The Constitution 1977 re-enacted the one-party state structure 
of the Interim Constitution in all its essentials, including the 
amendments, and also reinforced the concept of party supremacy 
by way of three new provisions.
Firstly, s. 3 of the Constitution 1977 proclaimed CCM not only 
"the sole political party in the United Republic" but also as 
having "final authority in all matters in accordance with the 
constitution of the Party." Secondly was the provision relating 
to the President's general exercise of his functions. From 1962 
the President had absolute discretion and was not "obliged to 
follow advice tendered by any other person."35 But now s.5(2) 
of the Constitution 1977 enjoined the President to abide always 
by the policies and directives of the Party. Finally, s.54(1) 
of the Constitution made the National Assembly a "Committee of 
the National Conference of the Party, in accordance with section
34By the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act 1975.
35Section 3(3) of the Constitution of Tanganyika 1962 and s.6(2) of the 
Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965.
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59(11) of the Constitution of the Party, whose function was to 
supervise the implementation of the policy of the Party by the 
Government and various other public institutions."36
Those provisions completed the process of entrenching the concept 
of "Party Supremacy" in the state constitution. Following is a 
brief outline of that process, and an assessment of how far the 
concept effected the exercise of control over the executive, a 
function which the Parliament was increasingly being rendered 
incapable of discharging.
4.4.1: Background to the Constitution 1977
When it was first adopted in 1965, the Interim Constitution 
elevated the single political party to a supreme position,
especially in relation to Parliament. When in 1968 the Second
Vice-President declared that "in a one party state the Party" was
"supreme" over the Parliament and other institutions,37 he was 
stating an existing constitutional fact, subsequently proved 
beyond doubt by the October 1968 expulsions of MPs from
Parliament by merely terminating their Party membership. Yet, 
in 1975 it was felt necessary to emphasise that fact with 
constitutional amendments, and to elaborate it as a new 
constitutional development (Nyerere 1975) .
36These were the section numbers prior to the Fifth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1984, which is considered below in Chapter Seven.
31Majadiliano ya Bunge, July 22, 1968: col.2534.
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This new constitutional development can be linked to the TANU 
Guidelines 1971, issued by the party as a reaction to the 
military coup which brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda in 
Janaury 1971. In the document,38 the coup was contrasted with 
the Portuguese invasion of Guinea in late 1970 which was 
successfully repelled as a result of "the people and the army 
standing solidly together" in defence of their national 
independence.39
The idea behind the TANU Guidelines 1971 sought to instil in the 
people a sense of duty and responsibility for safeguarding their 
national independence against subversion and, in that 
responsibility, the party had a crucial role:
The responsibility of the party is to lead the masses and their various 
institutions, in the effort to safeguard national independence and to 
advance the liberation of the African. The duty of a socialist party is 
to guide all activities of the masses. The Government, parastatals, 
national organisations, etc. are instruments for implementing the Party's 
policies... The time has now come for the Party to take the reins and 
lead all the people's activities.... Ways must be found to ensure that 
the Party actively supervises the activities and the running of its 
implementing agencies.40
The logic was that through the party the people could monitor the 
activities of all government agencies and ensure that national 
independence is in no way subverted, as happened in Uganda. That 
seems to have been the philosophy behind the concept of "party 
supremacy."
The Party, TANU, next deliberated on "party supremacy" in early
38The document is reproduced in full in Coulson (ed):36-42.
39TANU Guidelines 1971, paragraphs 8-9.
40Ibid., paragraphs 11, 14.
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1974; the subject was discussed by the NEC in its March 1974 
meeting. Finally, the NEC made specific recommendations for
jneeting
constitutional amendments during its November 1974^ at Musoma 
(Biaustein & Fianz:5; McHenry 1994:57) . The recommended amendments to 
the Interim Constitution were first introduced in the National 
Assembly in April 1975 and passed in early June of the same year 
as Act No. 8 of 1975 (hereinafter the "1975 Amendment"). This 
was the most extensive amendment made to the Interim 
Constitution. It amended the Preamble by adding some socialist 
principles, as expounded by the Arusha Declaration, to the list 
of factors declared basic to "freedom, justice, fraternity and 
concord." The amended Preamble also emphasised the need to 
prevent exploitation and exalted a society that was both 
democratic and socialist.
On party supremacy, s.3 (3) of the Interim Constitution, which had 
specifically exempted from the auspices of the Party the 
performance of the functions of the organs of state of the United 
Republic and the Zanzibar Executive and Legislature, was amended 
by deleting that exemption. And a new sub-section (4)41 
declared: "The functions of all the organs of State of the United 
Republic shall be performed under the auspices of the Party." 
This, then, removed all ambiguities about the constitutionally 
superior position of the Party in relation to all other "organs 
of State of the United Republic."
Further emphasis on party supremacy was made through the
41The old sub-section (4) was re-numbered as sub-section (5).
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amendment to s. 20 of the Interim Constitution under which 
previously the President had appointed "a regional commissioner 
for every region within Tanganyika." The 1975 Amendment made the 
post of "regional commissioner" ex officio only, and the 
President was to "appoint a regional secretary for every region 
within Tanganyika" and a person so appointed became the regional 
commissioner for that region. And, accordingly, s. 24 of the 
Interim Constitution was amended to replace "regional 
commissioners appointed for regions in Tanganyika" with "regional 
secretaries appointed for the regions in Tanganyika", as one of 
the categories of the members of the National Assembly. The term 
"regional secretary" was not defined but it was understood and 
accepted as meaning "regional secretary of TANU", referred to in 
Article IV,D of the TANU Constitution, scheduled to the Interim 
Constitution. In that regard the amendment made no visible 
change because already, from 1962, regional commissioners were 
also TANU regional secretaries.
A very significant change was in respect of the composition of 
the National Assembly. In 1968 the number of constituency 
members had been raised from 107 to 120. The policy then was to 
have one MP for up to 100,000 inhabitants provided that 
geographically no constituency extended to more than one 
district; the 1968 increase took into account the population 
distribution as established by the 1967 national census.42 But 
the 1975 Amendment reduced the number of constituency members
42The national population was then just over 12,000,000.
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from 120 to 88; it was raised again to 96 shortly after.43 The 
new policy was to have one MP to a district without regard to 
population. It emphasised the role of the MP not as a 
representative of the people in his constituency but a member of 
the Party Leadership Team in the district, of which the other 
members were the District Party Chairman and the District Party 
Secretary.44
The 1975 Amendment introduced an additional category of 
indirectly elected "national MPs", who were popularly referred 
to as "regional MPs" because there was one such MP for each of 
the regions, also forming a "Regional Team" with the Regional 
Party Chairman and the Regional Party Secretary. The procedure 
of electing them, as provided under a new S.30A of the Interim 
Constitution, was that a committee for each region nominated up 
to five persons whose names were submitted to the NEC for its 
approval as part of the selection process. The NEC then 
presented the candidates it approved (not being less than two) 
to the National Assembly which then elected one "national MP" 
from each region.
One overall effect of the amendment was that the directly elected 
MPs became a minority in the National Assembly: only 96 out of 
a maximum capacity of 218.
43By the Interim Constitution (Increase in the Number of Constituency 
Members) Act 1975.
44Vol.8 Africa Contemporary Record 1975-1976: B318.
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Notably, though, the 1975 Amendment did not concern or affect 
Zanzibar, and the new composition of the National Assembly 
concerned only those MPs from Mainland Tanzania. Even the 
functions of the organs of state, whose performance was brought 
under the auspices of the Party under s.3(4) of the Interim 
Constitution (as re-numbered by the amendment), were functions 
of "the organs of State of the United Republic" only. The 
exclusion of Zanzibar was necessary because the concept of "Party 
Supremacy" which the amendment sought to effect was conceived, 
developed and promoted exclusively by TANU and TANU had no 
jurisdictional role or authority over Zanzibar.
Significantly, it was immediately after the 1975 Amendment was 
passed that developments towards the merger of TANU and ASP 
began. On September 22, 1975, the Electoral Conference, i.e. the 
TANU National Conference in a joint meeting with ASP delegates, 
renominated Julius Nyerere as sole Presidential candidate in the 
elections due on October 26. In his acceptance speech, Nyerere 
recommended that it would help the country if TANU and ASP merged 
without further hesitation. The idea was received with great 
enthusiasm; it was discussed and overwhelmingly supported by the 
party branches of both TANU and ASP. Subsequently the two 
parties merged and out of the merger, on February 5, 1977, a new 
party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), was launched.
Following the birth of CCM as the single political party for the 
whole of Tanzania a new constitution, the Constitution 1977, was 
enacted in April 1977. All the provisions of the 1975 Amendment
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were re-enacted in the new constitution, thereby applying them 
to the whole of Tanzania. The merger of the two parties into one 
also facilitated the formal declaration of the new single party 
as supreme in all matters, the subjecting of the President's 
general powers to the policies and directives of the Party, and 
the formal declaration of the National Assembly as a committee 
of the National Conference of the Party. That is what the 
Constitution 1977 did.
4.4.2: Party Supremacy in Practice
As outlined above, "Party Supremacy" was already in the 
constitution even before the Constitution 1977 came in with its 
reinforcing declaration and extension of its application to 
Zanzibar. A graphic demonstration of party supremacy was the way 
the Constitution 1977 itself was adopted. After the proposed 
merger of TANU and ASP was endorsed by the branches of the two 
parties, a twenty-member committee was appointed to formulate a 
constitution for the proposed new party, which was then adopted 
as the constitution of CCM. After the founding of CCM in 
February 1977, the very first directive of the NEC of the new 
party was that Tanzania should have a new constitution. The same 
twenty-member committee was assigned by this new NEC to formulate 
the new constitution, and it immediately started work on its new 
assignment. On March 26, 1977, the twenty-member team submitted 
its proposals for a new constitution to the NEC (Mohamed:85-6) .
But the law as contained in the Articles of Union had its
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requirements for making a new constitution. It required the 
President, acting in agreement with the Executive for Zanzibar, 
to appoint a constitutional commission to make proposals for a 
new constitution. Then the President, again in agreement with 
the Executive for Zanzibar, was required to summon a constituent 
assembly composed of members from both Zanzibar and Tanganyika 
to pass the new constitution.45 To comply with these technical 
requirements the President appointed the same twenty-member team 
as the "Constitutional Commission", and the members of the 
current Parliament then as the members of the "Constituent 
Assembly" which he summoned to meet on April 25, 1977, to enact 
the new constitution.46 The appointment of the Constitutional 
Commission, on March 16, 1977, was long after it had started its 
work, assigned to it by the Party, and shortly before submitting 
its proposals to the NEC (Mohamed: 85-6; Shivji 1990a: 56-60) .
In effect, therefore, the appointing of the Constitutional 
Commission was done by the Party. The subsequent formal 
appointment was done by the President (of the United Republic) 
merely to ensure compliance with legal technicalities.47
Party supremacy was then authoritatively affirmed by the late 
Edward Sokoine, then Prime Minister, when he presented the Draft 
Constitution for consideration by the Constituent Assembly on
45Article (vii) of the Schedule to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act
1964.
46G.N. 38 & 39 of 1977, both published on March 25, 1977.
47In fact the Commission submitted its proposals to the NEC one day after 
the publication of the notice of its appointment, see Mohamed: 85-6.
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April 25, 1977. Having stated that the Constituent Assembly,
because it was enacting the basic law of the Nation, had greater 
authority than the ordinary Parliament, he went on:
This Constituent Assembly is at liberty either to accept or to reject 
these proposals. But, Mr Speaker, in exercising our authority, we ought 
to be conscious of its limitations. The proposals we are about to debate 
are the outcome of the Party directives. We Tanzanians, in our wisdom, 
have determined without hesitation that the Party shall be the ultimate 
authority in the country. Therefore, this Constituent Assembly has full 
powers to reject or amend these Government proposals if it feels that they 
are contrary to or in conflict with the Party directives. On the other 
hand, if these proposals correctly represent the Party's wishes, I beg the 
Assembly to accept them without a moment's hesitation.48
After three hours of "seven laudatory speeches", the Constitution 
1977 was passed on the same day by the Constituent Assembly 
(shivji i994a:87), and took effect the next day.
The process of adopting the Constitution 1977 was accomplished 
rather swiftly. It took little more that two months between the 
Party decision to have a new constitution and its adoption. It 
seems to have been an almost exclusive agenda of the top Party 
leadership with all involvement limited to the NEC only; the 
general public was not involved at all. Not even the Attorney 
General and the legal drafting experts of the Government were 
sufficiently involved. The drafting was not even done by the 20- 
member Constitutional Commission; rather it was virtually 
dictated by the NEC itself. The Constitution 1977 was drafted, 
passed and published only in Kiswahili, the popular language of 
the political arena, an exclusive domain of the Party. It was 
not made available in English, the official language of 
legislation, until 13 years later.
48A s quoted in Shivji 1994a:86-7.
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The position of the late Edward Sokoine when he presented the 
Draft Constitution before the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 
1977, deserves a comment, He was the Prime Minister, having 
replaced Kawawa in a major cabinet reshuffle made immediately 
after the launching of CCM in February 1977. The office of Prime 
Minister was not an establishment of the Interim Constitution but 
it had been established in 1972 by Presidential Instrument49 and 
Kawawa had held it in combination with that of Second Vice- 
President and Leader of Government Business in the National 
Assembly. But Sokoine did not hold the two offices as his 
predecessor had done and, curiously, from February to April 1977 
the office of Second Vice-President (and Leader of Government 
Business in the National Assembly) remained vacant.
However, when the Constitution 1977 came into force in April 
1977, it made no provision for a Second Vice-President; it 
provided for only one Vice-president who was also to be the 
President of Zanzibar. But it provided under s.14(2) that the 
President could appoint any one of the ministers a "Prime 
Minister." Apparently, Edward Sokoine was appointed Prime 
Minister in contemplation of the Constitution 1977 even before 
it was enacted; it was another case of implementing a 
constitutional arrangement in advance of its formal adoption, the 
only mandate being the Party decision to formulate a new state 
constitution.
A number of instances could be cited to illustrate party
49G.N. 41 of 1972.
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supremacy in practice. Herebelow we refer to two cases which 
appeared to demonstrate that the Party was somehow assuming 
powers of censuring the Government similar, in effect at least, 
to those which Parliament had lost in 1962.
In 1981 there was wide public indignation with the Government 
following press revelations of a mishandled international 
transaction involving the national airline, Air Tanzania 
Corporation (ATC), and an Athens based businessman called George 
Hallack. Some aircraft were leased to the airline upon terms 
which smacked of a deliberate fraud: one of the aircraft could 
not even make a single flight after delivery!
The Central Committee of the Party, with powers delegated to it 
for that purpose by the NEC in accordance with the National 
Executive Committee (Powers and Privileges) Act 1965, summoned 
for questioning a number of public officials involved in the 
transaction or otherwise concerned with the airline's business. 
Thus the Central Committee of the Party acted as a Parliamentary 
Committee might do in the United Kingdom. Those summoned 
included the Minister for Communications and Transport, Mr 
Augustine Mwingira, and the General Manager of ATC, Mr Lawrence 
Mmasi. Following that the Central Committee confirmed that the 
transaction had indeed been mishandled thus . causing a 
considerable loss to the nation. Most important, the Central 
Committee issued a directive requiring the President to take 
action against the minister and the ATC General Manager. The 
President proceeded to sack them. Subsequently, the Chairman and
the General Manager of the Tanzania Investment Bank, and some 
executives of the Tanzania Elimu Supplies Ltd (all parastatal 
firms) were also sacked following similar action by the Central 
Committee.50 Significantly, when the Central Committee took 
these actions it was chaired by Aboud Jumbe, its vice-chairman, 
and not by its regular chairman who was the President himself.
In January 1984, it was Aboud Jumbe's turn to be censured by the 
Party. The year before, the NEC of the Party issued some 
proposals for constitutional amendments and invited the public 
to discuss them. In the ensuing debate some strongly felt views 
were made advocating greater autonomy for Zanzibar. This aspect 
of the debate escalated into a major political issue.51 An 
unscheduled meeting of the NEC was called at Dodoma to clear what 
was called "political pollution" over the union. In short those 
advocating greater autonomy for Zanzibar were accused of 
sabotaging the union and Jumbe, as Zanzibar President, was "put 
in the dock" for near complicity in the sabotage. It was like 
a censure motion by the NEC and Jumbe was forced to resign from 
all his positions: President of Zanzibar, Vice-President of the 
United Republic, and Vice-Chairman of CCM.
The sacking of Augustine Mwingira from the Cabinet was a graphic 
demonstration of party supremacy as a practical reality, and not 
merely an aspect of Tanzanian constitutional theory. It 
contrasted sharply with the earlier inability of Parliament to
50Vo1.13 Africa Contemporary Record 1980-1981: B331-2.
51Vo1.16 Africa Contemporary Record 1983-1984: B272-3.
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force, by exerting pressure, the Minister for Agriculture to 
resign. And the forced resignation of Jumbe projected the NEC 
sharply as the focus of final authority. For the people of 
Zanzibar, especially, the January 1984 meeting of the NEC at 
Dodoma had an extremely powerful impact: their President went to 
Dodoma to attend the meeting, and he came back without his 
office! The NEC nominated Ali Hassan Mwinyi as Interim 
President; three months later he was confirmed by a popular vote.
The following year the Party made another demonstration of its 
position of authority. President Nyerere had stated consistently 
from 1980 that he was in his last five-year term as President of 
the United Republic. Yet, until the NEC proposed to the 
Electoral Conference of the Party the name of Ali Hassan Mwinyi 
to be the sole Presidential candidate, there was absolutely no 
prediction of Nyerere's successor. After that there was no doubt 
that Mwinyi was going to be the next President. He was indeed 
endorsed by an approximately 92% "Yes" vote (othman, et a h 233-41) .
That the party was supreme was beyond question. But the question 
we now turn to is whether the Party was indeed sufficiently 
disposed to exercise effective control over the executive.
4.4.3: The Party as an Instrument of Responsibility
It may be of interest to note that the constitution of CCM was 
not scheduled to the Constitution 1977 as the previous TANU 
Constitution was scheduled to the Interim Constitution. But by
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its own proclamation in s.3, the Constitution 1977 made itself 
inferior not only to the Party Constitution, wherever it was, but 
also to all Party decisions made "in accordance with the 
constitution of the Party." That proclamation removed, as far 
as the Party was concerned, any pretence of supremacy in the 
state constitution.
Given the constitutionally proclaimed supremacy of the Party, its 
policies and directives were not to be questioned by any other 
institution; rather they bound every body. Further, by s.5(2) 
of the Constitution 1977, obedience to Party directives was 
specifically expected of the President. And by s. 54(1) the role 
of Parliament was reduced to that of a "committee of the Party," 
supervising the implementation of policies and decisions in whose 
making it had no authority. This virtually stripped Parliament 
even of its mere status as the sovereign law-making body because 
as a committee of the National Conference of the Party, it became 
liable to dictation by the latter.52
It would seem that in the arguments made to advance the supremacy 
of the Party, the role of Parliament as an institution 
representing and expressing the popular will was dismissed or 
simply ignored. This, it may be argued, could have been due to 
the subservient role that Parliament was found to be playing 
under the one-party system. Being subservient, therefore, it 
could not be the ideal institution for popular control of the
52The section numbers cited here are based on the original edition of the 
Constitution 1977, prior to the 1984 amendments.
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Government. But, without reference to the role of Parliament as 
a people's institution, Nyerere, in explaining "Party Supremacy" 
emphasised the distinction between the Government and the Party 
(Nyerere 1975) , a distinction which, ironically, in 1963 he had 
considered to be unnecessary (Nyerere 1966:202).
Apparently in this distinction Nyerere was not referring to "the 
Government" merely as "the executive organ of State" as this 
study generally does; rather he was referring to the entire set 
of the institutions of the state. In short he argued that the 
Government, by its very nature, was and had to be detached from 
the people. It was coercive, it was bureaucratic, and, almost 
inevitably, its servants easily and complacently drifted away 
from whatever attachments and identifications they may have had 
with the people they were supposed to be serving (Nyerere 1973: 
28i) . The Party, on the other hand, was the only organised 
institution which was and could remain close to the people, and 
always with them. It made practical sense, therefore, to make 
use of the Party as the institution for exercising people's 
control over the Government.53 In that way, "Party Supremacy" 
would also constitute "People's Supremacy" over the Government. 
This was the line of argument which was first given in the TANU 
Guidelines 1971.
There have been arguments that the Party did have, or at least 
in due course did acquire, the capability and resources necessary
53Vol.8 Africa Contemporary Record 1975-1976: B317; also see Mwansasu:172-
9.
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for the discharge of its supervisory and controlling functions. 
Some have argued that TANU's capacity resource was enhanced by 
the Government assuming responsibility for paying all TANU 
salaries, by the secondment of civil servants to TANU 
Headquarters, and by placing "the entire Civil Service machinery 
at the disposal Of the NEC" (Msekwa:56-9; Mwansasu: 181-2) . But that, 
in our view, could easily have undermined the authority of the 
Party because "he who pays the piper chooses the tune."
More important, though, was how the Party itself was organised 
and what, institutionally, constituted the Party that was 
declared "supreme." From the beginning, TANU had sought to 
organise itself into a geographical structure coextensive with 
that of the Government Administration. After independence the 
two organisational structures, TANU's and the Government's, 
deliberately replicated each other; the regional and district 
secretaries of TANU were also regional and district 
commissioners. The TANU Constitution which was adopted in 1965 
made this structure very clear by establishing definite Party 
organs at national, regional, district and branch levels.54 
Subsequent amendments to the Party Constitution never altered 
that basic structure.
Below the "branch" was the "Cell" which consisted of ten houses 
(or households) grouped together for that purpose; all party 
members living in those ten houses comprised a cell. 
Significantly, the "cell" has been the only organ of the Party
54See Appendix B in Tordoff 1967.
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to which all party members (within the cell) have belonged as of 
right. Above the cell was the "Party Branch" with a "Branch 
Annual Conference" attended by all Cell Leaders as well as 
delegates (from the Branch) to the District Party Conference, and 
all local government councillors resident in the area of the 
Branch. The Party Branch also had an Executive Committee whose 
Secretary was, significantly, appointed by the Central Committee, 
a national organ of the Party.
Above the Branch was the District with the District Conference 
comprising of, among others, all Branch Chairmen and Secretaries, 
and two delegates elected by and from each Branch within the 
District. There was also a District Executive Committee whose 
secretary, also the District Commissioner, was "appointed by the 
President of the United Republic." Above the District, the 
Regional organisation of the Party replicated the one at the 
district level. Above all those were the national organs of the 
Party: the National Conference, the National Executive Committee 
(NEC), and the Central Committee. There was also the Electoral 
Conference which was the National Conference meeting (until 1977 
jointly with ASP Delegates) for purposes of nominating the sole 
candidate for a Presidential election.
The National Conference consisted of the "National Leaders of the 
Party" (President, Vice-President, Secretary-General, and 
National Treasurer), all Regional Chairmen and Secretaries, all 
District Chairmen and Secretaries, all MPs (from Tanganyika) , all 
members of the Central Committee, one delegate elected
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from each region, and two delegates (increased to 10 in 1969) 
from each district. Apart from the last two categories, all 
other members of the National Conference were ex officio.
The National Conference was the supreme organ of the Party 
responsible for policy formulation and general superintendence 
of the activities of the Party. It elected the Party President 
and Vice-President and the regional delegates to the NEC, and it 
has always had the power "to confirm, amend, repudiate or revoke 
any decision made by any other organ" or any other officer of the 
Party. It also had power to expel any member or affiliate 
organisation from the Party. From 1965 it met once every two 
years. It could delegate, and actually delegated almost all its 
powers to the NEC and remained only with the residual powers of 
confirming or revoking whatever the NEC had decided. No known 
action or decision of the NEC has ever been revoked or reversed.
As a result it is the NEC, the chief executive organ of the 
Party, which became the supreme organ of the Party in fact. Its 
meetings were once every three months, and it included in its 
membership all the National Leaders of the Party, all Regional 
Chairmen and Secretaries, the regional delegates elected by the 
National Conference (one from each region), the secretary- 
generals of (or delegates from) the Trade Union, the Cooperative 
Union, the Party Youth League, Women's League and Parents 
Association. The NEC elected the Secretary-General and the 
National Treasurer of the Party.
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There was also the Central Committee which consisted of the 4 
National Leaders of the Party, and another 8 members appointed 
by the President. These 8 members of the Central Committee 
attended the NEC meetings as of right, even if they were not 
members of the NEC. The Central Committee met at least once 
every month, and was responsible for the day to day 
administration of the affairs of the Party, and also performed 
any function delegated to it by the NEC. It had the power to 
appoint or remove from office any officer of the Party, except 
the "National Leaders". It appointed the branch secretaries of 
the Party. It also considered, as part of the electoral process, 
the names of aspiring candidates for local government elections; 
and it could delegate this function to the District Conference.
The Party has a very elaborate network of branches all over the 
country but its organisation has concentrated all power at the 
centre and the function of the local organs of the Party has been 
limited to carrying out the policies, decisions and directives 
handed down from the centralised national organs, to which the 
local organs are required to report and look for guidance in 
every activity. The fact that even the Branch Secretary of the 
Party is appointed by the Central Committee reflects the heavily 
centralised structure of the Party.
In that structure, party supremacy has in fact meant supremacy 
of the central organs of the Party, notably the NEC. But by its 
composition, the NEC has not always been very democratically 
constituted. Apart from the regional delegates and regional
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chairmen (one of each category from each region), it was at one 
time full of appointed ex officio members. But its powers have 
been immense. It is the one that has screened candidates 
aspiring for parliamentary elections, and it is the one which has 
always proposed to the Electoral Conference the name of the sole 
presidential election candidate. Even in the election of the 
overall Party Leader (President and later Chairman) by the 
National Conference, it is the NEC which presents to the 
conference the name of only one candidate to be voted for or 
against. The Central Committee, to which the NEC has often 
delegated its powers and functions, for sometime consisted of 
appointed members only. With all power vested in those central 
institutions, one is inclined to doubt whether "Party Supremacy" 
did indeed constitute "People's Supremacy" over the government.
Such doubts are reinforced by two factors. Firstly, the members 
of the Central Committee and those of the NEC whose membership 
was by appointment were all appointed by the Party President, 
also the Chief Executive of the United Republic. It is hard to 
imagine such appointees being bold enough genuinely to seek to 
exercise control over the government which paid their salaries 
and was headed by the person who had appointed them, and could 
remove them from their positions. Secondly, apart from the 
"National Leaders of the Party", many other leading members of 
the Cabinet were also members of the Central Committee. It is 
doubtful whether these organs of the Party could indeed exercise 
any influence, let alone control, over President Nyerere.
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Instead, many studies concede that Nyerere often presented major 
issues before an unexpecting NEC and simply argued them through, 
often with relative ease, thereby giving a mandate to his 
Government to take steps which he may have had in mind.55 The 
most obvious example is the way the Arusha Declaration was 
adopted: it was indicated in the agenda for the NEC meeting
simply as the "President's Opening Address" whose content nobody 
had any idea until it was given and then it dominated the rest 
of the meeting to the exclusion of everything else (Msekwa:38-9; 
Mwansasu: 184) . Indeed, up to 1969 at least, neither the Central 
Committee nor the NEC made any policy initiatives; they relied 
on President Nyerere to make all initiatives (Mwansasu:186) , which 
were then adopted as NEC policy decisions.
When such "policy decisions" are then handed down to the 
districts and branches, the local party organs have a duty.to 
ensure local implementation of the decisions, and to act as 
watchdogs by reporting to the superior organs about any person 
or institution hindering implementation. They also act as 
publicity agents, campaigning and mobilising support for any 
decision claiming to have the NEC "stamp" of approval. 
Increasingly, the distinction between "Party" and "Government" 
decisions became meaningless to the Party Branches not only 
because they were both headed by the same person but also the 
entire compositions of the Cabinet and the Central Committee were 
increasingly becoming the same, and that pattern was replicated
55Many writers verify this: Cartwright:170,172; Hopkins:38; Msekwa:23-5, 
38-40, 61-2; Pratt 1971:122; Pratt 1976:160-5.
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at the regional and district levels.
The like composition of the Cabinet and the Central Committee 
continued even after 1969 when Central Committee membership 
became elective. Also, more and more ministers sought to be 
elected to the NEC. In the end, particularly after the formation 
of CCM and NEC membership became exclusively elective, either 
through regional conferences or through the National Conference, 
winning a seat in the NEC became a highly prized political 
achievement.
At this point we should only say that CCM adopted all the 
organisational features and structures of TANU almost wholesale. 
A significant change was that of 1982 when the size of the NEC 
was increased to at least 180 members, and the Party Chairman 
(formerly President) lost his power to appoint District and 
Regional Party Secretaries, as well as to appoint any NEC 
members. Regional secretaries and Central Committee members were 
elected by the NEC from amongst its members. District and Branch 
secretaries continued to be appointed by the Central Committee.
Also the offices of district and regional secretaries of the 
Party were separated from those of district and regional 
commissioners. This was repeated at national level when Mwinyi 
replaced Nyerere as President of the United Republic but the 
latter continued as Chairman of CCM. But this arrangement ceased 
in 1990 when the positions were fused back into one person again 
at all levels: national, regional and district. By that time,
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though, the one-party state system was entering a period of acute 
crisis in its legitimacy, and its end was drawing close.
4.5: BEHIND PARTY SUPREMACY: AN APPRAISAL
From the above exposition one may not conclude that "Party 
Supremacy" enhanced either democracy or any mechanism of 
effective control over the executive. The constitutional 
provisions tended to indicate that the Party replaced the 
Parliament as the institution for exercising control over the 
executive and bringing it to account. But the simultaneous 
membership of most, if not all, cabinet ministers in the superior 
organs of the Party must have eroded the prospects of effective 
control of the Government by the Party.
But on the other hand, the position of the executive was not 
affected in any significant way. In fact, party supremacy 
strengthened the executive. The NEC was used, as in the case of 
the Arusha Declaration, to give legitimacy and a direct mandate 
to the Government to undertake any program while the nationwide 
network of party branches was used for publicity and mobilisation 
of support for the Government and its policies.
Julius Nyerere was largely responsible for the dominant position 
of the executive. As TANU President and later CCM Chairman, he 
was the chief executive and spokesman of the Party. As President 
of the United Republic, he was the state's chief executive, with 
all state powers, including powers over individuals' personal
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freedom, concentrated in his hands, and not subject to control 
or vetting by any other person or body. He also held powers of 
appointment to executive positions and directorships not only in 
the government but also in the ever-elastic parastatal sector. 
It was within his powers to render the NEC virtually useless by 
taking particular steps in respect of individual NEC members of 
influence, using not only the stick but the carrot as well.
But the NEC, or the Party in general, could not remove him from 
office as President. Party control over the President, 
therefore, was extremely remote; all that the Party could do was 
to refuse to nominate him as the Presidential candidate in the 
next election. With Nyerere, this was unlikely not just because 
he occupied the highest seat in both the Party and the Government 
but also because of his personal qualities: a great thinker, and 
a visionary, the Party was acknowledgeably his creation both in 
its form and in its ideas and policies which made it widely 
credible. And he was immensely popular, both within and outside 
the Party. Internationally, he was acclaimed as a leader with 
credible ideas to which he was genuinely committed, thus drawing 
wide international assistance without which Tanzania's economic 
constraints would have severely intensified.
In short, the concept of "Party Supremacy" reduced neither the 
powers of President Nyerere, nor his prospects of continuing to 
have them. On the other hand, seeking and obtaining the sanction 
or approval of the Party for his Government's programs as he was 
increasingly doing served to add a democratic veil of legitimacy
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to the actions of the Government in what had effectively become 
"Executive Supremacy".
As pointed out in Chapter Three above, Nyerere wanted to be in 
firm control of all developments. But also he always wanted to 
have some assurance that he had the backing of some popular 
support in everything he did. That is why he always preferred 
to win support for his ideas, policies and programs by arguments 
given in what he conceived as free discussions, rather than to 
exercise direct coercion. In other words he preferred to 
"legitimise" his control with the force of argument and an 
acknowledged superiority of his ideas, not just the force of law. 
Party supremacy, rather than parliamentary supremacy, was better 
suited for his preferred kind of leadership.
Nyerere's view of democracy has always emphasised the need for 
free discussion and reaching decisions by agreement. Even in his 
early writings on democracy, he gave no evidence for the claim 
that Africans were "natural democrats" other than the elders' 
practice of "sitting under a tree, discussing until they agree." 
Apparently, Nyerere has valued "discussion" mainly as a means to 
an agreement, not for its exposure of divergent views. And for 
that reason, he preferred "government by consensus" rather than 
"government by rules". Even in his Cabinet:
...decisions tended to emerge from informal face-to-face discussions. 
Many TANU leaders, including Nyerere, continued to prefer or at least to 
gravitate back to this style of decision making. Some government 
decisions continued, therefore, to be taken by the president on the basis 
of informal discussion and without reference to the carefully established 
[cabinet] procedures which the president himself had established. 
(Pratt 1971:103)
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Thus Nyerere used discussions to secure the agreement of his 
colleagues in the Cabinet or the NEC or Central Committee, as the 
case may be, and to secure their commitment to whatever the 
agreement then was.
In his style of "government by consensus", he deliberately 
avoided differences with or among his colleagues and when they 
occurred, he carefully avoided making them public. For that 
reason he sometimes adopted "the politics of accommodation": 
deliberately avoiding to take action against a colleague, like 
a minister who has abused his office, because such action would 
reveal that there have been conflicts or differences between them 
(Pratt 1971:104, 106-7) . Sometimes he took some action after a long 
delay which made it unlikely for the public to link, say, a 
dismissal from office with an abuse of office by the dismissed 
officer (smith:24) .
Nyerere's penchant for consensus can also be traced in his 
passionate appeal for a one-party system,56 as well as in his 
strong rejection of the necessity of class struggle in building 
socialism.57 And in reaching for decisions, Nyerere never 
presented issues for discussion if a consensus was unlikely to 
emerge from the discussion, unless he considered the need for a 
consensus to be a minor issue (Hopkins:34-5, 38; Pratt I97i:ii3) .
Otherwise, rather than risk a deadlock, he was prepared to take
56See Spearhead, January 1963:12-23, and Nyerere 1966:196-203.
57See Nyerere 1966: 162-71, and his articles on "Socialism" contained in 
(and especially the introductory essays to) his 1968 and 1973 volumes.
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a. decision on his own, if the law permitted.58 But more 
usually, he took issues to a forum where and when a consensus was 
most likely to emerge.
Thus in 196 6 "he drew back from" establishing a commission on 
building socialism as had earlier been announced because he 
feared a deadlock; instead he took the matter to the NEC, rather 
than the Cabinet, and singlehandedly argued it through (Pratt 
i97i:ii3; Msekwa:38-9) . The issue of transferring the capital from 
Dar es Salaam to Dodoma was discussed by TANU branches, which 
voted 1,017 in favour and 842 against the transfer. In August 
1973 the NEC considered those views and resolved to transfer the 
capital to Dodoma. And when the National Conference (the supreme 
organ) of TANU met the following month, Nyerere did not present 
it to the Conference as an issue for deliberation but as simply 
giving notice of a final decision made by the NEC (Msekwa:52-3) . 
And the TANU-ASP merger was proposed by Nyerere at an electoral 
conference which had just nominated him as Presidential candidate 
and was still drunk with the mood of enthusiastic support for 
him. Ultimately, the pattern became such that:
...a presidential decision based on tactical considerations rather than 
clearly defined procedures determines whether a major question is referred 
to the cabinet, discussed with the regional commissioners, raised at a 
National Executive Committee meeting, or handled by direct presidential 
initiative after whatever discussion he judges necessary. (Pratt 
1971:116)
Now the constitutional relationship between the President and the 
National Assembly made the latter completely out of style with
58As he did when he recognised Biafra in the Nigerian conflict in 1968; his 
ministers were simply notified of the recognition as they left at the end of a 
Cabinet Meeting: information from Mr A M Babu, then a Cabinet Minister.
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Nyerere. Unlike the President of Kenya (Ghai & McAuslan 1970:231-2), 
the President of Tanzania has never been a member of the National 
Assembly. He could address the Assembly at any time but he could 
not have discussions with it. There could therefore be n<p 
contemplation of a "Parliamentary" consensus emerging out of a 
discussion involving the two parts of Parliament: the President 
and the National Assembly. To make it worse, the President's 
relationship with the National Assembly was such that any 
differences between them were always in the public glare.
The November 1973 stalemate over the Income Tax Bill59 made that 
position abundantly clear. The Bill was crucial to the 
Government because the East African Income Tax Department which 
had administered the collection of income tax for the three East 
African territories from the beginning of the East Africa High 
Commission in 194 7, and then under the East African Common 
Services Organisation 1963-67, and finally the East African 
Community after 1967, was being wound up. The Bill therefore was 
part of the measures the Government of Tanzania was undertaking 
to administer this tax properly on its own. But, although the 
President expressed some bitter surprise at the Assembly's 
rejection of what he regarded as "measures aimed at promoting 
socialism"60 contained in the Bill, the stalemate was nowhere 
close to a clash of principles as in the 1961 Citizenship
Debate.
59 (1973) 7 Annual Survey of African Law: 136-7, 165-6; Vol.6 Africa
Contemporary Record 1973-1974: B259-60.
60Vol.6 Africa Contemporary Record 1973-1974: B259.
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But the President was nevertheless very concerned about the 
Assembly's rejection of the Bill and was prepared to dissolve 
Parliament over the issue although, he said, he had no immediate 
intention of doing that. It is significant, though, that very
soon after this stalemate, in March 1974, the concept of "Party
Supremacy" started getting serious consideration within the 
Party. It ended with the 1975 Amendment exalting the party above 
all other institutions of the state.
The effect of entrenching "Party Supremacy" in the state 
constitution was a practical revival of the Party Whip because 
party members were required, now by the state constitution, not 
to oppose party policy. Any measure considered crucial by the 
Government could be assured of Parliamentary support by simply 
making it known to the MPs that it was a "policy matter" 
sanctioned or directed by the Party. But the 1975 Amendment was 
not enough to guarantee Parliamentary consensus in absolute terms 
because at the time it was passed there were no less than 52 MPs 
from Zanzibar who were not TANU members; the revival of the TANU 
Whip had no effect on them. It may not be surprising then, that 
Nyerere made the proposal to merge TANU and ASP so soon after the 
1975 Amendment was passed because without the merger the desired 
effect of the amendment could not be fully realised.
The formation of CCM made possible the constitutional provision 
which then made the National Assembly a "committee" of the 
National Conference of the Party. This, and that all MPs should 
be ex officio members of the National Conference, had been
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recommended in 1965 by the Presidential Commission (Tanzania 1965: 
21,28). The TANU Constitution made all MPs ex officio delegates 
to the National Conference.61 But they did not, and could not, 
constitute a "committee of the Party"; the National Assembly was 
an institution of the United Republic, with members from Zanzibar 
who were neither members nor eligible for membership of TANU. 
It would have been awkward, therefore, for the state constitution 
to make "the National Assembly a committee of the Party" as that 
would have necessarily included non-members of the Party. Even 
the "all MPs" who became ex officio delegates to the National 
Conference of TANU meant only those MPs who were TANU members. 
This technical hindrance ended with the merger of TANU and ASP 
into a single political party. It enabled the President to meet 
the National Assembly, and actually hold discussions with it as 
a "committee" of the Party.
Thus the formation of CCM in February 1977, and the subsequent 
passing of the Constitution 1977 were a great accomplishment for 
"Party Supremacy", and for Nyerere's strategy of governing 
without exposing conflicts or differences to the public.
61Article IV,E.2.(1)(c) of the TANU Constitution.
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CHAPTER F IV E
The Role of the Judiciary and 
Other Controlling Agencies
5.0: INTRODUCTION
Implied in the principle of responsible government is the 
requirement that government actions should always be within the 
limits prescribed by the law, and that the government should be 
liable for any of its actions which violate those prescribed 
limits. In both requirements the Judiciary plays a crucial role. 
Firstly, through judicial pronouncements the courts define with 
greater precision the limits to executive powers imposed by the 
constitution and other laws. Secondly, in case of violation of 
those limits the courts will hold the government liable and 
thereby ensure "government according to law."
For the courts to perform their role effectively, an important 
requirement is the independence of the Judiciary. As the 
administration of justice invariably requires adjudication 
between the interests of the state and those of the subjects, it 
is essential for the courts to be free from political or 
executive pressure. Also the authority of the courts must be 
respected by the Executive, irrespective of whether judicial 
pronouncements are favourable to the government or not. If the 
government refuses to respect court orders then the Judiciary, 
independent though it may be, will also be irrelevant. On the 
other hand, the Judiciary must project itself as an institution
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committed to serve society and meet its aspirations for both 
individuals and groups or communities; it should not be an 
institution alien to the people.
With that in mind, we examine the role and function of the 
Judiciary with specific regard to the need to exercise control 
over the use of executive powers. In addition to the Judiciary, 
this chapter also examines the role of two other controlling 
agencies: the Permanent Commission of Enquiry and the Commission 
for the Enforcement of the Leadership Code.
5.1: THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
We have pointed out in Chapter Two that the independence package 
failed to deliver an independent Judiciary; instead it delivered 
the dual court system of the colonial administration consisting 
of the High Court and the local courts systems. For the local 
courts, with jurisdiction only over the majority Africans, the 
independence of the Judiciary was wholly inapplicable: they were 
part of the administration, presided over by persons in the 
administration (Cole & Denison: 102-10; James & Kassam: 12-5) .
Local courts officers were subject to the wide disciplinary 
powers of District Commissioners who also had extensive 
revisionary powers over their decisions. And Provincial 
Commissioners had wide powers of hiring and firing them, and wide 
discretion to grant or refuse leave (a mandatory condition) for 
appeal. Their tenure had absolutely no security, and this
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position was preserved under s.65 (3) of the Independence 
Constitution, by excluding them from the jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Service Commission; the security of tenure introduced 
by that constitution applied only to High Court judges and other 
judicial officers under the High Court system.
But from independence, the nationalist leadership affirmed a 
commitment to the Rule of Law which they said was essential to 
freedom and equality, and could only be guaranteed with an 
independent Judiciary. Shortly before independence Julius 
Nyerere, then Prime Minister, stated:
... it is of paramount importance that the execution of the law should be 
without fear or favour. Our Judiciary at every level must be independent 
of the executive arm of the state. Real freedom requires that any citizen 
feels confident that his case will be impartially judged, even if it is a 
case against the Prime Minister himself. (Nyerere 1966:131)
And in the 1962 proposals for a Republic, the Government stated 
that it sought, among other things, to preserve the Rule of Law 
as a necessary safeguard against tyranny, and further that:
... the Rule of Law is best preserved, not by formal guarantees in a Bill 
of Rights which invite conflict between the executive and judiciary, but 
by independent judges administering justice free from political pressure. 
(Tanganyika 1962:6)
The Presidential Commission similarly emphasised that the 
independence of the Judiciary was the foundation of the Rule of 
Law in both one-party and multi-party states (Tanzania 1965:33 ) .
Accordingly, the post-independence government separated the 
courts from the administration by integrating the local courts 
system with that of the High Court into a single system under the
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High Court. The process of integrating the courts1 was 
completed on July 1, 1964, when the Magistrates' Courts Act 1963 
brought in the new system consisting of the High Court as the 
superior court of record, the district courts (and courts of 
resident magistrates) below it, and below those were established 
primary courts. Above the High Court was the East African Court 
of Appeal, which was also the final court of appeal for Kenya and 
Uganda as part of the East African Community establishment. But 
as a result of the collapse of the East African Community in 
1977, that court could not survive and each of the former member 
states proceeded to establish their respective national courts 
of appeal. For Tanzania, the national Court of Appeal was 
established in 1979.2
5.1.1: Appointment and Tenure of Office
All judicial officers under the new court system came under the 
provisions of the Constitution and of the Judicial Service Act 
1962 relating to the appointment, disciplinary control, tenure 
of office and removal from office of judges and other judicial 
officers.
Under the Independence Constitution the Chief Justice was 
appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister, and the puisne judges were
^Tor a detailed account, see Cotran.
2By the First Constitutional Amendment Act 1979; for a detailed account of 
the Tanzania Court of Appeal, see Fimbo.
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appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. Under the Republican 
Constitution the President appointed the Chief Justice and, after 
consultation with the Chief Justice, the puisne judges, and that 
position was retained in the Interim Constitution, and the 
Constitution 1977, only slightly modifying it in 1979 to 
accommodate the establishment of the Court of Appeal, headed by 
the Chief Justice; since then the President appoints the Chief 
Justice and, after consultation with the Chief Justice, the other 
Judges of Appeal, the Principal Judge of the High Court and all 
the other Judges of the High Court.3
From 1962 the President has delegated his power to appoint 
Resident Magistrates and District Magistrates to the Judicial 
Service Commission.4 But the power of disciplinary control over 
them, and of terminating their appointment and of removing them 
from office is directly vested in the Judicial Service Commission 
by the Constitution.5 The Commission is established by the 
Constitution6 and governed by the Judicial Service Act 1962, and 
regulations made thereunder. It is chaired by the Chief Justice 
and its members include two judges and two other members 
appointed by the President. Members of Parliament are
3See the Republican Constitution, s.47(1) & (2); the Interim Constitution 
of Tanzania 1965, s.57(1) & (2), and the Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania 1977, ss.109(1) & (2), 117, 118(1), (2) & (3).
4See s.53(1) (a), s.61(1) (a) and s.113(1) (a) of the constitutions (short 
titled as in ibid.) of 1962, 1965 and 1977 respectively, and G.N.- 665 of 1964, 
s.4(1) (a) .
5See s.53(l)(b), s.61(l)(b) and s .113 (1) (b) of the constitutions of 1962, 
1965 and 1977 respectively.
6Ibid., sections 52, 60 and 112 respectively.
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disqualified from membership of the Commission.
Primary court magistrates are appointed by the Minister 
responsible for legal affairs acting on the recommendations of 
the Judicial Service Special Commission established by S.21B of 
the Judicial Service Act 1962 (as amended by the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1963) . The Special Commission also has power to 
exercise disciplinary control over primary court magistrates, 
and, subject to ministerial consent, to terminate their 
appointment and to remove them from office. In its functions the 
Special Commission acts through Regional Judicial Boards which 
in turn act on the recommendations of District Judicial Boards.7 
Ultimately, therefore, a primary court magistrate cannot be 
appointed or dismissed, for whatever reason, on the basis of a 
single person's decision.
Once appointed all judges and all magistrates enjoy a secure 
tenure of office. They may only be removed for inability to 
perform the functions of their offices or for misbehaviour, and 
before one can be so removed, there has to be an enquiry into the 
alleged inability or misbehaviour by an impartial tribunal. For 
judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal, the Chairman of the 
tribunal and at least one half of its members must be High Court 
or Court of Appeal judges from Commonwealth countries. So far 
such a tribunal has been formed twice in Tanzania. The first 
time was in 1982 when three judges were investigated and one of
7See s.21 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act
1971.
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them was removed from office on the recommendation of the 
tribunal. The second time was in 1991 when the tribunal 
recommended the removal of two judges, and they were removed. 
In short, the procedure8 in all cases ensures impartiality and 
observes natural justice so that a judicial officer, even the 
most junior, cannot be arbitrarily removed from office (James & 
Kassam:2o-5) . Thus the scheme of service for judges and 
magistrates raises no doubts about the independence of the 
Judiciary.
But, the Chief Justice as the Head of the Judiciary and the 
Principal Judge as his "special assistant... in the 
administration of the High Court and courts subordinate to it"9 
have security of tenure only as judges of the Court of Appeal and 
the High Court respectively, not as Chief Justice and Principal 
Judge; those offices are held at the pleasure of the President. 
For that reason it has been argued that the executive can exert 
undue influence on them (ong'wamuhana:264) .
But no evidence supports that argument. The Chief Justices up 
to 1971 were non-citizens appointed on contract terms and not 
entirely on the basis of the Constitution. The first citizen to 
be appointed Chief Justice was extremely sympathetic to the 
policies of the Government and the Party (ong'wamuhana:264-5; Peter 
1980:26; Srivastava: 113-4) ; he held the office for six years. His
8See s.48, s.58 and ss.110(5) & 120(5) of the constitutions of 1962, 1965 
and 1977 respectively, as well as G.N. 57 of 1965 and G.N. 175 of 1965.
9Sections 109(3) & 118(2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of
Tanzania 1977.
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successor, under whose leadership the Judiciary has increasingly 
asserted its independence from the executive, was appointed in 
1977 and is still in office today (1995).
The office of Principal Judge was first established in 1979 and 
the first incumbent is known to have delivered some strong 
judgments against the Government.10 But he held the office for 
ten years, up to 1989 when he retired and was nevertheless 
appointed on contract to the Court of Appeal. His successor is 
renowned for his strong affirmations, both judicial and extra­
judicial, of the independence of the Judiciary. Clearly, the 
President's power of appointment has not been used to erode that 
independence,
There have been worries too that the President can easily remove 
a judge or a magistrate by appointing him or her to a prestigious 
and well rewarding office outside the Judiciary. In 1975 Miss 
Justice Julie Manning was appointed MP and Minister for Justice, 
and Mr Justice Yona Mwakasendo was appointed Chief Corporation 
Counsel of the Tanzania Legal Corporation (TLC). It is 
understood that Miss Manning had resigned as a judge when she was 
dropped from the Cabinet in 1982. Mr Mwakasendo, on the other 
hand, was appointed judge of the Court of Appeal in 1979. 
Another High Court judge, Damian Lubuva, was assigned to Zanzibar 
where he then became Attorney General until 1985 when he became 
union Attorney General, until 1993 when he was appointed judge
10See Laiton Kigala v. Musa Bariti, 1975 L.R.T., n.40, and Re: Application 
by Paul Massawe, 1979 L.R.T., n.18.
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of the Court of Appeal. Generally, therefore, appointments whose 
effect was to remove judges from the Brench have been few, and 
they have not sought to remove them entirely from the Law sector.
But there have been a few cases of executive interference with 
the tenure of some judicial officers. In 1984 President Nyerere 
ordered the dismissal of a magistrate in Mara Region, and in 1991 
the Minister for Home Affairs issued a similar directive in 
respect of a magistrate in Rukwa Region. Apparently, some 
complaints were genuinely made about the conduct of the two 
primary court magistrates. But both orders were contrary to law 
and the Chief Justice (in the Mara case) and the Registrar of the 
Court of Appeal (in the Rukwa case) intervened to ensure that the 
law was strictly followed.
5.1.2: Interference With the Judicial Process
There have been cases of direct interferences in the judicial 
process but generally they are due to ignorance rather than a 
deliberate intent to interfere with the Judiciary. An extreme 
case occurred in 1982 in Morogoro Region when a Ward Secretary11 
stormed into a primary court in the middle of court proceedings 
and angrily shouted at the presiding magistrate because he had 
not turned up at a meeting at his (the Ward Secretary's) office.
1XA ward secretary is a local executive of the central government, reports 
and is answerable to the District Commissioner.
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The Ward Secretary was immediately arrested and charged with 
contempt of court. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced 
to two weeks' imprisonment. His appeal to the District Court 
only earned him an enhanced sentence of six weeks' imprisonment. 
And almost as a gesture of support, the primary court magistrate 
involved was promoted to District Magistrate and posted to the 
new district court of Ileje.12
Unfortunately, not all magistrates have always been as diligent 
about guarding the independence of the Judiciary. In James Bita 
v. Idd Kambi13 a district commissioner (also District Party 
Secretary) directed the district magistrate to refer the case to 
Party authorities for decision because it was a "political 
issue." The magistrate complied and let the District Party 
authorities decide the case. Then he wrote a formal judgment of 
the court complaining of the unfairness of the decision by the 
Party, and yet incorporated that decision into his judgment 
because he felt bound by it! Fortunately this miscarriage of 
justice was rectified on appeal to the High Court which also 
severely criticised the magistrate for abdicating his judicial 
function to the Party.
In Hamisi Masisi & Six Others v. R,14 the High Court was 
similarly critical of the Resident Magistrate of Musoma for
12This incident was first accounted at an Orientation Seminar for (newly 
appointed) District Magistrates, attended by the magistrate involved and held at 
IDM Mzumbe, September-October 1982.
131979 L.R.T., n.9.
14 [1984] T.L.R. 751 (in Draft)
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succumbing to executive pressure. The Regional Commissioner had 
unlawfully detained the applicants after they had been granted 
bail by the Resident Magistrate. When they applied for bail 
again the magistrate, feeling helpless, refused the application 
on the ground that even if he granted them bail, the Regional 
Commissioner would probably detain them anyway.
Perhaps more disturbing was the case of Ally Juuyawatu v. 
Loserian Mollel & Another15 before the High Court at Arusha. 
While the case was pending in court, the local Ward Secretary 
sought to forcefully evict the plaintiff from the disputed land 
and reinstate the Defendants thereon. Then the Regional 
Commissioner sought to transfer the case to his office for 
determination but the lawyer from the Attorney General's 
chambers, whose offices the Regional Commissioner had hoped to 
use to secure the transfer, refused to help because it would be 
illegal. Finally the chambers of the judge who was hearing the 
case were, in his absence, searched and the case file taken 
therefrom and away to Dar es Salaam for action to be taken on it 
by the Chief Justice on instructions of His Excellency the 
President.
The file was returned after some weeks with a written message 
merely indicating that the Chief Justice, having gone through it, 
was returning it to the judge to continue hearing the case 
accordingly. The judge was extremely bitter about the way the 
matter had been handled. Calling it an unprecedented case, he
15197 9 L.R.T., n.6.
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took the unprecedented step of declaring not only himself but the 
entire High Court as incompetent to decide the case, and he 
referred it instead to the Court of Appeal, established later 
that year, for decision.
Generally, interference with the independence of the Judiciary 
has not been condoned, certainly not by the Judiciary, and the 
incidents of interference which have occurred have had no 
Government backing in any way.
5.2: JUDICIAL CONTROL AND EXECUTIVE ATTITUDE
A responsible democratic government is expected to have its 
commitment to the Rule of Law manifested in various ways. It is 
not, for example, expected to insist on having wide arbitrary 
powers given to the executive by statute with little or no 
limitation to their use. Even if it has those powers, it is not 
expected to show preference for their use instead of the ordinary 
court process. And finally, the government should have respect 
for the Judiciary and accept its control.
In Tanzania, the entire set of instruments of arbitrary power of 
the colonial government were carried over at independence and 
adopted by the post-colonial government. Initially these powers 
vested in the Governor-General, who exercised them only in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. 
But on transition to a Republic, those powers were vested in a 
single individual, the President, who was given absolute power
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and discretion to act without, or even in disregard of, any 
advice whatsoever, a position which has been retained ever 
since.16
The overall result has been the vesting of enormous powers in the 
executive with hardly any mechanism for checking against their 
indiscriminate use. It may have undermined the role of the 
courts in controlling government powers because it made it 
difficult to challenge government actions before the courts. 
That difficulty was enhanced by the statutory protection against 
legal proceedings which the government enjoyed for many years.
5.2.1: Proceedings Against the Government
The power of the court to exercise control over the government 
was severely restricted. Firstly, for well over a decade after 
independence the Government was virtually immune from tortious 
liability, and this position did not change significantly even 
after the Government Proceedings Act 1967 was enacted. Secondly, 
up to 1984 Tanzania had no Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
thus leaving the extensive powers of the executive free from 
likely checks by the Judiciary.
Generally, the Government of Tanzania has exhibited a persistent 
reluctance to submit itself to adjudication by the courts. When 
the Government Proceedings Act 1967 was enacted, it provided that
16Sections 3(3), 6(2) and 5(2) [now s.37(1)] of the Republican
Constitution, the Interim Constitution and the Constitution 1977 respectively.
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the Government could sue and be sued in court like any other 
person. But the Government deliberately delayed the effective 
date of the new law until 7 years later,17 and after amending 
s. 6 of the Act18 to require the consent of the Minister before 
any suit can proceed against the Government. Research has shown 
that the Government has used this provision simply to avoid 
liability by granting consent to no more than 10% of the 
applicants, and not even responding to most of the rest (wambaii 
1985). Where the Minister responded, either way, the delay was 
inordinate.
In some of the letters communicating the Minister's refusal, the 
reasons given have been that the claim "is not maintainable, " or 
"has no chance of success," or "has no basis at all in law," or 
"has nothing whatsoever involving the interests of the 
Government," and even that it "is hopelessly barred by 
limitation."19 One would expect those reasons in defence 
pleadings by the Government. Thus the Government has used that 
law to adjudicate in its own causes, as Korosso, J., lamented 
when on October 1, 1991, he was on that account unable to proceed 
with a case20 filed back in 1986.
A more mischievous use of that law was in Patrick Maziku v. G.A.
17G.N. 308 of 1974.
18By the Government Proceedings (Amendment) Act 1974.
19From the records of the (Faculty of Law) University of Dar es Salaam 
Legal Aid Committee.
2 0Njile Maheda v. Mbalagane Village Council & the Attorney General, High 
Court of Tanzania, Tabora, Civil Case No. 14 of 1986.
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Sebabili & Others21 which arose out of actions by the first 
defendant as Regional Commissioner for Shinyanga but so as to 
avoid the consent requirement, the plaintiff chose not to join 
the Government as co-defendant. However, the Government asked 
to be joined and then successfully prevented the case from 
proceeding by pleading lack of the Minister's consent! But as 
we see further below, this is no longer the position today.
After independence the power of judicial review of administrative 
action was retained by the Judicature and Application of Laws
Ordinance 1961, and it was specifically saved by s. 75 of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1963 and subsequently by s. 77 of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1984. The procedure is to apply to the
High Court under the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 1955, as amended in 1968, for 
the orders of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, and under the 
Habeas Corpus Rules of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 for habeas 
corpus. But while judicial review can be an effective way of 
controlling the use of public power, until recently, its
significance in Tanzania has been limited. From 1951 to 1969, 
applications for judicial review were made at the rate of one per 
year! (Martin, R: 130)
That low rate was partly due to ignorance; most of the people 
affected by the use or misuse of public powers have been ignorant 
of the availability of judicial remedies. But also the
subjective statutory wording used in granting extensive powers
21High Court of Tanzania, Tabora, Civil Case No. 3 of 1982.
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to the executive, usually crowned with finality and ouster 
clauses excluding judicial enquiry, has often discouraged people 
who would otherwise have sought judicial review. As a result, 
it has not been easy for the Judiciary to establish itself as 
having any controlling role over the executive.
5.2.2: Attitude to the Due Process of Law
On the other hand, political executives have sometimes acted as 
if the courts had nothing to do with them or with their powers, 
and they have sometimes happily used their wide discretionary 
powers purely for administrative convenience.
Detention powers were defended by President Nyerere in the 1960s 
as necessary in a young and weak nation for occasional use 
against traitors and those likely to threaten the country's 
fragile peace and stability (Nyerere 1966:312-3). The clear 
implication was that those powers would not be invoked unless it 
was absolutely necessary in order to preserve peace. Nyerere 
even warned his District and Regional Commissioners not to use 
their limited detention powers22 against political critics 
(Nyerere 1977:44-5) . But on occasions, and especially in the second 
half of his rule, his own detention powers were invoked against 
isolated political dissenters and even suspected common criminals 
instead of taking them to court (Peter 1993; shaidi:255) .
22From 1963 district and regional commissioners have been empowered to 
detain any person up to 48 hours under the District Commissioners Act 1962 and 
the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act 1962.
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It means that the President's powers of detention have been used 
as an alternative to the normal court process under criminal law 
for the convenience of the government since there has been no 
need for proof or even evidence of guilt. In 1969 some people 
were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government; they were 
subsequently charged in court and convicted.23 But some five 
persons (including two MPs) arrested and detained for similar 
allegations in mid-1967 were never taken to court.24 And in 
November 196 9 some 3 9 people said to be involved in a corrupt 
racket forging passports were detained and after five months the 
non-citizens amongst them were released, their property 
confiscated, and expelled from the country (Martin,r:92-3) . These 
had criminal allegations against them but no charges were 
preferred. But the 14 peasants of Ukerewe detained for over a 
year in 1968 for refusing to give up their farming land to an 
Ujamaa village (Martin,R: 92) had hardly done anything upon which 
even a charge against them could be based; it could have been a 
case of abuse.
There have also been detentions for corrupt practices which could 
not be proved in court; four Indian brothers were detained for 
that reason in 196 9 until June 1970 when they were expelled from 
the country (Martin,R:92) . In 1981 Abdul Haji and Akperal Rajpar, 
both prominent businessmen, were detained for what was believed 
to be mass tax evasions, bribery and foreign exchange
22Mattaka v. R, [1971] E .A. 495.
24 (1967) 4 Africa Research Bulletin: 823C-824A.
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racketeering.25 And recently, (former) President Nyerere gave 
an account of a Greek Cypriot businessman he detained for 
boasting around saying he had the entire Government (of Tanzania) 
in his pocket.26
Nyerere admitted that such use of the detention law contravened 
the Rule of Law but justified it with the need to combat worse 
evils which are difficult to rout. One wonders what could be 
used to justify invoking the Collective Punishment Ordinance 1921 
as recently as 1984 when Taturu families in eight villages in 
Singida Region were ordered to pay compensation for the death of 
4 9 persons and loss of several hundred head of livestock suffered 
by a neighbouring ethnic community.27 Whatever justifications 
one may advance, using detention or similar powers as an 
alternative to the courts helped to enhance an attitude of 
contempt for the judicial process on the part of political 
executives.
In March 1983, over 1000 people were arrested and detained in a 
massive operation against what was called "economic sabotage." 
The detentions were under the Preventive Detention Act 1962 but 
some detention orders had been signed in blank by the President 
and distributed to the regions and districts where the respective 
commissioners then filled in the names of the detainees; it was
25Vo1.13 Africa Contemporary Record 1980-1981: B331-B332.
26J K Nyerere in a talk to the Dar es Salaam Press Club, at the Kilimanjaro 
Hotel, Dar es Salaam, March 14, 1995. A transcription was published in Business 
Times, March 31 & April 7, 1995.
27G.N. 163 of 1984; also see Shivji 1990b:29-30.
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the regional (and district) commissioners, therefore, who made 
the actual decisions as to who to detain, and not the President 
as the law provided. Invariably, some had their detention orders 
made several days subsequent to their actual detention.
Incidentally, one of those detained was an advocate, the late Mr 
Tukunjoba, who was arrested and detained for trying to challenge 
in court, by habeas corpus, the detention of his client. About 
two weeks later, President Nyerere announced that the "economic 
saboteurs" detained would not be taken to court because in court 
they could use their ill-gotten money to engage clever lawyers 
to twist the law in their favour. Subsequently, the Economic 
Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act 1983 was passed and 
retrospectively effected from the day the campaign began. This 
law created an almost parallel system of adjudication by setting 
up special tribunals to try economic sabotage cases without any 
of the known safeguards of right to bail or right to counsel or 
even right to appeal. Even the principle of separation of powers 
was violated: the composition of one of the tribunals included 
an MP who had participated in passing the law (shivji i990b:52-3) .
The Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act 1983 may have 
shown the peak of the executive's contemptuous regard for the 
judicial process. But that attitude has been exhibited at 
various other times over the years. In 1964 President Nyerere 
said publicly that his Government had no intention of varying the 
court sentences imposed on the convicted army mutineers despite 
the justified criticism of the lenient court sentences; yet, in
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a glaring contradiction, he detained many, without charge, for 
alleged involvement in that same mutiny. Sometime in 1983 the 
preliminary hearing of charges of treason against some 3 0 
suspects stopped suddenly because the charges were withdrawn and 
instead the accused were detained under the Preventive Detention 
Act 1962. This followed the escape of two of the leading 
suspects from custody, as a result of which the Minister for Home 
Affairs resigned under Parliamentary pressure. A year later, 
after one of those who had escaped was re-arrested, the court 
hearing restarted and proceeded, to end with conviction.
At times the judicial process has been treated like a tool for 
achieving specific ends desired by the executive, and which could 
otherwise be done without. In 1969 Mr Ngitami, then a Resident 
Magistrate presiding at a preliminary inquiry, was detained for 
two days for allowing bail to Mr Kasella-Bantu, one of the 
accused in a charge of murder who was also an MP and a renowned 
critic of the government. Hearing continued before another 
magistrate who, not surprisingly, did not allow bail.28 
Ultimately Mr Kasella-Bantu was acquitted by the High Court;29 
he was nevertheless kept in detention for several years.30
28Vol.1 Africa Contemporary Record 1968-1969: 214.
29R v. Joseph Kasella-Bantu, [1970] H.C.D., n.170.
30Watu, No.08, December/February 1991.
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5.2.3: Attitude to Court Orders and Legality
Respect for court orders has not always been there where the 
government did not like the verdict. Some of the suspects 
tortured to death in the course of Police interrogation, which 
led to the unprecedented resignations of two ministers and two 
regional commissioners in January 1977 as mentioned in Chapter 
4, had actually been acquitted by the courts; but they were re- 
arrested for re-interrogation (shivji i990b:90-i) . In some cases 
detention orders have been successfully challenged in court, only 
to be replaced immediately by deportation orders. In Lesinoi 
Ndeanai & Others v. Regional Prisons Officer & Another31 the 
High Court judge held the detention order invalid, as it was 
signed by the Vice-President, not the President. But he lamented 
in his judgment that he was doing a futile exercise because 
already it had been replaced by a fresh order properly signed by 
the President himself under the Deportation Ordinance 1921.
S i m i l a r l y  in Re: An Application by James Mapalala & Athumani 
Upindo22 the d e t e n t i o n  o r d e r  was c h a l l e n g e d  a f ter the law h a d  
been a m e n d e d  to a l l o w  s uch orders to be c h a l l e n g e d  on a n y  
g r o u n d . 33 But on the d ay of h e a r i n g  the d e t e n t i o n  o r d e r  h a d  
been r e s c i n d e d  an d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a d e p o r t a t i o n  o r d e r  (shivji i990b:5i- 
2), e n s u r i n g  the applicants' c o n t i n u e d  restriction. There have
31High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Misc.Criminal Applications No. 22 & 23 
of 1979; the Court of Appeal judgment is in [1980] T.L.R. 214.
32High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc.Criminal Cause No. 3 0 of
1986 .
33By the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act 1985.
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even been cases of people set free by the courts being 
immediately re-arrested, sometimes just outside the courtroom!
That attitude of the executive sometimes tends to make the courts 
appear helpless or even redundant. In Ally Lalakwa v. Regional 
Prisons Officer & Another34 the respondents, served with the 
summons for habeas corpus could not bring the detainee to court 
(in Arusha) because he had been secretly transferred to Dodoma 
under a fresh order, of deportation. In Re: An Application by 
Paul Massawe35 an order of the district court to restore to the 
applicant goods seized by the Police was flouted by the Regional 
Commissioner for over a year.
An order of the Resident Magistrate's court not to send two 
Kenyan fugitive soldiers back to Kenya36 was flouted in 1983; 
they were sent back in exchange for one of the treason trial 
suspects who had escaped from custody. When one Mr Nyirenda was 
the General Manager of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority, he 
was on private prosecution convicted of contempt of court (having 
disobeyed an order to re-instate employees wrongfully dismissed 
by the Authority). But by the time the court entered judgment, 
the Government had removed him from the jurisdiction of the court 
by transferring him to Zambia.37 And in January 1992 the
34High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Misc.Criminal Cause No.29 of 1979.
35197 9 L.R.T., n.18.
36 R v. Hezekiah Ochuka & Another, Kivukoni Resident Magistrate's Court, 
Criminal Case No. 1059 of 1982.
37Information from Issa G Shivji, who had conducted the prosecution.
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Government sent troops of Riot Police to evict some 70 doctors 
from their residences at the Muhimbili Medical Centre contrary 
to a court order of temporary injunction.38
This trend led to a tendency of total disregard for legality. 
In Kivuyo & Others v. Regional Police Commander39 the applicants 
were arrested for allegations of attempting to smuggle goods to 
Kenya, and their four vehicles and goods were seized by the 
Police. Instead of charging them in court, the Police referred 
the matter to the Regional Security Committee of the Party, 
chaired by the Regional Commissioner, which discussed it secretly 
and decided to recommend to the Prime Minister to forfeit the 
vehicles and allocate them to government departments in the 
region! The applicants neither appeared nor were they 
represented at the committee "hearing." Strangely, the 
committee's recommendation was adopted, thus making the order of 
mandamus sought against the respondent impracticable because he 
no longer had the vehicles.
In Ernest Masola v. Charamba Ngerengere40 the appellant, a Ward 
Secretary (with Police powers of arrest) had ordered the arrest 
of the respondent and had put him in a "lock-up" for seven days 
without any charges or any explanation whatsoever.
3 8 •Issued in J J Masika & Others v. Muhimbili Medical Centre, Dar es Salaam 
Resident Magistrate's Court, RM Civil Case No. 6 of 1992.
39High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Misc.Civil Application No. 22 of 1978.
401979 L.R.T., n.24.
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In Abdi Athumani & Nine Others v. The District Commissioner of 
Tunduru & Others41 the respondents had, on orders of the 
Regional Commissioner for Ruvuma, refused to renew the 
applicants' business licences and then used the Townships 
(Removal of Undesirable Persons) Ordinance 1944 to order the 
applicants to leave Tunduru and Songea districts. The reasons 
behind this were that the applicants belonged to the Gunya and 
Somali tribes who, having moved to those districts, were 
suspected of engaging in illegal trade in government trophies. 
Both the refusal to renew the licences and the expulsion order 
were held unlawful.
At one time, unlawful expulsion orders, made without any pretence 
to invoke any law, were quite a favoured resort against 
journalists whose revelations did not please the authorities in 
the districts they worked in. But instead of questioning the
power of those authorities to expel them for any reason, most of
the affected journalists simply devoted themselves towards
defending what they had published as true and therefore arguing 
that authorities had no reason to expel them (Konde: 112-6) . 
Unfortunately, this reinforced the attitude of disregard to 
legality because it tended to suggest that the authorities had 
power at law to expel them for good reason.
Disregard of legality was most grossly demonstrated in the
implementation of the Villagisation Program referred to in
41High Court of Tanzania, Songea (Sessions), Misc. Civil Causes No. 2 & No.
3 of 1987.
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Chapter Six herebelow. But another development which has raised 
issues of legality has been the emergence of traditional defence 
groups known as Sungusungu, which first emerged as a result of 
the failure of the state agencies of law and order to protect 
rural communities against a growing wave of cattle raids and 
other criminal conduct (Abrahams; Bukurura) . The groups do Police 
work in their respective areas, operating according to the 
traditional customs of their communities, without reliance on the 
state. In 1982 the government allowed them to operate in Geita 
District and the crime rate fell; this encouraged the spread of 
Sungusungu into other districts.42 But the traditional customs 
guiding Sungusungu activity are often at variance with the law. 
Thus, while acknowledged as responsible for the fall in the crime 
rate in Geita District in 1983, they did not report a single case 
to court or to the Police!43
Despite the questionable legality, the role of Sungusungu in 
enforcing law and order reached phenomenal proportions with the 
appointment of Augustine Mrema as Minister for Home Affairs in 
November 1990. In a frantic endeavour to arrest the increase in 
urban crime rate, he urged the formation of Sungusungu groups 
everywhere, and virtually sought to make Sungusungu night time 
patrols compulsory for every adult male in urban areas.
Apart from the questionable legal status of Sungusungu, in 
practice they have employed illegal methods, usurping judicial
42Daily News, November 28, 29, and December 5, 1995.
42Daily News, November 29, 1983.
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functions and inflicted punishment (shivji i990b:i6-8, 99-100) . But 
Mrema's own regard for legality and jurisdictional limits has 
been no better than Sungusungu's. As Minister for Home Affairs, 
Mrema has:
...heard complaints, investigated suspicions, arrested suspects, summoned 
lawyers, judged cases and handed down sentences and orders dissolving 
marriages and dividing matrimonial assets; reprimanding recalcitrant and 
awarding compensation against those found "guilty" by him. ( Shivji  
1995:28)
In the event, he was accused of going beyond the limits of his 
jurisdiction, an accusation made most consistently by lawyers. 
In one "case before Mrema", the Minister, through the Arusha 
Regional Police Commander, summoned two advocates based in Arusha 
to appear before him and explain how they had allowed their firm 
to be used in executing what he said was a fraudulent transfer 
deed to deprive a poor woman of her property. The woman had gone 
to complain to him. The two lawyers refused to appear before 
Mrema and instead sought to apply to the High Court for an order 
to prohibit the minister from assuming judicial functions by 
purporting to adjudicate in a civil matter at the instance of the 
woman who had complained to him. The lawyers were actually 
granted leave to apply for the order of prohibition.44 The case 
was subsequently settled out of court.
But the Minister continued with his campaign. To charges that 
he was not observing the law he insisted that the people were not 
interested in legal niceties but in tangible results and "an end
44Colman M  Ngalo & Joseph D'Souza v. Hon Augustine Mrema MP, Minister for 
Home Affairs, High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Misc. Civil Application No. 24 of
1992 .
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to the problems bothering them", and that as long as he was able 
to deliver those results, he would continue. Making no pretences 
about the need to act according to law, he claimed that his 
campaign was sanctioned by the CCM 1990 Election Manifesto! For 
him, therefore, the Judiciary was an institution that was almost 
unnecessary and could even be done without.
The overall picture of the role of the Judiciary as shown above 
is a bit uninspiring. That is rather misleading, though, because 
as we show further below, the courts have not been timid. Over 
the years, the Judiciary has managed to assert its independence 
on many occasions and today, its role as an institution for 
exercising control over the executive is not doubted.
5.3: EXECUTIVE POWERS AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDE
5.3.1: Early Post-colonial Experiences
Before independence the courts defended colonial law and order 
which the nationalist movement fought against, sometimes making 
deliberate challenges to it. Some nationalist leaders were even 
convicted by the courts for offences committed essentially 
because of their devotion to the struggle.46 As such the courts 
were regarded as allies of colonialism, and that attitude stayed 
on after independence (McAusian & Ghai:487) . Worse still, the 
judiciary was predominantly expatriate and not representative "of
46Nyerere was also convicted in 1958; see Listowel:323-33 and Ngh'waya.
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the indigenous majority" in its composition. As a result, many 
found it logical to look to the nationalist "politicians and 
politics to protect them from the courts, rather than the other 
way round" (Leys 1963 :i35) . There was a danger of the courts being 
isolated and regarded as irrelevant by the people.
To compound the problem, in the early years of independence the 
line dividing administrative questions, reviewable by the courts, 
from purely political questions was sometimes extremely thin, and 
the Government was often impatient with court decisions which 
ignored political considerations. Thus the High Court decision 
in Re: An Application by Bukoba Gymkhana Club47 was
criticised as irrational, absurd, and insensitive to the problem 
of racism encouraged by colonialism and sought to be
eliminated by the independent government (Martin,R:i26,12s) . The 
High Court quashed the decision of the Liquor Licensing Board 
refusing to renew the liquor licence of the applicant club on the 
ground that the club's constitution was "still largely 
discriminatory." The rule found to be discriminatory by the 
Board was that a new member could not be admitted into the club 
unless proposed by a member and seconded by another member. In 
itself, the rule was not discriminatory; but, with the colonial 
policies encouraging discrimination against Africans, it was 
extremely difficult to get even two members, out of its entirely 
non-African membership, to support the admission of an
47[1963] E.A. 478.
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African.48 But according to the High Court, considering this 
would have amounted to going beyond the rule's purport.
An extreme manifestation of the government's impatience with 
judicial indifference to political considerations followed the 
High Court decision in Marealle v. Kilimanjaro District 
Council,49 awarding damages to the plaintiff for loss of office 
as chief without regard to the statutory abolition of that 
office50 as part of the post-independence democratisation of 
local government. The High Court decision was overruled by an 
Act of Parliament passed 12 days after the judgment.51
It would certainly be wrong to encourage the courts to base their 
decisions on political considerations. But the problem arises 
in situations where the courts may be required under the law to 
make decisions which are essentially political, and such a 
situation could easily arise with a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. In its report in 1965 the Presidential Commission 
warned that:
...a Bill of Rights would invite conflict between the Judiciary and the 
Executive and Legislature... [as] it would have overriding legislative 
effect. This means that the Courts could be asked to declare invalid any 
law passed by Parliament if it were inconsistent with a provision 
contained in the Bill of Rights. By requiring the Courts to stand in
480n May 3, 1995, Mr Trevor Jagger recalled to me (in London) that when he 
was District Officer in Bukoba in 1950, he proposed Dr Mtawali, a fully qualified 
African doctor, for membership of that club. The uproarious opposition to his 
proposal shocked him so much that it added much to his early disillusionment with 
the colonial service.
49High Court of Tanganyika, Arusha, Civil Case No. 44 of 1961.
50By the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act 1963.
51By the Chiefs (Abolition of Office: Consequential Provisions) Act 1963; 
see Martin,R:57-8.
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judgment on the legislature the Commission feels that the Judiciary would 
be drawn into the arena of political controversy. (Tanzania 1965:31)
Indeed, the exclusion of the Bill of Rights from the Constitution 
helped to avoid a conflict between the Judiciary and the other 
organs of state, as can be seen when events surrounding the 1967 
Arusha Declaration are considered. Immediately after the 
declaration, a number of private firms were nationalised. 
Although the previous owners were subsequently compensated, their 
firms were compulsorily taken over by the government and they got 
neither the right nor, for many of them, the opportunity to 
negotiate the take over. The government acted without any legal 
basis; legislation to legalise the steps was passed subsequently.
With a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the High Court would 
have been invited to prevent the Executive from nationalising, 
and to declare the nationalisation laws invalid. This would have 
led to the kind of conflict which the Presidential Commission had 
feared. In that conflict the Rule of Law would have been 
undermined and the impartiality of the courts would have been 
jeopardised. Support for the Arusha Declaration and
nationalisation was demonstrated by numerous mass rallies and 
long distance marches conducted countrywide over a period of 
several months. Were the courts to declare the nationalisation 
measures unlawful, it would have enraged the public and probably 
turned the mass rallies into protest demonstrations against the 
Judiciary. Alternatively, the courts might have simply defended 
the nationalisations out of fear, compromising the impartiality 
required of the Judiciary.
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The point emphasised here is not the legality or the wisdom of 
the nationalisation measures, but the wisdom of involving the 
courts in deciding to take or not to take those measures. It is 
unwise to involve the Judiciary in making decisions which are, 
strictly speaking, more political than judicial. At that time, 
as stated by the Presidential Commission, it was seen that:
Decisions concerning the extent to which individual rights must give way 
to the wider considerations of social progress are not properly judicial 
decisions. They are political decisions best taken by political leaders 
responsible to the electorate. (Tanzania 1965:31)
The absence of a Bill of Rights kept the Judiciary away from 
involvement in making those political decisions.
5.3.2: Contending With Executive Might
But on the other hand, the absence of a Bill of Rights also gave 
the government freedom to act without much control or restraint 
by the Judiciary, so much so that some magistrates and even some 
judges may have adopted an attitude which exalted the Executive 
as superior beyond censuring by the Judiciary, even in decisions 
which were not strictly political. Thus, while a decision to 
restrain the freedom of an individual is not, in ordinary 
circumstances, a political decision, the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania stated in Attorney General v. Lesinoi Ndeanai & Others1 
that the power of the President to detain a person under the 
Preventive Detention Act 1962 was "entirely subjective" and not 
to be tested or questioned in any court.
1 [1980] T.L.R. 214.
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In Ahmed Janmohamed Dhirani v. R,2 the Prime Minister had signed 
a detention order purporting to have been delegated the detention 
powers of the President. No instrument of such delegation was 
shown in court; only the detention order itself recited that the 
Prime Minister was exercising the powers of the President under 
the Preventive Detention Act 1962 "and all other powers thereunto 
enabling." And the High Court simply assumed that there must 
have been some delegation or other enabling laws, not named, upon 
which the Prime Minister had acted!
In Saidi Hilali v. R3 the applicant was out on bail pending some 
criminal charges before a district when he was arrested and put 
in custody. At the hearing of an application for habeas corpus 
filed subsequently, a photocopy of a deportation order signed by 
the President three weeks after the arrest was produced in court. 
The order did not indicate where the applicant was to be deported 
to. All the same the High Court dismissed the application saying 
the deportation order was not challengeable in court.
In Ali Yusuf Mrope v. R4 the applicant was detained without any 
order being signed until the day of hearing his application for 
habeas corpus. Rather surprisingly, the court allowed an 
application by the state attorney for a few hours' adjournment 
to enable the production in court of a detention order, signed
2 [1979] L.R.T., n.l.
3High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc. Criminal Application No. 44
of 1979.
4High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc.Crim. Cause No.2 of 1977.
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on that same day, and then directed that the applicant remain in 
detention.
Mohamed Ahmed v. R5 exhibited an uninspiring judicial attitude. 
It was an attempt to question, by habeas corpus, the detentions 
made in the campaign against economic sabotage. In a half page 
ruling, Munyera, J., dismissed it with these words:
... I would say that any fool knows that there is a nationwide crackdown on 
suspected economic saboteurs which began in March 1983. The detainee 
Mohamed Ahmed is not the only person detained as a result of the 
crackdown... The applicant knows very well that ordinary courts have no 
jurisdiction over cases of suspected economic saboteurs. His application 
is misconceived.
Indeed, under the Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act 
1983, ordinary courts had no jurisdiction over matters of 
economic sabotage. But this was an application to determine the 
legality of the applicant's detention, not for adjudication on 
economic sabotage. The decision had no basis in law.
Fortunately, that has not been the overall attitude of the 
Judiciary. On occasions the High Court has delivered strong 
judgments condemning the government for its excesses and in fact 
some of the cases already referred to above indicate a firm 
resolve by judges to defend the independence of the Judiciary and 
to emphasise its role in controlling the executive. Thus in both 
James Bita v. Idd Kambi6 and Hamisi Masisi & Six Others v. R,1 
the High Court condemned the district and regional commissioners'
5High Court of Tanzania, Mwanza, Misc. Criminal Cause No.16 of 1983
6 [1979] L.R.T., n .9.
7 [1984] T.L.R. 751 (in Draft).
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interferences with the courts below. In Ernest Masola v. 
Charamba Ngerengere8 the ward secretary who had detained the 
respondent with absolutely no cause for seven days was held 
liable in damages. In Abdi Athumani & Nine Others v. The 
District Commissioner of Tunduru & Three Others,9 the High Court 
quashed the unlawful decisions and orders of the district and 
regional authorities. In a series of judgments, the High Court 
declared sungusungu illegal. And in J J Masika & Others v. 
Muhimbili Medical Centre,10 the Director of the Medical Centre 
which had evicted doctors from their residences was committed to 
serve two weeks in civil prison for disobeying an order of 
temporary injunction.
In Re: An Application by Paul Massawe11 the applicant had been 
acquitted of charges of smuggling goods to Kenya and the trial 
court had ordered the said goods and the lorry carrying them, 
which had been seized by the Police as evidence, to be returned 
to him as the rightful owner. This order was not complied with. 
The applicant paid visits and wrote letters to various government 
authorities in an effort to get his goods back, but all in vain. 
By the time the High Court granted his application for an order 
of mandamus, it was almost 21 months after the goods were first 
seized.
8[1979] L.R.T., n .24.
9High Court of Tanzania, Songea (Sessions), Misc. Civil Causes No. 2 & No. 
3 of 1987.
10Dar es Salaam Resident Magistrate's Court, RM Civil Case No.6 of 1992.
11 [1979] L.R.T., n .18.
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At the hearing before the High Court, it transpired that the 
Regional Commissioner had ordered the confiscation of the goods, 
thus violating the order of the trial court. Delivering 
judgment, Mnzavas, J., as he then was, condemned this 
interference with the independence of the Judiciary:
...should one now commence, as did the Honourable Regional Commissioner, 
blocking and interfering with court orders which are not to his liking, we 
will, I am afraid, be sinking to the level of a Banana Republic where 
Judges can be dismissed at whim and where judgements are written by- 
rulers. No one of us would like such a situation to develop in 
Tanzania.12
Although judicial activism was in many cases restricted by 
statutory clauses ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, judges 
still insisted on a strict observance of procedural legality. 
Thus in Attorney General v. Lesinoi Ndeanai & Others13 the Court 
of Appeal, while holding that the President's decision to detain 
anyone under the Preventive Detention Act 1962 was entirely 
subjective and not to be questioned in any court, nevertheless 
held the particular order in question invalid for the procedural 
defect of wanting the Public Seal. Kisanga, J.A., stated:
For, it seems to me correct on principle to insist that the application of 
such a stringent Act to curtail the freedom of the subject is a matter 
which should not be done casually or lightly.... In other words, justice 
demands that in order to take away or to curtail that which is so precious 
to the individual, the power to do so must be exercised with scrupulous 
accuracy.14
That principle was invoked in Re: An Application by Winfred 
Ngonyani15 concerning a deportation order which did not indicate
12Ibid. , at p .166.
13 [1980] T.L.R. 214.
14Ibid. , at p. 247.
15 [1982] T.L.R. 272.
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the place where the applicant was to be deported to. Biron, J., 
quashed the deportation order upon this irregularity because 
provisions curtailing the liberty of the subject "must be 
strictly construed."
As already shown earlier, the powers of the President were so 
immense that some people tended to regard the President as being 
above the law. Therefore the emphasis in those two cases that 
the President must observe the law "with scrupulous accuracy" was 
a good contribution to the Rule of Law in Tanzania.
Significant too are those few cases in which the court quashed 
orders or decisions of the President because they were ultra 
vires. In Sheikh Muhammad Nassor Abdulla v. Regional Police 
Commander & Two Others16 a deportation order signed by the 
President purporting to deport the applicant from Dar es Salaam 
to Zanzibar was quashed by the High Court because the Deportation 
Ordinance 1921 was limited to Tanganyika in its application, and 
did not extend to Zanzibar.
Patman Garments Industries Ltd v. Tanzania Manufacturers Ltd17 
concerned revocation of a Right of Occupancy under s.10 of the 
Land Ordinance 1923. The President was empowered to revoke a 
Right of Occupancy either for good cause, which consisted of 
circumstances listed in the Ordinance, or in the public interest.
16High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc. Criminal Cause No. 21 of
1983; [1984] T.L.R. 598 (Draft Law Report).
17 [1981] T.L.R. 303.
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Apparently, personnel in the Lands Department had, either 
inadvertently or mischievously, granted offers of Rights of 
Occupancy to both parties in respect of the same land. It 
appears that the President was advised to revoke the right of the 
earlier grantee as a convenient way out of this "double 
allocation" of the same land.
Citing three English authorities, the Court of Appeal first 
rejected the old "distinction between judicial and administrative 
or executive functions of public officials", with the attendant 
bar to judicial review in respect of the latter. Then the court 
found that the revocation of the Right of Occupancy was unlawful 
because it was done neither in the public interest nor for good 
cause. And finally, this being an appeal from a suit and not an 
application for judicial review, the court relied on a passage 
from Lord Denning, M.R., in Congreve v. Home Office18 to nullify 
the revocation by the President and to declare the appellant the 
rightful owner of the disputed land.
5.3.3: After the Bill of Rights
The Bill of Rights, incorporated in the Constitution in late 
1984, removed or weakened many previously existing statutory 
protections to executive and administrative actions and thereby 
enhanced the scope of judicial control considerably. Provisions 
of an Act of Parliament became insufficient as the basis for 
executive or administrative action unless they also conformed
18 [1976] Q.B. 629.
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with the Bill of Rights as contained in the Constitution,
otherwise the High Court could declare them null and void. On
that basis, in Chumchua Marwa v. Officer i/c Musoma Prison & the 
Attorney General,19 the High Court declared the entire
Deportation Ordinance 1921 null and void for being 
unconstitutional. This rendered the President incapable of
issuing deportation orders.
Significantly, in that case the question whether the Ordinance 
was constitutional or not was raised, suo moto, by the court 
(Mwalusanya, J.) . This was found to be quite proper by the Court 
of Appeal because:
Firstly, all courts of law in this country are duty bound to take judicial 
notice of all constitutional and legal matters. Secondly, the courts in 
this country are not courts of the parties but are courts of law and have 
thus inherent jurisdiction to raise and to consider matters which are 
necessary to a fair and just decision of a case, provided the parties are 
given reasonable opportunity to respond to the matters thus raised.20
As the condition in the proviso had not been observed, the case 
was remitted to the High Court with directions to the trial judge 
to invite the parties to specifically address the court on the 
constitutionality of the Ordinance. This was subsequently done 
and, as directed by the Court of Appeal, the judge made a finding 
on it (which was the same as the previous one) and then forwarded 
the whole record to the Court of Appeal for final judgment.
In the event, however, the final judgment was never entered by
19High Court of Tanzania, Mwanza, Misc. Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1988.
20Attorney General v. Marwa Magori, Tanzania Court of Appeal, (at Mwanza), 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 1988 (unreported), at p.3 of typescript.
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the Court of Appeal because the appeal was struck off the 
Register at the instance of the appellant, the Attorney General, 
who had sought to withdraw it.21 Thus, the decision of the High 
Court remains. In that decision the Deportation Ordinance 1921 
was found to offend the right to personal freedom, to freedom of 
movement, and to a fair hearing (including the right to appeal) 
which are now guaranteed by, respectively, sections 15, 17 and 
13 of the Constitution 1977.
In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Daudi Pete22 the Court of 
Appeal held s. 148 (5) (e) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985, which 
denied the right to bail in charges for certain offences, to be 
unconstitutional because it was too wide and unguarded against 
abuse.
Meanwhile, problems with the rule requiring the consent of the 
Minister to sue the Government continued. In mitigation, the 
courts started upholding the right of individual claimants to sue 
only the particular government officers whose actions gave rise 
to the claims in their personal capacities, as joint tortfeasors, 
without joining the Government. That position was given great 
publicity when the High Court ruled in Rev Christopher Mtikila 
v. Business Times & Augustine Lyatonga Mrema23 that the Minister 
for Home Affairs, the 2nd Defendant, could be sued in his
21By letter Ref. N o .J/J.10/26/84, dated April 2, 1992. The appeal could 
not be withdrawn as it had already been heard and was only pending judgment; the 
appropriate course therefore was to strike it off the Register.
22 [1991] L.R.C. (Const) 553.
23High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Civil Case No. 47 of 1992.
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personal capacity without joining the Government. It was hoped 
that this position would encourage the government, acting through 
its officers, to be more mindful of the law.
But then came Peter Ng'omango v. Gerson Mwangwa & the Attorney 
General24 in which Mwalusanya, J., declared s.6 of the 
Government Proceedings Act 1967, requiring the consent of the 
Minister to sue the Government, unconstitutional. Then the Court 
of Appeal considered the same issue in Kukutia Ole Pumbun & 
Another v. Attorney General25 and, after referring with 
approval to the High Court judgment in the former case, also held 
the provision unconstitutional.
A case which greatly illustrates the present position is Rev
Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General26 in which the
Attorney General specifically requested Mr Justice Mwalusanya not 
over
to preside/the hearing of the case because he was unlikely to be 
seen to be impartial. It appeared from the pleadings that the 
petitioner may have been inspired in some of his claims by a 
pamphlet written by the judge (Mwalusanya) for general popular 
readership. The Attorney General's request was readily granted 
and the case proceeded under another judge who nevertheless 
upheld many of the petitioner's claims. It showed that before 
the High Court, the Government was not in any way better placed 
than an individual litigant.
24High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No.22 of 1992.
25 [1993] 2 L.R.C. 317.
26High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993.
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Briefly, the Judiciary in Tanzania has been fairly active in 
recent years. It has not tried, however, to take its activism 
beyond the limits of judicial decision making. Some attempts 
have been made in recent years to drag the Judiciary into
political decision making but they have been resisted by the High 
Court. In Mwalimu Paul John Mhozya v. Attorney General27 the 
plaintiff sought to use the judicial process to remove the 
President of the United Republic of Tanzania from office for 
violating the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the case 
because it involved a political issue the jurisdiction for which 
was vested exclusively in the National Assembly. And in Rev 
Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney General28 the High Court 
dismissed a number of claims by the plaintiff, including prayers 
for orders to declare the Constitution void and to require the 
government to convene a constitutional conference or set up a 
Constitutional Commission, because the "High Court cannot... 
adjudicate on matters that are purely political as distinct from 
legal issues."
At the same time the High Court has not been indifferent to the 
overall interests of society and it has made no attempt to use 
its powers deliberately to frustrate the executive. This was 
illustrated in Ally Mohamedi Liheta v. R29 in which the High
Court, Mkude, J., held that s.148(5)(d), prohibiting the courts 
from granting bail to persons charged with offences alleged to
27High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Civil Case No. 206 of 1993.
2 8High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993.
29High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc.Crim. Cause No.29 of 1991.
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have been committed by those persons while out on bail, was 
unconstitutional for infringing the discretionary powers of the 
judiciary. But having so held, the court used its discretion to 
refuse bail to the applicant.
5.4: PARTY SUPREMACY AND THE JUDICIARY
In emphasising the independence of the Judiciary, judges and 
magistrates are required to be free from political control and 
influence in discharging their judicial functions. For that 
reason, they enjoy a secure tenure of office, free from worries 
of possible removal as a result of a change of government. They 
are also not to be actively involved in politics or political 
parties because such involvement may raise doubts about their 
impartiality.
But in one-party state Tanzania, the context has been different, 
and in upholding the independence and impartiality of the 
Judiciary it has not been necessary to stick to every letter of 
the rule as known to the western tradition. The greatest novelty 
was party membership for judicial officers, which was actually 
encouraged by the then Chief Justice, Mr Telford Georges (James
Sc Kassam:26-8) .
His reasons were that firstly, political commitment as such was, 
as shown by English and American practice, not in itself a bar 
to judicial office (James & Kassam:27) ; competence and professional 
integrity is what counted. Secondly, TANU beliefs were not in
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conflict with the principles of justice to which all lawyers 
subscribe. And thirdly, and most important was the need for the 
Judiciary to establish its relevance and legitimacy in Tanzanian 
society. The apparently negative role of the Judiciary in the 
struggle for independence contrasted sharply with that of TANU 
which had established itself firmly as the people's champion. 
The Judiciary could not gain popular acceptance as an institution 
committed to serve the people if it chose to operate in total 
isolation from, rather than in cooperation with, TANU.
The need for the Judiciary to understand people's fears, hopes 
and aspirations was also strongly emphasised by the President 
when he warned that the independence of the Judiciary:
...must not lead to the belief that... Judge [s] can be, or should be, 
"neutral" on the basic issues of our society.... Otherwise their 
interpretation may appear ridiculous to that society, and may lead to the 
whole concept of law being held in contempt by the people. (Nyerere 
1968:112)
Accordingly, the idea of the Chief Justice was to build up a 
Judiciary which was, "without sacrifice of principle, to remain 
independent though not isolated, impartial but not indifferent, 
positive but not inflexible" (James & Kassam:62) . It was certainly 
not for anyone to become a politician while still retaining 
judicial office.
A worry was expressed that a judge or magistrate so committed to 
the party as to register as a member may not be impartial in a 
conflict of interests between the party and an individual 
(Nwabueze:281-2) . This was unlikely because firstly, as mentioned
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above, the basic principles and beliefs of the Party supported 
justice, which judges and magistrates swore to uphold. Partly 
for that reason, perhaps, at least at the time Mr Georges was 
encouraging party membership for members of the bench, the sole 
political party enjoyed the support of the entire population 
generally and propagated nothing whatsoever to conflict with the 
law. Secondly, judicial decisions were made entirely in 
accordance with the law, and not subject to party or other 
beliefs. That is why Mr Georges also strongly emphasised the 
need for high professional standards and integrity. Therefore 
that worry was, in our view, as idle as worrying that a judge or 
magistrate who strongly believes in religious morals may not be 
trusted to administer provisions of the Law of Marriage Act 1971 
which confer certain rights of a married woman to a woman who has 
merely been cohabiting with a man.
But Tanzania has been more than just a one-party state: the 1975 
constitutional amendment required "the functions of all the 
organs of state" to be "performed under the auspices of the 
Party", and in 1977 the Party was declared "supreme in all 
matters in accordance with the Constitution of the Party." And 
party supremacy over the legislature and with regard to policy 
was well established even before 1975.
But in so far as the Judiciary was concerned, courts continued 
under the requirement to operate in accordance with the law, thus 
affirming the continuing supremacy of law as enacted by 
Parliament, irrespective of any changes in the Parliamentary
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relations with the Party or the Executive.
This is well demonstrated by some judgments in which there was 
apparent conflict between the implementation of party policies, 
and some rights of the individual. In Laiton Kigala v. Musa 
Bariti30 the applicant had been expelled from an ujamaa village. 
He did not contest the expulsion but claimed, and was awarded by 
the primary court, compensation for the contribution of his 
labour in clearing the village's shamba. The district 
authorities wanted to avoid implementing the decision of the 
court because, according to them, its implementation would 
undermine the party policy on rural socialism. But the High 
Court, Mnzavas, J. , reminded the district authorities that it was 
not "the policy of this country to substitute expediency for 
legality." Quoting from the TANU Constitution, then scheduled 
to the Interim Constitution, and from the writings of President 
Nyerere, the High Court affirmed the applicant's legal right to 
"a just return for his labour," irrespective of any adverse 
implications to the policies of the party.
In Lalata Msangawale v. Henry Mwamlima31 an ujamaa village 
purported to take over the appellant's piece of land following 
an alleged decision to that effect at a meeting of the village; 
the said decision was claimed to be backed by the TANU district 
authorities. Once again, the High Court affirmed the property 
rights of the individual, and the need to pay compensation if at
30 [1975] L.R.T., n.40.
31 [1979] L.R.T., n.3.
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property
all onesjwas to be lawfully expropriated. In this case too, the 
court relied on the TANU Constitution and Nyerere's writings to 
show that there need not be any conflict between party policies 
and the law.
The above case was one in a series in which some local party 
authorities, perhaps misled by a provision in the Villages and 
Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) 
Act 1975 that village councils had final authority over land 
matters within their respective village boundaries, purported to 
take over individually held properties claiming to be exercising 
powers at village level similar to those of the Government of the 
United Republic in nationalising private firms. This was the 
claim in Khimji Gangji Sisodya v. R32 in which the appellant 
had, as a result of the claims, suddenly found himself charged 
with criminal trespass over his own land! In this, as in the 
other cases, the High Court affirmed the supremacy of the law.
It should be noted that even the flouting of the order of the 
district court by the Regional Commissioner in Re: An Application 
by Paul Massawe,33 and the usurpation of judicial functions by 
the Regional Commissioner in Kivuyo & Others v. Regional Police 
Commander34 and by the District Commissioner in James Bita v. 
Idd Kambi,35 accounts of all of which have been given above,
32High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Criminal Appeal No. 191 of 1978.
33 [1979] L.R.T., n .18.
34High Court of Tanzania, Arusha, Misc. Civil Application No.22 of 1978.
35 [1979] L.R.T., n .9.
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were done in the name of the Party's Regional Security Committee 
(District Security Committee in the ilatter case) of the Party, 
of which the commissioners were chairmen.
The Judiciary has also refused to back the party policy of 
favouring or giving preference to public enterprise, in the form 
of parastatal firms, over private enterprise unless the 
preference is clearly supported by the law. In Agro Industries 
Ltd v. Attorney General36 the President had exercised his power 
under s.10(2) of the Land Ordinance 1923 to "revoke a right of 
occupancy if, in his opinion, it is in the public interest so to 
do." It transpired that the President had revoked the right of 
a lawful owner, a private company, in favour of a trespassing 
parastatal company. The Court of Appeal found this to be an 
illegal exercise of the powers of the President because:
In the eyes of the law a trespasser is a trespasser, be it a public 
enterprise or a private enterprise or an individual. So the crucial 
question is what action is in the public interest?.... We are satisfied 
that public interest, as we have stated to understand it, requires that 
legal property rights should be protected against.... a trespasser, albeit 
a public enterprise.37
That Party Supremacy did not allow the party to disregard the law 
was also shown in relation to the sungusungu traditional defence 
groups. They were not established by or under any law and, as 
pointed out earlier, they often did not observe the law in their 
operations. In Mara Region, the Regional Executive Committee of 
the Party issued a "Code for the Operation of Sungusungu" which
36Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No.34 of 1990.
37Ibid., at pp.14-5 of the typescript.
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was then considered as the "legal authority" for the groups' 
existence (shivji i990b:i6-7) . In a series of judgments,38 
Mwalusanya, J., declared sungusungu unconstitutional39 and their 
methods of operation illegal. Those decisions are said to have 
extremely offended some leaders of the Party who supported 
sungusungu activities; there were even unconfirmed reports that 
the delay in effecting the transfer of Mr Justice Mwalusanya from 
Mwanza to Dodoma was because they did not want to see him in the 
Party's "capital."
But the Judiciary was not to compromise legality with party 
supremacy. Following those judgments, an attempt was made to 
legalise sungusungu by passing the People's Militia Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1989, which included sungusungu 
in the definition of "people's militia." It is doubtful whether 
that law resolves fully the issue of sungusungu's legality 
because the law does not say who is responsible for raising and 
maintaining sungusungu units. As a kind of military force, it 
is only the government of the United Republic of Tanzania which 
has authority under the Constitution to raise and maintain them; 
but in practice the government does not do so.
One can say, however, that in spite of the concept of Party
38Ngwengwe Sangija & Others v. R, High Court of Tanzania, Mwanza, Criminal 
Appeal No. 72 of 1987; the others are civil cases at the same (Mwanza) Registry 
of the High Court: Charles Mwita & Another v. Mresi & Eleven Others, Misperesi 
K Maingu v. Hamisi Mtongori & Others, and Amoni Magigi Nyamuganda & Another v. 
Bonifas Kilingo & Others, being Civil Cases Nos. 15, 16 and 22 respectively, all 
of 1988, and all unreported.
39S.147(1) of the Constitution provides that raising and maintaining "any 
military force of any kind" is the exclusive monopoly of the Government.
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Supremacy, the Judiciary remained steadfast in defending its 
independence, and the supremacy of law in the administration of 
justice. Apart from occasional individual aberrations, members 
of the Judiciary have, on the whole, not allowed the Judiciary 
to succumb to undue party pressure or interference.
Perhaps the greatest threat to judicial independence could have 
come from within the Judiciary itself. The Chief Justice who 
succeeded Mr Telford Georges in 1971 is known to have been an 
ardent supporter of the party and its policies, and to have even 
issued a circular telling judges that they were obliged to 
further the policies of the party. The circular was rejected by 
the other judges of the High Court who remained firm in defence 
of the independence of the Judiciary and their duty to administer 
justice according to law, and without fear or favour. Responding 
to the circular, Mr Justice Biron stated that the Chief Justice 
had no right or authority to issue circulars requiring courts to 
abide by "political or executive whims". And on party policies 
he said:
The fact that the NEC made policy did not mean that it followed without 
saying that whatever came out of it was law. No! Where an important 
policy matter had been issued without a corresponding parliamentary 
endorsement by the way of legislation, the courts are not bound to enforce 
it. (Peter 1980:24)
Such firm stand by judges may well have saved the Judiciary from 
falling under the control or influence of political party whims.
The same Chief Justice is said to have once directed that all 
cases going to the High Court by appeal or revision, and in which 
ujamaa villages were either parties or had a direct interest
should not be sent to other judges but himself (ongw'amuhana:264-5) . 
This directive does not seem to have had much effect either. Mr 
Saidi was removed from the office of Chief Justice in 1977, just 
after the new constitution formally declared the Party to be 
"supreme in all matters in accordance with the Constitution of 
the Party." Ironically, the power of the President to remove the 
Chief Justice from office at any time which has been criticised 
for its likely use to influence the judicial conduct of an 
incumbent Chief Justice (ong'wamuhana: 264-5) was in this case used 
to terminate the tenure of a chief justice whose conduct tended 
to jeopardise the independence of the Judiciary.
Subsequent to that the Judiciary has steadfastly remained 
independent and the whole public generally acknowledges it as 
such. Evidence of this acknowledgement is in the public demands 
to have judges to head commissions or probe teams whose tasks 
demand a high degree of integrity and impartiality. It is for 
that reason that the President deliberately appointed the Chief 
Justice to head the Commission which, after collecting the 
people's views, recommended an end to the one-party state, a 
recommendation adopted and implemented from July 1992.
5.5: THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
A great innovation of the Interim Constitution was the Tanzanian 
Ombudsman, known as the Permanent Commission of Enquiry 
(hereinafter the PCE). Having rejected the incorporation of a 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution, the Presidential Commission
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recommended the establishment of the PCE specifically as a 
safeguard against abuse of power by officials of both the 
Government and the Party (Tanzania 1965:32) . That recommendation 
was adopted.
In his address to the Assembly which passed the Interim 
Constitution President Nyerere strongly commended the proposal 
to establish the PCE because:
The nature of our economic problems in Tanzania demands that many officers 
of the Government, the Party, and the law itself, should be entrusted with 
great powers over other individuals. At the same time our recent history, 
and the educational backwardness of the majority of our people mean that 
automatic checks on abuse of power are almost non-existent. (Nyerere 
1968 :39)
Thus ss. 67-69 of the Interim Constitution established the PCE 
specifically as a safeguard against abuse of power. Subsequent 
constitutional changes have retained the PCE and now it is deemed 
to be established under ss.129-131 of the Constitution 1977.
5.5.1: Set-Up and Jurisdiction
The PCE was the first Ombudsman ever to be established in Africa, 
and only the second in the Commonwealth, after New Zealand which 
had established the Ombudsman in 1962. The New Zealand model was 
actually studied and some of its features adopted in the PCE. 
Notably, the PCE visited New Zealand during its first year in 
office.40
Initially, the Constitution set up the PCE with a Chairman and
40Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1966-1967:14 para 58.
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two commissioners, all appointed by the President, to hold office 
for two years but one commissioner vacating office each year so 
as to ensure continuity. A commissioner could be re-appointed 
for another term provided that after two consecutive terms, a 
commissioner had to vacate for at least one term before he could 
be re-appointed again. Later, there was an increase in the 
length of terms to three years and the number of commissioners 
to a maximum of four. Usually, those appointed chairmen and 
commissioners are highly respected persons of proven integrity 
with long experience in the the Judiciary or other sectors of the 
public service.
The Constitution gives a broad mandate to the PCE to enquire into 
the conduct of any person holding office in the Government, the 
Party, local government authorities, public corporations, and 
other institutions specified by Parliament. Excluded from this 
mandate are the President and judges and magistrates in the 
discharge of their judicial functions.41
Details of how the PCE operates are provided for under the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act 1966. Section 8 of the Act 
provides that, apart from the constitutional exemptions, the 
jurisdiction of the PCE shall not be ousted by statutory clauses 
of finality or exclusion. According to its first Chairman, the 
PCE was set up to • investigate arbitrary arrests and other 
improper uses of discretionary powers; nepotism, decisions taken 
maliciously, or in bad faith, or on irrelevant considerations;
41Section 129(4),(5) of the Constitution 1977.
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inordinate delays in taking a required action, cases of 
misapplication or misinterpretation of laws, and so on 
(Mang'enya:6) . And according to one of his successors, the PCE 
was also to investigate all acts of "oppression, threats, 
discrimination, bribery and misapplication of public 
property. "42
Generally the PCE has quite a wide jurisdiction which is 
justified by the purpose of its establishment: protection against 
abuse of power and official authority. Investigation by the PCE 
can be initiated by the PCE itself upon notice of any conduct 
that justifies such enquiry; but usually an enquiry is commenced 
by a complaint being made to the PCE. The President may direct 
the PCE to make any such enquiry; he can also order any enquiry 
to be stopped.43 At the commencement of every enquiry, s.9(1) 
of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act 1966 requires the PCE 
to inform the head of the department or institution being 
enquired into.
According to s. 10 of the Act, enquiries must be conducted in 
private. Nobody is entitled to a hearing by the PCE as of right; 
but the PCE is not to make any adverse recommendation on any 
person or organisation without giving a prior opportunity to the 
person or organisation to be heard. Sections 11, 12 and 13 of 
the Act give to the PCE powers similar to those of a court of law 
to summon witnesses, call for papers and enter premises for
42Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1973-1974: 6, para 16.
43Section 129(2) of the Constitution 1977.
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purposes of conducting enquiries. The Commission determines its 
own procedure and it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
applying in courts.
The working language of the PCE is Swahili;44 complaints may be 
lodged in writing or orally, and there is no fee. This has made 
the PCE easily accessible to most people, far more than the 
courts are. After concluding an enquiry, the PCE submits its 
findings and recommendations in confidence to the President for 
appropriate action. Where the report to the President is not a 
unanimous report, s.15(2) of the Act requires the dissenting 
Commissioner to attach his dissenting report, properly signed by 
him. The PCE is not allowed to disclose the contents of any 
report made to the President except with the President's 
permission. And s.19 of the Act accords to the reports of the 
PCE, and to any information and document given to it in the 
course of an enquiry, the same privileges as are accorded to 
court proceedings.
But unlike the courts, the PCE has no power to issue orders of 
its own to enforce its findings. It just reports them to the 
President and leaves it to him to redress whatever wrongs it may 
find in its enquiries, and the President has no obligation to act 
as recommended by the PCE. That position is not very different 
from that of the New Zealand Ombudsman who also has no direct 
powers of his own but can only make recommendations to the 
relevant department to change any decision or conduct disapproved
44Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1966-1977: 14, para 56.
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by the Ombudsman. If the department is unwilling to change, the 
Ombudsman reports the matter to the Minister concerned, then 
further to the Prime Minister and finally to Parliament
(Robson:144) .
In New Zealand, however, the Ombudsman is appointed by the 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of 
Represent at ives, and reports his findings and recommendations 
ultimately to Parliament; he is generally regarded as 
"Parliament's man" (Robson: 145) . - In other countries too,
legislative control is often regarded as an essential feature of 
the Ombudsman institution (Norton-.609) . In the United Kingdom, the 
Ombudsman is known as the Parliamentary Commissioner and even the 
investigation he makes is usually at the instance of a Member of 
Parliament who requests it on behalf of or for the benefit of a 
constituent.
But while the Tanzanian position may be an exception in global 
terms, it is not so in Africa. In many African countries the 
Ombudsman is appointed by the Head of State (who is usually also 
the head of government), reports to him, and depends on him to 
implement the decisions or recommendations made (Hatchard:257-9) .
5.5.2: An Assessment of Its Role
During its first year of operation the PCE covered 16,096 miles 
in 215 days, touring and holding meetings of 104 divisions in 53 
districts in 14 regions, addressing an overall total of 64,065
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people.45 The following year the PCE visited 7 regions, 10 
districts, 45 divisions and addressed a total of 21,262 
people.46 That was how many people got to know about the PCE 
and many of the up-country complaints submitted to the PCE were 
made orally in private sessions held immediately after each such 
meeting.
The PCE received 1627 complaints during its first year of 
operation, of which 65.3% were rejected for lack of 
jurisdiction.47 The following year saw a proportional decline 
in the number of cases rejected, showing a better public 
understanding of the PCE's jurisdiction.48 From inception in 
1966 to June 1990, the PCE received a total of 57,520 complaints, 
of which 27,222 were rejected, either for lack of jurisdiction 
or because they had alternative channels, 8,521 were withdrawn 
or discontinued, 3,746 were still pending and 6,686 were upheld 
(Mjemmas:4i-2) . The proportion of complaints upheld, at 11.6%, 
compares well with those of the Ombudsman institutions in other 
countries (Robson: 145-6 ; Norton: 618-20 ) .
The PCE often handles cases which could have been handled by 
other bodies, whenever such intervention by the PCE is justified. 
Even where it has no jurisdiction, complainants are advised what 
to do; where the acts or omissions complained of are lawful,
*5Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1966-1967: 4, para 6.
46Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1967-1968: 3, para 6.
47Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1966-1967: 7-9.
48Permanent Commission of Enquiry Annual Report 1967-1968:11 para 34-5.
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thorough explanations are given to the complainants. And even 
where the PCE has no jurisdiction, complainants are given advice 
and guidance on what to do; thus
...the man who complained "that his wife does not want him and after 
divorce proceedings judgment was given in her favour" was advised to 
appeal, if he wished; the complainant who considered "that personal tax is 
excessive" was advised to contact his Member of Parliament; the complaint 
"that too many thefts have occurred at railway stations" stimulated the 
advice "to go and see the Police". But complaints of unjust personal 
treatment, such as unlawful detention, expulsion from school without 
reason, or unlawful seizure of property were investigated by the 
Commission, which reported its finding thereon in confidence to the 
President.49
As such the PCE has also been acting as a poor man's "Legal Aid 
Clinic" and as a "Citizens' Advice Bureau."50 Many of the 
"withdrawn" or "discontinued" cases have actually ended in 
negotiated settlements as a result of the PCE's initiatives; thus 
the PCE has worked on them but the end did not require or justify 
a report to the President. Therefore, a proper assessment of the 
extent of the PCE's effectiveness in curbing abuse of power is 
hard to make, and reliance upon numbers alone can be misleading.
By far the greatest criticism against the PCE is the fact that 
it has no powers of its own and depends entirely on the President 
for any positive effect to its work. The criticism is that the 
PCE, appointed by the President, reporting to the President, and 
depending on the President to implement its decisions cannot be 
an effective check against abuse of power by the executive and 
its agencies; it can only serve the interest of the executive. 
The argument in that criticism, however, overlooks the fact that
49 (1968) 2 Annual Survey of African Law: 131.
50 Ibid.; also see Ghai 1969, Martin,R:213-4 and Mjemmas:44-5.
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from the beginning the PCE was so linked to the President so as 
to conform with the structure and organisation of state power in 
Tanzania, where
...it is the unity, not the division, of the branches of government which 
is the basic principle of the Constitution. The symbol and focus of this 
unity is the President himself, who is effectively both responsible for 
the efficient operation of the executive functions of government and for 
ensuring that individual rights are not transgressed in the process. 
(Norton:609)
And the PCE was deliberately designed to be, in effect, an 
instrument of the President for exercising control over officers 
in the service of his government (McAusian & Ghai:505-6) .
In Tanzania, with a Parliament relatively weak and subservient 
to the Executive, it would have been unrealistic to subject the 
PCE to legislative control and expect it to be effective. The 
effectiveness of the PCE should be seen in terms of the 
President's own effectiveness in discharging his contradictory 
responsibilities of, as quoted above, running an efficient 
government and ensuring that individual rights are not violated. 
The PCE, therefore, was meant to enhance the stature and 
authority of the President, not to reduce it. That is why the 
President has been excluded from the PCE's jurisdiction, has 
final discretion to take action on PCE reports or not, and can 
order any enquiry to be stopped.
The latter discretion was exercised in 1968 when the President 
ordered the PCE to stop enquiring into what was actually a 
political conflict between the Regional Commissioner for West 
Lake (now Kagera) Region and two MPs representing constituencies
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in that region.51 The matter was instead investigated by the 
Party which then expelled the two MPs, along with 7 others, from 
the Party and consequently from the Parliament as we saw earlier 
{supra, section 4 .2). The step taken by the President proved 
correct the early assessment that the PCE "could not be allowed 
to become a rallying point for political opposition, yet it had 
to be effective enough to prevent" resentment and complaint 
against the bureaucracy "turning into political opposition" 
(McAusian & Ghai:503) . It is difficult to imagine how the PCE could 
have maintained that position without the President's power of 
intervention.
A further indication of the enhancement of the President's 
position is that even with the proclamations of "Party 
Supremacy", the PCE has always had power to investigate the Party 
and its officials, and to report its findings to the President.
The effectiveness of the PCE is thus a direct result of the 
immense powers of the President on which it relies: there is no 
government or public official who would not be concerned at being 
adversely reported on to the President. The range of actions 
open to the President to take against an official is almost 
limitless, and the outcome unpredictable. The routine secrecy 
(from both the complainant and the official investigated) which 
accompanies the PCE reports to the President makes them 
apprehensive and uncertain. Partly for that reason the PCE has 
sometimes been feared by public officials, especially during the
51See, Thoden Van Velzen & Sterkenburg 1972b: 259-60.
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early years (Ghai 1969:34) . During 1967-68 the PCE Chairman with 
its Secretary and Legal Secretary, on a tour of Europe, were 
surprised on arrival in Oslo to see the entire staff of the 
Tanzanian Embassy in office although it was a Sunday: they were 
evidently apprehensive of possible adverse reports on them.52
That fear almost verged on hostility sometimes, as observed by 
the PCE when making regional and district tours and holding 
meetings to explain its role and function to the public. In some 
areas the meetings were not well attended because of poor 
cooperation by government officials in the regions and districts 
who were expected to give advance notice of the PCE's tours and 
to encourage people to attend the meetings. Some local heads of 
government departments did not want their staff to attend PCE 
meetings, and there were even cases of further victimisation of 
people who complained to the PCE by officers against whom they 
had complained.53
But there has been some criticism56 and charges that after 
reporting to the President, there is no feed back at all and so 
the PCE (or anybody else) cannot know whether the President 
treats the reports seriously. Sometimes he takes so long before 
acting upon a particular recommendation of the PCE that it is
52From interview with Bob Makani, Legal Secretary to the PCE (1966-1968), 
Dar es Salaam, September 1994.
53 (1969) 3 Annual Survey of African Law: 13 7.
56This paragraph is based on accounts given at a workshop held in Dar es
Salaam on September 7, 1994, organised by the "Legal Task Force" which cordinated
the "Legal Sector Studies" of the on-going Financial Institutions and Legal 
Management Upgrading Project (FILMUP).
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difficult to associate it with his subsequent action. Sometimes 
he may even act in a way which frustrates both the PCE and the 
complainants. In one case, a person dismissed from his executive 
post in a parastatal organisation complained of unfair dismissal 
to the President who directed the PCE to investigate the matter. 
The PCE found that the dismissal was both lawful and justified, 
and reported so to the President. Shortly after that, however, 
the President appointed that same person to the Board of 
Directors of that same corporation!
A number of lawyers (including High Court judges, senior State 
Attorneys and practising advocates) interviewed in January and 
February 1994 were rather sceptical of the PCE's usefulness. But 
there has been no suggestion to dissolve the PCE. Most 
commentators, however, would prefer to divest the President of 
most of his powers over the PCE, and to vest them in Parliament. 
In the constitutional changes taking place after 1992, it may 
indeed be desirable to re-align the PCE with a more 
representative institution. Trends in recent constitutional 
amendments, which we examine in Chapter 7 below, show that the 
Parliament is getting increasingly powerful over the executive. 
It will therefore make sense, in our opinion, to re-align the PCE 
with the Parliament instead of the President as is now the case.
One should always bear in mind, however, that institutions like 
the PCE cannot, in themselves, make a bad government good; but 
they can make a good one better.
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5.6: THE COMMISSION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP CODE
A code of conduct for political leaders and other public figures 
is there in every society. It is a controlling instrument 
because it conditions the behaviour and conduct of political 
executives to a standard presumed acceptable to the particular 
society and its values and aspirations.
The Tanzanian "Leadership Code" was actually Part V(a) of the 
Arusha Declaration which had a very clear purpose: to set and 
maintain a high standard of socialist morality for the
leadership, consonant with the high aspirations of that
declaration. Thus according to the code, no leader of the 
Government or the Party (or his or her spouse) was to be in any 
way "associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism." 
The practices so proscribed included holding shares in any 
company; being a director in any privately owned enterprise; 
receiving two or more salaries; owning houses for rent to others; 
and employing labour. And leaders were defined as MPs, members 
of the NEC, senior officials of organisations affiliated to the 
Party,57 Party leaders at all levels, senior officials of
parastatal organisations, local government councillors, and high 
and middle level civil servants.
The Code was so stringent that Nyerere only managed to win its 
acceptance by the NEC by shrewdly trading it off with the
57These were the Youth League, the UWT, the Trade Union and the Cooperative 
Movement.
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nationalisation measures, with which Party and Government leaders 
were quite happy, apparently because they had nothing to lose 
(Cartwright: 170; Pratt 1976:160-5). With the Leadership Code Nyerere 
wanted to prevent, or at least to discourage, Government and 
Party leaders from taking advantage of their positions to advance 
themselves materially at the expense of the people they led.
A conspicuous aspect of the Leadership Code in Tanzania has been 
the endeavour to enforce it by statute. After the Arusha 
Declaration, the Interim Constitution was amended58 to include 
the Leadership Code in the qualifications for membership of 
Parliament. All MPs were required to submit to the Speaker by 
March 5, 1968, (or within 15 days if elected or appointed to
Parliament after March 2, 1968) their declarations of compliance 
with the Code and, subsequently, annual statements specifying 
property they (or their spouses) owned and how it was being used, 
and showing their annual incomes. Copies of the declarations and 
statements were forwarded to the Attorney General who was 
subsequently authorised to petition the High Court to declare 
vacant a seat whose incumbent failed to observe the code.59 
Similar requirements were made for local government 
councillors.60
In December 1969, the High Court actually declared one
r Q
By the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1967.
59By the National Assembly (Qualification of Members) (Forms and Procedure) 
Act 1968.
60By the Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act 1968.
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Parliamentary vacancy on that basis.61 But apart from that, all 
MPs apparently complied with the code; even Oscar Kambona, who 
fled the country in August 1967, submitted his declaration one 
day before the deadline.62
Subsequently, the Leadership Code was extended, by amendments to 
the relevant Service Regulations, to all government servants, 
including judicial officers, receiving a monthly wage of Shs 
1,066/- or higher.63 But as early as January 1971 the NEC of 
the Party noted:
There are presently some leaders who do not fulfil these conditions. They 
disregard and cleverly avoid the leadership code. The time has come for 
the Party to supervise the conduct and the bearing of the leaders.64
Following similar complaints by Party members at seminars and 
meetings, the NEC recommended that a special committee be set up 
to deal with alleged breaches of the Leadership Code (Mwinyigogo: 
267) . Accordingly, such a committee was established by the 
Committee for the Enforcement of the Leadership Code Act 1973. 
The Constitution was then amended65 so that copies of 
declarations of compliance with the Code by MPs were now 
submitted to this committee and not to the Attorney General as 
previously.
61 (1969) 3 Annual Survey of African Law: 132-3.
62 (1968) 5 Africa Research Bulletin: 1010B.
63G.N. 180 of 1969 and G.N. 286 of 1970; (1969) 3 Annual Survey of African 
Law: 133, and (1970) 4 Annual Survey of African Law: 135.
64TANU Guidelines: para 16.
65By the Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act 1974.
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In 1977 the committee was deemed to be established under s. 78 
(now s. 132) of the Constitution 1977, as a commission (not a 
committee as known under the Act) with jurisdiction "to inquire 
into the behaviour and conduct of any leader for purposes of 
ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Leadership 
Code." The Commission (or committee as the Act still calls it) 
consists of a Chairman and at least two and at most three 
members, all appointed by the President.
The Commission investigates cases of alleged or suspected 
breaches of the Leadership Code and reports its findings to the 
President for appropriate action. Like the PCE, this Commission 
has no power to issue orders pursuant to its findings; it leaves 
it to the President to act as he may see appropriate. Similarly, 
its enquiries are in private; nobody is entitled to a hearing but 
nobody should be adversely reported on without first being given 
an opportunity to be heard. It can summon witnesses and call for 
papers, and its proceedings are also privileged.
During its first decade (1974-1984) it received 2,125 complaints, 
of which it confirmed only 78 breaches of the Code (McHenry 1994: 
39). By 1986, the confirmed cases reached 83 and the President 
is said to have acted against the culprits as follows: 41 were 
sternly warned, 14 were dismissed from leadership, 2 were 
demoted, 10 were referred to the disciplinary committee of the 
Party, and 16 were dealt with miscellaneously (Mwinyigogo:273) . 
Many factors undermined the Leadership Code. Commitment to 
socialism, the underlying objective of the Code, was doubtful
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among the top leaders themselves, except for a few like Nyerere 
(Ghai 1975:160-1) . Economic hardships made a strict observance of 
the Code difficult, its violation understandable in some 
circumstances, and the all too powerful President was also too 
forgiving of code violators, "recycling" them to meet demands of 
Skilled manpower (McHenry 1994:40-3) .
Increasingly, the Leadership Code became absurd and unrealistic. 
The unreviewed wage limit of Shs 1,066/- soon categorised most 
public servants as leaders; by 1990, then equalling $11, it had 
been surpassed by the official minimum wage. Although it is 
claimed that during 198 9/90 the Commission confirmed and reported 
to the President 3 cases of breaching the Code (Tanzania 1990:273, 
28H 2 ) , public attitude towards the Code had changed and there was 
little interest in whether the Commission was even in existence 
at all.
In December 1986 President Mwinyi, who had succeeded Nyerere in 
November 1985, suggested that there was a need to review the 
Leadership Code (McHenry 1994:43) . This was ultimately done by the 
Party six months after Mwinyi became Party Chairman as well, 
following Nyerere's retirement from Party leadership in August 
1990. The NEC met in Zanzibar in February 1991 and resolved to 
effectively "repeal" the Leadership Code. This was a decision 
of the Party only, and there was no immediate change in the law; 
but all enforcement of the Leadership Code stopped immediately.
In July 1992, constitutional amendments scrapping the Leadership
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Code and the commission for its enforcement66 took effect.
Unlike the PCE, the Commission was regarded with much public 
scepticism. From the beginning, leaders engaged in private 
businesses under the disguise of proxies, and on retirement they 
suddenly had large amounts of capital with which to continue in 
business openly (shivji 1976:95; McHenry i994:40-i) . Unlike abuse of 
power, the Leadership Code could be breached without creating a 
host of complainants to come forward and complain or give 
evidence before the Commission. In many cases, people with 
information useful as evidence were themselves assessories to, 
and part beneficiaries of, the elaborate schemes used to breach 
the Code. Consequently, this Commission's record of performance 
is unimpressive.
The Leadership Code itself was rather stringent and ensuring its 
enforcement was a task that may have been well beyond the 
competence of the Commission. Breaches of the Leadership Code 
were mostly committed through corruption and other deceitful 
conduct hard to detect and amounting to offences under some other 
laws administered by the Police or the Anti-Corruption Squad67 
which were better capable of making effective investigation, 
ending in open prosecutions in court. By contrast, the 
Commission had little investigative expertise and its findings, 
whatever they were, remained throughout shrouded in dubious 
secrecy, never openly proved, and their outcome never known
66Sections 19 & 35 of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment Act 1992.
67Established under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1971.
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beyond speculative reports. While corruption proved in court was 
punished by imprisonment, an adverse report by the Commission was 
left to the President for action, without any assurance that the 
culprit would not be dealt with less severely. There were thus 
other agencies which appeared capable of dealing with that same 
problem more effectively than the Commission.
Despite those reservations, a credible political system should 
have a code of ethics, and it may not be necessary to have a 
special commission to enforce the code. The Leadership Code had 
become almost impossible to enforce when it was repealed. The 
repeal, therefore, may have been justified. But what was almost 
absurd was its replacement with nothing.
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CHAPTER S I X
Party Supremacy and the Consolidation of
Central Control
6.0: INTRODUCTION
A representative and democratically elected Parliament and an 
independent Judiciary are generally regarded as essential for a 
truly responsible democratic government. But in the complex 
relations of present day societies, those organs alone are not 
enough. Ensuring that the government is responsible to the 
people it governs requires a number of other factors and 
institutions which in well established democracies are sometimes 
taken for granted. They include popular organisations, pressure 
groups and civil associations of various kinds, both formal and 
informal, through which popular opinion is mobilised and 
expressed.
This chapter looks at such people's organisations and their 
relationship with the state. We look at institutions in the 
cooperative and trade union movements, the local government 
system, and at government powers in relation to the people's 
right to civil liberties and organisations in various forms. The 
general assessment is that the Executive sought to bring all 
aspects of public life and activity under the direct supervision 
and control of its centralised command and, in that endeavour, 
the machinery and organisation of the Party has usually been 
employed to great effect.
6.1: STATE CONTROL OF POPULAR INSTITUTIONS
The "popular institutions" referred to here are the trade union 
and cooperative movements, and the local government system. Many 
of the functions of the state, especially the service provision 
functions of the modern day welfare state, are best discharged 
through local authorities close to the people being served. At 
the same time local government enhances democracy, with local 
authorities as the organs through which the people's interests 
generally can best be served and promoted.
On the other hand, trade unions and cooperative societies are 
institutions formed to protect and promote specific interests of 
the particular groups of the people who form them: workers'
rights and interests for trade unions, and the common interests 
of the "cooperators" in the case of cooperative societies.
In Tanzania, however, the government has carried out policies 
whose effect was to transform those institutions and make them 
instruments to be used by it in controlling the very people those 
institutions were supposed to serve.
6.1.1: The Trade Union Movement
At independence, the trade union movement constituted what was 
probably the strongest independent organisation apart from TANU, 
the nationalist movement itself. Trade unionism first emerged 
among dockworkers in Dar es Salaam in 1947, and then spread 
gradually to other crafts and sectors like sisal plantations.
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After a slow and generally troubled start, a small number of 
unions managed to get established and by 1955 they were able to 
federate into the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL).1
During the campaign for independence there was close cooperation 
and alliance between the TFL and TANU but with the coming of 
independence, the alliance ended.2 It soon turned to conflict 
as the TANU Government was unable to meet trade union demands for 
rapid Africanisation of the public service while at the same time 
it sought to secure greater control of union affairs. The 
conflict reached its peak after the January 1964 army mutiny when 
more than 200 trade unionists, mostly those in the leadership, 
were detained, and the TFL) with its affiliated unions^ wois 
dissolved and replaced by a single Government-controlled union 
(supra, section 3.4.1).
The government had started to seek control over the trade unions 
well before 1964. Firstly, in 1962 the Trade Unions Ordinance 
was amended3 to require all trade unions to affiliate themselves 
to a single federation of labour so designated by the state. The 
TFL was so designated and any union not affiliated to it could 
have its registration cancelled. But the government could easily 
make the TFL and its unions illegal by simply changing the 
designation to any other organisation. Also under this law the
1For a detailed account, see Friedland 1969.
2For a detailed account, see Friedland 1967.
3By the Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act 1962.
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Minister for Labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions were 
empowered to intervene in the financial affairs of the TFL to 
ensure that union funds were not misapplied. It has been 
suggested that this was simply to ensure that union funds were 
not used for political purposes (Kapinga:89) . Another law, the 
Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act 1962, excluded from 
trade union membership all civil servants earning more than £702 
a year. This undermined the trade unions' leadership by removing 
from membership the most educated and well talented civil 
servants (Friedland 1967.-87-8) ; by then the starting salary for a 
university graduate employed in the public service was about £660 
a year.
Secondly, in 1963 the Minister for Labour, Michael Kamaliza, 
himself a former trade unionist and President of the TFL (1960- 
62) , proposed to integrate trade unions directly into his 
ministry; the proposal was rejected by the TFL after considerable 
discussions (Friedland 1967:85,92). The mutiny, therefore, simply 
created an opportunity for the government to implement swiftly 
its intention to control the trade union movement.
As we saw in Chapter Three, the National Union of Tanganyika 
Workers (NUTA) was established by statute as an affiliate of the 
ruling party, TANU, and replaced the TFL which was dissolved by 
the same statute.4 Its objects included an obligation "to 
promote the policies of TANU and to encourage its members to join
4The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act 1964.
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TANU. 1,5 Its Secretary-General became an ex-officio member of 
the NEC of TANU. All trade union activity outside this union was 
unlawful. NUTA was not a "federation" with constituent unions 
but a "unitary".institution with nine industrial sections, each 
under an assistant secretary. It was highly centralised in its 
organisation, replicating TANU's set of organs at national, 
regional, district and branch levels.
NUTA's chief executive, the Secretary-General, and his deputy 
were appointed by the President of the United Republic and they 
held office for five years. They could be re-appointed, but the 
President could also remove them before the expiry of the five- 
year term. The Financial Secretary, the nine assistant 
secretaries who headed the industrial sections, and the directors 
of major departments were all appointed by the Secretary-General. 
Executives at lower levels, right down to branch secretaries, 
were appointed by NUTA's Executive Council, itself consisting of 
appointed officials, which could remove them at any time.6 The 
only directly elected leaders of the union were the members of 
the branch committees. The organisational structure was almost 
a replica of that of the ruling party.
The President appointed Michael Kamaliza as NUTA's first 
Secretary-General, and he also retained his post as Minister for 
Labour. Ever since, successive secretaries-general of NUTA have
5Ibidem, 1st Schedule, s. 3.
6This paragraph is based on Kapinga: 90.
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also held office simultaneously as ministers for labour, thus 
making a norm of this absurd combination. NUTA was certainly not 
a body established by the workers but by the government through 
legislative action. The President was empowered to dissolve and 
replace it with another body of employees if, in his opinion, it 
did not serve the purposes it was established for; but its 
members had no power either to dissolve it or to make provision 
for its dissolution.7
Significantly, the period 1971-74 saw a growth of industrial 
unrest. Workers laid down tools and, obviously inspired by the 
1971 TANU Guidelines, locked out managers of parastatal firms who 
were arrogant and oppressive, and even sought to "take over" 
privately owned industrial plants (Mihyo; shivji 1976:134-45) . But 
in all this, NUTA was hardly ever involved; rather, many workers 
regarded it with suspicion (shivji: 137-8).
In February 1977 TANU (of which NUTA was an affiliate) and ASP 
merged to form a single new party for Tanzania, Chama cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM). It was understood at the time of the merger 
that the trade union would continue to affiliate to the new party 
as had been the case with TANU. But now the state constitution 
declared the party to be supreme with "final authority in all 
matters" in accordance with the party's own constitution. 
Therefore, subsequent developments were to be dictated by party 
decisions. Section 70 of the Constitution of the Party provided
7The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act 1964, section 
5(1) and (2).
254
for five "mass organisations of the Party", including a workers' 
organisation,8 to be established and closely supervised by the 
Party, and their constitutions to be approved by the NEC of the 
Party before taking effect. It is on that basis that in 1978, 
NUTA was replaced by a new workers organisation called Jumuiya 
ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (hereinafter JUWATA).
JUWATA was established by the Party as a "mass organisation" of 
the Party for all workers. It was formally launched on February 
5, 1978, taking over the assets, personnel, officers, members and 
even leadership of NUTA, which was thereby dissolved and 
replaced. Rather surprisingly, however, JUWATA functioned as a 
trade union without any statutory backing for almost two years; 
the law for its establishment,9 hereinafter called the Juwata 
Act, was not passed until the end of 1979.
It is clear from the recital in the preamble that the Juwata Act 
was passed merely to give legal status to JUWATA, an already 
existing organisation, established by the Party to replace NUTA, 
which was accordingly disestablished from February 5, 1978, the 
deemed effective date of the Act. The power of dissolution which 
the President had had over NUTA was retained by s. 8 of the Juwata 
Act, but subject to the approval of the NEC of CCM and, in the 
event of JUWATA being so dissolved, any "new body representative 
of employees designated in that behalf by the Party" was to be
8The others were the Women's Organisation, the Party Youth League, the
Parents Association and the Cooperatives.
9The Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania Act 1979.
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deemed a trade union.
Scheduled to the Juwata Act was the Constitution of JUWATA, as 
made by the Party in 1978. One of JUWATA's objectives stated 
therein was to ensure the implementation of Party directives 
concerning workers. JUWATA's Secretary-General and his two 
deputies, one for the Mainland and one for Zanzibar, were 
appointed by the Chairman of CCM.10 This was not a big change 
from the previous position because the Party Chairman was also 
the President and up to 1982, he continued the norm of appointing 
the Minister for Labour as the Secretary-General. JUWATA's 
regional and district executives were appointed by either the 
Chairman or the Central Committee of CCM.11 All elective posts 
within JUWATA were contested by members under the supervision of 
the Party and all aspirants were subjected to a screening process 
by the Party Central Committee.12
Like NUTA, JUWATA was not established by the workers and s.7(4) 
of the Juwata Act prohibited them from making rules providing for 
its dissolution. In a further surprise, s.4 (2) of the Act 
requiring the Registrar to register JUWATA under the Trade Unions 
Ordinance was "overlooked" until February 1981, after JUWATA's 
competence to act as a trade union was questioned in judicial 
proceedings initiated by it on behalf of a worker. The Court of
10Juwata Act, Schedule, ss.41 and 42.
11Ibidem, s.40.
12Section 71(1) of the CCM Constitution (1977 Edition).
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Appeal held that although JUWATA may have been "recognized by law 
to exist as a trade union," the Trade Union Ordinance "prohibited 
it or its officers from acting for its members" without first 
being registered.13 It has been suggested that this "oversight" 
occurred because JUWATA was "virtually a government department," 
not a workers' union (Kapinga:94) . It sounds true of the 
Government of Tanzania which, as we saw above (section 5.2), 
often acted in disregard of the law.
Later on, there started a movement amongst the workers for 
greater trade union autonomy. This was part of the developments 
we analyse below (infra, section 8.3).
6.1.2: The Cooperative Movement
Agricultural crop marketing cooperatives first began in the 
Kilimanjaro region in 1925 for marketing African produced coffee. 
Initially, the colonial administration did not support this 
development because it sympathised with the European settlers who 
wanted a ban to be imposed against coffee growing by Africans. 
But later on cooperative societies were allowed to operate 
subject to registration and government control under the 
Cooperative Societies Ordinance 1932. The movement then spread 
to other coffee growing areas in Mbinga and Rungwe districts in 
the south, and Bukoba in the Kagera Region. Subsequently, the 
cotton growing regions of Lake Victoria formed the strongest
12Zambia Tanzania Road Services Ltd v. J K Pallangyo, [1982] T.L.R. 24 at
pp.28 - 9 .
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cooperative organisation in East Africa (couison 1982:60-9)
The cooperative movement was most active in the major cash crop 
growing areas and, like the trade unions, xt wCLS also used to
mobilise support for the nationalist movement. After
independence the government promoted the cooperative movement in 
a country-wide campaign. As a result some cooperative societies 
vrere registered with government encouragement and even political 
pressure, but with little local demand and possibly even less 
understanding of what they meant.
The number of registered societies rose from 857 in 1961 to 1533 
in 1966 in response to this government campaign, the reasons for 
which were as much political as they may have been economic:
It was decided that the cooperative form was well suited to the African 
setting and to the achievement of independence in the economic sense: 
control of the economy by the indigenous people rather than by expatriates 
and others non-African in origin. (Tanzania 1966:5)
The idea, therefore, was to replace the Asian middleman with 
government-supported cooperatives in purchasing agricultural 
produce. The government also hoped to use them to extend various 
forms of rural credit and agricultural advice to improve the 
position of the rural Africans economically (couison 1982:149; 
Naali:136-7) .
Quite a few of the well established cooperative unions, on the 
other hand, had accumulated some reserves whose magnitude gave 
the government some concern regarding their proper use (Naali :138; 
Pratt 1976:192) . That was also a reason for the government wishing
to exercise control over the cooperative movement. The 
government encouraged the separate cooperative unions to federate 
under a government sponsored body, the Cooperative Union of 
Tanganyika (CUT), whose formation in November 1961 pre-empted 
moves to form a more independent apex organisation by powerful 
unions around Lake Victoria (Kimario:2i) . After formation, CUT was 
affiliated to TANU and in the changes that came with the one- 
party state, its Secretary-General became an ex-officio member 
of the NEC of TANU.
Meanwhile, the hastily established government inspired 
cooperative societies lacked both trained personnel and effective 
democratic control. This led to inefficiency, unchecked 
misapplications of funds and corrupt practices by officials and 
committee members (couison i982:iso-2; Bryceson:6-9) . Finally, the 
President appointed a Special Committee to enquire into the 
cooperative movement. The committee recommended that
administrative controls over the cooperative movement should be 
strengthened (Naali: 138-9) , and its recommendations were adopted 
and implemented by the Cooperative Societies Act 1968 and the 
Unified Cooperative Service Act 1968. Significantly, the 
government dismissed all criticisms which alleged political 
interference in the cooperative movement (Kimario:3i) .
Under s. 3 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1968, the President 
appointed the Registrar (of Cooperatives), a Deputy Registrar 
"and such number of assistant registrars as may be required." 
Apart from powers relating to the registration of cooperative
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societies [s.10],14 the Registrar could remove the elected 
committee members of a society [ss.39 & 40] , he could control how 
a society invested its funds [s.45(2)], and he could order 
enquiries into a society's constitution, activities and finances 
[s.68]; he also exercised control under Rules made by the 
Minister [s . 99] .
There was no improvement in democratic control of the cooperative 
movement. Instead, the Unified Cooperative Service Act 1968 
deprived the cooperatives of the power to employ their own staff 
by establishing, under s.4 of the Act, a Commission responsible 
for appointment and transfer of, and exercising control over, all 
employees of cooperative societies other than primary societies. 
Presumably, primary societies were excluded because they were 
usually economically weak and not capable of employing more than 
one or two clerks at a time, mostly on temporary basis; but the 
Minister could, under s.13 of the Act, extend the Commission's 
jurisdiction to any primary society, a provision obviously 
intended to cover the wealthier primary societies. The 
Commission's Chairman was appointed by the President and the 
members, a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 6, were appointed by the 
Minister. Of the members, one represented the Minister and one 
represented the CUT.
Also under ss.73 and 75 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1968 the 
Registrar could order compulsory amalgamation of two or more
14In this paragraph, references in square brackets refer to provisions of 
the Cooperative Societies Act 1968.
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societies and compulsory division of a society into two or more 
societies. This power was used to merge and divide cooperatives 
into units suitable for government control of the movement: one 
cooperative union was established for each administrative region, 
so that each union came under the direct supervision of a 
Regional Cooperative Officer acting as an Assistant Registrar of 
Cooperatives under the Act.
Meanwhile, as a result of the Villagisation Programme {infra, 
section 7.3.2), a new law was enacted in 1975 to give legal 
status to the many villages established over the previous two 
years. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, 
Designation and Administration) Act 1975 gave corporate 
personality to villages registered under it, declared such 
villages multi-purpose primary cooperative societies, but 
disapplied the Cooperative Societies Act 1968 in those villages. 
The Cooperative Societies Act 1968 was disapplied partly because 
membership of those villages was not entirely voluntary, which 
is a cardinal principle of the cooperative movement worldwide and 
which was also embodied in the Act. As a result of that 
disapplication, the regional unions lost their rural support base 
and, in May 1976, they were themselves abolished following a 
Party resolution to that effect (Kimario: 132-40) . The cooperative 
movement was virtually halted, its crop marketing function taken 
over by parastatal authorities.
After the merger of TANU and ASP, s. 70 (2) of the constitution of 
the new party, CCM, named the cooperative movement as another of
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its "mass organisations." Accordingly, the Party "formed" such 
an organisation under its constitution, calling it "Washirika." 
Then the Jumuiya ya Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika 
(Establishment) Act 1979 made Washirika the sole apex 
organisation and required all cooperative societies15 to 
affiliate to it. The rules and practice of Washirika reflected 
its status as an organisation of, and subservient to, the Party 
in the same way as was the status of JUWATA (McHenry 1994:113-4) .
In 1 9 8 2  the Cooperative Societies Act 1982 was passed to revive 
the cooperative movement. It retained many of the powers of the 
Registrar (Naali: 148-9) under the 1 9 6 8  law, which it repealed. But 
the new law also repealed the Jumuiya ya Washirika Act 1979 and 
asserted the right of the cooperative societies themselves to 
form and control their own apex organisation, to which the 
Registrar was expected to "gradually delegate his duties of 
promoting" and advising cooperative societies, and whose 
Secretary-General he had to consult each time he wanted to 
dissolve or suspend a committee, for failure to perform its 
duties properly, and to appoint a temporary one in its place.16
Despite the repeal of the Jumuiya ya Washirika Act 1979, its 
creation, Washirika, continued with Party backing to function as 
an apex organisation without any legal basis for almost 8 years. 
Once again the Government was startled by the High Court in
15Urban cooperative societies survived the 1975-76 abolitions.
16The Cooperative Societies Act 1982, ss. 14(2) & 106(1), and s. 2.
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Conrad Berege v. Registrar of Cooperatives17 when it quashed the 
order of the Registrar purporting to suspend a committee (of 
which the applicant was the Chairman) and to appoint a temporary 
one in its place. The order was quashed because the Registrar 
had not consulted the secretary-general of the apex organisation, 
and he had not consulted because there was then no such 
organisation in law. Following the court order, issued on March 
17, 1990, the National Apex Organisation of Tanzania (Formation) 
Act 1990 was passed and made Washirika an apex organisation.
This, however, was only a temporary measure. The cooperative 
movement was now falling into disgrace and by the end of 1992, 
unions had a debt of TShs 66 billion.18 Besides poor or 
inefficient management, the extent of corruption reached alarming 
proportions, with cooperatives being used as mere conduits for 
moneys from bank loans dubiously negotiated by political leaders 
and government executives. A widespread attitude tended to 
regard the cooperatives as entirely government institutions. The 
committee members of the societies, elected there under the 
supervision of the party often assisted the bureaucrats in 
misapplying cooperative funds and felt no obligation to account 
to the members.
Meanwhile, however, some genuine cooperators continued to press 
for greater freedom, and to reject the state created Washirika
17High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Miscellaneous Civil Application
No. 174 of 1989 (unreported).
19Daily News, October 13, 1992.
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as their apex organisation. These developments (McHenry 1994:114- 
21) ultimately led to a new law, the Cooperative Societies Act 
1991, abolishing Washirika and completely divorcing the 
cooperative movement from political control and patronage. In 
February 1992, CCM formally gave up claims over the movement as 
its mass organisation.
6.1.3: The Local Government System
Local government authorities are supposed to be institutions 
through which people are involved and participate in making 
decisions on matters affecting them in their localities. In 
practice, however, the central regime has always sought to use 
them to assert its control and influence over the population.
As mentioned earlier (supra, 2.4.1 and 3.1.1), at independence 
most of the country was administered through traditional chiefs 
under the Native Authority Ordinance 1926. But after 
independence, "district councils" under the Local Government 
Ordinance spread rapidly and replaced the native authorities.19 
But this promotion of local government strengthened central 
control and influence more than democratic control of local 
affairs. Firstly, it facilitated the swift elimination of tribal 
native chiefs. Before independence most of them, as agents of 
the colonial order, had been either indifferent or opposed to 
TANU and now the TANU government was not going to tolerate
19Wherever a district council was established, the Native Authority 
Ordinance ceased to apply; a detailed account of the post-independence 
development is given by Dryden.
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continuance of their authority (Listowel:320-i; Morris & Read:263) .
Secondly, apart from replacing chiefs, whose loyalty to TANU was 
doubtful anyway, the new district councils were also used to 
silence opposition to TANU. The generally small and weak 
opposition emerging against TANU (before the one-party state) and 
impatiently harassed out of existence {supra, 3.1.3) had actually 
sought political influence in local government in a few districts 
like Kwimba, Mwanza, Kilimanjaro and Bukoba.20
In elections to the Bukoba District Council in March 1963, some 
TANU candidates were defeated by independents; and once in the 
council they were joined by a few TANU councillors in resisting 
the TANU whip. This was clearly in line with, and probably 
inspired by, Nyerere's 1963 thesis on one-party democracy (Nyerere 
1963) ; but the councillors were condemned as traitors (Bienen 
1967:104-5) . The TANU government dissolved the council and 
reconstituted another by nominations which included all the 
former councillors except the "independents," four of whom were 
detained (Hyden 1969:134-5) . It demonstrated TANU's resolve not to 
tolerate .either opposition to, or independence from it in the 
organs of local government.
Control by TANU eroded local autonomy and enhanced central 
control; the organisation and power structure of TANU usually 
exalted central organs (supra, 4.4.3), at the expense of the
20See generally, Tordoff 1967:115, Bienen 1967:102-3, Maguire:339-43, and 
Pratt 1976:196-7.
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branches. Even in the one-party elections introduced by the 
Local Government Elections Act 1966, the District Executive 
Committee of TANU sometimes reversed the local preferences 
expressed through TANU Branch Conferences in nominating the two 
candidates presented to the electorate.21 An attempt to 
question the District Executive Committee overturning such a 
local preference was made in Re: Petition by Habel Kasenha,22 
but failed because courts were precluded from questioning the 
deliberations of any Party organ in the electoral process.
Local authorities were then invariably regarded, and increasingly 
used, as tools for carrying out programmes decided upon by the 
central government without any local involvement.. Although the 
Government provided grants to pay for these programs, they 
nevertheless burdened local authorities with incidental costs and 
in various other ways. Primary education, for example, was a 
local government responsibility but the central government 
decided, without involving local authorities, to expand its 
provision to at least 50% of all children and then, under the 
1964-69 Five-Year Development Plan, to extend its duration from 
4 to 7 years. These practices added to the burdens of the local 
authorities, many of which were already weak and facing numerous 
other problems which tended to justify central government 
intervention and control to ensure survival (Drydenriii; Pratt 1976: 
194-6) .
21In local government elections, the TANU District Executive Committee had
the screening powers exercised by the NEC in national elections.
22 [1967] E .A . 455.
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In frantic endeavours to raise revenue, some of the local 
authorities even used Riot Police to track down local rate 
defaulters, which is itself revealing since the Police Force is 
an exclusively central government institution. Then the 1968 
Ilemera tragedy in Mwanza District where 13 local rate defaulters 
died of suffocation while locked up in a cell23 prompted the 
Government to abolish the local rate, leaving local authorities 
without revenue. And in 1972, local government was abolished in 
a massive reorganisation of Government administration ironically 
labelled Decentralisation (Nyerere 1972) .
The Decentralisation Programme was carried out under the 
Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim 
Provisions) Act 1972 which dissolved the local government 
district councils and replaced them with District Development 
Councils. The latter councils were dominated by Staff and 
Functional officers consisting mainly of local heads of the 
central government departments in the districts, many of whom 
were quite senior in the ranks of government administration but 
were transferred to the districts as part of the programme. They 
were headed in each district by the District Development Director 
who was appointed by the President and, through him, they were 
responsible entirely to the central government, which provided 
the funds for carrying out all programmes and decisions affecting 
the district. In short, the Decentralisation Programme was a 
"decentralisation" of personnel, not power, from the headquarters
23Vol.1 Africa Contemporary Record 1968-1969: 214.
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of the central ministries in Dar es Salaam, to the regions and 
districts (Couison 1982:254) .
The decision to re-establish local government ten years later was 
given the usual praise as enhancing democracy and giving power 
to the people.24 But while the new law did not require the 
establishment of district councils in every administrative 
district immediately25 so as to enable gradual implementation 
responding to popular demands from the respective districts, in 
1983 all district councils in the country were established on a 
single day26 and mandated to start functioning in January 1984. 
Popular demand is usually spontaneous; it could not have led to 
that wholesale re-establishment of district councils in a single 
day, with a uniform staffing pattern pre-determined by the 
central authorities without any regard to differences in 
geographical areas, population sizes, resource base and so on 
amongst the various districts (Mutahaba: 142-3) . The central 
government must have had its own objectives, other than enhancing 
local democracy and people's power, in reviving the local 
government system.
For village councils, constituting a tier of local authorities 
subordinate to district councils, it is at least clear that their 
initial establishment under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages
2iDaily News, October 7, 1982.
2sLocal Government (District Authorities) Act 1982, s.5(1), (2) & (3).
26By G.N. 134 of 1983.
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(Registration, Designation and Administration) Act 1975 was for 
purposes of giving legal status to the thousands of village 
settlements established, some of them forcefully, under the 
Villagisation Programme {infra, 6.3.2). That law has now been 
repealed but village councils have been saved as local government 
authorities. The law has always provided for all adult members 
of a village to elect the village chairman, village secretary and 
the other members to constitute the village council. But until 
July 1992, it also provided that in any village with a branch of 
the Party, the Party Branch Chairman and Secretary automatically 
became Chairman and Secretary of the village27 (and village 
council) . As most villages had Party branches, it is these Party 
functionaries who automatically assumed leadership in the 
villages. The Party Branch Chairman was elected by party members 
of the Branch while the Branch Secretary was appointed by the 
Central Committee of the Party. In some villages, the ordinary 
villagers had no power or influence over them at all (Ngware & 
Haule:30-1) .
At other levels, the Party has continued to control both district 
and urban councils in various ways, including screening 
candidates in council elections. Other central government 
controls could be defended because, after all:
...local government presupposes a central authority to which it is 
subordinate.... [and] the central government must ultimately be in control 
or else it is not a central government and "the state" will have no 
international reality. (Davies :1)
27Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982, s.56; it has since been 
changed by s.13 of the Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act 1992.
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But in Tanzania, that control tends to go beyond what is 
necessary to safeguard sovereignty. For example, all local 
government employees are appointed and controlled by a central 
Commission whose chairman and members are appointed by the 
President and the Minister respectively, under s.4 of the Local 
Government Service Act 1982. Even amongst the local population 
in some areas there is very little understanding of local 
authorities as their institutions; they regard them generally as 
institutions through which the Government hands down to them 
orders and directives, and ensures they are complied with (Ngware 
& Haule:32-3) .
With multi-party politics in July 1992, the central authorities 
still ensured that local authorities do not become too 
independent of central control. The Local Authorities 
(Elections) (Amendment) Act 1992 does not allow independent 
candidates in council elections. It means that all local 
councillors must, as a condition, subscribe to fully registered 
political parties which, according to the Political Parties Act 
1992, must espouse a highly centralist orientation in both their 
ideologies and their constitutions.
The ruling CCM took advantage of its well established network by 
fielding candidates for all seats in the 1994 local government 
elections and winning absolute majorities in all urban and 
district councils,28 except for Bariadi District Council, where
2&Tanzanian Affairs, No.50 (January 1995): 9-10.
270
CCM and the Opposition members are evenly balanced.
6.2: STATE CONTROL OF CIVIL ORGANISATIONS
The power of state control over groups and organisations not 
otherwise defined by specific laws is provided for under the 
Societies Ordinance 1954. Enacted the same year as the formation 
of TANU, it is sometimes claimed that the Ordinance was 
specifically intended to contain TANU. But apart from its 
subsequent use to proscribe TANU in some districts, the claim is 
extremely doubtful.29 Rather, there seems to have been a policy 
of the Colonial Office at the time which led to the enactment of 
this Ordinance and similar laws in other British colonies mainly 
in response to growing African nationalism after the Second World 
War.
The Societies Ordinance is a very repressive law administered by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. It defines a "society" as any club 
or group of ten or more persons, whatever its nature or object, 
but does not include cooperative societies, trade unions, 
business partnerships, companies registered under the Companies 
Ordinance, or any society declared by the President "not to be 
a society." The remark that its wording "was so wide that it 
covered even Sunday School classes" (Bates,m .l . :423) was certainly 
correct: a statutory order was issued to expressly declare, among 
others, congregations assembling "exclusively for the purpose of
29The Societies Ordinance came into force on June 1, 1954, by G.N. 121 of 
1954, published on May 7, 1954, while TANU was formed on July 7, 1954.
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religious teaching and worship" not to be societies for the 
purposes of the Ordinance.30
Every society is required by s.7 of the Ordinance to apply for 
registration otherwise it will be an unlawful society; according 
to the statutory definition, every society is an unlawful society 
unless it is either registered or exempted from registration. 
The Registrar of Societies has power to register a society, or 
to exempt it from registration, or to refuse it registration. 
Refusal could be for various reasons, including the subjective 
opinion of the Registrar that the society is likely to be used 
for purposes prejudicial to "peace, order and good government," 
or simply that its registration is "undesirable." He may, for 
similar reasons, rescind an exemption or cancel a registration. 
The Registrar of Societies is the Principal Secretary to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, responsible to the Minister and holding 
office at the pleasure of the President.
Under s.6A of the Ordinance the Minister may require any group, 
even if excluded from the statutory definition of "society", to 
apply for registration. The group must then apply at once or 
else it becomes an unlawful society, membership (and the 
management) of which is an offence. And s. 6 empowers the 
President, "in his absolute discretion," to declare any society 
unlawful where he considers such a declaration to be in the 
public interest. That power can be invoked against any society,
30G.N. 208 of 1954.
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group, or body of persons, including any that is "not a society" 
under the Ordinance!
In short, under the Societies Ordinance the right and freedom of 
individuals to associate and form groups for various lawful 
purposes is there only at the pleasure of the Executive. With 
that background, we look at how the state has been able to stifle 
and control civil society to its use and advantage. The cases 
of youth and women, religious organisations, and professional 
associations are used as illustrations of the general pattern.
6.2.1: The Youth and Women Organisations
Throughout the three decades of independent Tanzania, any 
references to youth and women's organisations generally have been 
references to the Youth and Women's wings of the ruling, and for 
the most part, only political party. Both were established 
before independence as part of the nationalist movement. The 
Women's League, hereinafter UWT, was founded in 1955 as the 
Women's Section of TANU by Bibi Titi Mohamed, a semi-literate 
Dar es Salaam woman who, within a year, mobilised it into the 
largest and only women's body in East Africa then (Bennett:20) . 
The Youth Wing began as a TANU supporters club for those aged 
under 18. It became known as the TANU Youth League (TYL) and its 
first leader was Rashidi Kawawa (Bennett:23-4) . Later, its 
constitution prescribed the age of 12 to 35 years for its 
members, and after 1977 it became known as the CCM Youth League, 
or Vijana.
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The secretaries-general of both organisations were appointed by 
the President ( who was also the Chairman of the Party) , and held 
office at his pleasure. In making the appointments the Chairman 
was not subject to any restraints, and he sometimes appointed 
even persons who might not have qualified for membership! On a 
number of times, TYL or Vijana had a secretary general aged over 
35 years, and for a brief period in the 1960s, a man was 
secretary-general of UWT! Regional and district secretaries of 
UWT and Vijana were appointed by the Central Committee of the 
Party. Other positions were elective but contestants were 
subjected to a screening process by the Party. The secretary- 
general and national chairperson of each of the two organisations 
have always been ex officio members of the NEC.
As constituent sections of the Party the two organisations always 
took it as their duty to actively recruit and mobilise support 
for the Party and its policies. Through them, the formation of 
other general purpose youth or women's organisations was actively 
and successfully prevented. There was no law against it as such; 
but the presence of UWT and Vijana was used to discourage as 
divisive, and therefore undesirable, all attempts for such 
organisation outside the Party. Thus the only other youth and 
women organisations were those of special interests or particular 
characteristics like the Young Christian Society, or the Tanzania 
Media Women Association (TAMWA) formed in the 1980s. But these 
were few and even there, UWT or Vijana, as the case may be, 
always sought involvement just to ensure that they were not used 
for rival purposes.
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Briefly, the two organisations have been used to further the 
general interests of the ruling party.
An interesting case in relation to the youth is that of students. 
In October 1966, students of the University College, Dar es 
Salaam (then a college of the University of East Africa), 
apparently joined by a few students from some other colleges in 
the city, staged a protest march to the State House. They 
protested against terms of a new scheme which required them to 
do two years of National Service at a considerably less pay than 
their prescribed civilian salaries (couison 1982:225) . The 
students' demands were generally elitist and self indulging, and 
President Nyerere expelled them; they only returned to college 
after a series of apologies and pleadings, and a year of 
humiliation (smith:27-30; Peter & Mvungi: 164-73) . An immediate
reaction of the TYL was to establish branches in all colleges and 
secondary schools, and to seek domination in almost all students' 
extra-curricula activities. But at the University, it was not 
TYL but the leftist University Students African Revolutionary 
Front (USARF) and its publication, Cheche, which became prominent 
in influencing students' political thought (Peter & Mvungi: 174-81) .
In July 1970, Dar es Salaam was established as a complete 
university and Pius Msekwa, until then TANU's Executive 
Secretary, was appointed Vice-Chancellor. On November 9, 1970, 
he announced that the government had banned USARF and its 
publication, Cheche, because:
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USARF had become a redundant organisation since TYL was supposed to 
exercise a monopoly of all political activities on the campus. USARF, the 
Vice-Chancellor explained, had been meddling in the political affairs of 
Tanzania by its mordant commentaries on various issues without any 
specific locus standi since it represented no recognized body inside 
Tanzania or abroad. (Peter & Mvungi:178 -9)
And so ended one of Africa's most independent student bodies. 
The TYL campus branch, soon elevated to a district of the TYL, 
tried with a new publication, Majimaji, to capture the militant 
elements left by USARF. But unlike USARF, the TYL University 
District was not independent and its purported militancy was 
simply a strategy to keep militant students under control.
Besides the presence of the TYL, the University of Dar es Salaam
Act 1970 provided for a representative body of students and on
that basis the Dar es Salaam University Students Organisation
(DUSO) was established. It was not part of the TYL and was free
to comment and give its own views and position on matters of
public interest. In 1977 DUSO demonstrated against France's
Foreign Minister, Mr Giringaud, when he came to Dar es Salaam in
his African tour seeking to sell the idea of a French commanded
African peace keeping force. This French initiative, strongly
opposed by Nyerere, followed Zaire's Shaba Province uprising
against General Mobutu, which had been put down earlier that year by Moroccan 
troops using French transport planes. Angry at the demonstrations, Giringaud
demanded an apology, but Nyerere's government did not oblige; 
furious, he abandoned his mission (Peter & Mvungi:i87) . Nyerere was 
to admit later that he was actually happy with that outcome of 
the students' demonstration!31
31In a talk with the University community on July 31, 1978.
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For those demonstrations DUSO had been refused Police permission 
under the Police Force Ordinance, so the students had 
demonstrated without a permit. They repeated that in March 1978, 
when they demonstrated against lucrative salaries and fringe 
benefits which Parliamentarians had just voted for themselves, 
this time with dire consequences (peter & Mvungi:i87-9i) .
Firstly, in their protest march, actively supported by some city 
workers, the students were violently intercepted by the Police 
who dispersed them. Secondly, those who managed to regroup and 
proceed to their destination in the city, about 400 of them, were 
expelled from the university by the government. Finally, DUSO 
was immediately banned. The contrast between 1966 and 1978 was 
that while in the former the students sought to protect their own 
privileges, in the latter they joined the "exploited workers and 
peasants to protest" against a privileged state bureaucracy which 
then saw them as a real threat (couison i982:23o) . On the 
difference in government reaction between the 1977 and the 1978 
demonstrations, Nyerere light heartedly advised the students that 
in future they should also try to figure out which side of their 
cause the "Chief of Police" was likely to be before demonstrating 
without a permit.32
The abolition of DUSO coincided with the change in the youth 
organisation from TYL to Vijana (or CCM Youth League) after the 
birth of CCM in 1977. The University Branch of Vijana was
32In a talk with the University Community, July 31, 1978.
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instructed to assume all DUSO's functions and responsibilities. 
Vijana branches in other institutions of learning were instructed 
to do the same in their respective campuses.33 Later that year, 
Vijana held its National Conference at Iringa, where:
Muungano wa Wanafunzi wa Tanzania (MUWATA) was conceived as a pan­
territorial student organisation under the control and supervision of the 
Youth League. A tailor-made constitution was adopted without students 
having been consulted. (Peter & Mvungi: 191)
MUWATA was, simply stated, a campus extension of the ruling CCM 
through Vijana, its Youth League. The constitution of MUWATA was 
drawn by Vijana whose own constitution was drawn by CCM. 
Elections for MUWATA leadership were supervised by Vijana; the 
latter also screened the aspirants like the Party did in national 
and civic elections. With MUWATA, state control over students 
was complete.
6.2.2: Religious Organisations
There are three main religious groups in Tanzania: Christian,
Muslim and Traditional. A small minority belongs to other 
smaller groups but those three are the main ones, sharing the 
population amongst them almost equally. Freedom of religious 
belief and practice is a right of the individual guaranteed under
i
| s.19 of the Constitution 1977, which also precludes the state
j
| from propagating any (or against any) religion.
In considering relations between the state and religious
33Until then, independent students' organisations had continued in a few 
colleges like IDM Mzumbe, and Ardhi Institute (Dar es Salaam).
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organisations, it is common to ignore traditional religions for 
various reasons, including their indeterminate numbers and 
sometimes indefinite organisations, as well as the ease with 
which they can either accept or co-exist with foreign religious 
practices.
Of the remaining two major groups, the government deals with 
them, conveniently, through main bodies which function as 
"umbrella" organisations (omari:29). These are the Christian 
Council of Tanzania (CCT) for all Protestant denominations and 
the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) for Catholics, and for 
all Muslims there is the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania, 
better known by its Swahili acronym, BAKWATA. The government has 
desisted from dealings with religious congregations except 
through those organisations. Usually any religious group 
claiming to be Christian or Muslim must indicate its affiliation 
with one or the other of those three bodies, otherwise it may 
invite the use of the government's censorial powers under the 
Societies Ordinance.
The government has always had very good relations with those 
three bodies, effectively using them to contain all religious 
groups and to encourage harmony with them. The leaders of those 
three bodies have usually been invited to NEC meetings as 
observers whenever matters touching on religion were to be 
deliberated. All attempts to challenge their hegemonic role over 
religious groups has been discouraged. Thus, in those three, it 
is as if a single ruling party has been established for each
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religious organisation and administration.
That those three bodies serve to facilitate state control of 
religious groups is not always too obvious. But it may be easier 
to see it in relation to BAKWATA than it is in relation to the 
other two. The state in Tanzania has had good reason to concern 
itself with either appeasing or containing Muslim communities. 
Until independence Muslims lagged behind in secular education and 
for that reason they were the only community to form a political 
party based on religious identity: the All Muslim National Union 
of Tanganyika (AMNUT) was formed in 1959 and sought to challenge 
TANU by demanding that independence be delayed until more Muslims 
were educated (Omari:26; Mwakyembe 1986:39).
After independence the TANU government, unable to educate more 
Muslims overnight, had to be concerned about the possible Muslim 
dissatisfactions developing into mass grievances of an entire 
religious community. It suited the government to have an all 
embracing Muslim Council through which their impatience could be 
assuaged. Accordingly, BAKWATA was formed in 196 8 with active 
government encouragement. The founding conference at Iringa was 
attended and addressed by, among others, Abeid Karume, the First 
Vice-President and President of Zanzibar, and Rashidi Kawawa, the 
Second Vice-President. And from its inception, the organisation 
and administrative set-up of BAKWATA has been remarkably similar 
to that of the Party.
Rashidi Kawawa has admitted that the government had indeed
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encouraged the formation of BAKWATA for the sake of harmony among 
Muslims who, until then, belonged to diverse groups, sometimes 
quarrelling amongst themselves; only an irresponsible government 
would remain insensitive to such growing social divisions. But 
he insists that the Policy of the TANU (and later CCM) government 
has always been to work in cooperation with all religious groups 
and not to dictate to them. He and Karume, he says, attended the 
Iringa Conference and addressed it as Muslims; what they said was 
probably given much weight because of their national leadership 
positions "but certainly there was no scheme for TANU to dominate 
any religious organisation."34
On the organisational similarity between BAKWATA and the Party, 
Kawawa says:
TANU began in Dar es Salaam and spread among Muslims. Naturally the 
Muslims in TANU had a hand in forming BAKWATA as Muslims, not as TANU. 
And in 1968 TANU's organisational structure was regarded by all of us as 
ideal for any organisation. Thus when forming BAKWATA, we TANU leaders 
and members who were there copied the TANU structure into BAKWATA simply 
because we saw it as the ideal structure.
That is overall a convincing explanation.
But doubts about government intentions with BAKWATA are not based 
on the founding conference. One of the resolutions at that 
conference was for all Muslims to dissolve their then existing 
congregations and make them regional and district organs of 
BAKWATA. Most congregations dissolved themselves accordingly. 
The state assisted in implementing that resolution against the
34Interview with Mr Rashidi M Kawawa, August 25, 1994; this whole paragraph 
and the next are based on that interview.
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few congregations not willing to dissolve themselves voluntarily. 
Thus the East African Muslim Welfare Society, along with the 
Tanzania Council of that society, were dissolved and ordered to 
wind up by the government,35 and their assets then vested in 
BAKWATA by a subsequent order.36 Similarly, the A1 Jummiyatul 
Islamiyya Bi Tanganyika was declared an unlawful society, and its 
assets subsequently vested in BAKWATA.37
The Arusha Muslim Union survived until 1990 when the courts held 
it to be an unlawful society, and it thereby lost all its assets 
to BAKWATA.38 The reason for the holding was that because the 
group had engaged itself in a number of other ancillary 
activities like running a dispensary and a school, it was beyond 
a congregation assembling "exclusively for the purpose of 
religious teaching and worship", which were excluded from the 
application of the Societies Ordinance. To be lawful, therefore, 
it ought to have been registered as a society.
Recently, some Muslim groups have tried to organise themselves 
independent of BAKWATA but most have failed to secure 
registration. There is one though, which managed to . secure
registration and even to gain prominence in recent years: the 
Baraza la Uendelezaji Kuran Tanzania (BALUKTA). Its prominence
35By G.N. 434 & 435 of 1968.
36G.N. 169 of 1969.
37G.N. 97, 98 & 312 of 1970.
38Arusha Muslim Union v. BAKWATA, Tanzania Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal
No. 33 of 1990.
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shot up almost overnight in 1991 when it took position in defence 
of the one-party state by condemning Muslims who engaged in 
politics in opposition to the ruling (and by then, only) 
political party. Apparently, therefore, BALUKTA "bought" its 
prominence by seeking an alliance with the Party. The alliance 
failed to persevere, though, as in 1993 BALUKTA was given notice 
of intention to cancel its registration. This followed the 
arrest of its leader, Yahya Hussein, and some of its members for 
alleged criminal conduct which included unruly behaviour and 
wanton destruction of property.39
Meanwhile, state relations with BAKWATA, and with the CCT and the 
TEC, have continued to be generally harmonious.
6.2.3: Professional Associations40
The state has been able to control professional organisations in 
various ways but by far the most effective has been the outlawing 
of trade union activity outside the single government-controlled 
union. This was used to suppress voluntary professional
associations by requiring them not to concern themselves with 
issues relating to better working conditions in their professions 
because those are trade union concerns; it undermined the 
meaningful purpose of professional association. After some years
39This was the chaos of Good Friday 1993 in which a number of Dar es Salaam 
pork butcheries were destroyed, as prominently reported by the local press from 
10th to 17th April, 1993.
40The analysis here does not include statutory organisations, like the 
Tanganyika Law Society or the Tanzania Medical Association, which are established 
by specific laws governing practice in their respective professions.
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without any formal organisation of their own, members of the 
academic staff of the University of Dar es Salaam managed only 
in 1983 to organise themselves into an "Academic Staff Assembly" 
(in 1983) by claiming that it was a constituent part of the 
university's Convocation, established under the University of Dar 
es Salaam Act 1970.
As the greatest single employer of all professions in the 
country, directly or indirectly, the government has been able to 
control the geographical distribution of various professionals, 
often isolating them into tiny pockets of individuals, impossible 
for any meaningful organisation or, alternatively, weakening the 
effectiveness of any professional organisation that manages to 
be formed.
The few professional associations formed in Tanzania have 
generally sought to organise themselves into single territorial 
organisations, reducing the chances of having a multiplicity of 
associations drawing members from the same profession. The 
associations are based in the capital, Dar es Salaam, where their 
office bearers are also stationed; they can only have branches 
in the up-country regions. Inevitably, therefore, they end up 
with organisational structures very similar to that of the ruling 
party. But most of them are not active outside the capital, 
where most of their members are usually based.
The general belief is that the tendency to avoid rival or 
multiple organisations in the same profession has been voluntary.
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It would seem, however, that the government has also preferred 
that pattern and discouraged the formation of multiple 
organisations for the same reason of avoiding divisions in 
society through multiple organisations. It has also made 
government control easier. Thus after any professional 
association is registered, attempts to form another organisation 
in the same profession afE- strongly discouraged.
In 1989/90 a group of junior doctors based at the Muhimbili 
Medical Centre in Dar es Salaam decided to form an organisation 
of their own, the Tanzania Junior Doctors Association. The idea 
was that junior doctors in the other consultant hospitals at 
Mwanza, Moshi and Mbeya would join the association and form 
active branches in their respective centres. But registration 
of this association was delayed for over a year because, as the 
doctors were told, there was already registered long ago a 
Tanzania Medical Association embracing all medical practitioners^
the junior doctors were reminded of their freedom to join it 
at any time instead of setting up a rival organisation. It was 
as if a "one-party" rule applied with regard to every civil and 
professional organisation as well.
Rather surprisingly, even lawyers tended to support this "one- 
party" rule. At the 1990 Annual General Meeting of the 
Tanganyika Law Society,41 there came up for discussion the 
question whether two lawyers' groups should be registered (under
41Established under the Advocates Ordinance for governing and regulating 
legal practice, and of which all practising lawyers must be members.
285
the Societies Ordinance) or not: the Kilimanjaro Lawyers
Association (formed by lawyers based in and around Kilimanjaro 
Region) and the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (formed by 
women lawyers generally but mainly based in Dar es Salaam). 
There was strong opposition from some of the members of the Law 
Society who advanced learned arguments remarkably similar to 
those of the Party in defence of its monopoly position.
That this came up for discussion at the Annual General Meeting 
of the Law Society could be revealing. After receiving 
applications for registration from the two lawyers' groups, the 
Registrar thought it wise to seek the opinion of the Law Society 
before making his decisions. Before the Annual General Meeting 
the Council of the Law Society had discussed the applications, 
and was inclined to advise the Registrar to refuse registration 
for the two groups; but the minority view in the Council 
vehemently insisted that the question be put before the Annual 
General Meeting which, in the event, supported the registrations.
Apparently, one means the government uses to control professional 
and other civil associations is through existing organisations 
or their leaders, patronising them or offering them favours, and 
then using them to exert influence or exercise control over 
potential activism. When favours and co-optation into government 
ranks fail, suffocation or subtle coercion of the organisations 
may serve the purpose. Either way, it is always better and more 
efficient for the government to exercise control through a single 
organisation. That is why with the proliferation of non­
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governmental organisations (NGOs) in the late 198 0s, the 
government initiated and virtually organised the formation of an 
"NGO umbrella" organisation, TANGO (sandbrook & Haifaniriso) .
With the Junior Doctors Association the government, unable to 
suppress or patronise it, decided to use its powers as the 
employer. In January 1992 when the doctors stopped work 
demanding improved facilities at the consultant hospital, the 
government sacked all 70 of them. The entire hospital came to 
a halt as all doctors, nurses, medical students and all students 
of the University of Dar es Salaam, marched to the office of the 
Prime Minister, who was forced to reverse the decision sacking 
the doctors. But to weaken the association, its secretary, Dr 
J J Masika, a paediatrician was transferred from the consultant 
hospital to a Council Clinic in the city. Another leader of the 
association, Rubera Mafwiri, a surgeon who was very active in 
mobilising support in the January 1992 crisis, was transferred 
to the Lindi Regional Hospital in the far south; and to remove 
all pretexts for him to remain in Dar es Salaam, his wife, an eye 
specialist, was transferred to the same remote region, where her 
expertise could not be utilised.. All three doctors resigned from 
government service.
An organisation of professionals which became a faithful servant 
of the government is the Tanzania Journalists Association (TAJA) . 
It was formed in the 1980s; Salim Ahmed Salim, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister, was its Patron. TAJA 
did nothing to arrest the degeneration of the mass media industry
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into a publicity enterprise for the government. The association 
sank into absurdity: when in 1992 the President, exercising his 
powers of appointment (and removal from the public service 
removed its secretary from active journalism as Managing Editor 
of the government owned Daily News and made him a Desk Officer 
in the Information Department, TAJA's President congratulated the 
government for the reforms!
At a meeting in May 1994, called by concerned journalists (not 
TAJA leaders), TAJA had only one confirmed subscribing member, 
Ndimara Tegambwage. Ironically, he led the initiative to form 
a rival organisation, the Association of Journalists and Media 
Workers (AJM), which was registered in August 1994.
6.2.4: The Mass Media
The uninspiring role of TAJA shown above reflects the extent to 
which the mass media came to in serving the government: state 
control of the mass media during the period of this study was 
thorough and complete.
At first, the instruments of control were the Newspaper Ordinance 
1928 and the Penal Code, both relics of colonial legislation. 
The former required a newspaper to be registered, and its 
publisher or proprietor to execute a bond, with or without 
sureties, in a sum not exceeding Shs 20,000/-, against possible 
liabilities arising out of the publication of the newspaper. On 
the other hand, s.51 of the Penal Code empowered the President,
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"in his absolute discretion" to prohibit the importation of any 
publication if "in his opinion" such prohibition was in the 
public interest. Also under ss.55 and 56 of the Code,' the 
offence of sedition was so widely defined as to include 
publishing anything that could 'provoke disaffection to the 
government (shivji 1991:10-2) .
Then the Newspaper Ordinance was amended42 to empower the 
President, if "in his opinion it is in the public interest" or 
that of "peace and good order", to order any newspaper in the 
country to cease publication. In 1976 the Newspapers Act 1976 
repealed the Ordinance and consolidated all the control powers 
with those hitherto under the Penal Code as cited above. Under 
the new law, though, the power to ban a newspaper or publication 
was moved from the President to the Minister.
The power to prohibit the importation of publications was used 
in 1968 to impose an 18-month ban against the Daily Nation and 
its sister papers,43 in 1974 against Drum magazine,44 and in 
1976 against a dozen books,45 all from Kenya. On the other 
hand, it is said that the initial aim of the provision whereby 
a newspaper can be ordered to cease publication was to enable the 
government to ban a publication by elements loyal to Oscar
42By the Newspaper Ordinance (Amendment) Act 1968.
43Ban imposed by G.N. 391 of 1968 and lifted by G.N. 35 of 1970.
44G.N. 285 of 1974.
45G.N. 105 of 1976.
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Kambona, former Foreign Minister and Secretary-General of TANU 
who in 1967 fled into exile in Britain (Martin,R:94) . In the 
event, no such publication ever went into circulation, and that 
power has hardly been used; the only known case was as recent as 
1993, when two papers, Michapo and Cheka were banned.46
«•
But the mere presence of that power, which could be used at any 
time, made newspaper publishing a risky business and may have 
scared many prospective newspaper publishers. Most of the 
newspapers registered under the Newspapers Act 1976 were owned 
and published either by government departments or by parastatal 
corporations, promoting their respective concerns.
Kiongozi, owned by the Catholic church, was one of the very few 
exceptions. But by 1976 it had lost much of its previous 
reputation as a free and independent paper for a general 
readership. In 1972 the bi-monthly was moved from its centre at 
Kipalapala in Tabora, where it was under independent management, 
to Dar es Salaam where it merged with the official Catholic 
mouthpiece, Ecclesia, under the Public Relations department of 
the Tanzania Episcopal Conference! This was after an incident 
in 1971 when the Kiongozi offices at Kipalapala were ransacked 
by the Police looking for the original script of a reader's 
letter published under the pseudonym "Macho", i.e. "eyes", 
condemning the conduct of some members of the National Service
46By G.N. 8 of 1993.
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forces.47
As such, the only available newspapers for general purpose 
readership were the Party-owned dailies, Uhuru (Kiswahili) and 
Nationalist (English). The other English daily, The Standard, 
was taken over by the government in 1970 and in 1972 merged with 
the Nationalist to form the Daily News, owned by the government. 
For over two decades, Uhuru and Daily News remained the only 
dailies in Tanzania. This is something of a paradox since, 
during that same period, Tanzania earned an international 
reputation for a highly successful literacy campaign which was 
set to exceed the 90% literacy rate under the 1981-1986 
Development Plan (Tanzania 1982:143-60) . But it explains why there 
was no banning of newspapers: besides those owned by the state, 
there were hardly any newspapers to ban. Besides newspapers 
there has been Radio Tanzania, the most effective medium in the 
country, which is a government department. Until 1994, Tanzania 
had no television broadcasting service, except for Zanzibar where 
there was one, government owned, since 1972.
Unable to use its harsh laws against its own press, the 
government used other methods to ensure that the content of the 
press conformed with its requirements and interests. The most 
effective was to appoint as editors only those persons least 
likely to disappoint the government. This was used, with
47This paragraph is based on information from Fr David Matipa, former 
editor of Kiongozi, and Fr Rweikiza, current head of the Publicity department of 
the TEC, as well as rn knowledge as former contributor to Kiongozi.
considerable demonstrative effect, against Frene Ginwala,48 the 
first Managing Editor of the government owned The Standard, when 
she was sacked abruptly in 1971. There had been a coup which 
toppled Jaafar el-Numeiri in Sudan but he was restored to power 
in a successful counter-coup three days later, and he immediately 
executed the coup-plotters. Frene Ginwala was sacked because of 
her editorial in The Standard clearly sympathising with the coup- 
plotters, and virtually advising any "other progressive oriented" 
coup plotters to be more scrupulous in executing their plans.49
The lesson was learnt. Since then, the editors adopted and 
rigorously enforced a "self-censorship" code to ensure that they 
do not offend the government. There were even claims, which have 
never been disputed, that some editors saw it prudent sometimes 
to send to the State House draft editorials on sensitive issues 
for approval before publishing them. Those who properly observed 
this code were well rewarded with promotions to become Press 
Secretaries to the President or the Prime Minister, or even 
ambassadors. These promotions may as well have been used to 
remove good independent editors from the press. Either way, they 
worked as "an incentive" to succeeding editors to observe the 
"self-censorship" code.
Besides the Newspapers Act 1976, state control of the mass media 
has also been exercised through the Tanzania News Agency Act
48Now Speaker of the South African Parliament.
49Information from Mr Jenerali Ulimwengu, MP, then a Standard staff writer, 
and Mr A M Babu, then a cabinet minister.
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1976. The Act established the Tanzania News Agency and gave it 
exclusive monopoly rights to collect and to distribute any news 
in the country. Under that law, no other person or body may 
collect or disseminate news in Tanzania, save with the 
authorisation of the Agency, given upon application and payment 
of a fee to the Agency. At any time the Agency may suspend or 
revoke its authorisation without assigning reasons. One effect 
of this law is to impose a "self-censorship" obligation on all 
news writers and publishers otherwise the Agency may revoke its 
authorisation for them to operate.
In serving the interests of the state, the press became very 
selective in the news it reported, and how it reported it. 
Sometimes even reports critical of some government practices were 
published, provided they did not appear to challenge the hegemony 
of the state party. For example, in the early 1970s a very 
lively debate was carried on in the government owned daily about 
the dangers of government policies on tourism.50 Also, all 
newspapers and the radio reported in detail the series of 
industrial actions of 1971-73 in Dar es Salaam, and their brutal 
suppression by the government. But the "Villagisation Programme" 
(infra, 6.3.2), in which the use of force against peasants would 
have been equally embarrassing to the government, was never 
reported.
At times the press gave misleading reports or deliberately
50The debate was subsequently published as a book: Shivji (ed) (1973).
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falsified impressions to suit government interests. Thus when 
university students were expelled for demonstrating against 
ministers' and MPs' salaries and fringe benefits in 1978, the 
press reported that the students were expelled because of their 
acts of hooliganism in an illegal demonstration against 
government plans to send experts to work in rural areas! (peter 
& Mvungi: 190) Another interesting case occurred in after the 
government published the Bill for the Regulation of Land Tenure 
(Established Villages) Act 1992. Apparently, the Bill was widely 
criticised and some people even tried to campaign against it.51 
To counter the criticism, Radio Tanzania announced in one of its 
popular broadcasts that the Bill actually resulted from the 
recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into 
Land Matters which had just submitted its report (Tanzania 1992b) . 
This turned out to be a lie and the Chairman of the Commission 
refuted it;52 the Commission submitted its report on November 
12, 1992, while the Bill had been published three days before! 
It was therefore a case of Radio Tanzania lying in order to 
defend a particular government policy.
For a long time the people of Tanzania had had doubts about the 
authenticity of the reports they were getting from the Radio, as 
well as from the other state owned media. That is why throughout 
the 1980s it became increasingly common to rely on foreign 
publications and the BBC Swahili Service for authentic balanced
51The Express, November 26, 1992.
52By Press Release, reference No.LC/ADV/l of November 17, 1992.
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news about Tanzania.
That was changed by the emergence of a vigorous free press after 
1990. By the end of 1994, there were a total of five dailies and 
more than ten periodicals, one independent radio station 
(excluding those of religious organisations), and three 
independent television stations.
6.3: COMMUNITY RIGHTS AND THE STATE
Since independence, and especially after the Arusha Declaration 
of 1967, Tanzania's policies placed a heavy emphasis on rural 
development. Underlying that emphasis was the importance of 
agriculture, by small holder peasant farmers, to the national 
economy, and the fact that more than 70% of the population lives 
in the rural areas. There was also compliance with Nyerere's 
view of responsible government: to him, a responsible government 
was not only one voted into office by, and deriving authority 
from, the many (Nyerere 1958:87), but also one capable of, and 
devoted to, leading those many forward to economic development 
(Nyerere i96ic:34o). That, we may say, has been Nyerere's concept 
of an ideal government.
Accordingly, Nyerere repeatedly drew attention to issues of rural 
development throughout his rule. Even the thrust of his argument 
for socialism as a development strategy reflected his concern for 
the well-being of the many. Thus in 1967 the Arusha Declaration
295
was followed shortly by "Socialism and Rural Development",53 a 
policy paper for the application of socialist principles of 
development to rural Tanzania. This led to the "ujamaa 
village"54 strategy and its subsequent variations which 
dominated rural development policy making and implementation in 
the late 1960s and 1970s.
One of the requirements of the ujamaa village strategy was the 
need for the rural population to settle in permanent village 
clusters. Within the village, ujamaa emphasised "work by 
everybody", preferably work in communal endeavours as far as 
possible, and exploitation by none. The ultimate in Nyerere's 
ambition was an egalitarian rural society based on the members' 
equal participation in their affairs, both economic and 
political, and self-reliance. Democracy was essential to ujamaa 
villages: there could be "no socialism without democracy" (Nyerere 
1968:5,234) . Achieving that kind of development, even if
difficult, would not be impossible because, according to Nyerere, 
ujamaa socialism was to be based on traditional African 
familyhood which, though interfered with by external influences 
through colonialism, could still be recaptured and developed to 
suit modern conditions (Nyerere 1966:164-6) .
Before 1967 Nyerere had emphasised the need for village 
settlements so that peasant farmers could share the high costs
53Reproduced in Nyerere 1968: 337-66.
54May be translated as "socialist village".
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of modern farming facilities, and to make easier the provision 
of essential facilities like hospitals, schools, and clean water 
supply, and to provide an opportunity to improve democracy 
(Nyerere 1966:183-4) . After 1967, he added a socialist objective to 
village settlements (Nyerere 1968:351-3, 405-7 ) by emphasising self- 
reliance (instead of government-provided services) , the voluntary 
association of the members and their own initiative and self- 
governance, as the essentials of an ujamaa village:
Ujamaa villages.... cannot be created from outside, nor governed from 
outside. No one can be forced into an ujamaa village, and no official at 
any level can go and tell the members of an ujamaa village what they 
should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual 
farmers. No official of the Government or Party can go to an ujamaa 
village and tell members what they must grow.... For if ...an outsider 
gives such instructions and enforces them - then it will no longer be an 
ujamaa village! An ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people 
who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for 
their common good. They ....should not be persuaded to start an ujamaa 
village by promises of the things which will be given to them if they do 
so... (Nyerere 1974:36-7)
The role of Party and government leaders was simply to provide 
leadership by educating and convincing the people to set up or 
join ujamaa villages of their own volition.
But the paradox we analyse in this section is that a few typical 
ujamaa villages, voluntarily established and democratically 
organised, were disbanded by the government, which then went on 
to use compulsion to establish village settlements. There is 
thus an almost alarming contrast between Nyerere's "ideal" 
government referred to above, and his "real" government. The 
only explanation for this contrast is that the real government 
is consistent in its overall tendency to control, and to refuse 
to be controlled by, the people.
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6.3.1: The Case of the Ruvuma Development Association
The Ruvuma Development Association (hereinafter "RDA") was an 
association of villages in Ruvuma Region, southern Tanzania, 
established by some determined TANU Youth League (TYL) members, 
and first registered under the Societies Ordinance in 1963.
During the first three years after independence, government 
sponsored village settlement schemes were launched in many parts 
of the country. A Village Settlements Agency (VSA) was 
established to coordinate the development of the schemes. It 
employed a number of staff and, through it, the government 
provided capital for the schemes. But many of the settlers in 
the schemes joined them merely on some unfounded expectation that 
the schemes would soon make them rich. They considered 
themselves as deserving a wage from the government, or the VSA, 
for working in the schemes. Not involved in the planning or 
management of the schemes, they had no commitment to their 
success (Brain:236-9) . In only four years the schemes collapsed 
and the whole policy of settlement schemes was abandoned.
By contrast, the RDA presented a genuine ujamaa village 
experiment, from which even Nyerere's subsequent theoretical 
expositions on developing rural socialism are said to have 
evolved (Martin,R:34-5; Coulson 1982:319) . It began at Litowa village 
and by 1967 it had 17 member villages. Its members had enough 
food, with a surplus to sell, from their communal farms; they had 
a sawmill and a grain milling machine, both operating profitably;
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they ventured into wool processing and soap production; they had 
a clean water supply system installed with their own labour; they 
ran a boarding school at Litowa for 3 00 school children; and from 
1963 to 196 9 at Litowa, the village with the largest number of 
children (in addition to the 3 00 boarding school children), only 
7 children died, against a regional average death rate of 4 0% for 
children under 5 years old!55
The secret behind RDA's success was its members' commitment to 
socialist discipline and self-reliance, and their highly 
democratic organisation. The members' commitment was first seen 
from their unwavering determination in the face of hardships 
during the early days: the threat of wild animals, food shortages 
and uncertainty of harvests or prosperity (coulson 1982:263-7o) . 
After establishing themselves many others sought to join; but the 
new applicants were subjected to a rigorous test and a long 
period of observation (Brain:24i-2) , so that only a committed 
person would persist to the end of the process. The long period 
also gave the members enough time to assess each new applicant 
before accepting or rejecting him.
Unlike the VSA and its settlement schemes, which had a host of 
paid "experts" and managers, all offices in the RDA villages were 
elective, the electorate being all adults in the villages, and 
none was remunerative. Progress in all projects and activities 
of each village was democratically reviewed at weekly (or bi-
55This paragraph is based on Coulson 1982: 263-70.
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weekly) meetings so arranged that everybody attended: they were 
held at the end of the weekly occasions when the entire community 
in each village ate together in common. It was at those meetings 
that the office holders were called to account and
. . .public opinion was brought to bear on anyone not pulling his or her 
weight. Very gently but quite remorselessly a person would be asked to 
explain why such and such had not been done. It was good-humoured but 
highly effective; the sanction of shame is worth all the laws ever 
written. (Brain : 241 -2 )
No RDA village undertook a plan which the members did not fully 
understand, or about which they had doubts (Lewin:i9o) . Clearly, 
their concept of democracy went beyond the right to cast a vote.
RDA villages had a similarly practical concept of equality. 
Government policy for the village settlement schemes was to 
recruit only married and able-bodied men, aged 18 to 40 years, 
on the assumption that they were the ones truly capable of 
working. At one of the RDA villages, by contrast:
...there were nine old men and women, incapable of sustained field work, 
yet able to do a lot of useful and needed tasks such as bird and baboon 
scaring, sweeping the street, taking care of young children or weeding the 
vegetable garden. There was also a young man with a withered arm who 
worked as a storeman and clerk and who gave the younger children some 
rudimentary instruction in the three R s. (Brain: 242)
Also women were in the communal farms for only three and a half 
hours (compared to seven and a half for men), because they had 
to attend to other household concerns which were individual 
responsibilities but nevertheless necessary. But all adults, 
male and female (including holders of the elective positions), 
received equal shares out of the profits made from the communal 
enterprises of the village (Brain:242-3) .
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RDA's success in providing essential services for its members 
resulted from their commitment to self-reliance. Although they 
were assisted in purchasing the sawmill and grain milling 
machine, these were then operated entirely by the villagers 
themselves. The water pump and water pipes at Litowa were 
donated by the charity organisation, Oxfam, but the labour for 
constructing the whole water supply system there was provided 
entirely by the villagers themselves. Their priority was always 
the production of food for their own consumption, rather than for 
a cash income (coulson 1982:265-7) .
A really great success was in reducing child deaths, as mentioned 
above. This was done firstly by jointly preparing and providing 
meals to all the children of the village together, thus ensuring 
that all were fed well. Secondly, a small dispensary was opened 
and run by one of the villagers who had done a three months' 
observation study at the local hospital. It was not until July 
1969 that a trained Rural Medical Aid gave up his paid job to 
work in the dispensary as a member of the village (coulson 
1982:267). In short, from 1963 the RDA practised the essentials 
of an ujamaa village which Nyerere was to write about in 1968.
Nyerere's 1967 paper on the need for a relevant education, 
Education for Self-Reliance (Nyerere 1968:267-90) , was also a 
theoretical exposition of another RDA experience. In it he 
emphasised that Tanzania's education system had to encourage and 
"foster the social goals of living together and working together 
for the common good"; to inculcate a "sense of commitment to the
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community" and to emphasise equality (Nyerere 1968:273). He
criticised the present system for divorcing children from the 
realities of their society and failing to relate theory to 
practice (Nyerere 1968:275-6, 278-83) .
Nyerere's ideas on education were already practised by the RDA 
school at Litowa (Toroka) . The school was founded by the
community, it belonged to and was part of the community; 
participation in the village projects and activities was
integrated in the school's curriculum as part of the learning
process. It thus did not divorce the pupils from the community, 
but integrated them in it and prepared them to serve it as full 
and responsible members when they grew up (Toroka:265-6) . The 
relevance of the education given at Litowa was proved when at the 
end of their schooling the pupils had no interest in going away 
to urban areas, the common tendency elsewhere, or from the RDA 
villages which, on the other hand, were ready to usefully absorb 
them. For the first 36 who finished school at Litowa in 1969:
...there were many more jobs requiring skills available than there were 
school-leavers to fill them. They were asked to fill in a form indicating 
what they would like to do when they left school. Only two (both from 
nearby non-ujamaa villages) chose to try and proceed to a secondary 
school. (Coulson 1982:269)
The Litowa experiment was indeed achieving the aspiration 
expressed as almost a dream by Nyerere in his Education for Self- 
Reliance in 1967.
But in 196 9 the President declared the RDA an unlawful society
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and ordered it to be wound up.56 The paradox is that Nyerere 
disbanded an association which was practising, with encouraging 
success, his own theories, an association he had supported with 
money to buy a grain milling machine and whose school he had 
authorised to test his theories in Education for Self-Reliance
(Coulson 1982:266, 270) .
Apparently, a conflict had developed between the RDA and local 
TANU (and other government) leaders in Songea some of whom were, 
admittedly, regarded with contempt by RDA villagers. When the 
former imposed a compulsory requirement for each family to grow 
one acre of tobacco, most peasants resented it and kept quiet;
but the RDA was able, as an organisation, to argue publicly
against it (Coulson 1982:266,270; Brain:245) .
One argument is that Nyerere banned the RDA because it was 
"turning into a new privileged elite group, through both its 
selectivity in choosing members and its growing affluence" 
(Cartwright: 173-4) . In fact this is the reason Kawawa gives for 
banning the RDA:
The RDA had indeed some very good ideological principles. But they wanted 
to be a select and exclusive club of people, admitting to their membership 
only those they could convert to their beliefs, to which they held so
rigidly. We in TANU merely wanted villages with membership open to all,
for the development of all. Naturally, we clashed.57
That may well be an explanation. But it is still not entirely 
satisfying because the ban came so suddenly and it was not
56G.N. 254 & 255 of 1969; also see Coulson 1982:270-1; Martin,R.:34-5; and 
Cartwright: 173.
57Interview with Mr Rashidi M Kawawa, August 25, 1994.
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preceded by any complaint about RDA's exclusivism.
It would seem, however, that the RDA was banned because of its 
autonomy and resolute intent to remain independent and free from 
central control which, at this time, was increasingly being 
exercised through the Party network (Martin,R:34-5; Cartwright 173-4 ; 
Coulson 1982:270-1). As already shown in this chapter, the 
government wanted to control every activity and every institution 
capable of influence. The RDA was not to be an exception. Even 
Kawawa's reply quoted above tends to support the view that the 
RDA was banned because the government was unable to compel it to 
admit just anybody into its membership.
The decision to ban the RDA was a decision of the Central 
Committee of the party made at its meeting in Dar es Salaam in 
September 196 9; it was not Nyerere's own decision. The Central 
Committee at this time is said to have consisted of a substantial 
number of members elected by regional party branches, who saw 
their political future as lying in their ability to exercise 
party influence and control over rural organisations in their 
respective regions. It is to people like them that organisations 
like the RDA, committed to remain free from party control, posed 
the greatest threat. "If RDA organisations became a norm 
nationally," these rural based "professional politicians" would 
be rendered redundant. It is believed that these were the ones 
strongly behind the decision to ban the RDA (coulson 1982:270-1 ) and 
Nyerere gave in because he needed their support and commitment 
in mobilising other development efforts all over the country.
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6.3.2: Popular Participation and the Villagisation Programme
In sharp contrast with the RDA were the thousands of villages 
established later as part of the government's Villagisation 
Programme.
Nyerere's ultimate ambition was to have ujamaa villages 
established voluntarily all over rural Tanzania. Only 
persuasion, and no compulsion, was to be used to establish ujamaa 
villages; that would negate the very essence of ujamaa villages. 
But with persuasion very little progress was made and Nyerere 
himself was not impressed. In 1969 he issued a circular 
encouraging some preferential treatment to registered villages 
in providing government funded services.58 This contradicted 
his earlier emphasis not to use promises of such services to 
persuade people into ujamaa villages.
And even the few villages that managed to be established in that 
slow progress were, save for the RDA villages, not ujamaa 
villages. Unlike the RDA villages, they were not founded upon 
a voluntary commitment to socialist development or self-reliance, 
but mainly as a strategy for getting favours and services from 
the government. Their leaders were often elected on their 
promise to negotiate for such favours from the government and not 
for purposes of genuine democratic governance within the 
villages. Communal work undertaken was only the bare minimum
58Presidential Circular No.l of 1969; Coulson 1982: 240-2.
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required for registration as ujamaa villages, and was often
abandoned after the government approved plans for a school or 
dispensary, or for some other service in the village (coulson
1982:244-6) .
Some of these villages were in fact founded by Party and
government officials at regional and district levels seeking to 
impress President Nyerere with numbers and figures of ujamaa 
villages established in their areas; the concern to impress was
so great that some officials even cheated about the facts and
figures they gave.59
Compulsion was first used in Rufiji District in 1969 to settle 
flood victims on higher ground which they did not like; they 
preferred the more fertile lower areas, regularly fed with silt 
brought by flood waters. But they had to oblige because only 
those who moved to higher ground were given famine relief (coulson
1982:142, 247-8) .
Then in September 1973, the NEC resolved that settlement in 
permanent villages was no longer optional, and the government was 
required to ensure that by the end of 1976 all rural peasants 
were settled in villages. It was to be left to the villagers 
themselves, subsequently, to develop their respective villages 
into ujamaa villages if they so wished.
s9Africa Report, December 1971; Ingle:252-3; Coulson 1982:244-5.
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This resolution was well received by government officials. 
Unlike the earlier emphasis on persuasion, it enabled them to 
plan and work for specific targets which, when met, gave them a 
sense of achievement. Accordingly, the resolution was 
implemented in massive military style "operations", and 
accomplished well ahead of the deadline. In January 1974 there 
were 4,666 villages with a population of 2,319,786; by May 1976 
there were more than 8,000 villages with a population of more 
than 12 million, or 85% of the population of Tanzania (Tanzania 
1974:3; Tanzania 1976:3). But the exact number of people actually 
moved in the operations was probably around 6 million only, 
because the program also merely gave formal recognition to many 
previously existing villages.60 It has nevertheless been 
described as the largest movement of people in Africa's history
(Cartwright:174 ) .
But the whole program was planned and organised entirely by 
government officials in the regions and districts, who then 
implemented it with the assistance of military personnel or units 
of the People's Militia. The people who were moved in the 
process were in most cases hardly consulted about the new village 
sites, or even the appropriate time to move there. Threats and 
harassments, and occasionally actual force, were used to ensure 
peasant compliance with the programme; old homesteads were often 
burned, and subsequently by-laws were passed to make it an
60Regarding these figures, see Tanzania 1975; Nyerere 1977:41-2; Hyden 
1980:130; Mapolu:119.
307
offence to return to them.61 In one case a government official 
died after being beaten by peasants resisting removal. They were 
subsequently convicted of manslaughter but the judge sentenced 
them to a conditional discharge because, among other things, he 
found the conduct of the government officials in carrying out the 
program to have been highly provocative (williams: 115) .
The government did not insist on communal farming or on any 
socialist investment or organisation in the new villages. But 
it insisted on production, of both food and cash crops, often 
with by-laws prescribing minimum acreages for specified crops 
(williams: 101-3) . Enforcement of these requirements was
facilitated by the location of the new villages whose sites were 
often chosen for their accessibility, making government control 
and supervision easier (Boesen: 136-7; De Vries & Fortmann: 129) .
Initially, the villages were encouraged to become registered as 
cooperatives under the Cooperative Societies Act 1968 but after 
1973 that law was unsuitable for the thousands of new villages, 
most of which had nothing resembling a cooperative society. The 
Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and 
Administration) Act 1975 (or the "Villages Act") was then passed. 
Under it the Registrar (of Villages) could register a village as 
a village if satisfied that 250 households had settled in it. 
But the Minister could authorise registration of a village 
without regard to that number.
61Some case studies are well documented in Coulson 1979: chapters 8, 9 and 
10; also see Hyden 1980:129-31, 143-51; Coulson 1982:250-4; Williams:103.
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Apparently, after being settled in the new villages, the peasants 
never regained control of their affairs. According to 
Directions62 made under the Villages Act, the application for 
registration of a village was not made by the village or 
villagers, but by the District Development Council (replaced by 
District Council under the 1982 local government legislation). 
The first meeting of the Village Assembly (consisting of all 
adult residents of the village) after registration was convened 
by the District Party Secretary who also supervised the meeting 
for purposes of electing the village council. But as mentioned 
earlier (7.1.3), in a village with a Party Branch, the Branch 
chairman and secretary automatically became the village council 
chairman and secretary respectively. And under s.16 of the Act 
a village could be designated an ujamaa village by the Minister 
upon recommendation to that effect by the Regional Committee of 
the Party, if the committee was satisfied that a substantial 
portion of the village's activities was done on a communal basis.
Section 11 of the Villages Act made village councils corporate 
bodies, and required villages to function as multi-purpose 
cooperative societies; but ss.13 and 14 of the Act disapplied the 
Cooperative Societies Act 1968 in the villages and prohibited any 
registered society from operating there. This was partly because 
under the Villagisation Programme, village membership was not 
necessarily voluntary, thus making it incompatible with the 
cooperative principle of voluntary membership. But also it
62G.N. 168 of 1975.
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ensured that no parallel unit or organisation besides the village 
council was allowed in a village. This suited the control 
purposes of the government as s.15 of the Villages Act required 
the village assembly and village council to "perform all their 
functions under the auspices of the Party."
Organisational structures were determined by government officials 
and took little account of the actual needs and capacity 
resources of the people. The village sizes of 250 households, 
with most households having more than one adult each, were too 
big for meaningful democratic control of village affairs by the 
village assembly, the RDA equivalent of which used to meet at 
least once a week to review every activity in detail. But the 
largest of the RDA villages had only 60 families (coulson 1982:264) .
Under the Villages Act, supervision of village affairs was 
entrusted to the village council and its five committees: Finance 
and Planning, Production and Marketing, Works and Transport, 
Security and Defence, and Education, Culture and Social Welfare. 
Again, those committees reflect common features in governmental 
departmentalisation and have no relationship with the main day 
to day concerns of most ordinary villagers. But statutory
regulations required all village councils to set up those 
committees!63
In 1982 the Villages Act was repealed by the Local Government
63G.N. 162 of 1975, Regulation 8.
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(District Authorities) Act 1982, but the latter saved all the 
structures and institutions established under the former. But 
what we wish to emphasise from the account given here is that the 
Villagisation Programme and the thousands of villages it created 
were essentially different from the earlier concept of ujamaa 
villages, a fact which, unfortunately, tends to elude even some 
authoritative commentaries about Nyerere and Tanzania (Hatch:197-8 ; 
Nyaiaii 1994) . An integral feature of ujamaa villages 'was the 
promotion of socialism and democratic self-governance. The 
Villagisation Programme, on the other hand, was an exercise in 
state authoritarianism which created some thousands of villages 
through which the government then secured a thoroughly effective 
controlling position over the entire rural population.
6.3.3: Villagisation and Pastoral Communities
For a long time the government attitude to pastoralism was 
dominated by a tendency to compel pastoralists to abandon their 
"primitive nomadism" and settle for agriculture (Klima: 18-21) . 
Some years after independence, however, this attitude is said to 
have been rejected in principle (parkipuny: 154) .
But in implementing the Villagisation Programme, there was no 
attempt to understand the pastoral way of life and to improve or 
even save the social and economic structures upon which it was 
based. Pastoralists were actually living in communities; no 
individual pastoral family could sustain itself living in 
isolation. The pastoral way of life depended on a communal
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system of land tenure for grazing grounds, so as to maximise the 
feeding capacity of the entire land for the equal benefit of all 
users (James & Fimbo:94; Tenga:4) . In a fairly elaborate transhumant 
land use system, pasture land was divided into classes according 
to seasonal use and importance, and used by the community in a 
rotational pattern enforced by traditional customs to ensure 
sustainability. This has always been the pattern for the Maasai, 
the Barabaig, and other pastoralists (Fosbrooke:65-7, 166-8 ; Arhem.-i7, 
42-3; Lane 1991:22-8) .
But the Villagisation Programme established "ranching villages" 
for pastoralists without regard to their land use patterns and 
requirements. Here too, the programme was planned and 
implemented by government officials who resorted to harassment 
and even the occasional use of force, simply lumping pastoralists 
(and their livestock) into overcrowded units without considering 
the sustaining capacity of pasture lands in the new ranching 
villages (parkipuny: 154-5) . For most of them, the pasture lands 
could not sustain the livestock because the areas were either too 
small or unsuitably located to enable the rotational grazing 
necessary to sustain pastoral life. This was to lead to 
disastrous ecological imbalances (parkipuny: 154-5; Mustafa:ios-ii; Lane 
1993 : 63-4 ) .
In the new villages the traditional institutions of the pastoral 
communities, which had been instrumental in observing the 
transhumant land use system, were given no role or place. 
Although pastoral communities like the Maasai and Barabaig are
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known to have traditionally powerful women's councils with 
important roles in their communities (Klima:88-94) , the new 
arrangements gave no role or place for such councils. Instead 
came the new set of institutions: the village council,
established under the Villages Act, and its 5 statutory 
committees mentioned above, the functions of some of which hardly 
make sense to the pastoralists.
As an institution the village council has failed to prove its 
worth in defending the interests of pastoral communities. When 
the Barabaig pastoralists used its name in court to recover 
communal pasture lands taken from them by a parastatal 
corporation for large-scale wheat farming, they lost the case64 
because, among other things, a village council, being a corporate 
body and therefore not a native,65 could not hold land under 
customary law, on which the claim was based. It could only get 
title by making a formal application for a Right of Occupancy 
under the Land Ordinance 1923, and following procedures not fully 
understood by the Barabaig, which the village council could not 
have managed without advice and guidance from, say, the Party. 
But the district leaders of the Party are the ones who 
facilitated the acquisition of the pasture lands by the 
parastatal corporation in the first place.
64National Agricultural and Food Corporation v. Mulbadaw Village Council 
and Others, Tanzania Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No.3 of 1985 (unreported).
65The Land Ordinance defines a "native" as a citizen of Tanganyika of 
African origin or descent, which means, by necessary implication, a natural 
person.
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The case showed the extreme variances between the acclaimed 
socialist objectives of ujamaa villages and what the government 
actually achieved through villagisation. One radical view is 
that the policy of the government, implemented partly through 
villagisation, was to deliberately marginalise and, if possible, 
proletarianise the pastoralists by imposing forced destocking and 
taking more and more land from them, and giving it either to 
cultivators or to the state sector for state ranches (Mustafa: 108- 
16) or state farms.
Another view is that to the Maasai pastoralists, the new 
hierarchy of institutions brought by villagisation are alien to 
them and deliberately created to facilitate state control of 
their communities and their resources (Arhem:22-7) . Perhaps 
realising this, some Maasai in Ngorongoro District started an 
organisation for safeguarding the rights and interests of 
pastoral communities and their environment. The organisation, 
known as KIPOC, was registered in 1988 under the Societies 
Ordinance. Through its efforts and coordination a number of 
development projects were undertaken, including the securing of 
title deeds for the pasture lands of seven pastoral villages in 
the district.66
Soon after its registration a branch was opened by some Barabaig 
pastoralists in Hanang District. But KIPOC, much like the RDA 
twenty years earlier, was independently established and
66Express, November 18-25, 1992.
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autonomously organised, and was free from control by the 
government or the party. This led to conflicts. The executive 
secretary of KIPOC, Mr Moringe Parkipuny (MP for Ngorongoro 
District 1980-90 who did not seek re-election in 1990 so as to 
devote himself fully to the organisation) , was harassed with 
repeated arrests and short term remands in Police custody on some 
holding charges although never fully prosecuted in court. The 
Katesh Branch of KIPOC was proscribed from September 1991 to 
December 1992.
Mr Parkipuny's harassment was believed to be instigated by some 
local party leaders who felt challenged by KIPOC's influence. 
Apparently, they charged that KIPOC was "usurping party functions 
of bringing development to the people."67 In a letter to 
KIPOC's executive secretary, the Minister of State in the Prime 
Minister's Office stated that the government supported KIPOC's 
developmental efforts but, he insisted:
KIPOC should not perform its functions without involving or cooperating 
with the leaders of Chama cha Mapinduzi and its Government in the 
districts otherwise it will be sowing seeds of mutual suspicion 
unnecessarily.68 [original emphasis]
Once again the propensity of the government to control every 
civil organisation showed itself.
But now the atmosphere had changed. Partly as a result of the 
Bill of Rights which was adopted in 1984 (infra, 8.2) people were
67Ibidem.
68Ref. No. PMC/2/0.60/23 dated November 23, 1992.
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asserting their right to organise themselves for lawful purposes, 
free from control by the government or the party, and the courts 
were increasingly being resorted to for enforcing basic rights. 
The government could not act against KIPOC as it had done against 
the RDA.
6.4: RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY
President Nyerere once said that he had "sufficient powers under 
the Constitution to be a dictator" (Hopkins:27) . It was a correct 
statement of constitutional fact. Constitutional developments 
after independence replicated the authoritarian power structure 
of the colonial era; the dominant roles of the executive
president and the sole political party compare well with the 
colonial governor and the Colonial Office respectively (Ghai
1972:407-10, 418-22) .
But, in spite of the various accounts in this study, the 
executive in Tanzania has had far more powers than it has 
actually used. An almost surprising remark is that the executive 
has actually been shy "to exercise coercive power even when
developmental imperatives dictate so" (Mudoola: 121) . Nyerere's 
1962 parliamentary speech on the "National Ethic"69 could
perhaps explain this. He supported the granting of so much power 
to the executive; but he never expected that those immense powers 
would be invoked indiscriminately, without circumstances
69See "Appendix A" to this study.
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compelling their use. Therefore, Nyerere premised the use of 
executive powers on factors other than the mere enabling 
provisions of the Constitution or other law.
The restraint on the use of coercive power by the executive is 
said to be due to the absence of anti-government power centres 
or internal political tensions in the country, which is the 
result of the government's popular goodwill earned through the 
ideology of ujamaa (Mudoola: 121-3 ) . Thus, if the government has 
not been dictatorial in practice, it is due to factors other than 
legal or formal constitutional restraints upon its powers. And 
this raises the importance of the extra-legal basis of the state 
and government practice in Tanzania.
6.4.1: "Ujamaa": The Extra-Legal Basis of Government Legitimacy
The Chief Justice of Tanzania said in a recent talk that during 
the one-party state in Tanzania the bonds holding the nation 
state together were not based on law but on the ideology and 
organisation of the sole political party. For that reason:
The ruling party ideology and party constitution was taught in Tanzanian 
schools, and the party was organised at all levels and in all sectors of 
the society, ...civics and the country's constitution ceased to be taught 
in Tanzanian schools by the end of the 1960's. It... was possible to move
the vast majority of the rural population into about 800 new ujamaa 
villages [sic] without enacting or using any law to legalise such a far 
reaching programme, ...[and] government was managed by a politicized civil 
service which increasingly became ignorant of administrative law and 
practice.70
On that basis, government powers were not subjected to rigorously
7 0Nyalali 1994, also reproduced in Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, January
1995: 13.
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imposed legal limitations.
But on the other hand, a naked brutal despotism was also absent 
because, despite its extra-legal basis, the state in Tanzania was 
not lacking popular legitimacy:
The rule of the extra-legal state was legitimised through the ideology of 
Ujamaa or the Arusha Declaration. Unlike many other African countries, 
where the extra-legal states faced the crisis of political legitimacy 
resulting in... explicit political repression, the Tanzanian state was 
pretty successful in mobilising the consent of the ruled through the 
ideology of Ujamaa.... [The] Arusha Declaration (1967)... had a popular 
support and provided political legitimacy to the state for the next ten to 
fifteen years. (Shivji 1994a: 83)
Indeed, the ideology of Ujamaa had a very strong popular appeal. 
Although first advanced by Nyerere in 1962,71 it was not until 
the Arusha Declaration of 1967 that the ideology was formally 
adopted and articulated into a framework for government action. 
Popular support for the declaration and its subsequent measures 
was shown by country-wide mass demonstrations and long-distance 
marches of support. Subsequently, all major decisions of the 
government and the party were deliberately linked, in one way or 
another, to the Arusha Declaration as the basis of legitimacy.
An important component of the Arusha Declaration was the emphasis 
on its notion of equaTity between the leaders and the led, which 
was then translated into the Leadership Code. The Code appealed 
strongly to the general public because it sought to prevent 
leaders from using their advantaged positions to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the ordinary citizen. Thus it was 
to achieve the ujamaa notion of equality, which was essentially
11Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, in Nyerere 1966: 162-71.
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different from the liberal democratic concept of "equality before 
the law":
Ujamaaist... "equality” ("usawa") and "right" ("haki") in the 
consciousness of the people is fundamentally different from those in the 
rule of law. Usawa (equality) here is akin to "utu" (one's humanity) 
which is real, concrete and lived, and defines one simply because of the 
fact that one is a member of a human community. Similarly, ...a more 
correct rendition of the concept "haki" would be "justice" rather than 
"right." (Shivji 1995:24-5)
And in pursuit of the ends of equality according to that 
ujamaaist notion, it was possible for the government even to 
breach the law and other liberal democratic notions of equality, 
with popular support.
The nationalisation measures immediately after the Arusha 
Declaration, massively supported by the public, were taken 
without any statutory backing. Similarly the 1983 campaign 
against "economic sabotage" {supra, 5.2.2) consisted of 
government actions which were basically illegal, but they evoked 
wide-spread popular support. The Economic Sabotage (Special 
Provisions) Act 1983 passed to give formal legality to the 
campaign and create special tribunals to try alleged "economic 
saboteurs" was soon amended to exclude the right to bail for 
persons charged before the tribunals, and to prohibit appeals 
from the decisions of those tribunals. It is significant that 
this amendment72 was actually demanded by the public, keen to 
punish individuals in responsible positions believed to be 
skilfully circumventing the Leadership Code and unlawfully using 
their offices to accumulate wealth, while the rest of the
12Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1983.
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population suffered under severe economic hardships.
While that law and the campaign behind it obviously violated the 
Rule of Law, the general population felt few qualms about it. 
Many other actions of the government may have been equally 
"unlawful" but they were acquiesced in or supported by the public 
simply because they appeared, or were claimed, to work for one 
or the other of the objective principles of the Arusha 
Declaration. Public support for government actions done without 
a basis in law was demonstrated most prominently during the 
Kagera War against Idi Amin's forces in 1978-79. The civilian 
population, especially in Kagera and other Lake Victoria regions, 
enthusiastically made extensive sacrifices to contribute to the 
war effort. The government did not declare a state of emergency 
under the Emergency Powers Order in Council 1939, not even in 
areas close to the war front, simply because the people's own 
support for the war rendered it unnecessary.
After retiring as President, Julius Nyerere correctly attributed 
Tanzania's peace and stability to the Arusha Declaration, not 
because it had done away with poverty or achieved equality (as 
indeed it had not), but because its ujamaa ideology "engendered 
hope and a vision around which the consensus between the ruler 
and the ruled was constructed" and "held out a promise, hope of 
building a society based on equality" (shivji 1995:20-2) . Nyerere 
repeated this tribute to the Arusha Declaration in his last 
address to the CCM National Conference in August 1990 when he 
retired as Chairman of the Party.
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6.4.2: Political Leadership and Ideological Commitment
Next after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the TANU Guidelines 
1971, popularly known in Swahili as Mwongozo,12 had a tremendous 
effect in instilling confidence in state institutions by 
emphatically declaring "the people" as the primary objective of 
all developmental efforts and for whose interests and concerns 
the government and all state institutions were to work for. 
Mwongozo emphasised that "development" meant "liberation" and the 
elimination not only of poverty, but also "oppression, 
exploitation, enslavement and humiliation, and the promotion of 
independence and human dignity" (utu); it demanded a "deliberate 
effort to build equality between the leaders" and the led, and 
called for supervision of the conduct of leaders to ensure 
compliance with the Leadership Code.74 It resulted in the 
establishment of the Commission for the Enforcement of the 
Leadership Code (supra, 5.6).
The establishment of that Commission indicated that the political 
leadership was seriously committed to serve the people. This 
commitment was also shown by the heavy government investment in 
social services which brought tremendous improvements in the 
quality of life generally. During the first 25 years of 
independence (1961-86) the infant mortality rate fell by 40% and 
life expectancy went up by 50%; primary education became
73English version is reproduced in Coulson 1979: 36-42.
TANU Guidelines 1971, para 28 and para 15 & 16.
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available to 95% of the eligible children, primary health care 
became easily accessible to at least 60% of the population, and 
a child immunisation programme protected 500,000 children a year 
(Legum:3- 4) . Those in leadership positions made no significant
gains above the ordinary population but cooperated in narrowing 
the income gap between the highest and the lowest paid public 
servant (Nyerere 1977:16) , thus showing that they were not 
clamouring for personal gain.
Commitment to self-less service was led by President Nyerere 
himself. In 1966, when protesting university students alleged 
that the salaries of the political elites were too high, Nyerere 
ordered their immediate revision, himself suffering a 20% 
reduction (smith:29-3o) . It was due to his determined persuasion 
that the Leadership Code was included in the Arusha Declaration, 
against resistance by many leaders who believed that they 
deserved higher rewards for their service than they were getting 
(Hatch: 194-5; Pratt 1976:160-5) . Then he sold his house at Magomeni, 
his wife gave up her poultry farm, and he made a public 
declaration of compliance with the Code even though the law did 
not require the President to do so.75
In 1971, when the coconut trees around his private house at 
Msasani were ready for harvest, his wife arranged to sell the 
coconuts to some dealers in Dar es Salaam, and they came 
regularly to pick them. As the trees were on his private
75 (1968) 5 Africa Research Bulletin: 1010B.
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property, this arrangement appeared logical and regular, until 
the President learned about.it and angrily terminated it, greatly 
humiliating his wife. His argument was that the President or his 
spouse could not be allowed to engage in private business even 
in their private residence.76
The standard of commitment demanded by Nyerere was not only high 
but also diametrically opposed to the then current thinking among 
other political leaders in East Africa who saw every 
justification for "enjoying the fruits of independence." In 
Kenya, for example, Bildad Kaggia, who had served in prison with 
Jomo Kenyatta during the independence struggles, resigned from 
the Cabinet shortly after independence because he publicly 
insisted on land reforms on the basis of some radical egalitarian 
ideas not accepted by Kenyatta's government (odinga:262-8) . 
Subsequently, in a speech intended to make Kaggia look stupid for 
sticking to empty egalitarianism instead of personal material 
gains, Kenyatta admonished:
We were together with Paul Ngei in jail. If you go to Ngei's home, he has 
planted a lot of coffee and other crops. What have you done for yourself? 
If you go to Rubai's home, he has a big house and has a nice shamba. 
Kaggia, what have you done for yourself? We were together with Kung'u 
Karumba in jail, now he is running his own buses. What have you done for 
yourself?77 [emphasis added]
By contrast, Nyerere defended the Leadership Code with the 
argument:
Which is the politician who, [when] sent to the people at election time. . . 
asked them to elect him so that he could provide for his future?. . .
76Information from Mr Joseph S Warioba.
77As quoted in Ngugi: 89.
Whenever a person seeks political work, whether it is through election or 
by appointment, he says he wants the opportunity to serve the people, to 
guard their interest and further their aspirations. What right has such 
a person, once he has the appointment he sought on this basis, to use his 
responsibility for his own betterment?78
Other measures of commitment to people's service were not very- 
direct. One example was the replacement of English by Swahili 
as the language of most government business: it removed an
unnecessary veil of secrecy on the government and made government 
administrators less of an elite group. The politicisation of the 
army had a similar effect. In fact Mwongozo declared the army 
"the people's army... for both the liberation and the defence of 
the people", whose task during peace-time was "to enable the 
people to safeguard their independence and their policy of 
socialism and self-reliance," and enjoined the Party to be 
responsible for giving political education to the army.79 This 
was to remove elitist attitudes in the army, and to commit it to 
the defence of the people and their genuine interests, and not 
merely to defend the interests of the political leaders.
The politicisation of the army also reduced the likelihood of a 
military take-over, once a fashionable way of changing 
governments in Africa, by allowing, and even encouraging, 
military personnel to take active parts in politics. The army 
was incorporated into the party structure: each army camp also 
constituted a Party Branch and the whole army constituted a 
"region" (with its own network of branches and districts) in the
78A s quoted in Brown: 14.
1STANU Guidelines 1971, para 23-7.
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party organisation, with full representation in the NEC and 
National Conference. Four army officers won parliamentary seats 
in the 1975 elections, others were appointed Regional and 
District Commissioners, and from 1974 to 1992 there has always 
been at least one army officer in the cabinet. Removing the 
likelihood of a military take-over reduced some of the insecurity 
which could otherwise provoke political leaders to accumulate 
wealth to fall back on in the event of losing office.
Rather sadly, however, the success of the Ujamaa ideology in 
shaping the policies and conduct of the government to engender 
popular support has been limited by the fact that it has really 
been Nyerere's ideology; the other leaders, caring no more than 
not to disappoint him, "have merely echoed his words, and often 
in a way which shows little understanding of the principles 
underlying it," while some were either opposed to or sceptical 
about the ideology, but sometimes used it to cover or justify 
their own political arrogance and arbitrariness (Ghai I975:i59-6i) .
Amir Jamal, one of Nyerere's most dedicated ministers, made an 
explicit admission of this fact when he said:
One of the reasons why Julius Nyerere made his Arusha Declaration in
February 1967 was that six years after independence practically no foreign
investment for Tanzania had been forthcoming.80
[emphasis added]
Thus knowing his immense commitment to the ujamaa ideology, and 
fearing his immense powers to hire and fire, many tried their
80As quoted in New African, June 1980: 69.
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best at least to appear to comply with his guiding ideology. It
was Nyerere the President, therefore, along with his powers, his
style of leadership and his own commitment to the ideology of the 
party, rather than the ideology itself, that had the greatest 
influence upon the conduct and behaviour of the government and 
its leaders.81
This was the greatest weakness of the extra-legal basis of the 
state in Tanzania. Dependent on an individual personality, it
was bound to crumble with his exit from office.
81This view was also expressed by Mr Joseph S Warioba, interviewed in Dar 
es Salaam, July 1994.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Decline of the Party State 
7.0: INTRODUCTION
The extra-legal state identified in the previous chapter reached 
the peak of its formal consolidation with the adoption of the 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 (hereinafter 
the Constitution 1977) . Then there was the war with Uganda in 
1978, followed immediately by a deep economic crisis which eroded 
the confidence of the government, seriously shaking the 
foundations of its legitimacy, as shown by the 1983 campaign 
against "economic sabotage", in which all pretensions of 
observing the Rule of Law were discarded (shivji i994a:87-8) .
Subsequently, changes towards some form of legal basis for the 
state and its institutions were made; the extensive 1984 
amendments to the Constitution 1977 marked the turning point away 
from Party ideology and organisation as the basis for government 
legitimacy. Finally came the 1992 changes abolishing the one- 
party state system and formally restoring to Parliament some of 
the authority it had lost.
In this chapter we analyse those changes and try to show that 
they were bound to come because of problems inherent in the one- 
party system as it functioned in Tanzania. Gradually, Party 
ideology and organisation proved increasingly limited in 
sustaining the legitimacy of the government. Apparently, Julius
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Nyerere came to see the limitations of his own creations and was 
willing, in his own way, to accept as inevitable the changes that 
were being demanded.
7.1: SOME LIMITS OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY
One argument for adopting the one party-system in Tanzania was
that it would enhance democracy, in the circumstances then 
existing, by giving the people an opportunity, in voting, to 
exercise a real choice (supra, 3.3.3). On that basis, the first 
elections under the one-party system were observed with keen 
interest and generally accepted as a success for democratic 
practice (cliffe). Some prominent politicians, including two 
cabinet ministers, lost their parliamentary seats in those 
elections, an occurrence repeated in subsequent elections held 
at regular 5-year intervals, a fact adding to the system's 
apparent credibility.
But democracy requires more than merely casting a vote and 
electing a representative. It also requires leaders and 
institutions, democratically constituted, to be responsible to 
the people and to defend their interests. In Tanzania, the 
contrary has often happened:
We have democratic institutions: they exist. But they are not being used. 
Especially in our rural areas, people are disregarded, and sometimes even 
ill-treated, without their representatives taking any action. Indeed, it
is sometimes the leaders who should be speaking for the people who are
committing the evils.1
President Nyerere, February 1977, as quoted by Scope: 9.
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Thus the one-party system was failing to serve the ends of 
democracy intended by its adoption.
Instead, the single party turned into a tool for a systematic 
"Top-Down" imposition of ideas and programmes which the recipient 
population became increasingly incapable of resisting or 
influencing. In the process, law and its institutions were 
frequently overridden by party organs. The party itself was 
increasingly bureaucratised and finally taken over as an 
exclusive club of select individuals to protect their privileged 
interests against the rest of the population who then, logically, 
began to withdraw the support which in the 1960s they had given 
to the one-party state without question.
7.1.1; Law, Democracy and the "Vikao" Culture
A favourite description of "African Democracy" used by Nyerere 
in support of the one-party system was from Guy Clutton-Brock's 
description of a typical African village life, where the elders 
sat under a tree and talked until they agreed (Nyerere 1966: 103-4 , 
195) . Nyerere picked that as the fundamental principle of 
democracy and used it to emphasise the need for government action 
to follow agreements reached at in free discussions. Simplifying 
the concept of democracy, he even reduced its definition to 
"government by discussion"; after reaching a consensus or an 
agreement, all it then required was disciplined action according 
to the agreement (Nyerere 1974:32-5). Apparently, this concept of 
democracy did not contemplate a dissenting opinion surviving
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alongside the mainstream consensus-based action.
Under this concept of democracy, government action depended for 
its base or support not on the force of law as such, but on an 
expressed agreement or consensus. The need for consensus as the 
basis for government action enhanced the role of meetings, 
commonly referred to in Swahili as vikao,2 even informal ones, 
which then characterised Nyerere's style of government. The 
execution of government plans depended increasingly on decisions 
emerging "from informal face-to-face discussions" involving the 
President and the ministers concerned, instead of following 
established cabinet rules and procedures; in fact, established 
cabinet rules were sometimes deliberately resisted in favour of 
decisions emerging from relaxed discussions in informal vikao
(Pratt 1971:103-4) .
These vikao were diverse in number and their respective 
composition, although membership increasingly overlapped. But 
the President headed all the important ones: the Cabinet, the 
Regional Commissioners meetings (informal), the party's Central 
Committee and NEC. As Nyerere grew in his "confidence that he 
had the right answers" to his country's problems (Cartwright: 172; 
Pratt i97i:ii4) , he started using the various vikao to push his 
ideas through, shrewdly selecting which particular kikao to take 
each particular issue to, always avoiding those from which a 
consensus or agreement was unlikely to emerge (Pratt 1971: ii3,ii6) .
2The singular is "kikao".
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Significantly, Parliament was not used as the organ for 
discussing and deciding important issues. One reason for this 
was that the parliamentary rules of procedure gave no opportunity 
to the President to meet MPs for purposes of "talking until they 
agree," which had become essential to Nyerere's style of 
government {supra, 4.5) . Decisions on important issues with far- 
reaching implications were usually taken to the NEC where 
Nyerere, who headed it, argued his ideas through to acceptance.
Paradoxically, one consequence of this style of government, 
government by vikao, was to sacrifice democracy. There is no 
doubt that Nyerere was a leader of immense abilities; he easily 
convinced the NEC to accept his ideas, and then eloquently 
explained them directly to the people. But also, as President, 
he had immense powers which he could use to ensure compliance 
with his views. There must have been times, even if infrequent, 
when support for his ideas in the NEC or other vikao was, at 
least partly, out of fear of his immense powers. Those with 
different views had neither his intellectual abilities, nor his 
opportunity to explain their ideas to the public. Consequently, 
government by vikao became the means of imposition of ideas from 
the President, through the NEC down to the people. Any 
democratic practice in that system depended largely on the 
personal democratic inclination of the President himself, not on 
the structure of the government (smith:3i) .
Democratic checks and controls from below were especially eroded 
by the concept and structure of the party which gave supreme
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authority to the NEC {supra, 4.4.3) . Whatever came from the NEC 
was carried out without question. While little is known about 
the course of deliberations within the NEC itself, and therefore 
whether they were indeed democratic or not, NEC decisions have 
been virtually final, even if in theory the law did not 
acknowledge this.
No decision of the NEC has ever been reversed. In Presidential 
elections, the sole candidate proposed by the NEC has always been 
guaranteed endorsement by both the National Conference (of the 
party) and the electorate (Martin, D: 108, lll-3; Mutahaba & Okema:69-75; 
othman: 136-43) . In parliamentary elections,, after nominating the 
two candidates to be presented to the electorate, the NEC also 
issued election manifestos and guidelines, rigorously enforced 
by local party officials, severely restricting the conduct of 
campaigns to the extent of disabling the electorate from properly 
assessing the candidates; party supervisors of campaign meetings 
often disallowed questions which sought to be critical of the 
candidates, rendering the campaigns an empty exercise (Bavu:32-3; 
Mvungi & Mhina:116-9; Shivji 1994b:26-7) .
Another deficiency of the one-party system was its tendency to 
deny completely and ignore the interests and views of the 
minority. In modern day conditions it is impracticable to have 
everybody participate in the consensus seeking discussions, as 
was the case in the traditional African villages which the one- 
party system claimed to emulate; therefore it had to run a 
representative government. But the elections, under party
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supervision, ensured that only those who echoed the views of the 
party as endorsed by the NEC went through as representatives. 
Therefore, unlike African traditional societies which ensured 
that each person's viewpoint could be heard, the one-party system 
never gave a forum for expressing minority views (Ayittey:67-9) . 
As a result, the system gradually ceased to represent the 
people's interests but rather reflected those of the leaders and 
their purported representatives (scope:9-10; Mmuya & chaiigha 1992:6 ) .
Coupled with the concept of "Party Supremacy", the vikao culture 
was behind the widespread attitude of disregarding legality 
referred to in previous chapters. Government administrators 
became increasingly "ignorant of administrative law"3 as party 
supremacy became the pretext for overriding the law. When 
Augustine Mrema was Minister for Home Affairs (1990-94) he became 
particularly outspoken by, and - paradoxically - popular for, his 
numerous surprise orders which took no account of jurisdictional 
limits or other legal requirements.4 Challenged about the 
illegality of some of his orders and actions, Mrema made no 
pretences to observe the law; he simply claimed that his actions 
were in accordance with the 1990 Election Manifesto, issued by 
the NEC from its pre-election kikaol
Considerable problems resulted from disregarding the law in 
implementing the Villagisation Programme. People were settled,
2Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, January 1995: 13.
4see Africa Events, February 1991, and the Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 
May/June 1991: 2-5, and September 1991: 17-8.
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in some cases compulsorily, in new villages situated on lands 
which legally still belonged to a few individuals who were 
displaced by the programme. A decade later, some of these former 
owners realised that they could actually recover their lands by 
court actions against the new village settlers. A few early 
successes of such cases in court led to a crisis (Tanzania 1992:53- 
60; shivji 1994c :6-15) as more cases were filed by individuals 
seeking to evict entire villages consisting of thousands of 
people, settled there by government compulsion in the first 
place, together with amenities like schools and houses of 
worship. Government attempts to terminate the rights of the 
claimants by legislation5 collapsed when the new law had many of 
its crucial provisions struck off by the courts for being 
unconstitutional.6 Therefore the crisis is still on.
Meanwhile, in February 1991 the NEC met in Zanzibar and resolved 
virtually to repeal the Leadership Code (McHenry 1994:22-3; 
Nyerere: 15) . The moral force behind the socialist ideology of 
ujamaa evaporated as, immediately, political leaders freely 
engaged in private business and other activities hitherto 
prohibited by the Code. Again, this was done in disregard of the 
law. Until July 1, 1992, when the Eighth Constitutional
Amendment Act 1992 took effect, s. 67 of the Constitution 1977 
still prohibited all MPs from such activities.
President Mwinyi, who succeeded Nyerere in November 1985, greatly
5The Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act 1992.
6Akonaay and Another v. Attorney General, [1994] 2 L.R.C. 3 99.
333
enhanced his popularity during his first year in office when he 
repeatedly pledged his government's commitment to accountability. 
In a public gesture of support, the Party Youth League presented 
to him a symbolic "iron broom" with which to sweep and rid the 
government administration of corrupt and irresponsible leaders. 
But the vikao culture, having taken root and frequently 
overriding the law, made it virtually impossible to hold anyone 
accountable. In March 1990 the President dismissed the entire 
cabinet because corruption and "malpractices were widespread 
throughout the government."7 But he dropped only four ministers 
from the reconstituted cabinet. There was similarly little 
change in the new cabinet after the October 1990 general 
election.
The government lost credibility; its structures exhibited signs 
of collapse. The President virtually lost confidence in the 
structures of his own government. In 1991 he physically took 
part in road repair works along Bagamoyo Road and personally 
supervised a campaign to clean up the Tandale Grain Market in Dar 
es Salaam. He then started having regular sessions of "meeting 
the people" at the Party Office along Lumumba Street, for a first 
hand hearing of their pertinent problems presented to him in 
confidence by each individual complainant!
The system needed a change and the change to a multi-party state 
constitution was a welcome change.
1Daily News, March 13 & 16, 1990.
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7.1.2: Party Supremacy and a Centralised Oligarchy
Under the one-party system the NEC of the party was a most 
powerful institution. Corresponding with its growing might and 
importance, its decisions increasingly disregarded and ignored 
grassroots interests and preferences.
We have already referred to the Election Manifesto which severely 
restricted the scope for the electorate to question the 
candidates so as to assess them properly before voting. Another 
fairly common occurrence was the screening out, by the NEC, of 
aspiring candidates widely supported in their constituencies when 
those aspirants, for whatever reason, did not enjoy the 
confidence of the NEC which rarely, if ever, made explicit its 
reasons for rejecting popular aspirants (van Donge & Liviga 1990:4; 
Kiondo:82-4) . Sometimes the NEC deliberately selected an
extremely weak candidate, one lowest rated by the local party 
preferential votes in the primary nominations, to compete with 
the one it favoured so as to enhance the chances of its favourite 
(Mwakyembe 1986:39-40) . There then developed a concept whereby a 
person would be selected for office simply because he or, rather 
rarely, she is regarded as mwenzetu, i.e. "one of us."
This often frustrated the electorate who reacted by refusing to 
vote at all or casting their votes so as to deliberately upset 
the NEC, by choosing the one lowest rated by the local party 
preferences (Bavu:26-7) . This is how Johnston Kihampa, then a 
cabinet minister, lost his seat in 1970, and again lost a by-
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election for the Kinondoni seat in 1981. In both cases the NEC 
deliberately pitted him with weak and politically unknown 
opponents. In 1980 the election of Chrisant Mzindakaya, a deputy 
minister, was nullified by the court on a successful petition.8 
In the by-election held subsequently (1982), Gilbert Ngua, the 
successful petitioner, got the highest preferential vote at the 
local party conference but the NEC rejected him this time and 
selected Mzindakaya and a low rated new comer to the contest. 
Mzindakaya lost, by a big margin, the seat he had held for 15 
years.
The reaction of the electorate to the overriding powers of the 
NEC was shown most strongly in Mbozi District in the 1985 
election.9 The incumbent MP, Japhet Sichona, got 400 
preferential votes in the local party conference, against 111, 
71, 23, 17 and 13 votes, in that order, for the other contenders. 
But the NEC rejected Sichona and nominated the second and third 
rated. There was an angry reaction from the Mbozi residents. 
They boycotted campaign meetings and rudely disrupted most that 
could be held at all. To ensure a turnout of voters, Party and 
government leaders threatened people that Sichona and those 
refusing to vote would be detained. They did vote finally, but 
the number of votes deliberately spoilt was so big that the 
winner actually had a minority vote.10
6Chrisant Mzindakaya v. Gilbert L. Ngua, [1982] T.L.R. 18.
9This paragraph is based on Mwakyembe 1990.
10Of the 70,099 votes cast the winner got 29,639, the loser 27,356 and an 
overwhelming 13,104 votes were spoilt.
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The reasons for rejecting Sichona were not made clear by the NEC. 
But it would seem that while the district party leadership did 
not want him for some undisclosed reason, the national leadership 
did not want him for his 1982 criticism, in Parliament, of 
corruption and nepotism which was even getting into the party 
hierarchy (Mwakyembe 1990:137-9, 145-7 ) . This, then, is what led the 
NEC to force upon the people a leader or representative contrary 
to their obvious choice.
The only institution with powers similar to, or greater than, 
those of the NEC was the President of the United Republic, who 
was for most part also the NEC Chairman. He exercised his powers 
of appointment uninhibited by contrary indications from the 
electorate. President Nyerere appointed Paul Bomani and Daudi 
Mwakawago to Parliament, and to the cabinet, after their 
electoral defeats in 1965 and 1980 respectively. He appointed 
Johnston Kihampa and Chrisant Mzindakaya regional commissioners, 
thus ex-officio MPs, after their electoral defeats in 1970 and 
1982 respectively. The 1980 election victories for Chediel 
Mngonja and Abel Mwanga were nullified by the courts; the two 
former ministers were also found guilty of corrupt practices and 
therefore disqualified from holding political office for 10 years 
as a punishment. But President Nyerere invoked the presidential 
prerogative of mercy under the Constitution 1977, and pardoned 
the two politicians,11 thus enabling them to contest, and win, 
in both the 1985 and 1990 elections.
11G .N . 120 of 1984, and G.N. 36 of 1985.
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After losing his parliamentary seat in the 1985 election, John 
Malecela was nevertheless appointed regional commissioner by 
President Mwinyi. Also in 1985, Mwinyi appointed Joseph Warioba 
to Parliament, so as to make him Prime Minister and Vice-
i O-aA
President, [the Leader of Government Business in the National 
Assembly; he repeated the same with John Malecela in 1990. 
Significantly, Joseph Warioba, John Malecela and Cleopa Msuya, 
who have each held the position of Prime Minister and First Vice- 
President, began their political careers by presidential 
appointment to political office; by 1995 all were members of the 
NEC and each of them was well placed to succeed Mwinyi as 
President. Ben Mkapa, the ultimate CCM presidential candidate 
in the October 1995 election, similarly began his political 
career by a simultaneous appointment to Parliament and to the 
Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1977.
Sometimes parastatal corporations, districts and constituencies, 
or even ministries have been unaccountably established, leading 
to speculations that the reason for the establishments was to 
give specific jobs to particular individuals. From 1977 to 1992 
the President's power to create districts was subject to approval 
by the party which, given his power and influence, was not hard 
to get. His appointment of Warioba (1985) and Malecela (1990) 
as vice-presidents gave those two seats in the NEC almost as a 
right. Also the President appointed regional commissioners who, 
by virtue of their positions as also Regional Party Secretaries, 
became members of the NEC. The position changed in 1982 when the 
two offices were separated; but it was restored in 1990.
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In the 1982 elections to the NEC President Nyerere, as Party 
Chairman, used his powers and influence to ensure a place in the 
NEC for some of his trusted ministers. Besides other categories 
of contestants, the Chairman was also entitled to submit to the 
National Conference a list of candidates for election to a 
limited number of seats. It was from this list that some 
prominent ministers (with doubtful grassroots party support) like 
Salim A. Salim, Cleopa Msuya and Amir Jamal were elected to the 
NEC (van Donge & Liviga 1985:53-5) . Kigoma A. Malima, then Minister 
for Planning and Economic Affairs, had lost the contest for NEC 
membership as a regional representative, but was immediately 
added to the Chairman's list and was elected from there (van Donge 
St Liviga 1985:51,53) .
All this indicates that the President's favour or confidence 
could be relied on for security in a political office, even if 
one had doubtful grassroots support. Therefore, career in a 
political office was secure if one had the favour of either the 
NEC or the President or, most certainly, of both.
When Nyerere declared in 1980 that he was accepting the 
Presidency for the last five-year term, those who depended on him 
for their political career suddenly felt insecure. The identity 
of his successor was unknown, almost up to the eleventh hour. 
But the NEC was to continue being powerful and, at least for a 
little while more, to be headed by Nyerere as party Chairman; the 
next President was to be proposed by it, certainly from amongst 
its members. There then began a clamour for NEC membership by
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prominent politicians already holding positions of national 
importance. They are the ones who did well in the 1982 elections 
for NEC membership, not the "peasants and workers" who made up 
the party membership (van Donge & Liviga 1985:50-5) . They included 
the four ministers mentioned above, and the veteran Paul Bomani 
who made a surprising come back after a long absence in 
diplomatic service.
Bomani's come-back was part of a scheme by a "liberal camp" in 
the party who wanted to take over control of the party from 
"leftist radicals" who appeared set to increase their domination 
with the expected gradual exit of Nyerere. Part of the leftists' 
strategy was to discredit Bomani by questioning him, before the 
electoral conference, about his personal wealth and relations 
with wealthy foreigners; but Bomani stood his ground and won. 
The leftists partly succeeded, however, in that Bomani was not 
elected Secretary-General of the party as the liberals had 
wished. Nyerere, aware of the rival camps, managed to have the 
post given to Rashidi Kawawa to ensure that neither camp took 
over, and then appointed both Bomani and the leftist contender, 
Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, to the cabinet.12
Subsequent to this election the NEC made a show of might by 
removing Aboud Jumbe from office as Vice-President (and President 
of Zanzibar) in January 1984. This added to the clamour for NEC 
membership in the next party elections, held in 1987. Again it 
was a contest for political heavyweights and prominent figures
12Paragraph based on interview with J.S. Warioba, July 1994.
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already holding responsible positions. Those who won included 
Gibbons Mwaikambo and Amon Nsekela who headed, respectively, the 
National Insurance Corporation and the National Bank of Commerce 
(both monopolies); David Wakati, the Director of Radio Tanzania; 
Nicholas Kuhanga, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar 
es Salaam; and virtually all cabinet ministers. Philemon 
Sarungi, then Director of the Muhimbili Medical Centre, won his 
NEC seat in a 1988 by-election, then a parliamentary seat in 
1990, after which he was appointed to the cabinet.
By then the NEC had become an exclusive club protecting the 
interests and positions of an oligarchy of political elites. For 
politicians and those aspiring for political office, membership 
of the NEC became absolutely essential. Many became NEC members 
not because of any commitment to party beliefs, but because of 
the positions they held in the government. Standing for 
membership of the NEC was now beyond the contemplation of most 
ordinary card-carrying members of the party, the peasants and the 
workers, whose party the political jargon still claimed it was.
The one-party state system became increasingly difficult to 
defend, even by its founders. The former President, Julius 
Nyerere, encouraged a public debate which led to political 
reforms introduced in 1992, with his support, because he found 
that the party had actually ceased to act in the interests of the 
people for whom it was founded (Bagenda:7-s) . And his exit from 
the leadership of the party itself in August 1990 came so 
suddenly that Titi Mohamed, the founder of the Women's
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Organisation (UWT), was almost certain it was done in protest.13
7.2: THE FIFTH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT 1984
The amendment made in 1984 to the Constitution 1977 was so 
extensive that commentators have sometimes erroneously referred 
to a "1985 Constitution".14 The fact is that the Constitution 
1977 was merely amended, not replaced.
The other fact, though, is that the amendment was an important 
landmark in the constitutional history of Tanzania. Firstly, 
this was the first time ever that the general public had taken 
part in constitution making. In 1983 the NEC proposed that some 
changes should be made to the Constitution 1977 and invited a 
public debate on its proposals. The Fifth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1984 (hereinafter the 1984 Amendment) resulted from 
the then ensuing one-year long debate.
Secondly, the amendment brought the Bill of Rights into the 
Constitution, overcoming the previous strong resistance to such 
inclusion. Finally, the amendment marked the beginning of a 
significant shift towards asserting law as the basis for 
government legitimacy, and gradually discarding the role of vikao 
as the basis for government action. One overall effect of the 
amendment, and one whose real extent did not manifest itself very
13Mzalendo, August 5, 1990; Radi, No. 8 (September 1990): 5.
14The amendment, officially known as the Fifth Constitutional Amendment Act 
1984, became effective in March 1985.
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clearly from the practice, was the reduction, probably slight but 
significant, in the powers of both the Executive and the Party. 
Even Party Supremacy, though still proclaimed in the 
Constitution, was tacitly circumscribed by a new emphasis on the 
supremacy of law and the Constitution, which both the party and 
the chief executive were enjoined to observe.
We try to show here below, how this change was effected. Another 
thing we wish to point out is that the change was deliberately 
effected by Julius Nyerere as part of his attempt to bequeath a 
constitutional edifice that offered a better assurance of 
stability.
7.2.1: Background to the Amendment
Commentaries about the 1984 Amendment have often been dominated 
by the Bill of Rights, regarding which it has often been remarked 
that the regime in Tanzania did not really intend to bring it 
into the Constitution in 1984. Indeed the Bill of Rights was not 
even mentioned in the 1983 NEC proposals issued to the public for 
debate on and consideration for constitutional changes.15 But 
the public did not feel limited by the NEC proposals and demanded 
a Bill of Rights, and the regime conceded. This enhanced the 
role of the public in effecting that particular amendment and 
showed the prudence of the regime in conceding to popular 
demands. But little attention is drawn to the question why the 
regime, through the NEC, proposed to amend the constitution at
lsDaily News, January 31, 1983.
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this particular time and, further, why it proposed to use a 
popular debate rather than a select commission as in previous 
cases.
In 1975, when Julius Nyerere was nominated presidential candidate 
he indicated in his acceptance speech that that might be his last 
5-year term as President. But in 1980 he was nominated again 
and, accepting the nomination "for the last time," admitted that 
only recently had he changed his mind from his 1975 
indication.16 This time he stuck to his decision to vacate the 
Presidency. But before vacating office, he oversaw changes in 
the Constitution which made executive powers, still vested in the 
President, a little more circumspect than had been the case under 
him.
It appears that one (and perhaps the main) reason for Nyerere 
changing his mind and not retiring in 1980 is that he suddenly 
doubted the ability of the then existing constitutional 
structures to operate effectively and smoothly. They were mostly 
his creation, finding him already in office as President, they 
were almost "made to measure" for his style. There was no 
guarantee for their smooth operation without him in office. Of 
the things that first prompted his re-evaluation of the 
constitutional structures were the murders committed by Police 
and State Security officers in early 1976, which prompted the 
January 1977 resignations of Mwinyi and Siyovelwa from the
16Vol.8 Africa Contemporary Record 1975-1976: B314-5; and Vol.13 Africa 
Contemporary Record 1980-1981: B326.
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Cabinet, and the regional commissioners for Mwanza and Shinyanga 
Regions.
At the peak of the Villagisation Programme in 1974-75, a number 
of people, in diverse areas of the rural districts of Mwanza and 
Shinyanga Regions, were inexplicably killed in what is thought 
to have been an underground campaign to eliminate people believed 
to be practising witchcraft. Investigations into those killings 
were not very successful. Complaints about unsatisfactory 
investigation by the Police reached the President. Concerned 
about the adverse effects this could have upon villagisation, he 
commissioned Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa, Home Affairs Minister 
Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and Peter Siyovelwa, the Minister of State in 
the President's Office (responsible for State Security), to look 
into the matter and ensure that appropriate measures were taken.
Subsequently, a joint meeting of the Regional Party Committees 
for Defence and Security for Mwanza and Shinyanga was held in 
Shinyanga in January 1976, chaired by Mr Kawawa and attended by 
the two ministers and the respective regional commissioners. The 
meeting resolved to arrest all suspects of the murders for 
interrogation, including some who may have been acquitted already 
for lack of evidence in connection with the same murders. The 
arrests and interrogations began almost immediately after this 
meeting. Altogether some 8 98 suspects were interrogated by a 
number of police and security officers. No less than a dozen 
suspects died, and a lot more were maimed for life, as a result 
of torture inflicted in the course (and, apparently, as part) of
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the "interrogations." A few years later some police and state 
security officers were charged with the murder of the suspects 
in two separate cases before the High Court which then heard a 
horrendous account of inhuman treatment.17
In both cases the accused were convicted of the lesser offence 
of manslaughter. In the first case the trial court judge
remarked that it was the "worst case of manslaughter" he had ever 
encountered in his long period on the bench; confirming the 
verdict, the Court of Appeal observed that the appellants were 
"lucky to have been convicted of manslaughter instead of murder," 
and enhanced the prison sentences imposed from 7 to 14 years 
although there had been no appeal against sentence by the 
Republic.18 In the second case the Court of Appeal also 
confirmed the verdict of manslaughter but remarked that some, 
even "if not all appellants, could have been convicted .of 
murder," and further that "some parties... not charged before the 
court could perhaps have been successfully prosecuted for the 
deaths" of the victims in the "disgraceful episode."19
Meanwhile, there was a concerted effort to cover up and conceal 
those murders from President Nyerere. But due to the persistence 
of Mr Edward Ngh'wani, then an MP for Bariadi in Shinyanga 
Region, some of the victims who survived the tortures were given 
audience by Nyerere in early January 1977 and recounted to him
17A short but comprehensive account is in Shivji 1990b: 90-9.
lsGodfrey James Ihuya & Others v. R, [1980] T.L.R. 197.
19Elias Kigadye & Others v. R, [1981] T.L.R. 355.
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their whole experience. He was furious. The two ministers and 
the regional commissioners were advised to resign to appease his 
fury.20 They took the advice and resigned, taking political 
responsibility for the murders.
The resignations occurred on January 21, 1977, just as the new 
party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was about to be launched. 
Nyerere readily accepted the resignations because, as he said in 
his answer to the resigning ministers, the principle of ministers 
accepting political responsibility for the actions of officers 
under them in their departments was a sound principle which had 
to be encouraged to take root in Tanzania so as to ensure 
justice:
Once our people know that Party leaders to whom certain instruments of
state have been entrusted will not tolerate evil, we will have bequeathed
to the new Party a firm foundation for the furtherance of justice in our 
country... By this selfless act, ...you remind us of leadership 
obligations, ...you are showing us the example of a good leader. This is 
a sign of maturity in leadership...21
But until Nyerere vacated office in 1985, the example of good 
leadership set by those resignations was not very 
enthusiastically emulated. In 1981 the Minister for Agriculture, 
Joseph Mungai, resisted all parliamentary pressure to resign over 
the sugar scandal in‘1981 and was only removed by the President
in a 1982 cabinet reshuffle (supra, 4.3.2).
It was after those resignations that Nyerere decided to stay on 
as President for a while after 1980 so as to try and make changes
20The paragraph is based on information from Mr Joseph Warioba.
21 (1977) 14 Africa Research Bulletin: 4284C.
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to the constitution so that such "maturity in leadership" is not
left entirely to sheer chance.22 Accordingly, in 1981 the party
issued a new document, the CCM Guidelines 1981, which declared
an even greater commitment to socialist principles (van
cranenburgh: 117-20) . But also the Guidelines called for greater
democracy as a safeguard against bureaucracy, a more powerful and
more representative Parliament, and for strengthening people's
power by devolution of government powers to democratic
institutions at district and village levels.23 Within the
party, the Guidelines sought greater democracy by proposing an
end to the appointment of members to the NEC; its entire
was to be
membershipjjelective. This proposal was adopted immediately and 
implemented in 1982.
From the CCM Guidelines 1981 the NEC issued, in January 1982, the 
proposals for constitutional amendments, citing four major areas 
to be considered: redefining the powers of the President and
their precise limits; enhancing the stature and authority of 
Parliament; increasing the power of the people; and strengthening 
the Union (between the Mainland and Zanzibar),24
Meanwhile, Amnesty International and other international human 
rights organisations continued to press Tanzania to improve her 
human rights record. Much of the campaign was directed against 
the Preventive Detention Act 1962 and its use. Even within the
22Based on information from Mr Joseph Warioba.
23CCM Guidelines 1981: 44-6.
24Daily News, January 31, 1983.
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country, that law became more and more difficult to defend. In 
1982, senior judges Kisanga and Mnzavas were among prominent 
lawyers who attacked it as a law whose original reasons were no 
longer there, and which was now increasingly being misused.25
As the constitutional debate began, an unprecedented number of 
detentions were effected in the crackdown on economic sabotage 
which started in March 1983. Complaints about misuse of 
detention powers by having detention orders post-dated or signed 
in blank or upon flimsy grounds and then being used by the 
President's subordinates for self-serving motives had started 
emerging, but with the 1983 crackdown their numbers rose sharply. 
Many people were detained on groundless . or very flimsy 
allegations, and many had their lawful properties looted while 
in detention. This, in turn, led to a series of complaints and 
petitions to the President. In one case involving two priests 
detained in remote Sumbawanga under the Economic Sabotage 
(Special Provisions) Act 1983, the President was so moved that 
he was inclined to release them although the economic sabotage 
Special Tribunal was yet to hear their case. But the Attorney 
General, himself strongly resentful of that draconian law,26 
firmly advised the President that either the law had to be 
amended to allow bail for all other suspects, or the two priests
25Africa Now, January 1983: 12-3.
26The Attorney General's Chambers were never even involved m  preparing 
this law. The Bill was hastily drafted by some Police and Immigration officers 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs and presented to Parliament while the Attorney 
General was away on an official trip overseas.
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had to wait to appear before the tribunal like all the others.27
The total implication of all this amounted in effect to a demand 
on the President himself to observe the Rule of Law.
Also in 1983, Chediel Mgonja, whom the Court of Appeal had found 
guilty of corrupt practices in an election petition and thereupon 
disqualified from holding political office for 10 years,28 was 
nevertheless appointed Regional Commissioner for Shinyanga. But 
the President had to revoke this appointment three days later, 
after being reminded of the court ruling.29 During that same 
year, the Chief Justice "invited himself" to meetings of the 
party's Central Committee and NEC and warned, in his addresses 
to them, against the dangers of increasingly disregarding the 
Rule of Law.30 While all this happened, the constitutional 
debate continued.
In mid-1984, a few months before Parliament debated the 
Constitutional Amendment Bill, the government introduced a policy 
of liberalisation of trade and economy, reversing the previous 
policies which had discouraged and restricted private investment. 
Promises of security of property rights were necessary to 
encourage private investors, both local and foreign.
27Based on information from Mr Joseph Warioba.
2BBakari & Alua v. Chediel Mgonja & Another, Tanzania Court of Appeal, 
Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1981.
29This happened before the President had pardoned him.
30Daily News, June 8, 1993; Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, Jan.1995:16
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It is against that background that the 1984 Amendment was passed 
and brought into the Constitution 1977 the Bill of Rights and a 
renewed commitment to legality and the supremacy of law.
7.2.2; Reasserting Legality and Government Responsibility
According to Joseph Warioba, who was Attorney General for ten 
years (1975-85) , one intention of the 1984 Amendment was to 
subject the powers of the party to some strict legal limits. 
Indeed, a survey of the provisions brought into the Constitution 
1977 by that amendment reveal a particular emphasis on the 
requirement to observe the provisions of "this Constitution and 
the laws of the United Republic," an emphasis which was absent 
before the amendment.
The amendment did not alter the position of the party but 
although it still remained supreme with "final authority in 
respect of all matters", the new s. 3 (2) of the Constitution 1977 
now made it "subject to this Constitution and party 
constitution", unlike the previous position under which the party 
had been supreme according to its own constitution.
An important new provision was in s.4, expressly declared the 
principle of separation of powers and vested "all state 
authority"31 in the three separate organs: the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary, and requiring them to exercise their
31The English version of the Constitution 1977 refers to "all executive 
authority", which is not a correct translation of "shughuli zote za Mamlaka ya 
Nchi" appearing in the original Swahili version.
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functions according to the Constitution. The Party was not even 
mentioned, thus implying that the government could run its 
business without waiting for, or referring to, the party to make 
decisions or give directions. This was a subtle change in the 
position of the party.
Indeed s.10 (2) still required, "subject to this Constitution, all 
activities of all public institutions... [to] be conducted under 
the auspices and control of the Party." But this was part of the 
unjusticiable "Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
of State Policy"; moreover, s.10 (3) went on to impose a duty on 
the party to ensure that all organs and public institutions carry 
out their functions "in strict adherence to the provisions of 
this and the laws of the land, " a requirement also directly 
imposed on those institutions themselves.
Under the concept of "Party Supremacy", matters of policy were 
always said to be the prerogative of the Party, although there 
was no constitutional provision to that effect. But after the 
1984 Amendment, s. 53 (2) of the Constitution 1977 stated: "the
Executive of the United Republic shall, under the authority of 
the President, determine the general policy of the Government." 
Therefore, even with regard to policy, the party remained supreme 
more as a matter of practice and Presidential discretion rather 
than as a matter of law or constitution.
The position of regional commissioners holding that office merely 
by virtue of their positions as regional party secretaries ended
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in 1982 when the two offices were separated. The 1984 Amendment 
reinforced this position by providing for the President to 
appoint regional commissioners, and requiring them to perform 
their functions according to law [s. 61].32 Also the power of 
the President to act in his absolute discretion without, or even 
in disregard of, advice was, before 1984, "subject to the 
policies and directives of the party", but after 1984 it became 
subject to "the provisions of this Constitution, the laws of the 
United Republic and the policy and directions of the Party" 
[s.37(l)] . This did not, in fact, reduce the discretionary power 
of the President; but it emphasised the supremacy of law, not the 
party, in the exercise of that discretion.
The 1984 Amendment made little reduction in the actual powers of 
the President as such; but it subjected them to some apparently 
"harmless" circumspection in various ways. The requirement upon 
the President to act according to law, previously merely assumed, 
was now repeatedly highlighted like a tacit warning against the 
tendency towards "government by vikao." A big change, though, 
was the limit to a maximum of two five-year terms for any one 
person holding the office of President [s.40(2)]. Previously, 
a person could be re-elected over and over again which, under the 
one-party system, was practically the rule; it tended to make the 
presidency an appointment for life, and presidents unsusceptible 
to any form of accountability.
32References in square brackets in this and the next sections refer to the 
Constitution 1977 after the 1984 Amendment.
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Following the 1984 Amendment, the Presidential powers of 
appointment were slightly reduced. The Constitution 1977 now 
provided for two vice-presidents, one of whom was to be the 
President of Zanzibar, and the other was also to be the Prime 
Minister, whose office was now established by the Constitution 
[ss.51-53], and not created by the President exercising his 
discretion as previously. The Constitution now required the 
President to appoint the Prime Minister, from amongst the MPs, 
within 7 days of assuming office [s.51(2)]. Subsequently, the 
Prime Minister must be consulted by the President when appointing 
Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers (also from amongst the 
MPs), as well as Regional Commissioners [ss.55 & 61] who then 
became ex-officio MPs [s.66(1)(g)].
In the event, the status of the Prime Minister was enhanced. The 
requirement to consult him in appointing Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers means that although all ministers hold office at the 
pleasure of the President [s. 58], the removal of the Prime 
Minister from office entailed loss of office for all the other 
ministers, at least so as to enable the new Prime Minister to be 
consulted in constituting a new Cabinet.
That interpretation was first followed in Zanzibar where there 
is a similar provision requiring the President to consult the 
Chief Minister in appointing ministers. In May 1988, President 
Idris Abdul Wakil dissolved the Zanzibar Cabinet and
it
reconstituted/two days later simply because he wanted to replace 
Seif Shariff Hamad with Omar Ali Juma as Chief Minister; almost
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all the other ministers were re-appointed to the new Cabinet. 
For the United Republic of Tanzania, President Mwinyi did exactly 
the same thing in December 1994, the whole purpose being to 
replace the Prime Minister, John Malecela, who had come under 
severfi attack from former President Nyerere, whose influence is 
still enormous, for failing to advise the President properly
(Nyerere 1994) .
The Constitution 1977 now charges the Prime Minister with the 
"control, supervision and execution of the day to day functions" 
of the government, being "Leader of Government Business in the 
National Assembly, " as well as any other functions as may be 
directed by the President [s. 52]. In the performance of his 
functions, the Prime Minister is answerable to the President 
[s.53(1)], but on the other hand, the Constitution [s.53(2)] also 
declares:
The Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, shall be collectively 
responsible to the National Assembly for the discharge of the functions of 
the Government of the United Republic.
This came in 1984 like a return to the doctrine of ministerial 
collective responsibility of s.43(2) of the Independence 
Constitution, encapsulating the basic element of government 
responsibility to Parliament under the Westminster system. But 
in 1961-62 the Prime Minister was also the effective Head of the 
Executive and the Cabinet, a position now held by the President, 
who is not even an MP. And under this new position the Prime 
Minister and the Ministers still remained responsible to the 
President, who appointed them and could remove them from office
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at any time. Thus they were now responsible to both the
President and the National Assembly, which was not exactly the 
position in 1961. Also the 1984 Amendment did not restore the 
power of the National Assembly to pass a motion of no confidence 
in the government.
Whatever its limitations, however, the 1984 Amendment did attempt 
to change, for the better, the status and composition of the 
National Assembly. Indeed, it remained a "special committee of 
the National Conference of the Party" [s. 63 (4)] , but only for the 
stated purpose of supervising the implementation of party 
policies by the government and parastatal organisations and not 
in general terms as previously, and the provision now made no 
reference to the Party Constitution. A completely new provision 
[s.63(2)] stated:
The National Assembly shall be the principal organ of the United Republic 
which shall, on behalf of the people, supervise and advise the Government 
of the United Republic and all its agencies in the exercise of their 
functions in accordance with this Constitution.
The emphasis thus shifted in favour of Parliament regaining its 
supremacy as the representative organ of the people and their 
common rights and interests, a role which, over the years, had 
been lost to the party.
The 1984 Amendment made the National Assembly more democratic in 
its composition [s.66] . The number of members directly elected 
to represent constituencies rose from the previous 111 to 169, 
and that of indirectly elected members fell from 72 to 35. The 
number of MPs appointed by the President fell from 56 to 40,
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including regional commissioners. The 35 indirectly elected 
members were so elected as follows: 15 women members elected to 
represent women; 15 members elected to represent the 5 mass 
organisations (3 for each), i.e. the' Women's Organisation, the 
Youth League (Vijana), the Trade Union, the Cooperative Movement, 
and the Parents' Association; and 5 members elected by the 
Zanzibar House of Representatives to represent Zanzibar [ss.78- 
80] . Other members from Zanzibar, totalling 50, were directly 
elected constituency members, thus putting an end to the previous 
category of 52 members appointed from Zanzibar.
Another important new provision was s.100 of the Constitution 
1977, which made parliamentary proceedings absolutely privileged 
and not to be questioned anywhere outside parliament. This was 
reinforced a few years later by the Parliamentary Immunities, 
Powers and Privileges Act 1987 which restated that nothing said 
in the National Assembly shall be questioned in any court or 
other place outside the Assembly, and gave all MPs freedom to 
hold public meetings in their constituencies and required all 
respective authorities to facilitate the holding of such meetings 
whenever required by the MPs. As the one-party state has since 
been abolished, the full impact of those provisions at that time 
may now never be known. But it is doubtful whether the 
questioning of MPs by the NEC in 1968 and their subsequent 
expulsion from the party and the Parliament for what they had 
said in Parliament would have indeed occurred if a similar 
provision, and all others brought in by the 1984 Amendment, had 
been in the Constitution.
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The 1984 Amendment also introduced two new sections on local 
government which is now expressly established "for purposes of 
consolidating and giving more power to the people" [ss.145-146]. 
This was the first constitutional reference ever to local 
government. Whether local government does give more power to the 
people ultimately depends on how much power the local government 
laws actually give to the local institutions and how far those 
institutions are democratically controlled, issues which the 
Constitution 1977 does not cover. But the provision for local 
government in the Constitution makes it difficult for the 
executive to simply abolish local government, as it did in 1972, 
without violating the Constitution.
Finally, the 1984 Amendment also enhanced the role of the 
Judiciary. The emphasis on legality and on the supremacy of the 
Constitution [s.64 (5)], the constitutional declaration of 
separation of powers and the adjudicative role of the Judiciary 
[s.4(2)]# the inclusion of the Bill of Rights and the right of 
individuals to institute proceedings in defence of legality and 
constitutional rights [ss.26(2) & 30(3)], and the power of the
High Court to hear and determine the constitutionality of any act 
or law [ss.30(4) & 108] , all had the effect of greatly enhancing 
the role and status of the Judiciary to a level not known before.
There was a great increase in the amount of litigation, much of 
it relating to the Bill of Rights. Consequently, this enhanced 
role and status of the Judiciary is also inextricably associated 
with the Bill of Rights.
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7.2.3: Some Effects of the Bill of Rights
The 1984 Amendment 'incorporated the Bill of Rights as
ss. 12-32 of the Constitution 1977. This now guarantees the right 
to freedom, dignity and equality before the law; the right to 
life, privacy and personal liberty; freedom of movement,
expression, religious belief and association; and the right to 
property. The Constitution did not create these rights; it only 
guarantees their protection by, among other things, empowering 
the High Court to review any act, and to declare null and void 
any law, infringing upon them.
The operation of that power of the High Court was deliberately
withheld for 3 years by s. 5 (2) of the Constitution
(Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, 
so as to give time to the government to repeal or amend all 
statutory provisions which were inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights (Nyaiaii 1991:4) . But apart from the Preventive Detention 
(Amendment) Act 1985 which, among other things, required the 
President to give reasons for a detention order and allowed such 
an order to be questioned in court, little else was done. All 
other laws offending the Bill of Rights, and there were quite a 
lot, remained intact and thus amenable to challenge before the 
High Court when the 3 years expired.
An early challenge came through the case of Chumchua Marwa v. 
Officer i/c Musoma Prison & the Attorney General,33 in which the
33High Court of Tanzania, Mwanza, Misc. Criminal Cause No.2 of 1988.
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Deportation Ordinance was held unconstitutional and declared null 
and void {supra, 5.3.3). And in the Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Daudi Pete,34 not an entire law but only 
paragraph (e) of s. 148 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 was 
similarly declared null and void. Besides the declaration, a 
very important holding in the latter case, made by the trial 
judge and upheld on appeal, was that although the procedure which 
Parliament was empowered to enact under s.30 (4) of the 
Constitution 1977 to regulate proceedings for enforcing the Bill 
of Rights had not been enacted, the power of the High Court to 
enforce the Bill of Rights was not limited by the absence of 
procedural rules; proceedings for enforcing the Bill of Rights 
can thus be instituted by any procedure within the jurisdiction 
of the court. Thus in this particular case the proceedings were 
by way of application for bail.
The importance of that holding is that it enabled the High Court 
to hear a number of other applications in which more provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 and the Economic and Organised 
Crime Control Act 1984 were held unconstitutional for attempting 
to remove completely the discretionary power of the courts to 
grant bail. These holdings were, in a way, not only in defence 
of the constitutional right to personal liberty [s.15] and to the 
presumption of innocence until proved guilty [s.13 (6) (b)], but 
also defending the principle of separation of powers, now 
expressly declared in the Constitution [s.4]. The other 
important decisions were, as we saw earlier (chapter 6.3.3), in
34 [1991] L.R.C. (Const) 553.
360
Peter Ng'omango v. Gerson Mwangwa & the Attorney General35 and 
Kukutia Ole Pumbun & Another v. Attorney General36 in which s. 6 
of the Government Proceedings Act 1967, which had required the 
consent of the Minister to sue the government, was declared 
unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
With the success of a few early cases involving the Bill of 
Rights, public awareness was enhanced in two ways. Firstly, more 
and more people became aware of their rights under the law and 
the Constitution. Secondly, they became aware not only of the 
right to defend their rights by court action, but also of the 
power of the courts to enforce their rights against the 
government. This enhanced awareness has contributed
significantly towards dispelling the myth of "executive 
infallibility" by challenging in court even decisions of the 
President; until very recently, it has been common to hear that 
nobody was above the law except the President!
The case on the Deportation Ordinance mentioned above was thus 
a reminder that even the President is not above the law. 
Similarly, in James F Gwagilo v. Attorney General,37 the 
plaintiff successfully challenged the power of the President to 
remove a civil servant from service "in the public interest" 
under the Civil Service Act 1989, when the President removed him 
without disclosing what that public interest was. Before the
35High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 22 of 1992.
36 [1993] 2 L.R.C. 317.
37High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 23 of 1993.
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purported removal the plaintiff had been charged under the 
Economic and Organised Crime Control Act 1984 and acquitted; then 
he was charged with a disciplinary offence under the Civil 
Service Regulations and acquitted again. Had he been found 
guilty in either of the charges he would have been dismissed from 
service. The High Court quashed the purported removal because, 
among other reasons, it appeared that the powers of the President 
under the Civil Service Act 1989 had been invoked not in the 
public interest but to punish the plaintiff after failing to do 
so through those charges.
Growing public awareness is well illustrated by the case of the 
Junior Doctors Association referred to earlier [supra, 6.2.3). 
Registration of the Association under the Societies Ordinance was 
inordinately delayed until after its founders had threatened the 
Registrar of Societies with court action. Then in January 1992, 
hardly a year after registration, the government sacked the
junior doctors following a dispute, and ordered them to 
immediately vacate their living quarters at the Muhimbili Medical 
Centre. The Association's secretary, Dr Joseph Masika, at once 
filed a civil case on behalf of his colleagues.38 
Unrepresented, his pleadings were not perfectly drafted but they 
were enough basis for him to make an oral application for 
temporary injunction, which was granted, against forced evictions 
from the doctors' living quarters.
38J.J.Masika & 66 Others v. Muhimbili Medical Centre, Resident Magistrate's
Court, Dar es Salaam, RM Civil Case No. 6 of 1992.
362
In defiance of the court order, troops of Riot Police were sent 
to evict the doctors and their families, leading to the crisis 
mentioned earlier {supra, 6.2.3), with a big protest march and 
ultimately the Prime Minister reinstating the doctors. But while 
most of the doctors were in the protest march, a few of their 
representatives spent the day at the Resident Magistrate's 
courthouse where, having secured legal representation, they got 
an order committing the Director of Muhimbili Medical Centre to 
civil prison for 14 days for contempt of court in defying the 
order of temporary injunction.39
The doctors' case may not have been directly based on the Bill 
of Rights as such; but it highlighted the power of the courts, 
which was increasingly made known by the enforcement of the Bill 
of Rights. In other cases constitutional rights were 
increasingly being used to enforce claims which may well have 
been based elsewhere. Thus in claims essentially based on 
Planning and Local Government Law, the constitutional right to 
life was interpreted as including a clean environment free from 
pollution in two successful cases against waste dumping close to 
residential areas by the Dar es Salaam City Council.40
In the early 1990s, students made considerable use of the High 
Court in defending their rights. Not all cases have been very
39Execution of the order was stayed pending appeal by the Director. By 
September 1994 the appeal was yet to be heard as, the crisis being over, there 
was little pressure for it and the Director concerned was retiring.
40Joseph D Kessy & Others v. City Council of Dar es Salaam, High Court of 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Civil Case No. 299 of 1988; Festo Balegele and 794 
Others v. Dar es Salaam City Council, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 
Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 90 of 1991.
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successful but they have helped to reveal the alarming extent of 
"administrative lawlessness" often involved in handling students' 
problems, with students' victimisation being the rule. On March 
4, 1991, students of the Dar es Salaam Technical College
boycotted classes after several years of dispute with the 
government and the college authorities over, among other things, 
the need for a clear definition of the status of the college and 
the diploma courses it offered. A week later, the College Board 
expelled 232 Diploma Course students; they took the matter to 
court. The High Court quashed the decision of the Board and 
reinstated the students because they had been condemned without 
a hearing and the Board was not properly constituted.41
On 5 September 1991, some 248 Advanced Diploma Course students 
of the Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe, were expelled 
after a dispute lasting several weeks. The expulsion order was 
apparently made by the government but the Board of the Institute 
immediately endorsed it. Again, the decision was wrong for 
condemning the students unheard and the High Court quashed it and 
ordered the expelled students to be either treated as suspended 
pending a proper inquiry into the crisis to be initiated by the 
Institute within 6 months, or reinstated.42
The overall effect has been a tightening of the limits of 
executive and administrative power. It is now no longer
AXMtoka s Mtwangi & Others v . Board of Dar es Salaam Technical College & 
Another, High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc. Civil Cause No. 25 of 1991.
*2Felix Bushaija & Others v. Institute of Development Management & Another, 
High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc.Civil Cause No.89 of 1991
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sufficient merely to cite a law as the basis for an 
administrative action; one has to ascertain further that the law 
cited is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The power of 
the High Court to enforce the Bill of Rights has thus demanded 
that government administration be more scrupulous in observing 
the Constitution. On the other hand the growing public awareness 
of the controlling power of the courts leads to a forced 
reawakening of government administrators to the need to learn and 
use some of the essential rules of administrative law like the 
principles of natural justice.
The Bill of Rights has also contributed greatly to the confidence 
of the people in challenging the restrictions to freedom imposed 
under the one-party state policies. On its basis, people felt 
confident to assert their right to freedom of expression and 
organisation and, subsequently, to challenge the legitimacy of 
the one-party state itself, as shown further below.
7.3: CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE
After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Tanzania saw a change 
in the political climate. People acquired a new confidence in 
asserting their rights and freedom against censure by the 
government or the party, against harassment by the Police, the 
City Council militia, or other agencies of the state. They 
started demanding and asserting their rights, as individuals and 
as groups, to exist and to organise and conduct their affairs, 
free from control and interference by the ruling party.
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This new spirit of freedom and confidence owed much to the Bill 
of Rights, information about which spread gradually after 1985. 
The Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam contributed 
significantly to that spread. In October 1986 the Faculty 
commemorated its 25th anniversary with a week-long, widely 
publicised seminar devoted exclusively to a discussion of the 
Bill of Rights. And the Legal Aid Committee (of that Faculty) 
embarked on an ambitious campaign for Legal Literacy (sandbrook & 
Haifani:57-60) with the Bill of Rights providing a major part of 
the syllabus.
There also developed a wider scope of freedom of expression as 
a result of a few bold-spirited independent newspapers, and an 
upsurge in popular demands for the autonomy of popular 
institutions and civil organisations. In the event the 
government had to adjust to this new climate, leading ultimately 
to the abolition of the one-party system. We look briefly at how 
this new climate manifested itself through greater freedom of 
expression and association, as well as the struggle for political 
expression outside the one-party state establishment.
7.3.1: Freedom of Expression
As we have seen {supra, 6.2.4), two state-owned dailies and the 
state owned radio were all the information media available in 
Tanzania for most of the period under review. The government 
used them to report (or misreport) issues to suit its purposes 
and interests. Sometimes the media just kept quiet even on major
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issues about which the public desperately needed information, 
thus encouraging a thriving rumour industry (Tegambwage) . The 
private media, consisting of a few irregular periodicals with 
limited circulation, apparently afraid of the extensive 
government powers over the press, rarely corrected the 
misinformation by the state and concentrated on sports and 
entertainment.
But after 1985 a few independent publications emerged. Radi, a 
Swahili monthly, was one of them. It often failed to maintain 
its publication schedule but when it appeared it was a refreshing 
contrast with the official media. It reported the activities of 
a group which had actively campaigned against Zanzibar President 
Idris Abdul Wakil in the 1985 election. The official sources 
said nothing, although Wakil7s margin of victory in the election 
was so small (in the context of the one-party single candidate 
elections) that an explanation was needed.43 An official 
explanation finally came in May 1988 when Seif Shariff Hamad, 
until then a member of the NEC and extremely popular Chief 
Minister of Zanzibar, was expelled from the party and all 
leadership positions for allegedly not campaigning effectively 
for Wakil in the 1985 election.44
Another issue of Radi in 1986 had <l long article, "Hatukumjua 
Nyerere" [literally: "We Did Not Know Nyerere] , attacking the
official media for its unnecessary and unjustified secrecy around
43Wakil obtained a mere 61% "Yes" vote; see Othman & Mlimuka: 62-3.
**Daily News, May 17, 1988.
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the private lives of national leaders such that until Nyerere 
left the Presidency, the public virtually did not know him as a 
human being, with ordinary human needs and weaknesses.
Shortly before the party elections in 1987, the Roman Catholic 
Church-owned bi-monthly, Kiongozi, came out of obscurity with a 
bold editorial challenging the wisdom of Nyerere's apparent 
reluctance to hand over chairmanship of the party to President 
Mwinyi, and let the latter hold both positions as Nyerere himself 
had done up to 1985.45 The issue was picked up and intensely 
debated by readers and writers, not so much in Kiongozi, but 
mainly in the up and coming Trade Union-owned bi-weekly, 
Mfanyakazi, which had not raised it in the first place. The 
debate did not stop Nyerere's re-election as party chairman tYV 
October 1987, but it prompted some explanation in his acceptance 
speech to justify his continuing as chairman.46
Fahari was another irregular, independent publication which had 
existed in the 1970s, concentrating on entertainment, then went 
out of circulation for several years. It re-emerged in 1989 with 
a bitter attack on the World Bank-IMF inspired economic policies 
of Mwinyi's government. In particular, it severely criticised 
the Minister for Finance, Cleopa Msuya, for a somewhat arrogant 
remark in Parliament that Tanzanian peasants were unwise to 
expect the government, or anyone else, "to bear their cross [i.e. 
their economic burdens] for them." Then Fahari disappeared
45Kiongozi, August 15-31, 1987.
46Sunday News, November 1, 1987.
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again, only to re-appear after a few months, dispelling rumours 
that its editor had been detained. It started serialising 
elaborations of the Bill of Rights for its Swahili readership.
Two English language periodicals, Business Times, a weekly 
started in 1988, and Family Mirror, a bi-monthly started in 1989, 
soon established themselves as regular independent publications. 
Together with Radi and Fahari (although these two were sometimes 
irregular), they effectively opened up the way to independent 
news reporting in Tanzania, often correcting the biases created 
by the state owned media.
One case of deliberate misreporting by the state media was the 
Dar es Salaam University crisis of 1989-90 in which students 
boycotted classes in April 1990 and were expelled by the 
government the following month. The crisis had centred on poor 
and deteriorating facilities at the university on account of a 
55% reduction in the university budget, which the students 
associated directly with poor management of national resources 
and total lack of accountability on the part of the government. 
After expelling them the government used the state media to paint 
a biased picture of the students as self-indulgent and demanding 
increases in their allowances which were claimed to be already 
higher than the salaries of most public servants. Only those 
four publications explained the students' demands objectively, 
and when investigation by an independent commission vindicated 
the students, only those four publicised its report.47
47Family Mirror, October 1-15, 1990.
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By 1990 the independent press was able to publish individual 
views challenging the legitimacy of the one party system. The 
first time those views were expressed to a wide public was at 
press luncheons organised through the Dar es Salaam Press Club 
and addressed by individuals who were soon to become prominent 
in the movement against the one-party system. The press luncheon 
addresses were reported prominently in the new independent media.
We should emphasise that all the laws with which the government 
could suppress the media (supra, 6.2.4) remained intact. But the 
government did not invoke them against the emerging free press 
to the extent of suppressing it completely. In the event the 
state owned media was also forced to adjust itself and report 
more objectively. Otherwise it was bound to frustrate 
journalists as already shown by some who began leaving and 
joining the independent press which, after 1990, saw the 
emergence of more publications.
7.3.2: Autonomous Civil Organisations
After 1984 there was an upsurge in the formation of diverse 
groups and organisations, free from party control. They included 
most of the non-governmental organisations registered by 1990 
(Mmuya & chaiigha 1992:18-9) . Besides new organisations, within 
existing ones there emerged a movement in favour of autonomy and 
freedom from the ruling (and only) political party. And, 
invariably, the government started conceding to these demands.
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The new struggle for autonomy for both the cooperative and the 
trade union movements seems to have started in 1982. We saw in 
Chapter Six how the two popular institutions were put under state 
control by statutory provisions and by organisational affiliation 
to the ruling party. Following the CCM Guidelines 1981 which, 
among other things, called for greater democracy and 
strengthening of people's power, the Cooperative Societies Act 
1982 was enacted. It revived the cooperative movement (which had 
virtually been abolished in 1976) and repealed the Jumuiya ya 
Washirika Act 1979 under which a "mass organisation of the party" 
called Washirika had been the sole apex organisation for the 
cooperative movement. The new law gave power to cooperative 
societies to form and control their own apex organisation.
However, for some years the cooperative societies did not form 
an apex organisation and the party continued to exercise 
influence through its "mass organisation", Washirika, although 
in law there was no such organisation. In 1990, the National 
Apex Organisation of Tanzania (Formation) Act 1990 was passed to 
specifically make Washirika an apex organisation. This move did 
not satisfy mounting pressure for autonomy and cooperative 
societies and their members rejected the state-created Washirika. 
With increasing support from government officials (McHenry 1994: 
116-9) the demands for autonomy led to the Cooperative Societies 
Act 1991.
This new law ended the affiliations with the party and repealed 
the one designating Washirika an apex organisation. Cooperative
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societies formed their own apex organisations according to 
sector, which then federated into the Tanzania Cooperative 
Alliance (TCA) . In 1993 the TCA, entirely controlled by its 
member organisations, took over the assets of the officially 
defunct Washirika.
Regarding the state controlled trade union (supra, 6.1.1), the 
appointment of Joseph Rwegasira as Secretary-General of JUWATA 
in 1982 was a break with the tradition, started in 1964, of 
appointing successive ministers for labour as secretaries-general 
of the trade union; Rwegasira was not a minister. Two years 
later, Alfred Tandau, who had served for years up to 1982 as 
Minister for Labour and Secretary-General of the trade union, 
contested for its chairmanship in elections supervised, in the 
usual way, by the party. He lost to Horace Kolimba.
Rwegasira and Kolimba then led a concerted campaign to free 
JUWATA from party control. As a result of this campaign the 
Party Chairman lost his power to appoint the Secretary-General 
of JUWATA to the union's National Conference which used it for 
the first time in 1989, confirming Joseph Rwegasira in that 
position. The conference also re-elected Kolimba as Chairman. 
The campaign went on and finally the party lost its supervisory 
role over the elections and other affairs of the trade union 
movement. This was effected by the Organisation of Tanzania 
Trade Unions Act 1991 which established a new trade union, 
unaffiliated to the party.
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The government did try to contain these developments with the aim 
of retaining de facto control of trade unionism. In 1988 Joseph 
Rwegasira was appointed Minister for Labour. But in 1989 the 
JUWATA Conference nevertheless elected him to continue as 
Secretary-General. Following the October 1990 general election, 
Horace Kolimba became Secretary-General of CCM and was, in that 
capacity, appointed to Parliament and to the Cabinet. Rwegasira 
was also elected to Parliament and retained as Minister for 
Labour. Under the new trade union rules effective from 1991, 
these appointments disqualified the two from leadership and, 
accordingly, they both resigned their trade union posts. A new 
leadership, elected in August 1991, entered office at the start 
of the reformed trade union established under the new law.
The new trade union, styled the Organisation of Tanzania Trade 
Unions (OTTU), faced widespread suspicion that it was not a 
workers' organisation but another state institution created to 
facilitate government control of the workers. Indeed the 
Organisation of Tanzania Trade Unions Act 1991 simply replaced 
JUWATA with OTTU and, besides an end to party control and 
supervision of the trade union, did little else to enhance free 
trade unionism. Like JUWATA, OTTU became the only lawful trade 
union to which all workers must belong if they are to participate 
in any trade union activity. Upon establishment in 1991, OTTU 
inherited the entire structure and membership, as well as assets 
and liabilities, of the former JUWATA. As such OTTU came in 
essentially as an organisation established by law, not a 
voluntary federation of free trade unions. The law establishing
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it also empowers the President to order its dissolution, and the 
Minister to close any of its branches.
But the OTTU leadership set out to demonstrate some determination 
in confronting the government, as the biggest employer, without 
fear. From 1993 relations between OTTU and the government 
deteriorated because of an unfulfilled promise of a civil service 
wage increase. Ultimately, OTTU called a three-day civil service 
strike in March 1994. The strike was not a success, but it 
helped to project OTTU's resolve to be free from government 
control. The government can still threaten it or any of its 
branches with dissolution or closure. But in the new climate of 
greater freedom and confidence in asserting people's rights, it 
is doubtful if the government would take such a step.
Meanwhile, the Women's Organisation and the Youth League remained 
under the control of the party. But from the Youth League, 
university students soon regained the right to form their own 
autonomous organisations.
Dar es Salaam University students became increasingly 
disillusioned by MUWATA, the campus extension of the CCM Youth 
League formed in 1979, and by 1989 they proposed to establish 
their own organisation. This move gained momentum after the 
World Youth and Students Festival held in North Korea in July 
1989. During the festival, the student leader attending the 
festival was put in seclusion under "hotel arrest" guarded by 
Korean security men in Pyongyang, apparently for his persistent
questioning of a number of things, including why the Tanzanian 
delegation to a festival of "Youth and Students" had only 8 
students and 18 not so youthful party officials, and how the 
funds for the delegation were being spent. On return home the 
student leader, Ludovick Bazigiza, and his deputy, Adolf Mkenda, 
wrote a "protest report" about the experience at the festival and 
circulated it widely.48
Then Bazigiza was suddenly picked up by state security agents and 
detained for 3 weeks at an unknown place, where he was subjected 
to humiliating treatment, including being photographed naked!49 
As part of the administrative efforts made to secure his release, 
a meeting was arranged at the CCM Youth League headquarters 
involving the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam, 
the deputy student leader (Adolf Mkenda) and one Paschal Mabiti, 
an official of the party believed to have been behind the
confinements both in Pyongyang and in Dar es Salaam. The meeting
never took place. Instead, Mr Mabiti brought security men who 
arrested Mkenda before everybody's eyes, hurled him into a
waiting car and disappeared without any explanation. He was
released two weeks later, along with his colleague Bazigiza.
Rather than intimidate them, these experiences made the students 
even more determined to have their own autonomous organisations. 
The government did not suppress them further and their first 
autonomous students' organisation was set up in 1991 by students
48The report was dated July 17, 1989.
49Account by the victim himself after release.
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of the University of Dar es Salaam. Similar organisations were 
soon established in other institutions of higher learning.
Generally, after 1990 the political climate would no longer 
support state control of or patronage over every organisation. 
Even the monopoly over politics enjoyed by the single ruling 
party, through which the control of civil organisations was most 
effectively exercised, came under challenge. Thus the emergence 
of new professional associations, like the Junior Doctors 
Association and the Association of Journalists and Media Workers, 
could not be suppressed.
Besides professional associations, there also emerged 
organisations formed by indigenous communities to defend their 
particular rights and interests. Among these were KIPOC, 
mentioned earlier (section 6.3.3), and the Inyuat e-Maa (oie- 
Nguiay) , both formed by pastoralists' communities. The government 
may have wished to contain their activities sometimes, as indeed 
it tried to act against KIPOC. But in the new political climate 
of freedom of association guaranteed under the Constitution 1977, 
the government could not ban them, as it did the RDA in 1969.
7.3.3: The Struggle for Political Expression and Organisation
The one-party state Constitution severely restricted the right 
to participate in political activity. Even the Bill of Rights 
did not mitigate this restriction because the freedom of 
association it guaranteed under s. 20 of the Constitution was
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"subject to the laws of the land", some of which prohibited 
political activity outside the ruling and only political party. 
The Constitution established certain institutions and organs of 
state which included the one-party system, and as a matter of 
construction:
. . .no provisions of the Constitution can reasonably be interpreted or 
applied in a manner which effectively abolishes or diminishes the 
existence or the role of any such institution or organ. Articles 3 and 10 
of the Constitution establish the one-party state in this country. So it 
cannot be abolished or diminished by interpretation of any other provision 
of the Constitution. Thus the freedom of association guaranteed by 
article 20(1) does not include any freedom to form political parties apart 
from Chama cha Mapinduzi established by the Constitution itself. 
(Nyalali 1991:5)
Thus freedom of political association and expression was not 
advanced, certainly not directly, by the Bill of Rights as such.
But in the "changing political climate" of less government
control and greater freedom of expression and civil organisation 
generally, political views sought ways of expression outside the 
only lawful political party. Perhaps the absence of a statutory 
provision expressly prohibiting the expression of views not 
endorsed by the party was the basis for some determined
individuals, non-party members, to speak out their minds.
A significant early attempt was in September 1984 when James 
Mapalala wrote an 18-page petition to the Chairman and NEC 
members of CCM asking them to initiate changes to end the one- 
party system, which he accused of denying the people the right 
to political participation, removing the necessary checks against 
tyranny and injustice, exalting the Executive to supremacy,
reducing Parliament to a sham, and of being undemocratic,
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oppressive and corrupt; those evils, Mapalala argued, could only 
be properly countered by allowing opposition parties.50
On account of that petition, James Mapalala was detained without 
charge for almost a year. Two academicians in the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam, apparently 
consulted by Mapalala in writing his petition, were also arrested 
and then released shortly, after united action by the entire 
academic staff of the university.
After his release, and following the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights, an end to the one-party system became Mapalala's 
obsession. He started collecting signatures, which soon ran into 
thousands, of people subscribing to his views. In October 1986, 
he was detained again. An application was filed in the High 
Court challenging his detention.51 It would probably have 
succeeded because already the Preventive Detention (Amendment) 
Act 1985 allowed a detention order to be questioned in court "on 
any ground." But before the date of hearing, the detention order 
was revoked and Mapalala was instead deported and confined to the 
island of Mafia for almost two years.
After his release, Mapalala continued collecting signatures in 
support of his crusade. In 1989 he conceived a civil rights 
organisation and in 1990 applied for its registration as the
50"Appeal for Revocation of the One-Party Law," dated September 28, 1984,
signed by James Mapalala.
slRe: An Application by James Mapalala & Athumani Upindo, High Court of
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc. Criminal Cause No. 30 of 1986.
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"Civil and Legal Rights Movement." Its constitution declared 
that it was "not a political party" and was not to "be used by 
any person or group to gain or secure any political office or 
political purpose." But it was obvious that Mapalala wanted to 
use the organisation to advance his views which aimed ultimately 
at changing the Constitution to allow him to form his own 
political party. Thus, although there was nothing irregular in 
its constitution or other records, the Registrar of Societies 
simply kept quiet, neither expressly rejecting the application 
nor registering the movement. The effect of non-registration was 
to cripple the movement and disable it from meaningful operation.
In September 1991, a group of Mapalala's youthful supporters 
staged a demonstration in Dar es Salaam, protesting against the 
refusal to register their movement. They were arrested for 
holding an unlawful assembly and remanded in custody pending 
trial. But after a few weeks they were released, and the charges 
against them withdrawn. Already, a Presidential Commission was 
at work reviewing the one-party system, and it was only a matter 
of time before opposition parties would be allowed.
On another front, there was the fiery Rev Christopher Mtikila of 
the little known Full Salvation Church.52 The said church also 
had a "unit" for human rights issues called the "Liberty Desk", 
also headed by Rev Mtikila and operating from his flat at Ilala 
in Dar es Salaam. From early 1990 or thereabouts, Mtikila began
52The following of that church in Tanzania is unknown and its minister, 
Mtikila, is more renowned for his political activism than religious service.
379
using his Liberty Desk to write and circulate a number of 
pamphlets strongly criticising the government and the one-party 
system. Occasionally, he also addressed well-attended press 
luncheons, organised through the otherwise inactive Dar es Salaam 
Press Club, making similar criticism, and his addresses were 
published in detail by the emerging free press. Press luncheons 
became a new feature associated with, the emerging opposition 
(Mmuya & chaiigha 1992:133) as James Mapalala and Mabere Marando also 
addressed them on separate occasions in 1990; the latter is a 
lawyer who soon proved to be an eloquent political crusader.
By 1990, however, the debate on whether the one-party system was 
still appropriate started. The Tanganyika Law Society organised 
a one-day seminar on the subject in September 1990. It was 
addressed by Marando and some other prominent lawyers, including 
one from CCM Headquarters who defended the system against 
overwhelming opinion opposed to it. Significantly, this seminar 
was widely reported, even by the state owned media.
Then the problem of the multi-party advocates turned out to be 
not their suppression as individuals but the lack of an 
organisation through which to express and propagate their views, 
without such organisation being seen as a political party and 
being proscribed. All existing organisations were either 
indifferent or, at least officially, opposed to those views. 
Nyerere's encouragement of a public debate and a re-assessment 
of the one-party system {infra, 7.4.1) may have given them a 
feeling of confidence that an organisation of their own was
justified. In February 1991 they formed a "National Committee 
for Constitutional Reform"; they claimed it was merely a steering 
committee for coordinating views from people committed to 
constitutional reform.53 The committee was chaired by Abdulla 
Fundikira with James Mapalala as his deputy, and Mabere Marando 
its secretary; it did not seek registration and the government 
took no direct action against it.
In March 1991 the committee sought to hold a public seminar under 
the auspices of the Tanzania Legal Education Trust, a hitherto 
dormant trust of which Marando was vice-chairman. The Trust was 
immediately served with a notice to cancel its registration for 
engaging in political activities, and the seminar could not be 
held (McHenry 1994:64). Subsequently, President Mwinyi issued a 
stern warning against groups organising themselves for political 
purposes and reminded that the country was still a one-party 
state.54 But later on, the government made a U-turn and allowed 
any group, whether registered or not, to hold seminars and 
discussions on the party system. And in June 1991, that seminar 
was finally held, organised directly by the self-appointed 
committee itself (McHenry 1994:64-5) , and given wide publicity (Mtnuya 
& Chaligha 1992:143-7) .
This was a breakthrough in independent political organisation. 
From then on the committee existed and, though unregistered for 
well over a year, it received tacit recognition as representing
53 (1991) 28 Africa Research Bulletin: 10043A-C.
54 (1991) 28 Africa Research Bulletin: 1004A-C.
381
the future opposition. When opposition parties were finally 
allowed to register and operate lawfully from July 1992, it 
registered itself as a political party styled "National 
Convention for Construction and Reform" (NCCR) . By then its 
leadership had changed. James Mapalala had resigned early from 
the committee, and Abdulla Fundikira was removed for attempting 
to present it, while on a trip abroad in 1991, as if it was 
already a political party. So by the time it registered as a 
political party, NCCR was chaired by Mabere Marando. Mapalala 
and Fundikira each formed their own political parties.
7.4: TOWARDS MULTI-PARTY POLITICS
Political pluralism returned to Tanzania with the Eighth 
Constitutional Amendment Act 1992 which took effect in July 1992. 
The events and developments analysed in this chapter generally 
contributed to the process towards that change in various way. 
By 1990 the one-party system was certain to end soon, and much 
of that year and 1991 was dominated by a big debate on the issue 
of a multi-party system being both desirable and inevitable.
In both neighbouring Zambia and Kenya, developments towards that 
change saw some serious clashes in July 1990 between the 
governments in those countries and people demanding change. By 
contrast, Tanzania was relatively incident free. This is partly 
because from early 1990 people were encouraged to debate the 
issue and, on his re-election in November 1990, President Mwinyi 
promised to set up a commission to collect views, including views
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from the debate, upon which a decision would ultimately be made. 
Unlike direct suppression, this had a pacifying effect.
We now look briefly at both the "debate" and the Presidential 
Commission, which recommended the return to a multi-party system.
7.4.1: The Big Debate 1990-92
Although the debate on political pluralism intensified in 1990 
and 1991, it was there, albeit quietly, much earlier. James 
Mapalala's "petition" mentioned above, written in the first 
person plural and signed by Mapalala "for and on behalf of the 
appellants", shows that views in support of political pluralism 
were raised much earlier, even if only discreetly.
Julius Nyerere is often credited with initiating, while still CCM 
Chairman, the debate on multi-parties (Bagenda:7-9) . Firstly, he 
told the press in February 1990 that it was not taboo to question 
the one-party system. Secondly, in an address to the CCM Youth 
League Conference held in Mwanza in June 1990, he warned that 
multi-parties were ultimately inevitable as the reasons that had 
supported the one-party state in 1965 could hardly stand in the 
conditions of the 1990s. The most important thing is that by 
that initiative, Nyerere effectively disarmed those elements in 
the party (of which he was still Chairman) and the government who 
were still inclined to suppress the demands for change (Mmuya & 
Chaligha 1992:130) .
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The debate went on in various ways and forums. Newspapers, 
especially the new private media, actively carried out the debate 
by publishing a continuous flow of "Readers' Letters" and regular 
feature articles. Even the government-owned Daily News joined 
in. Some of the newspaper contributions were subsequently 
compiled in a book (Bagenda) . The debate was also conducted 
through seminars organised by the Tanganyika Law Society, the 
Faculty of Law and other departments of the University of Dar es 
Salaam, and various other institutions. There was a general 
proliferation of seminars on this debate during 1991-92; even 
those organised for other purposes tended, in their proceedings, 
to gravitate to the debate on multi-parties. The debate also 
went on through informal discussions even in casual and 
spontaneous gatherings in leisure centres and beer clubs, where 
it readily captured Tanzanians' exuberance for talking.
What dominated the debate was an overwhelming desire for change. 
Even those who wanted the one-party state to continue also 
insisted on major changes in the role of the single party. Some 
of the one-party supporters, for example, wanted the party to 
have no power over Parliament, and to allow non-members to 
campaign and contest in elections for political office at all 
levels. Others, the unsophisticated rural peasants unable to 
distinguish the party from the government, complained that 
already with one party they were getting enough problems, like 
not being paid for crops (often grown at the insistence of local 
party leaders) and compulsory contributions to party functions 
and projects, and feared that multi-parties would multiply those
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problems (Tanzania 1992a: 68-9)
The proponents of multi-parties argued that one-party rule had 
lost touch with the people, was corrupt, undemocratic and 
concerned only with securing and preserving leadership positions 
for a select oligarchy serving its own interests. A multi-party 
system, they argued, would restore parliamentary supremacy and 
make the government more responsible to the people. Others 
advocated change to enhance democracy even for members of the 
ruling CCM because the one-party state Constitution, they argued, 
denied CCM members control over their own party: it was a
state party created by the Constitution and its members had no 
power, even by a unanimous resolution, to dissolve it. Yet 
others demanded change for the sake of democracy which, they 
insisted, could be achieved only through autonomous civil 
organisations at grass-roots level (which the one-party state had 
inhibited) , not merely political parties which they suspected 
would be another set of institutions from above (sandbrook & 
Halfani:30) .
The problem of the one-party system breeding complacency was 
behind Nyerere's initiatives in the debate. In 1986, while on 
a trip to Zambia, he had warned against that problem,55 and in 
1990 he repeated the same warning (Bagenda:7-9) . For him it was 
mainly, if not only, for that purpose that he favoured multi- 
parties: to keep the ruling party, CCM, constantly awake and
sensitive to the interests of the people, responding promptly to
55(1986) 23 Africa Research Bulletin: 8113C-8114A.
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their needs and demands. Only that way could the CCM government 
indeed be responsible and would Tanzanians enjoy democracy 
(McHenry 1994:62-3) . For that reason, Nyerere advised that the 
introduction of a multi-party system should not wait until a 
majority of Tanzanians demanded it (sandbrook & Haifani:28) . His aim 
was not just to enhance democracy but rather, in that process, 
to enable CCM to retain office by being more democratically 
vigorous, and not by using law and the constitution to suppress 
dissent.
There were also those just fed up with CCM in office, and simply 
wanted an opportunity to replace it, or so it appeared, even if 
there was little further change in constitutional structures 
because once in office, they would not be as bad as CCM! They 
were inclined to press for no more than the immediate 
liberalisation of politics, followed immediately by multi-party 
elections in which they were confident of defeating CCM. These 
were possibly many among the multi-party advocates,56 but they 
ingeniously employed the more sophisticated argument of advancing 
democracy to render themselves more credible.
And there were others opposed to change because they wanted to 
safeguard national unity, peace and tranquillity; a multi-party 
system, they argued, would encourage ethnic, regional and 
religious conflicts. They also argued that a multi-party system 
was too expensive for Tanzania's poor economy and that it was in
56Janies Mapalala expressed such confidence at a seminar held at the Gogo 
Hotel in Dar es Salaam, January 27-28, 1992.
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any case'demanded by only a few power hungry elites.
The ruling party defended its political monopoly. In spite of 
Nyerere's warnings, the CCM Youth League ended its June 1990 
conference with a resolution strongly supporting the continuance 
of the one-party system. During the next 18 months party 
branches all over the country competed in organising rallies in 
support of the one-party system and condemning the proponents of 
change. Some Dar es Salaam local party leaders sponsored a 
cripple who made a spirited 120 miles journey on his (hand 
propelled) tricycle from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro in support of 
one-party rule.
All the views were collected by the Commission set up by the 
President in February 1991, which in its report in 1992 
recommended an end to the one-party system, . and the 
recommendation was adopted. An absurd irony is that immediately 
after this decision was announced, CCM branches went into renewed 
competition, organising rallies in support of introducing multi­
parties! This cast doubts over the sincerity of the organisers 
of the various rallies.
7.4.2: The Nyalali Commission
When in November 1990 President Mwinyi promised to set up a 
commission to collect and analyse the different views in the 
multi-party debate, the debate was given definite objectives. 
Unlike the 1983 Constitutional Debate, this one had started
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rather spontaneously and intensified without its direction and 
ultimate end being clear. The promised commission gave it a 
definite purpose and direction.
The commission was then appointed in February 1991. It had a 
very long name in Swahili57 but, conveniently, it has also been 
known as the Nyalali Commission, in reference to its chairman, 
Mr Francis Nyalali, the Chief Justice of Tanzania. Established 
because of the debate, the Commission also became briefly the 
subject of debate. Questions were raised regarding the necessity 
for, and logic of, setting up a commission to find out whether 
indeed people wanted freedom. And as it was rather common for 
reports of commissions and probe teams to be ignored or treated 
casually, this move was also suspected as a mere government ploy 
to delay action on inevitable changes (Bagenda:28, 76-9) .
Some people questioned the Commission's integrity and 
impartiality especially as its members were mainly CCM members, 
currently or previously in responsible positions. Mabere Marando 
was appointed to the Commission but he declined the appointment, 
questioning the relevance of the whole exercise and the honesty 
of the government, especially as initially the Commission was 
given only 3 months to do its work. His place was given to 
Wolfango Dourado, who had served as Attorney General of Zanzibar 
and was now a known critic of the establishment. But the time 
frame for the commission was extended to one year thanks,
57,lTume ya Rais ya Mfumo wa Chama Kimoja au Vyama Vingi vya Siasa Tanzania,
1991."
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possibly, to Marando's public reaction.
The terms of reference required the Nyalali Commission to collect 
and coordinate the public views on the on-going debate and then 
recommend whether to continue with a one-party system or to 
change to a multi-party system, giving appropriate advice on the 
implications of either option, and how best to implement it 
without prejudice to the fundamental objectives of state policy, 
or to the basic rights and duties contained in the Constitution. 
The Commission was also required to take into account the need 
to maintain and strengthen the union (of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar), to promote national unity and cohesion, and to 
recommend ways of strengthening democracy and developing a 
democratic culture in the country (irrespective of the political 
system), and to recommend necessary amendments to the 
Constitution and other laws.
In its work the Nyalali Commission visited all the districts of 
Tanzania, holding a total of 1,061 public meetings, gathering 
people's views. Opinions were also given in private meetings 
with the Commission, in writing by submitting letters and 
reports, and by responding to a questionnaire drawn by the 
Commission from the terms of reference. Using those same 
methods, opinions were also received from Tanzanians living 
abroad. Opinions published in the local press were also 
collected. The Commission also had sessions with the former 
President, Julius Nyerere, and former President of Zanzibar, 
Aboud Jumbe, for their views. Members of the Commission also
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made study visits to 12 countries.
On February 17, 1992, the Commission submitted its final
report,58 showing that of the 36,299 people who gave their 
opinions, 28,018 or 77.2% expressed support for the one-party 
state, and 7,817 or 21.5% wanted a multi-party system [60-1] .59 
But the Commission nevertheless recommended a multi-party system 
because 55.6% of those one-party supporters also wanted major 
reforms which, in the opinion of the Commission, were impossible 
to implement within a one-party system [4] . Also the Commission 
found that ultimately, a multi-party system was inevitable 
because the one-party system was inherently restrictive of 
freedom and democracy, a fact often admitted, albeit indirectly, 
even by the ruling party itself [104-5] . And a multi-party 
system was considered desirable and appropriate, as it was 
already demanded by a substantial number of people, albeit a 
minority [107] .
In its recommendations the Nyalali Commission emphasised that the 
Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights as contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights were absolute essentials 
for a democratic society, and should never be left to the 
discretion of politicians [91-3].
On the organs of state the Commission recommended [99-100] a
58Tanzania 1992a.
59In this section, references in square brackets refer to pages in Volume 
One of the report, Tanzania 1992a.
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representative parliament with supreme legislative authority, 
subject only to the Constitution, to consist of elected members
I
only and not to be interfered/or controlled by any other organ 
or institution in its work. It insisted that ministers should 
be appointed only from amongst the elected members because the 
practice of appointing nominated MPs as ministers undermines 
democracy. The Commission also recommended that the President 
may continue appointing only the most senior officials like 
principal secretaries, and leave the appointment of middle and 
low level executives like district directors to appropriate 
commissions. It also emphasised the importance of the 
independence of the Judiciary, and the role and function of the 
High Court to defend human rights and the Constitution and, for 
that purpose, pointed out the need to devise a way of making it 
more easily accessible to ordinary citizens [100].
The Nyalali Commission also recommended that the Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry (PCE) should be appointed by Parliament and 
report to Parliament, and further that it should be empowered to 
conduct prosecutions, to ensure that its decisions are carried 
out. It also recommended that the PCE should consist of a number 
of such commissions, each dealing with complaints relating to its 
own particular sector [100] .
The Commission also warned that the mere constitutional 
designation of separate organs of state, each with its specific 
powers and functions, was in itself not enough. Democracy also 
required freedom for popular institutions like trade unions, the
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cooperative movement, local government authorities, and civil 
organisations (commonly known as NGOs), to operate without 
unnecessary constraints or interference by the state, which was 
not the case in Tanzania [100-2] . For that reason the Commission 
welcomed the Cooperative Societies Act 1991 as signalling a new 
era in the cooperative movement, but was critical of the local 
government legislation and the new trade union law for inhibiting 
freedom and democracy by subjecting popular institutions to 
excessive government control [46-51]. The Commission traced a 
number of other laws similarly restricting freedom and democracy 
and, in Volume Three of its report, listed them as requiring 
either to be repealed or to be amended.
On the whole the Nyalali Commission has been widely praised for 
its work. But some of its recommendations have not been accepted 
by the government.60 Implementation of the accepted
recommendations began in 1992 with a number of amendments to the 
Constitution 1977. Before looking at those changes, we look 
briefly at the contribution of external factors to these changes.
7.5: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR
External events and developments have certainly played an 
important role in the constitutional changes and developments in 
Tanzania, as well as Africa generally. One example easily cited 
in recent years is that of the dramatic changes which brought
60A notable example is the recommendation to adopt a federal structure for 
the Union, which the government rejected.
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liberal democracy to Eastern Europe and the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union; they have had a big effect upon 
constitutional and other developments in Africa. But those 
changes did not mark any beginning or end in external influence 
on African constitutional practice. The influence of Western 
Europe and North America has always been dominant and decisive, 
both before and after the events in Eastern Europe, in either 
maintaining or changing the constitutional structures in Africa.
Indeed the events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
had an immense global impact. But while those changes are 
largely associated with the perestroika and glasnost policies 
initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev who came to power in the Soviet 
Union in 1985, in Tanzania James Mapalala had written his 
petition demanding changes the year before. Clearly, therefore, 
the demands for change in Tanzania were not merely imitating 
Eastern Europe, and there is need to locate properly how external 
influence, not just the events in Eastern Europe, has operated.
7.5.1: The Changes in Eastern Europe
The year 1989 saw rapid changes in the state structures and 
constitutions of East European countries which were often 
referred to as the "Communist Block" countries: Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia (which then split into the Czech and Slovak 
republics), German Democratic Republic (or East Germany which 
then reunited with the Federal Republic of Gernmany), Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. The last mentioned was the
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undisputed leader of the block with a measure of influence and 
control over the affairs of the others. They were all committed 
to communist or socialist policies and development, and the 
"changes" referred to here affected both their constitutional and 
their policy orientation.
Besides their communist orientation, those countries were also 
governed by one-party regimes with highly centralised structures 
increasingly detached from the people they governed and 
insensitive to their actual needs. Encouraged by Gorbachev's 
policies of perestroika and glasnost, the people in those 
countries rose up in popular uprisings which enabled democracy 
to triumph over one-party dictatorships. In some of the 
countries, the changes were effected by popular elections; in 
others the old regimes were overthrown first and elections held 
subsequently confirmed the legitimacy of the changes. In the 
Soviet Union the wave of democratisation and, in this case, self 
determination, saw the dissolution of the Communist Party and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union itself in 1991.
Tanzania, and some other African countries, had one thing in 
common with those countries of Eastern Europe. Both had one- 
party regimes, with all the restrictions to democracy they 
implied. It was therefore logical to regard the events in 
Eastern Europe as signalling a similar fate to similarly 
undemocratic regimes in Africa.61 Indeed, even Nyerere's 
warning in February 1990 not to ignore the events in Eastern
61"Babu Warns Nyerere," in New African, February 1990.
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Europe was summed up in the Swahili saying that "when you see 
your colleague being shaved, better get your head ready for your
turn" (Sarungi:43-4; Mmuya & Chaligha 1992:23-4) .
The saying was relevant in so far as Tanzania was a one-party 
state, even though the party in Tanzania was not an elite or 
"vanguard" party like many of the parties in Eastern Europe.
The other relevant factor is that 
Tanzania was not only a one-party state but also, like the East 
European states, had a party committed to socialism. There were 
cordial relations with, and support from, most East European 
countries either at governmental level or through "party 
protocols" . Many "cadres of the party" in Tanzania had their 
training in Eastern Europe. Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the Head 
of the Ideological Department of the NEC of Chama cha Mapinduzi 
came back from a visit in Romania "with friendly greetings" from 
the party in that country only two weeks before the fall of 
Ceausescu
For Tanzania, therefore, the warning was even more ominous 
because the passion for democracy had also exhibited a rejection 
of socialism. Even if the new regimes in Eastern Europe would 
tolerate a one-party state, they were unlikely to continue their 
support and sympathy for a socialist party, like CCM, and its 
government. The changes in Eastern Europe, therefore, reduced 
the scope of international support enjoyed by African one-party 
regimes like Tanzania.
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But the most important support to African one-party regimes which 
was indeed affected by changes in Eastern Europe was from the 
liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America. Most 
African countries had links with the West, often maintained 
through the former colonial power. Tanzania, despite commitments 
to socialist policies, has all along relied heavily on external 
aid from the west. One reason for the west maintaining 
assistance to Africa was to "protect" the African countries from 
communist influence and domination. Thus it was part of the then 
international politics of the Cold War.
Now, the changes in Eastern Europe also ended the Cold War. The 
attention of western aid donors was directed away from Africa to 
their eastern neighbours which had much of the necessary 
infrastructure, lacking in Africa, giving a better hope and 
promise of returns for investment. Also the industrialised west 
had a moral obligation to support a fast capitalist 
development and prove that abandoning socialism was just the 
right thing. Thus the end of the Cold War replaced confrontation 
with cooperation in East-West relations and, in the event, 
maintaining assistance to Africa lost some of its importance.
During the Cold War the western powers supported even dictatorial 
and undemocratic regimes in Africa simply to check the spread of 
communism. Such was the case for Siad Barre in Somalia, Banda 
in Malawi, Moi in Kenya and Mobutu in Zaire. With the end of the 
.Cold War that policy had to change. Firstly, communism as the 
enemy was no longer there; there was thus no reason to continue
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supporting despotic regimes in Africa. Secondly, the electorate 
in the western countries supported changes in Eastern Europe 
because they had brought democratic governments into office; that 
same electorate would certainly not support assistance to 
undemocratic regimes in Africa.62
This meant that African undemocratic regimes would not be 
supported to maintain themselves in office against any 
(presumably democratic) challenges. And accordingly, in their 
policies to Africa, western donor countries started emphasising 
a reduction in military expenditure.63 Certainly, the big 
defence budgets incurred by the African regimes, with western 
support, was not incurred so much in defence against communism 
as it was in "self-defence" against democratic forces within the 
countries themselves.
But the withdrawal of support for military expenditure was not 
enough to bring about immediate change and soon donor countries 
demanded democratic reforms as a condition for all forms of 
assistance. This is part of the continuing influence of the 
donor countries on constitutional practice in Africa.
62New Political Criteria: The German Concept, Statement by Dr Volker
Ducklau, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, to a visiting delegation from 
Tanzania, Bonn, December 3, 1992.
63Address by Dr Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Gernmany, to the Diplomatic Corps, Bonn, December 3, 1992, Translation of Advance 
Text: 5-6; also German Development Policy, Memorandum of the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the DAC Annual Aid Review 1991/92, Bonn, October 
25, 1991: 2-4.
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7.5.2: The Role of the International Donor Community
In recent years western donor countries have simply required 
individual African regimes to initiate political reforms and 
democratisation or suffer reductions in aid. By 1990 African 
economies were in such desperate condition that most governments 
could not run without donor funds; therefore, they had to comply 
with donor conditions in order to survive.
As a result, Zambia returned to a multi-party constitution in 
1991. In June 1990 there had been a coup attempt and some 
serious rioting (in which 29 people died)64 sparked by the 
removal of subsidies on the price of maize meal, Zambia's staple 
food. President Kaunda had been resisting political reforms and 
for that reason donor funds, which could have provided for some 
subsidies, were with-held. He finally yielded to the demands for 
political reforms, accepted the enactment of a new Constitution, 
lost the November 1991 multi-party election, and was replaced by 
a leadership ready to comply with all conditions imposed by the 
donors.
Meanwhile, in 1990 the United States threatened Kenya with a 
reduction in aid unless there was political reform.65 But the 
regime in Kenya resisted the pressure. A mass demonstration 
organised in Nairobi by a pro-reform movement in July 1990 was
64New African, August 1990.
65New African, July 1990.
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violently crushed by the government, killing more than 10 
people.66 President Moi continued to resist change, arguing 
that multi-parties would lead to bloody civil conflicts. 
Finally, in November 1991 it was announced that the major donors 
of Kenya would with-hold further aid for at least six months 
unless reforms were introduced (Ripley:545) . And in December 1991 
the regime announced a change in the Constitution to allow other 
political parties. A year later, multi-party elections returned 
President Moi in office, with a fairly powerful opposition in 
Parliament.
By contrast, the appointment of the Nyalali Commission seems to 
have resulted in sparing Tanzania from such direct external 
pressure:
Unlike situations in the neighbouring country of Kenya where directly and 
publicly the British Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker, 
presented to the Kenyan head of state her government demands that Kenya go 
multiparty, in Tanzania the message often was presented tacitly through 
statements of encouragement and sometimes praise by representatives of 
western foreign missions that Tanzania was moving towards "the right 
direction", ...clear messages to the Tanzanian Government and CCM 
regarding what they were supposed to do... The harsher statements to 
government leaders in a neighbouring state concretized the order for the 
Tanzanian government to also hasten to go multiparty. (Mmuya & 
Chaligha 1992:22)
And while the Nyalali Commission went on with its work, the donor 
community was clearly indicating to the government that political 
reform was expected irrespective of what the Commission would 
recommend. Indeed, some of the commissioners did complain in 
private that they were under severe pressure to finish up their 
work and report, so that the government could announce major 
political reforms. Obviously, the changes had already been
66Africa Events, August 1990.
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decided upon and the report of the Commission was required only 
as a formality.
On the other hand international donor pressure or support was 
behind most of the internal developments analysed in this chapter 
as being part of the changing political climate.
Besides demands within the country, international pressure by 
human rights organisations and donor countries was also behind 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1984. Developments that 
led to an independent cooperative movement had been demanded by 
the International Cooperative Alliance, which even threatened 
Tanzania with expulsion unless control of the apex organisation 
was transferred from the state to the member unions.67 The 
setting free of James Mapalala, detained and deported for 
petitioning against the one-party system, had been incessantly 
demanded by the Scandinavian countries, Tanzania's greatest 
benefactors.
When the High Court ruled in favour of the students of the 
Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe, who had petitioned 
against their wrongful expulsion from the institute,68 the 
government wanted to appeal against the decision. But 
subsequently the intended appeal was abandoned because the 
Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) , whose funds support the
67see McHenry 1994:119, fn.74.
6 8Felix Bushaija & Others v. Institute of Development Management & Another, 
High Court of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Misc.Civil Cause No.89 of 1991
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institute, insisted on compliance with/court order and the return 
of the expelled students. The Principal of the institute felt 
so humiliated by the turn of events that he resigned in protest.
James Mapalala's young supporters, arrested in September 1991 for 
demonstrating against the refusal to register their movement, 
were released and charges against them withdrawn due to donor 
pressure, and not just because the President was, as a father, 
pardoning his misguided children as the official statement said 
(Mmuya & chaiigha 1992:140) . Also, we referred above to the formation 
of a self appointed National Committee for Constitutional Reform 
in 1991, and that its first attempt to hold a seminar failed and 
provoked a stern warning from the President. Later, again thanks 
to donor pressure, the government made a U-turn and allowed the 
committee and any other groups to hold seminars if they wished.
The seminar was finally held in June 1991, attended by well over 
8 00 people, jointly funded by Denmark, Norway and Sweden, among 
other donors. Most other public seminars which were held on 
political reforms were also externally funded. The Legal Aid 
Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam conducted its legal 
literacy campaign with funds from diverse sources: CUSO, DANIDA, 
Oxfam, USAID, etc. It was also external donor funds which 
enabled the Nyalali Commission to do its commendable work. Even 
the costs of the first multi-party election since independence, 
to be held in October 1995, are being met from various western 
countries. Thus there is hardly any single development that has 
occurred without external support or pressure.
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As a g e n e r a l  rule, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d o n o r  c o m m u n i t y  n o w  insists 
u p o n  the r e c i p i e n t  states to ensure, a m ong o t h e r  things, respect 
for H u m a n  R i g h t s  a n d  the Rul e  of Law, an d  p o p u l a r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in the p o l i t i c a l  process. F a i l i n g  in that m a y  lead to n e c e s s a r y  
a s s i s t a n c e  b e i n g  w i t h - h e l d  or reduced.
Thi s  is a n e w  p h e n o m e n o n  a nd s h o u l d  be a n a l y s e d  c r i t i c a l l y  
b e c a u s e  e x t e r n a l  influence, eve n  if it reduces the d o m i n a n c e  and 
c o n trol of the government, m a y  not n e c e s s a r i l y  e n h ance p o p u l a r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  control. Previous trends in d o n o r  p o l i c i e s  
s u p p o r t e d  a d o m i n a n t  g o v e r n m e n t . The w h ole d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a t e g y 
of T a n z a n i a  for almost two d e c ades gave the state total control 
o ver all p o p u l a r  institutions: cooperatives, trade unions,
v i l l a g e  councils, a nd the entire eco n o m i c  s e ctor r e l i e d  on state 
i n i t i a t i v e  a nd control t h r o u g h  p a r a s t a t a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  (McHenry 
1994:129-44), all w i t h  m a s s i v e  external support for wel l  ove r  a 
d e c a d e .
State co n t r o l  b e g a n  to recede w h e n  the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  of the 
e c o n o m y  came in, e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  1986, as a result of IMF 
pressure. That p r e s s u r e  co n t i n u e s  to-date, w i t h  d o n o r  countries  
also i n s i s t i n g  on p r i v a t i s a t i o n  of b u s i n e s s  a n d  industry, and 
al l o w i n g  m a r k e t  forces com p l e t e  f r e e d o m  to d o m i n a t e  the economy. 
These p r e s s u r e s  do reduce the d o m i n a n c e  of the government. But 
they do not n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  m ore control an d  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  
p o w e r s  b y  the people. E v e n  the agreement itself b e t w e e n  the 
Ta n z a n i a  G o v e r n m e n t  an d  the IMF, w h i c h  br o u g h t  the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  
policies, was far from democratic:
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All the discussions on the terms of the IMF agreement were held in secret 
at the point that even members of the Cabinet and the Central Committee of 
the National Executive of the party were unaware of the specific 
conditions. Moreover there was a lack of clarity of the content of 
negotiations. The...party gave its consent to the Minister of Finance to 
come to an agreement with the IMF. [But] even the discussion in the 
National Executive was constrained by a lack of information. (Campbell 
& Stein:17)
And the government went on to implement the agreement while the 
people remained ignorant of its terms (Tegambwage: 9-14) . It has 
therefore been a case of external pressure reducing the dominance 
of the government without enhancing democracy.
Some of the programmes for the public seminars on political 
reform, which the government was forced to allow by donor 
pressure, were sometimes presented to identified local 
institutions complete with details of subject content, venue, and 
even numbers and identities of some of the participants already 
determined by the donors; the local groups holding or 
"organising" the seminars had themselves little control. Many 
of the seminars were held in exclusive hotels, and were not open 
to the general public. Clearly some of the donor organisations 
have had their own agenda which their offices in Dar es Salaam 
are required to implement and report on back home.
Thus, although the cases referred to here indicate that the 
pressure of international donors sought, in one way or another, 
to make the government less dominant and less restrictive of 
people's interests, they should not be indiscriminately taken for 
granted as advancing the cause of democracy and popular control 
of government institutions. There is need to guard against the
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danger of replacing the dominance of the government with that of 
some international institutions without enhancing democracy.
7.6: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF 1992
The Nyalali Commission submitted its preliminary report on 
January 16, 1992, and its final report on February 17, 1992.
Immediately after the preliminary report, the recommendation to 
adopt a multi-party system was accepted by the Cabinet, and 
during the same month the NEC of the ruling CCM unanimously 
adopted it. Finally, an extra-ordinary National Conference of 
the party held on February 18-20, 1992, also unanimously endorsed 
the termination of its own monopoly of politics, and directed 
that the necessary constitutional amendments be made to 
facilitate the changes.
The decision for a multi-party system was the dominating concern, 
tending to obscure other important issues related to the changes. 
It was effected by Parliament through the Eighth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1992 (hereinafter the "Eighth Amendment"), which 
took effect on July 1, 1992. Further changes came with the Ninth 
Constitutional Amendment Act 1992 (hereinafter the "Ninth 
Amendment"), enacted in December 1992. Also relevant is the 
Eleventh Constitutional Amendment Act 1994 (hereinafter the 
"Eleventh Amendment), enacted two years later but inextricably 
linked to the changes begun in 1992.
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7.6.1: General Con tent
The Eighth Amendment amended s. 3 of the Constitution 1977 to 
declare Tanzania a "democratic and socialist state with a multi­
party political system", and to remove provisions that had given 
"final authority" to the ruling CCM. The amendment also repealed 
s. 10 of the Constitution which had given the party monopoly over 
political activity and supervision over public institutions, 
provisions in s.37(1) which had required the President to observe 
"the policies and directives of the Party", and s.63(4) which had 
made the National Assembly "a committee of the National 
Conference of the Party." Other provisions giving
responsibilities to the NEC or any other organ of the party were 
also repealed.
The Eighth Amendment also excluded regional commissioners from 
membership of Parliament and terminated the power of the 
President to appoint MPs. Now the National Assembly is to 
consist of: directly elected constituency members (one from each 
constituency), five members indirectly elected by (and from 
amongst the members of) the Zanzibar House of Representatives, 
and fifteen women members indirectly elected (by the former two 
categories) from a list submitted by political parties 
represented in the Assembly by members in the first two 
categories. The Attorney General, now an ex officio MP, is the 
only member appointed by the President. The number of 
constituencies and their boundaries is to be determined by the 
Electoral Commission subject to the approval of the President.
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The Commission is required to review them from time to time and 
in any case must review them every ten years. For the October 
1995 general election there are no less than 220 constituencies 
for the whole country.
Qualifications for membership of Parliament have been reduced to 
citizenship, age (21 years) and literacy (in Swahili or English), 
and the new condition relating to party membership is that a 
contestant must be a member of, and nominated by, a registered 
political party. Conditions of leadership which had bound MPs 
from 1967 were now repealed, along with the Commission for their 
enforcement. One reason for the repeal is that the conditions 
were the "Leadership Code" originally promulgated by and for the 
ruling party, and could not now be extended to leaders and 
members of other parties. But another (and more practical) 
reason is that even within the ruling CCM, the Leadership Code 
was abandoned by the Zanzibar Resolution made in February 1991
(McHenry 1994:22-3, 32) .
Corresponding changes were made to local government laws,69 and 
to election laws for both national and local government 
elections.70 A new law, the Political Parties Act 1992 was 
passed with detailed provisions regarding the terms, conditions 
and procedure for the registration and operation of political 
parties. In the meantime the status quo was retained, with CCM
69Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act 1992.
noElections (Amendment) Act 1992 and Local Authorities (Elections) 
(Amendment) Act 1992.
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remaining the ruling party until next election, and all 
institutions were retained lawful as constituted until the 
expiration of their terms.71
Within a year, over half a dozen political groups had completed 
the necessary procedure and were fully registered political 
parties. By June 30, 1994, the number had almost doubled. The 
first opportunity for a multi-party contest in an election came 
up in the Kwahani constituency in Zanzibar, where there was a 
parliamentary by-election in early 1993; but it was boycotted by 
all opposition parties except one, giving an easy victory to CCM 
(Mmuya & chaligha 1993) . There have since been by-elections in 
Ileje, Kigoma Urban, Igunga and Tabora North constituencies; in 
each of them the contest was fairly stiff but CCM won in all. 
In Kigoma Urban, where the contest was strongest, the CCM victory 
was nullified by the High Court following a successful petition 
by the leading opposition candidate.72 CCM had an equally 
resounding victory in the 1994 civic elections.73
Following the Eighth Amendment executive power continues to vest 
in the President who will now be elected from among contestants 
nominated by the various political parties taking part in the 
elections. The qualifications for election are the same as for 
parliamentary candidates except that a presidential candidate
11Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act
1992.
72Attorney General & Two Others v. Aman Walid Kabourou, Tanzania Court of
Appeal, Civil Appeals Nos. 32 & 42 of 1994.
12Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, Janauary 1995: 9-10.
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must be a citizen by birth, aged at least 40 years. Rather 
curiously, the amendments make no attempt to ensure that the 
President belongs to the party with the majority in the National 
Assembly; it is just assumed that he will be enjoying the support 
of the majority of the MPs.
The Ninth Amendment brought some very important new provisions 
in the Constitution 1977. It brought a new S.46A empowering the 
National Assembly to impeach the President for acting in breach 
of the Constitution or for bringing disrepute to the Office of 
the President. The procedure is that a notice for the motion of 
impeachment, supported by at least 20% of the MPs, must be 
submitted to the Speaker at least 30 days before presentation to 
the Assembly. Then a Special Committee of Enquiry is formed if 
two thirds of the Assembly votes in support of the motion. The 
Committee is headed by the Chief Justice, and the Chief Justice 
of Zanzibar and seven MPs appointed by the Speaker are its 
members.
The Committee investigates the allegations against the President, 
giving him a hearing, and reports to the Speaker within 90 days. 
The Assembly then discusses the report and gives the President 
another hearing before deciding on the matter by a vote. The 
President is removed if a resolution to that effect is passed by 
a two-thirds majority. A President removed from office by 
impeachment loses his retirement benefits, as well as the 
immunity from court proceedings otherwise enjoyed under s.46 (3) 
of the Constitution 1977.
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The Ninth Amendment also replaced s.90(2) of the Constitution 
1977, which had empowered the President to "dissolve Parliament 
at any time," with a new provision setting out circumstances in 
which the President may dissolve Parliament. These are: when the 
National Assembly refuses to pass the annual budget proposed by 
the government; when a Bill already refused assent by the 
President is presented to him a second time after being re-passed 
by a two-thirds majority in less than 6 months; when the 
government is defeated on an important motion concerning basic 
policy; when the government loses its majority support in the 
Assembly; and at any time during the last 12 months of the tenure 
of Parliament. But in the last mentioned case the President 
cannot dissolve Parliament if a notice of motion to impeach him 
has been submitted to the Speaker.
The Ninth Amendment also replaced s.51 of the Constitution 1977 
with a new one requiring the President to appoint as Prime 
Minister only an elected constituency MP belonging to the 
majority party or likely to command the majority support of the 
National Assembly. The appointment of the Prime Minister must 
be approved by the National Assembly to take effect.
Another new provision, S.53A of the Constitution 1977, restores 
the power of the National Assembly to censure the government by 
passing a resolution of no confidence in the Prime Minister. The 
motion for that resolution is also started by a notice, supported 
by 20% of the MPs, submitted to the Speaker at least 14 days 
before presentation to the Assembly. In this case there is no
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"Special Committee" involved; the motion is debated straight away 
and a simple majority is enough to carry the resolution. The 
Prime Minister must then resign within two days of the 
resolution, and when the Prime Minister vacates his office, for 
whatever reason, all the other ministers also vacate their 
offices with him.
Thus, led by the Prime Minister, the ministers are indeed 
collectively responsible to the National Assembly. The full 
cabinet, however, consisting of the Prime Minister and the other 
ministers, also includes the Vice-President and is headed by the 
President himself. But the President and the Vice-President are 
not members of the National Assembly.
The Eleventh Amendment introduced new provisions for the Vice- 
President which take effect in the coming elections and under 
which the Vice-President is no longer appointed by, but is 
elected simultaneously with, the President, as "running mate" 
similar to the American system. The Vice-President cannot be 
removed from office by the President either; he can only be 
removed by the National Assembly following impeachment 
proceedings similar to those against the President and, for that 
purpose, the President can also initiate the impeachment process 
by a submission to the Speaker. In the event of the office of 
the President falling vacant, for any reason, before the term 
expires, the Vice-President automatically becomes President for 
the remainder of the term. In such an event the (new) President 
appoints another person who, subject to the approval of the
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National Assembly, becomes the (new) Vice-President.
The amendments make no change in the establishment and 
composition of the Judiciary, or in the tenure of judges and 
magistrates. But the Eleventh Amendment prohibits all judges and 
magistrates from membership of political parties, a prohibition 
also applied to members and officers of the Electoral Commission, 
and of all Defence and Police Forces. Regarding jurisdiction, 
however, s.5 of the Eleventh Amendment brought a new provision 
to the effect that instead of declaring any law null and void for 
contravening the Bill of Rights, the High Court may allow a 
specified time for the government to make necessary changes to 
make the law conform with the Constitution, and during that 
specified time the impugned law continues to be valid.
In itself, that amendment seems to derogate nothing from the 
power of the High Court. But the Basic Rights and Duties 
(Enforcement) Act 1994 which was assented to in January 1995 and 
re-enacts that provision, now requires the High Court to sit with 
3 judges when determining petitions on the Bill of Rights. The 
Act also requires the High Court to dismiss summarily any 
application seeking to restrain the enactment of a law likely to 
contravene the Bill of Rights. In addition, s.8 (4) states that 
in all cases of alleged contravention of the Bill of Rights:
The provisions... which relate to the procedure for and the power of the
High Court to issue prerogative orders, shall not apply for the purposes
of obtaining redress.
It is not very clear what effect this Act has had in practice but
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it would seem to be a serious derogation of the powers of the 
High Court. Judicial review is the most effective means of 
exercising control over government powers by the High Court, and 
prerogative orders the remedies which make it effective. 
Precluding their use in the enforcement of basic rights makes the 
High Court powerless in defending those rights against violation 
by the executive.
7.6.2: A General Assessment
It may still be too early to assess the full extent of these 
changes and their effect. But one overall effect is that the 
authority and status of Parliament has generally been enhanced. 
Its sovereignty is no longer doubtful, following an end to the 
inhibiting concept of "Party Supremacy." By depriving the 
President of the power to appoint MPs, the amendments have 
reduced his power and influence over the National Assembly, 
especially considering that there will now be members belonging 
to parties other than the President's. Also the Parliament is 
more secure; the President can no longer dissolve it at any time. 
On the other hand, while the President's Office becomes vacant 
each time Parliament is dissolved,74 Parliament can by 
impeachment remove the President (and Vice-President) from office 
without, in so doing, terminating its own tenure.
The National Assembly now approves and confirms the appointment 
of the Prime Minister, as well as the Vice-President when there
74Section 38(2)(a) of the Constitution 1977.
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is a mid-term vacancy in the latter office. It is also empowered 
to dissolve the Cabinet by passing a resolution of no confidence 
in the Prime Minister. The fact that now MPs can remove from 
office the Prime Minister, the Vice-President, and even the 
President, without themselves terminating their tenure thereby, 
is an enormous step forward in democratic control of executive 
powers.
An early remark about the power of impeachment was that the 
procedure has so many "hurdles" that impeaching the President is 
extremely difficult (shivji i994a:89-9o) . This is deliberate and, 
possibly, desirable. The Office of the President is the highest 
office of the land and its holder, once democratically elected, 
should be free to govern according to law, without unnecessary 
inhibitions. He should not be removed with casual simplicity, 
but only upon grounds compelling enough to overwhelm the hurdles 
in the impeachment procedure. In any case, although the 
President remains extremely powerful, simplifying the impeachment 
procedure may not necessarily lead to the powers vested in him 
being exercised more properly.
Apart from the new limitations in appointing the Prime Minister 
or the Vice-President, the President has retained all his 
previous powers over the civil service, including the power to 
constitute and to abolish offices under s.36 of the Constitution 
1977. His discretion to act without (or even in disregard of) 
advice is also retained under s.37(1) of the Constitution. The 
Nyalali Commission had recommended that the President should stop
appointing middle and low level government executives [99],75 
but this recommendation has been ignored.
Many other recommendations of the Nyalali Commission have been 
ignored while others have been contradicted, either directly or 
in effect, by the 1992 changes. The Commission recommended a 
system for the electorate to recall their MPs where appropriate 
[133] ; it recommended the formal establishment of the "State 
Intelligence Services (or National Security) Department", which 
is there in fact but not in law and the public hardly knows about 
it [14 8]; it also recommended that a number of laws, listed in 
Volume Three of its report, be amended or repealed because they 
inhibit human rights and democracy [143-8] . But all those 
recommendations have been ignored.
On the other hand, while the Nyalali Commission emphasised the 
right of every citizen to stand for election, the 1992 amendments 
deny the right of "independents" to contest elections by 
requiring membership and sponsorship of a registered political 
party as a necessary condition for every elective office, 
including membership of village councils!76 The Commission 
recommended a Code of Ethics for political leaders and government 
executives to be retained, and suggested the Permanent Commission 
of Enquiry to be charged with enforcing it [131-2,140]; but the
75In this section, references in square brackets refer to pages in (Volume 
One of) the report, Tanzania 1992a.
76The Constitution 1977, ss.3 9 & 67, as amended by ss.13 & 19 of the Eighth 
Amendment, and the Local Authorities (Elections) Act 1979, s.39, as amended by 
the Local Authorities (Elections) (Amendment) Act 1992, s.9.
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1992 amendments simply repealed the previously existing 
Leadership Code and replaced it with nothing. Also the Nyalali 
Commission recommended that both the Electoral Commission [141-2] 
and the Permanent Commission of Enquiry [100] should now be 
appointed by the National Assembly, but they continue to be 
appointed by the President.77
Finally, the Nyalali Commission recommended a comprehensive 
programme or time-table for a smooth transition to a multi-party 
system [161-3], including the setting up of a Constitutional 
Commission, having a public debate and a referendum on a new 
constitution. This would have enabled the public to take part 
in constitution making. But the government proceeded by 
patchwork constitutional amendments without involving the public, 
despite frequent demands for either a constitutional conference 
or a constitutional commission and a referendum.
In Rev Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney General,78 one of the 
petitioner's prayers was for an order to the government to either 
call a constitutional conference or set up a constitutional 
commission and hold a referendum. But the High Court held:
I know that the question of a new constitution and even a referendum is a 
burning issue at the moment. And I venture to say that it would be 
impolitic to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to this reality. Yet I do 
not see how the court can make the order prayed for in the present state 
of the law without appearing to infringe on the spheres of other organs of 
government... The High Court cannot... adjudicate on matters that are 
purely political as distinct from legal issues.79
77Eighth Amendment, s.24, and the Elections (Amendment) Act 1992, s.4.
7 fiHigh Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993.
79Ibid., preliminary ruling made on September 22, 1994.
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The prayer was rejected; but both the filing of the petition and 
the statement of the court show that there was public demand for 
such a democratic exercise. So far it has gone unheeded.
Another remark relates to the requirement to belong to a 
political party in order to contest for political office. The 
requirement gives undue importance to political parties, almost 
equating them with democracy, an equation which, ironically, was 
soundly rebutted by Nyerere when advancing the case for a one- 
party state in the early 1960s. In its final judgment in the 
above case the High Court ruled that it was a denial of a basic 
right to "independent" citizens and therefore unconstitutional. 
But the government has been so persistent with it that it brought 
amendments enacting that requirement in the Constitution 
itself.80 This move has been severely criticised (Mvungi 1993:27-8; 
Nyerere 1995:7 - n ) . It amounts to using the legislature to overrule 
a court decision, a practice not uncommon in Tanzania, and which 
tends to treat the Judiciary with contempt.
Contempt for the Judiciary could possibly be traced too in the 
motives behind enacting the Basic Rights and Duties (Enforcement) 
Act 1994. Its disapplication of the power of the High Court to 
issue the prerogative orders of certiorari, mandamus and 
prohibition renders the High Court virtually impotent in 
protecting basic rights against infringement by the government. 
The Act is in direct contradiction with the recommendation of the
80The Eleventh Constitutional Amendment Act 1994, ss.4, 8 & 13, amending 
SS.21 (1), 39 & 67(2) of the Constitution 1977.
416
Nyalali Commission that human rights should not be left to the 
discretion of politicians [91-3]. By requiring the High Court 
to sit with three judges in determining cases of breach of the 
Bill of Rights, the Act also contradicts the recommendation that 
the High Court, as the defender of human rights, should be made 
more easily accessible to ordinary citizens [100] .
Also a matter of concern are the numerous laws recommended for 
repeal or amendment by the Nyalali Commission. The laws listed 
allow the executive to impose arbitrary punishment, to restrict 
personal liberty as well as freedom of movement, freedom of 
association and expression, and so on. A selection from the list 
is given in Appendix C to this study, with a brief statement 
following each law. There is no doubt that the continued 
presence of those laws in the statute books is a great inhibition 
to freedom and democracy. But the government has done absolutely 
nothing to repeal or amend those laws, thus raising doubts about 
its commitment to democracy.
Thus the overall assessment is that despite their apparent 
democratic content, the 1992 changes have not been effected very 
democratically, and they have still left some unjustified 
restrictions to democracy and the enhancement of people's power.
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CHAPTER EIG H T
Conclusion:
The Achievement of Responsible Government
8.0: INTRODUCTION
This study set out to review the developments in the 
constitutional practice of Tanzania since independence relating 
to the composition and use of executive powers. In particular, 
the aim has been to focus upon and analyse the extent to which 
those developments have succeeded, or not, in securing a 
responsible democratic government.
In this final chapter we make a concluding assessment of the 
trends in the constitutional developments given in the preceding 
chapters. The assessment is made against the notions of 
responsible government identified in Chapter One. They include 
the requirement that the government must be accountable to a 
representative organ of the people which is democratically 
constituted; that the government must be "responsive to public 
demands" and opinion, willing to act as a servant, and not just 
as the all-knowing master, of the people (Birch:i7-8) ; that the 
government must always be subject to the law which in turn must 
observe justice; and that the government should be held liable 
for all its actions or omissions in breach of the law.
We begin with a brief highlight of the main features and 
landmarks in the developments presented in this study. Then we
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assess the achievements made towards a responsible democratic 
government, and point out what may be regarded as the shortfalls 
and limits in that regard. Finally, we give an outlook of what 
may be useful points of consideration for future developments.
8.1: LANDMARKS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Independence Constitution of 1961 was a compromise between 
the departing colonial power and the nationalist leaders who led 
the campaign for independence. It imported the institutional 
framework of the Westminster model of parliamentary government, 
along with the principles of separation of powers, independence 
of the Judiciary and a supreme Parliament with power to control 
and hold the government to account. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
that framework was hurriedly adopted as part of the independence 
package, in spite of doubts about its suitability expressed by 
former governors (Twining:23; Kirk-Greene: 157) as well as by Nyerere 
himself (Nyerere 1966:103-6, 133-4, 195-203) .
One may even doubt whether the parties to the independence "pact 
of compromises" did indeed expect that constitution to achieve 
much beyond the mere provision of a juridical basis for the 
formal transfer of power to end colonial rule. It was replaced, 
after only a year, by the Republican Constitution of 1962. This 
Constitution established the office of Executive President, 
combining in him the roles and powers of the former Prime 
Minister and those of the crown (until then exercised by the 
Governor-General). The President, a constituent part of the
legislature, was empowered to appoint up to 10 members to the 
National Assembly, the other part of the legislature, which he 
could dissolve at any time. The National Assembly lost its power 
to censure the government; the Cabinet now became accountable to 
the President who appointed its members and was not bound by 
advice from it or from any other body. The President was also 
given the power to appoint judges and other public officials, and 
he had virtually absolute control over the civil service. This 
was the first landmark.
Next was the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965, which 
introduced the one-party system. The move was initiated by 
President Nyerere, who argued that democracy and the one-party 
system were not incompatible; he was aided in that move by the 
use or threatened use of the immense powers vesting in him as 
President to suppress all opposition to it, scant though it was. 
The union (of Tanganyika and Zanzibar) which formed Tanzania 
shortly before the one-party state constitution took effect gave 
the President powers to appoint an additional 52 MPs to represent 
Zanzibar, where, following the January 1964 Revolution, there 
were no elections until after 1980.
The one-party system made membership of Parliament conditional 
upon membership of the party,' and party policies and directives 
were placed beyond the competence of Parliament to question. 
This made the party superior to Parliament, a position 
subsequently asserted by the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 
(Amendment) Act 1975 (the 1975 Amendment), and followed in 1977
420
by the unequivocal declaration of the concept of "Party 
Supremacy" in the Constitution 1977. Among other things, the 
1975 Amendment altered the composition of the National Assembly 
and made the directly elected constituency members a minority to 
those appointed by the President and those indirectly elected 
from party organisations. The changes were re-enacted by the 
Constitution 1977, which also made the National Assembly a 
committee of the party.
Besides those constitutional enactments, the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration is one of the most important events in Tanzania's 
political and constitutional history. Through it, the supremacy 
of the party was demonstrated, even before it was expressly 
stated in the Constitution, when nationalisation measures were 
taken by the government pursuant to it, a mere party resolution, 
without even waiting for parliamentary authorisation. Also the 
passionate appeal of its ujamaa socialist ideology, with its 
emphasis on equality and social justice and the stringent 
Leadership Code it imposed on political leaders and government 
bureaucrats, projected the party as a true champion of the 
genuine interests of the people. Linked with the Arusha 
Declaration were the TANU Guidelines 1971 which strengthened the 
ideological basis for the concept of "Party Supremacy" 
promulgated subsequently.
The next important landmark was the Fifth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1984 (hereinafter the "Fifth Amendment"). It was 
initiated by President Nyerere and virtually bequeathed by him
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as a legacy before vacating the Presidency. The Amendment 
incorporated the Bill of Rights in the Constitution for the first 
time. It also laid such a great emphasis on the supremacy of law 
and the Constitution that even the party, though still proclaimed 
supreme, was nevertheless enjoined to observe the law. It also 
limited a person's eligibility for the Presidency to two five- 
year terms only, reduced the number of MPs appointed by the 
President and required him to consult the Prime Minister in 
appointing ministers and regional commissioners.
The Fifth Amendment contributed much to the growth of a new 
atmosphere of greater freedom and confidence in demanding and 
asserting basic rights. This led, ultimately, to the end of the 
one-party state in 1992, following a big wave of popular demand 
for change within the country, supported by strong external 
pressure. Those 1992 reforms are the latest landmark in the 
continuing process of constitutional developments in Tanzania 
covered by this study.
8.2: NYERERE AND THE DOMINANT ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
The constitutional developments presented in this study have 
occurred, by and large, in response to popular aspirations and 
demands for some form of democratic control over the government. 
But they also show that after independence the executive was 
progressively strengthened while Parliament, as the instrument 
for democratic control of the government, was made weaker and 
replaced by the Party. But the Party was itself dominated by the
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executive. As such, executive dominance has been the main 
feature of constitutional practice in Tanzania; the main 
constitutional changes and developments have all been controlled 
by the executive.
It must be emphasised here that even under the Westminster model 
of parliamentary government which was adopted by the Independence 
Constitution, the executive is an extremely powerful institution. 
But in the United Kingdom, from which the model was adopted, the 
immense powers of the executive can be checked by institutions 
which, in their own right, are very powerful as well. There is 
an active and well established supreme Parliament with a wholly 
elected lower house, and an independent Judiciary. In addition 
there are strong, independent and influential pressure groups and 
civil organisations, and a free press constantly monitoring the 
opinion of an informed and alert public.
By contrast, in the newly independent African countries of the 
early 1960s, the checking mechanisms constituted by all those 
bodies and institutions were weak or absent. In Tanzania, 
specifically, there was a one-party Parliament, most of whose 
members had been returned unopposed, and its sessions were 
sometimes complacently "lifeless." The High Court, through which 
judicial control of the executive could be exercised, could only 
play a marginal role. The general population was overwhelmingly 
illiterate; a free press, even if there had been one, would not 
have been of much democratic use; and the radio was state owned. 
There were no independent pressure groups; even the trade union
and cooperative movements were still allied to TANU, the 
nationalist movement which formed the independence government, 
as part of the then anti-colonial alliance.
On the other hand, the Independence Constitution inherited the 
extremely elaborate and powerful structure of colonial 
administration, heavily biased in favour of executive might. As 
we saw in Chapter Two, not even a democratic local government 
system had been established; local administration was carried out 
through a network of Native Authorities, directly controlled by 
the central executive through its district and provincial 
commissioners. Soon after independence these commissioners, 
until then civil servants, were replaced by political 
commissioners, designated district and regional commissioners, 
to perform the function of local political executives appointed 
by the President, responsible to him, and holding office at his 
pleasure. This reinforced the dominant position of the central 
executive that had existed under colonial rule. The executive 
then went on to take over control of the trade union and 
cooperative movements, and to ban opposition parties, all with 
relative ease.
The greatest significance of the Republican Constitution of 1962 
was noz so much the severing of links with the British crown, but 
the "crowning of the executive" by establishing the office of 
Executive President, vesting it with extensive powers and 
virtually removing all restrictions to their use. The 
justification for this development was presented in Nyerere's
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powerful speech in Parliament in June 1962, extracts of which are 
attached to this study as Appendix A.
In short, Nyerere never shared the view that regards power as 
evil (Ghai 1972:419) . He argued that once democratically elected, 
the government should be free to govern, and should have enough 
power to mobilise all resources for economic development.1 On 
the dangers of misuse of such powers, he argued in his 1962 
parliamentary speech that there can never be designed a fool­
proof constitution to guard against misuse of power; rather, he 
said, mutual confidence between the people and their 
democratically elected government, the political leaders' sense 
of decency, and the extra-juridical "National Ethic" were the 
best safeguard against abuse of power. It was the strength of 
that argument that led to the acceptance of the dominance of the 
executive as the main feature in the constitutional practice of 
Tanzania.
But that acceptance of a strong executive in Tanzania was also 
due to the personal influence of Julius Nyerere, then the obvious 
choice for the Presidency, as we saw earlier {supra, 3.2). His 
charm, wisdom, proven ability and overall personality had such 
a disarming effect that even the few who warned against vesting 
too much power in the President readily conceded that Nyerere 
could certainly be trusted not to misuse such power.2 And ever 
since, Nyerere has decisively influenced constitutional
10bserver, July 3, 1962; also Nyerere 1961c: 340 and Nyerere 1968: 5.
2Parliamentary Debates, June 28, 1962: cols.1101-2.
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developments in much the same way as the executive as a whole has 
dominated Tanzania's constitutional practice. Almost every other 
institution has been acting in response to the dictates of the 
executive which, in turn, has been acting largely in accordance 
with his mandate. Thus most of the constitutional changes under 
review bear the mark of Nyerere's influence.
From the beginning, Nyerere's concept of a responsible government 
gave paramount importance to the right to vote. In his 1962 
parliamentary speech, he justified the powers of the President 
over the civil service by the fact that the executive would have 
the mandate of the electorate to implement the policies and 
programmes upon which it was voted into office, and that such 
powers were necessary for effective implementation. In the same 
speech he defended the provision that in case of an impasse in 
the legislative process due to differences between the President 
and the National Assembly, both (and not just the President) 
should seek a fresh mandate from the electorate because "the 
final judge in a democracy is the voter."3
Nyerere also based his decision to adopt a one-party system, to 
a great extent, on the argument that it would give the citizens 
an opportunity to vote for their leaders and representatives. 
He has repeated this argument in subsequent statements 
emphasising that the decision had been "demanded not by 
philosophy but by reality:"4 the multi-party system in one-party
2Parliamentary Debates, June 28, 1962: cols.1110-1.
4Africa Now, December 1983:108-13; also see Sandbrook & Halfani: 28.
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Tanzania had denied most citizens the right to vote! And to 
prove the point, Nyerere's one-party system came with an 
extremely elaborate and thoroughly involving electoral scheme, 
and elections have been held with impressive regularity. This 
has had the effect of giving the system in Tanzania a degree of 
credibility and respect not readily accorded to some other one- 
party states.
Also, despite its dominant role, the executive has not had a 
reputation for despotism or extreme oppression. We have 
attributed this to the ujamaa ideology and its declared 
commitment to equality and social justice. We should add here 
that the government in Tanzania has also been spared the threats 
to national unity and cohesion within the state boundaries, which 
in other countries have often been used as the justification for 
repression by many African governments. The sheer number of 
ethnic groups, over 120, and a common national language, 
Kiswahili, understood all over the country but not belonging to 
any particular ethnic group, have all worked in favour of a 
common identity and national unity. And after the 1964 army 
mutiny, a new army, highly politicised, was established under 
party surveillance and an organisational structure closely linked 
with that of the party that the possibility of a military take­
over became remote.
But in that too the executive owes much to Nyerere's personal 
skills and ability. One of his greatest assets, which has been 
used with maximum effect, has been his ability to keep himself
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constantly in touch with the people, and to react promptly and 
appropriately to changing political situations, moods and 
attitudes in society. His ability to address large crowds and 
to appeal to all people and make himself understood by even the 
illiterate and most unsophisticated poor citizens hardly finds 
any parallel. That, together with his clear commitment to 
equality and social justice as expounded by his highly appealing 
ujamaa ideology, have been largely responsible for the popular 
support which the executive always enjoyed under his leadership. 
He succeeded in cultivating public confidence in the executive, 
enabling it to implement its schemes and policies with public 
support generally, and with relatively little oppression.
It was Nyerere who initiated the one-party system, with 
widespread public acceptance at the time. It restricted freedom, 
but there were some among his colleagues who would have had a 
worse state, with no elections at all (Pratt 1976:187-8) . The 
Arusha Declaration, which introduced the ujamaa ideology with all 
its effect on the conduct of government and government leaders, 
was his initiative. He even gave a silver lining to the now 
discredited concept of "Party Supremacy" by using it, after 
uniting the ASP with TANU to form Chama cha Mapinduzi in 1977, 
gradually to extend elections to Zanzibar, where Karume, the 
first leader after the 1964 Revolution, had decreed that there 
would be no elections.
In 1977 Nyerere came out strongly in public condemnation of 
spreading dictatorial tendencies among his colleagues and
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assistants in the political leadership (Nyerere 1977:43-5; scope:9- 
10) . In 1980 he deliberately postponed his earlier intention to 
vacate the Presidency, and he used the extended lease of office 
to initiate the changes effected by the Fifth Amendment in 1984, 
which included the enactment of a Bill of Rights and limiting the 
presidential tenure to only two five-year terms. In 1985 he 
voluntarily vacated the Presidency; but he continued to exert 
influence as Chairman of the ruling party. And in 1990, while 
still Party Chairman, he deliberately undermined possible 
resistance to change (from hardliners in the party and the 
government) by encouraging a multi-party debate.
Even after relinquishing his position as Party Chairman in 1990, 
Nyerere continued to command unparalleled respect as the "Father 
of the Nation." His continuing influence was demonstrated in 
late 1994 when he published a scathing attack on John Malecela, 
the Prime Minister, and Horace Kolimba, the Party Secretary 
General, for giving misleading advice to the President for the 
sake of their personal ambitions, and refusing to take blame and 
political responsibility for their misleading advice by 
resigning, even after being advised to do so (Nyerere 1994) . In 
December 1994, immediately after the formal launching of 
Nyerere's latest book, President Mwinyi dissolved the Cabinet and 
reconstituted it with a new Prime Minister. That move defused 
some of the pressure from mounting public criticism of the 
government.
Thus, all in all, Nyerere has played a role that enabled the
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executive to manage and control constitutional developments 
without being driven to the wall by popular pressure.
One effect of that dominance of the executive in constitutional 
practice in Tanzania, and Nyerere's role in it, is that the 
extent of public participation and involvement in constitution 
making has been quite limited. Constitution making has been an 
exercise in which the executive, especially after 1965, has been 
very free to effect changes as it chooses, in a remarkable 
parallel with the colonial government; even the practice of 
having some MPs appointed by the executive is in fact a carry 
over from the colonial era. Most constitutional changes, even 
where there was some input from the public, have been initiated 
from the top. The 1992 changes were a result of popular demands 
for change; but the executive responded quickly and easily 
managed to take over and proceed in command of all key 
developments. This dominance of the executive is largely 
responsible for the limits and shortfalls in the achievement of 
democratic control and popular influence over government powers.
8.3: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
The developments reviewed in this study are part of an on-going 
process. As we write, Tanzanians are getting ready for the 
October 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections which will 
be contested by several parties and will put to test for the 
first time some of the changes examined in Chapter Seven above. 
It is not possible, therefore, to make an authoritative
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assessment of their overall achievement in securing a responsible 
democratic government. But it is possible to indicate what steps 
have been made in that direction.
To start with, independence in 1961 was in itself a fundamental 
achievement. It restored political sovereignty by putting an end 
to colonial rule which had negated responsible democratic 
government, both in principle and in practice. It enabled the 
establishment of a sovereign parliament elected by the people to 
represent them, and to which the government was responsible. A 
year later, the Republican Constitution reinforced that 
achievement by declaring a "sovereign republic." The Republican 
Constitution also retained from the Independence Constitution 
those provisions securing the tenure of office for judges and 
magistrates. Subsequently, the Magistrates Courts Act 1963 
completed the establishment of an independent judiciary.
There have been many reservations about the one party system. 
But in Tanzania, it should be assessed on the basis of the 
objective conditions obtaining in the country at the relevant 
time. While it is true that the right to vote was achieved for 
all adults with independence in 1961, the practical realisation 
of that right only came with the one-party Interim Constitution 
of Tanzania 1965. The previous (multi-party) election had 
returned 8 0% of the MPs unopposed, making a sham of the claim 
that the government was responsible to "a freely elected
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Parliament representative of the people."5 Rather the 
government was responsible, if at all, to a body composed of 
members selected by the ruling party. The right to vote is 
absolutely essential for any democratic government and in 
Tanzania the one party system extended its realisation to all 
adult citizens, and it has been exercised regularly ever since.
The party was open to all citizens; it was not an elite party for 
a few people with proven ideological commitment. Despite its 
centralised structure, the elaborate party organisation network 
enabled to keep national leaders aware of what went on at grass­
roots level through information coming up from party branches. 
Within the party structure members had the right to give their 
views and criticise their leaders, and to vent their grievances, 
provided they did not attempt to challenge or otherwise tamper 
with key issues of policy. The party was thus a medium for 
monitoring public opinion and enabling the government to act 
according to demands from the people. And despite its 
limitations, the Permanent Commission of Enquiry was a welcome 
innovation made under the one-party state.
Some very important steps towards a responsible democratic 
government were effected by the Fifth Constitutional Amendment 
Act 1984 (the "Fifth Amendment") which was enacted due to, among 
other things, dissatisfaction with the concentration of too much 
power in the President, started by the Republican Constitution
5Statement in the preamble of both the Independence Constitution and the 
Republican Constitution.
432
and reinforced by subsequent developments. By limiting the 
Presidential tenure to only two five-year terms, the Fifth 
Amendment emphasised that presidents are not pre-ordained and 
indispensable masters of the people, and should not be allowed 
to stay in office indefinitely. Rather, the people should have 
a reasonably frequent opportunity to exercise their right, as the 
masters, to choose another person to serve them as President.
The Fifth Amendment also sounded, for the first time, a tacit 
warning against notions of "Presidential Infallibility" by 
specifically requiring the President to consult his Prime 
Minister, before appointing any person a minister or a regional 
commissioner.
The requirement that ministers, both collectively and 
individually, shall be responsible to the National Assembly is 
a cardinal principle of government responsibility which was 
introduced by the Interim Constitution. Subsequent constitutions 
did not contain specific provisions to that effect. In practice, 
however, ministers always defended government policies and 
actions as a team before the National Assembly, and always sought 
its sanction for raising and spending public funds, even if 
sometimes this may have been done as a mere formality. But the 
Fifth Amendment expressly declared this principle again in 
s. 53(2) of the amended Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment also enhanced the status and authority of 
Parliament by reducing the number of MPs appointed by the
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President, thus reducing his power over it, by increasing the 
number of elected members, and by expressly according absolute 
privilege to its proceedings. The parliamentary privilege was 
later supplemented by the right, and the power, of MPs to hold 
public meetings in their respective constituencies without any 
hindrance. This widened the base from which public opinion could 
be monitored, beyond the party structures, for purposes of 
enabling the government to be responsive to public demands.
Another achievement of the Fifth Amendment was in its express 
declaration of the separation of state powers and functions into 
three separate organs, an important principle for avoiding 
tyranny. The amendment also affirmed the supremacy of law, a 
necessary requirement of government responsibility.
The incorporation of a justiciable Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution ensured that the supremacy of law was not an empty 
declaration. It enhanced the role and power of the Judiciary 
over executive powers by enabling the High Court to censure 
government actions which infringe constitutional rights. The 
enhanced role of the Judiciary became even more evident with the 
holding that the procedural requirement of the Government 
Proceedings Act 1967 which the government had conveniently used 
to avoid the institution of legal proceedings against it was 
unconstitutional and therefore null and void.6 This finding 
made a reality of the legal liability of the government for its 
actions and omissions.
6Kukutia Ole Pumbun v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 L.R.C. 317.
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The Bill of Rights enabled many individuals to assert, by court 
action, their rights and freedoms against restriction by the 
government, and made it difficult for the government to suppress 
this new wave of demand for freedom. It encouraged the emergence 
of a number of independent publications and organisations 
operating free of state control and patronage, thereby widening 
the scope and sources of public opinion. Finally, the Bill of 
Rights was also the source of confidence and inspiration to 
various groups and individuals who then stood up to question the 
legality of the one-party state system.
The 1992 amendments went a step further in subjecting the 
executive to popular control, exercised through the National 
Assembly. The reintroduction of multi-party politics enlarged 
the base for recruitment to the National Assembly, widening the 
scope of the sources and channels of public opinion which a 
responsible government must take into account. All traces of 
subservience to the executive were terminated as the President 
lost both his power to appoint any MPs and his power to dissolve 
Parliament at any time.
On the other hand the National Assembly was strengthened by the 
new power to approve the appointment of the Prime Minister, and 
the power to remove him and his team of ministers from office by 
a vote of no confidence. These developments meet several 
requirements of government responsibility. Firstly, the 
President is compelled to appoint as Prime Minister only a person 
who enjoys the support of the people's representatives in
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Parliament. Secondly, the Prime Minister is constantly reminded 
of the need to conduct the affairs of the government in a manner 
that ensures continuing parliamentary support. And thirdly, 
because of their collective responsibility, the ministers have 
always to work not only to win the favour of the Prime Minister 
and the President, but also to ensure that the confidence of the 
National Assembly remains undented.
Finally, the Ninth Constitutional Amendment Act 1992 now empowers 
the National Assembly to remove the President by impeachment for 
breaching the Constitution or for bringing the office of the 
President into disrepute. Thus, although the President remains 
free to "act in his own discretion" and is not obliged to follow 
advice tendered by any body, Parliament can still hold him to 
account for his actions as President. It is a development which 
emphasises both the supremacy of law and the supremacy of the 
people as represented by Parliament.
These developments emphasise further the notion of government 
responsibility which projects the government as the servant, not 
the master, of the people. How far that notion may be realised 
in practice as a result of these recent developments remains to 
be seen. A point to be emphasised, though, is that "government 
as a servant of the people" remains, practically all over the 
world, more of an ideal than a reality.
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8.4: IMPEDIMENTS TO RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
We have already mentioned that the Independence Constitution 
imported to Tanzania a powerful executive, characteristic of the 
Westminster system of government, in conditions of an almost 
complete absence of the usual mechanisms for checking executive 
powers in that system. The system adopted from the start, 
therefore, had inadequate means of ensuring a responsible 
democratic government. The Republican Constitution removed even 
the bare minimum formal requirement of government responsibility 
to the National Assembly. The Cabinet was responsible to the 
enormously powerful President, who was accountable to nobody. 
That position continued under the one-party state system.
A clear attempt of the one-party system, especially the concept 
of "Party Supremacy", was to replace Parliament with the Party 
as the centre of authority exercising control, on behalf of the 
people, over the government and other state institutions and 
holding them to account. But since 1962 Parliament had lost its 
might to the executive; there was thus little authority in it to 
replace. Moreover, the supreme organs of the Party and the 
Executive were, for most part, constituted alike, making the 
Party not well placed to hold the government to account.
Besides enabling all people to vote, the one-party system did 
nothing to enhance people's control of the government. Within 
Parliament, freedom to debate was stifled by the requirement to 
support and observe party policies and directives. Parliament 
lost much of its role and function of representing the general
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will of the people. For purposes of control, it almost became 
redundant as the government began seeking, and readily obtaining, 
the sanction of party organs (instead of Parliament) to give 
legitimacy to its actions. With "Party Supremacy", Parliament 
lost its sovereign status and became a party committee, chaired 
by the Prime Minister (the Leader of Government Business in 
Parliament), required to meet before each session of Parliament, 
and which could also meet between sessions.7
Through those "party committee" meetings, which were held in 
camera, the government was able to overcome all parliamentary 
opposition to its proposals. Significantly, after instituting 
"Party Supremacy" the President never again used his 
constitutional power to address the National Assembly at any time 
to secure support for government proposals, as he had done over 
the Income Tax Bill in 1973. Instead, whenever MPs strongly 
resisted a government proposal, the Prime Minister called them 
into a meeting constituting the "party committee" to deal with 
the resistance.
Popular institutions and organisations were brought under the 
control of the party by coopting or affiliating them into its 
organisational structure. As a result, Tanzania hardly had any 
independent pressure group outside the party structure. Freedom 
of expression also suffered generally because of a repressive 
media law regime; only mass media owned by the government and the 
party were certain of survival. In the event, the party was more
7Tanzania Parliamentary Rules 1987 (1990 Edition), Rules 81-82.
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effective in subjecting the whole civil society to state control. 
The whole idea that the government should be responsible to the 
people it governs was, in effect, reversed, with the government 
hardly listening to the people. The supremacy of the party 
proclaimed by the Constitution, and the ujamaa socialist ideology 
which was largely responsible for mobilising the popular support 
enjoyed by the government, were often used as pretexts for
overriding the need for democracy and popular participation, and 
sometimes even legality.
The absence of a Bill of Rights from the Constitution undermined 
possible endeavours to hold the government liable for its actions 
which contravened some universally acknowledged basic human 
rights. The Government Proceedings Act 1967 also gave the 
government an unfair protection from legal proceedings. Thus 
although judges and magistrates at all levels had a secure tenure 
of office, for a long time the role of the Judiciary in
controlling government powers was deliberately marginalised. 
Other organs of control, the Permanent Commission of Enquiry and 
the Commission for the Enforcement of the Leadership Code, have 
had no powers of their own and have depended entirely on the 
discretion of the President to act according to their
recommendations, with no recourse if he refuses to act. As a
result the two Commissions served to enhance, rather than to 
check, the powers of the Chief Executive.
Many of these limitations were removed by the Fifth Amendment, 
which incorporated the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, and
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the 1992 amendments, which brought back a multi-party system. 
But these changes too came with limitations of their own.
The Fifth Amendment restored ministerial collective 
responsibility to the National Assembly but excluded the 
President, the Head of Government, from this responsibility, 
placing him above it. It also gave the National Assembly no 
powers of censure. As such the "collective responsibility" it 
declared was virtually an empty one, still leaving effective 
control in the hands of the President, who had power to dissolve 
the National Assembly at any time. Also, while guaranteeing the 
right to freedom of association, the Fifth Amendment still 
retained the restrictive provisions of the one-party state.
Those shortcomings were apparently rectified by the 1992 
amendments which gave to the National Assembly powers to censure 
the government and to impeach the President, making the supremacy 
of Parliament, and the corresponding responsibility of the 
government to it, indeed a reality. But membership of the 
National Assembly still excludes persons who are not members of 
registered political parties. The return of multi-parties only 
replaced the former "one party monopoly" with "a multiparty 
monopoly" (Mvungi 1993:27), and still disqualifies a majority of 
Tanzanians from contesting for political office, shutting off 
their voice and opinion. The changes, therefore, are short of 
establishing a government that "belongs to all the people" as 
once cherished by Nyerere (i958:87) ; they set up, instead, a 
government belonging to political parties. The right of
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political parties to operate is conditional upon satisfying the 
Registrar of Political Parties that the Political Parties Act 
1992 is complied with; he can cancel the registration of a 
political party with no right of appeal against such action.
This results from the dominant role of the executive in the 
constitutional developments in Tanzania. The executive has not 
listened to all sections of society and now seeks to deliberately 
exclude from political activity persons who are not identified 
with institutions it has sanctioned and can control, like 
political parties.8 Demands for a new Constitution, with the 
public involved in its making, have been ignored. The laws 
recommended by the Nyalali Commission to be repealed or amended 
because they inhibit freedom and democracy are still in the 
statute books.9 Many of those laws could be successfully 
challenged for contravening some basic constitutional rights. 
But until that happens they can be invoked by the government, and 
its reluctance to repeal or amend them shows its intent to use 
them. This makes it doubtful whether the government indeed 
accepts the supremacy of the Constitution and is willing to be 
always subject to it.
Those doubts are heightened by a renewed reluctance by the 
government to be bound by certain laws and court verdicts not to 
its liking. After the High Court declared the whole Deportation
8The Registrar of Political Parties is appointed by the President and holds 
office at the pleasure of the President.
9A selection of those laws is listed as Appendix B to this study.
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Ordinance unconstitutional and therefore a nullity, the 
government introduced a Bill which was passed and which amended 
the said Ordinance to make it consistent with the 
Constitution.10 It raises the question whether Parliament can 
amend a law which has been declared null and void by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, as the Ordinance was at the time of the 
purported amendment. But of greater concern here is the 
government's disregard of judicial authority demonstrated by that 
step. Also in 1991 the government secured an amendment11 re­
enacting into the Criminal Procedure Act 1985 the same provisions 
relating to bail which had been declared null and void by the 
courts, by simply putting them under a different subsection.
In December 1992, the controversial Regulation of Land Tenure 
(Established Villages) Act 1992 was rushed through Parliament; 
it extinguished customary land rights in villages established 
under the Villagisation Programme. The law went further: it
prohibited the payment of compensation, as of right, for the 
resultant loss of those rights; it terminated all pending court 
cases instituted on the basis of those rights; and it prohibited 
the execution of any court decree already made in respect of the 
same. It provoked widespread public concern and subsequently 
many of its controversial provisions were declared null and void 
by the Court of Appeal in Akonaay and Another v. Attorney- 
General.12 Finally, in December 1994 the government secured an
10The Deportation Ordinance (Amendment) Act 1991.
xlWritten Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1991.
12 [1994] 2 L.R.C. 399.
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amendment to the Constitution to exclude independent candidates 
from standing for elections, thereby overruling the decision of 
the High Court in Rev Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney General.13
Until now the government has refused to have the State 
Intelligence Services Department (popularly known as the 
"National Security Department") established by a specific law 
which should also govern its operations. Presently, that 
department exists and operates by executive fiat; its functions 
are hardly known. The Nyalali Commission recommended that a law 
should be enacted for its formal establishment and to govern its 
activities so as to avoid possible misuse of power and violations 
of the Rule of Law, a common complaint against such departments 
in some countries (Tanzania I992a:i48) . In Tanzania too, the 
department is not blameless. Its officers were involved in the 
1976 murders on account of which two ministers resigned in early 
1977. The arrests and detentions of student leaders in 1989 
{supra, 7.3.2) were also made by that department.
The reluctance to enact a specific law for it as recommended by 
the Nyalali Commission indicates that the government wishes to 
reserve an area of freedom for executive action without being 
restrained by the law. The same can be said regarding the Basic 
Rights and Duties Enforcement Act 1994 which, as we have already 
mentioned {supra, 7.6), makes the High Court less accessible for 
purposes of enforcing the Bill of Rights and also precludes the 
use of prerogative orders to enforce basic rights; it may render
13High Court of Tanzania, Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993.
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the High Court virtually powerless against the government.
The overall position shows a government determined to have its 
way regardless of the law, to obey only the laws it chooses, and 
not to be restrained in any way, even to the extent of expecting 
the Constitution to obey it, rather than the other way round. 
It shows a government refusing to be subject to the law, and in 
effect refusing to be responsible.
8.5: RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
In 1975, President Nyerere had this to say about Tanzania's 
achievements:
We call ourselves a democratic and socialist state. In reality we are 
neither democratic nor socialist... Democracy and socialism require a 
mature and popular awareness of the dignity and equality of men and women; 
a dynamic and popular intolerance of tyranny; a degree of maturity and 
integrity in those entrusted with responsibility for the institutions of 
State and Society; and a level of national and personal affluence [all 
of] which Tanzania and Tanzanians do not possess... We have the village 
tyrant and the insensitive bureaucrat. We have the habits of 
arbitrariness... We have judicial procedures which, to say the least, 
leave a lot to be desired. We have a law on the Statute Book under which 
an individual may be detained without trial. We have the traditional 
prejudice and discrimination against women. We still have a love of 
exerting authority, and an intolerable degree of submission to 
authority. ...14
Some steps have since been taken to improve the situation. There 
is now a Bill of Rights checking against "the habits of 
arbitrariness"; detention orders can now be questioned in court; 
and various parties are now competing for seats in a 
representative Parliament, with a reserved number of seats for 
women, which has power even to remove the President from office.
1/lBulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, December 1975 & January 1995; Vol. 8 Africa 
Contemporary Record 1975-1976: B315.
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But democracy is a living and dynamic concept, not a static 
virtue that can be won or achieved once and for all. For that 
reason Nyerere's assessment may be just as valid today as it was 
twenty years ago.
The Nyalali Commission recommended the establishment of a special 
commission for purposes of re-writing an entirely new
Constitution in whose making the public should be involved. That
recommendation has received wide public support; but the
government so far appears to have rejected it. Instead, the
Constitution has been amended five times over the past three 
years without any public involvement.
There is now this pertinent question: is the writing of a new 
constitution really necessary in order to ensure, among other 
things, an adequate framework for a responsible government?
The need for a new constitution for Tanzania is evident from a 
number of factors. It is not just that there has been a wide
public demand for a new constitution, including one failed
attempt to get a court order requiring the government to set in 
motion the constitution making process.15 But it seems to be a 
logical argument that amendments cannot make a constitution 
initially designed for a one-party state work effectively well
for a multi-party system. Therefore, there is need for a
completely new constitution; the amendments enacted from 1992 can
lsRev Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney General, High Court of Tanzania,
Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993.
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only serve to provide for a transitional framework.
Since its hurried enactment in 1977 up to 1995 the Constitution 
of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 has been amended 11 
times.16 There are very few original 1977 provisions now 
remaining unaffected by the subsequent amendments. As such, the 
Constitution has in effect been replaced by a series of 
amendments on the basis of which the government now operates. 
Not all the amendments have been very successful either; some of 
them, especially the most recent ones, have raised new problems 
calling for yet some more amendments. On the other hand, some 
of those amendments are so fundamentally different from the 
purposes of the original Constitution that writing a new one is 
more than justified.
The question of enacting a new Constitution has to be taken soon. 
It is important that the people should be involved in making a 
new Constitution. The people have a right to participate in 
making the supreme law of the land which binds even Parliament. 
Also a wide public consultation brings forward a wide range of 
alternative ideas to choose from, both in considering new forms 
and institutions and in revisiting previous experiences. For, 
it would be a mistake to dismiss the experiences under the one- 
party system as irrelevant and devoid of any forms, or even 
ideas, to be usefully modified and adopted into the new order.
16Going by their official citations, one would say there have been 12 
amendments. But the 4th Amendment was by default named as the 5th Amendment and 
has been known that way ever since.
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From the experiences of Tanzania, one important institution is 
the Permanent Commission of Enquiry (PCE), which was adopted 
specifically for checking abuse of power under the one-party 
system. But abuse of power is a problem transcending political 
party systems and the intrinsic benefits of an ombudsman 
institution are evident from its spread to divergent political 
systems in Africa (and elsewhere) ; it has been operating in 
single-party, multi-party and even (no-party) military regimes 
(Hatchard:256-7, 26o) . The Nyalali Commission recommended that the 
PCE should now be answerable to Parliament, which seems logical 
now that Parliament has superior authority over the President. 
But the amendments made so far have left the PCE entirely as it 
was under the one-party state.
Another institution whose role and function should be fully 
addressed in considering a new Constitution is a code of ethics 
for political leaders and executives.17
During the 1990-92 debate on the multi-party option, frequent 
warnings were given against equating democracy with political 
parties. It should similarly be emphasised that the reformed 
institutional structures for controlling government powers do 
not, in themselves, guarantee a responsible government. Thus, 
although the 1992 reforms make the power of the National Assembly 
over the executive greater than ever before, the practical effect 
of those reforms may still be minimal.
17It is understood that following a private member's motion in 1994, such 
a code has recently been enacted; see Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, September 
1995: 21-2.
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After 1992 the National Assembly seemed to have acquired some new 
confidence and became extremely critical of the government 
(simbakalia: 57-8) . But it has still been unable to censure the 
government and has left it to the discretion of the President to 
act against the ministers singled out for particularly severe 
criticism: the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Natural
Resources and Tourism in 1993, and the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance in December 1994. The President made changes 
affecting those ministers in the Cabinet18 after they had come 
under severe public criticism. In fact the 1994 reshuffle was 
mainly the result of Nyerere's intervention with the publication 
of his book, in the case of the Prime Minister, and pressure from 
the international donor community, in the case of the Minister 
for Finance. Otherwise the National Assembly itself failed to 
force any minister to resign, much as it had failed to remove 
Joseph Mungai from office as Minister for Agriculture in 1981.
The power to censure the government by a motion of no confidence 
in the Prime Minister does not necessarily require sitting MPs 
to belong to two or more different parties; members of the 
National Assembly can move and carry the motion against a Prime 
Minister belonging to their own party. The passing of such a 
motion, like that of impeaching the President, does not lead to 
dissolution of Parliament; members do not have to worry, 
therefore, about the possibility of immediately losing their 
seats as a result of censuring the government. Yet it required 
the intervention of a retired President and pressure from
18A11 the ministers were nevertheless given other Cabinet posts.
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external donors for the President to take censorial measures 
against his ministers. This shows that with all its new powers 
of censure, Parliament alone is still not enough to ensure 
effective control of the government.
With a strong opposition party in Parliament it may be easier to 
invoke the powers of censure and thereby keep the government 
alert, lest it be replaced for unsatisfactory performance. A 
major preoccupation of an opposition party is to watch out for 
failures and point them out as evidence of poor performance by 
the government in the hope of replacing it. But a good system 
of responsible government should have more than merely the 
provisions for sanctions against unsatisfactory performance; it 
should also make it possible to expect and compel the government 
to improve its performance, while still in office, by ensuring 
that it responds to the actual needs and demands of the people 
as its duty, and not just in wooing votes for the next election. 
And for that purpose, the formal organs of state, the legislature 
and the judiciary alone, are not enough.
There are other factors and institutions whose role is also 
vital. They include a free press, a diversity of pressure groups 
and civil associations organised variously, both formal and 
informal. They also include autonomous local government 
authorities, not mere outposts of the central executive. Those 
are the makers of public opinion. Political parties are 
interested in changing governments at general elections. Civil 
associations and other interest groups, on the other hand, are
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interested in good performance as a continuing concern; they are 
not interested in changing governments as such, but in changing 
government performance. They thus play an important role in 
ensuring a responsible government. It is for that reason that 
the recommendation of the Nyalali Commission to repeal or amend 
those laws that restrict freedom, including freedom of 
association and expression, should be taken as an important 
constitutional agenda.
Finally, it is important to develop a culture of respect for the 
Constitution. The ease and frequency with which the Constitution 
has sometimes been amended does not exhibit that respect. 
Certainly, a Constitution is not so sacred that it cannot be 
amended even if it fails to function effectively. But frequent 
amendments to a Constitution raises doubts about the seriousness 
of the constitution-making process itself. The executive can 
take advantage and secure amendments to suit its convenience as 
easily as it does with other laws; after all the Constitution is 
amended by Parliament in the same way as passing other laws, 
except that a constitutional amendment is passed by a two thirds 
majority in the House.
A successful constitution, and any successful law for that 
matter, is one which can survive a long time without needing an 
amendment. Julius Nyerere correctly pointed out in his 1962 
parliamentary speech (see Appendix A) that "no constitution is 
ever perfect." And in 1995 he stated, correctly again, that the 
success of any country's constitution depends on two factors:
Firstly the integrity, the commitment to democracy, and the loyalty of the 
Leaders of that country; and secondly the vigilance of the people -and 
their chosen representatives - in defence of the Constitution's provisions 
and especially its basic principles. (Nyerere 1995:3)
Both logic and experience tend to show that a constitution, and 
any law for that matter, is likely to be more successful if the 
people have been involved in its making. Leaders who lack 
integrity and commitment to democracy can be removed by the 
people (or their representatives) exercising their democratic 
right to that effect, if the Constitution provides for such a 
right. In so doing, the people will be defending the 
Constitution. Logically, the people's vigilance in defending the 
Constitution and their commitment to its basic principles will 
be greater if they know and understand the Constitution and its 
basic principles.
There is no better way of ensuring that the people know the basic 
principles of a law than involving them in making it. One 
practical example is that of the Bill of Rights and other related 
principles which were enacted under the Fifth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1984, after a public debate which took a whole 
year; until now nobody has called for their change, and they have 
remained virtually unchanged.
Another example is the Law of Marriage Act 1971 which, initially, 
would have been passed in November 1969. But at the start of 
that session of Parliament the UWT organised a mammoth 
demonstration by Dar es Salaam women demanding, among other 
things, the prohibition of polygamous marriages. The government
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withdrew the Bill, took a year to gather more views from the 
public, and then modified the Bill before presenting it to 
Parliament in April 1971. Although it did not prohibit polygamy 
as demanded by the women, the Act has been a remarkable success: 
it has not been amended ever since.
It cannot be expected, nor is it being suggested, that a similar 
procedure should always be followed in making other laws, just 
to ensure their success. Law making should be left as the 
regular function of Parliament. But constitution making is not 
a regular function of Parliament; and constitution making does 
include, in our view, enacting constitutional amendments. We 
would recommend, therefore, that future constitutional amendments 
should not be made by Parliament as easily as they have been so 
far, using the regular legislative process, only slightly 
modified. In any case, the Constitution should not be amended 
without involving the people in the process of amendment. This 
will ensure the success of the Constitution and emphasise that 
it is indeed supreme, and not to be easily tempered with, even 
by the legislature.
The success of all future constitutional developments will thus 
depend largely on the extent to which the people are involved in 
constitution making. Ultimately, therefore, it is a question of 
democratic participation. And that, in effect, is what 
responsible democratic government is all about.
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EPILOGUE
At the time of submitting this thesis Tanzanians were about to 
go to the polls, on October 29, 1995, in the first multi-party 
elections since independence. In actual fact, this is going to 
be the first election ever to be held in Tanzania (Zanzibar 
excepted), in which there is going to be a real contest between 
both individuals and political parties; the pre-independence 
elections presented no contest as TANU had no challenge.
About a dozen political parties, including the ruling CCM, are 
contesting for more than 24 0 seats in the Union Parliament; four 
of the parties are also contesting for the presidency. The 
contest is expected to be extremely close. Elections for the 
Zanzibar President and the Zanzibar Legislature, held a week 
earlier (on October 22, 1995), have been described as a "dress 
rehearsal" for those of the United Republic. The results, just 
announced, give victory to the ruling CCM by the narrowest of 
margins: 26 seats in the House of Representatives going to CCM 
and the other 24 going to the opposition Civic United Front, 
while the incumbent Zanzibar President (CCM) obtained 50.2% of 
the presidential votes.
While in Zanzibar the ruling CCM faced only one opposition party, 
for the union elections there are several of them. But the NCCR- 
Mageuzi, led by the popular Augustine Mrema, who was in President 
Mwinyi's Cabinet until February 1995 when he joined the 
opposition, seems to pose the greatest challenge. The CCM 
Presidential Candidate is Ben Mkapa. One of these two is likely 
to be the next President of the United Republic of Tanzania.
Whoever and whichever party wins will still face the need for a 
new Constitution. It can only be hoped that the winner will take 
it as a mandate to initiate the process of making a new 
Constitution with the active involvement of the people as we have 
argued for in this thesis.
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Appendix A
GOVERNMENT POWERS AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL ETHIC
Mr Julius Nyerere: Mr Speaker, Sir, ....I will not try to
say that Government has devised a perfect constitution. 
Government was not even attempting to devise a perfect 
constitution. No constitution is ever perfect. Fears that may 
have been raised about the constitution are fears concerning the 
power of the president. His powers over the civil service, 
powers of appointment and other powers which, I must admit, are 
a lot of powers. The problem, Sir, which confronts all people 
who frame constitutions is not a problem of trying to frame a
tyrant. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to frame a 
constitution that makes tyranny impossible. There are some 
beautiful constitutions on paper in the world, some of the most 
beautiful constitutions that have ever been devised. Sir, some 
of us here who have taken the trouble to study constitutions and 
who have taken the trouble to find out what is happening in 
various countries, constitutions or no constitutions, know that 
the constitutions in themselves are not safeguards against 
tyranny. We know some countries which have no written 
constitutions and, Sir, they have some of the best administration 
in the world. We have some constitutions very carefully drafted 
to prevent this or that happening but they have not completely 
succeeded to remove a bit of corruption in the administration. 
Now, Sir, why am I saying this? I am saying this, Sir, because 
the point must be made that ultimately the safeguard of a peoples 
right, the peoples freedom and those things which they value, 
ultimately the safeguard is the ethic of the nation.
When the nation does not have the ethic which will enable 
the Government to say: "We cannot do this, that is un-
Tanganyikan". Or the people to say: "That we cannot tolerate, 
that is un-Tanganyikan". If the people do not have that kind of
constitution which is going against a potential £be
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ethic, it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame. 
They can always be victims of tyranny.
Sir, let us take the present constitution as it is, without 
any change at all. This Parliament, Sir, can make any law, as 
it is now, any law. They can pass a law today, without any
change in the constitution, that nobody should become the
President of Tanganyika unless he had proved that he is a 
potential tyrant. (Laughter.) They can. They can! This
Parliament has perfect power to do that. They can pass a
constitution, they can pass a law now, and they have complete 
power, Sir, that nobody in Tanganyika should have the right to 
vote except bachelors and polygamists. (Laughter.) Because they 
have perfect power to do that, they are the supreme legislature 
of the nation. They can do it.
Why are they not doing it? Two reasons: one because they 
are not insane, they are not mad, Sir. The other one, if they 
were mad enough to try and do it, they know that the people of 
Tanganyika are going to give them a most determined "NO" . These 
two reasons, Sir, and ultimately the last one --that the people 
won't take it, are the safeguard of the rights of any people.
So, I am saying, Sir, whatever we try to do -- we can sit 
here and look at this constitution, and say that we are giving 
too much power to the President -- let us sit here for two years 
and devise the most foolproof constitution. I am saying, Sir, 
we will never succeed. What we must continue to do all the time, 
is to build an ethic of this nation -- all the time to build an 
ethic of this nation, which makes the Head of State, whoever he 
is to say, "I have the power to do this under the Constitution, 
but I cannot do it, it is un-Tanganyikan." Or for the people of 
Tanganyika, if they have made a mistake and elected an insane 
individual as their Head of State, who has the power under the 
Constitution to do X Y Z if he tried to do it, the people of 
Tanganyika would say, "We won't have it from anybody, President 
or President squared, we won't have it".
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I believe, Sir, that is the way we ought to look at this 
constitution. We have got to have a little amount of faith, 
although I know that some Members have been questioning this idea 
of faith. But, Sir, democracy is a declaration of faith in human 
nature, the very thing we are struggling to safeguard here, the 
very idea of democracy is a declaration of faith in mankind. And 
every enemy of democracy, every enemy of democracy, is some 
person who somewhere has no faith in human beings. He doubts. 
He thinks he is all right, but other human beings are not all 
right. He will be perfectly all right.
Democracy itself, Sir, is a declaration of faith in human 
beings. I am told, it was Sir Winston Churchill, who said 
Democracy is a very bad form of Government, but every other form 
of Government that has been tried is worse. Democracy, Sir, is 
a declaration of faith in the human being, and there must be that 
amount of faith somewhere, because if you don't have it, then we 
have to get a tyrant or a semi-God somewhere to come and run our 
business. Otherwise we will have to have some faith in some 
fellow-human being. It is risky, but what is the alternative? 
And, Sir, the quotation I have just mentioned indicates this 
faith is in most cases justified. That is why we still stand and 
defend democracy, defend this faith in man. And constitutions, 
democratic constitutions are aimed at getting the people to 
declare this faith in some individuals. It is also a declaration 
of faith by those individuals in the wisdom of the common people 
in choosing the persons who are going to be vested with these 
extremely important powers. It does not matter what authority 
it is. This very Government here, as I said, has very far- 
reaching powers.
Any government in the world is a dictator. When people use 
the word "dictator" it is one of those colourful words which they 
interpret as they please, but every government, Sir, in the world 
is a dictator. It has all the coercive means, it has the police, 
it has the armed forces; and it is incredible when one thinks of 
it, how it is that governments have these means and yet freedom
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is still there. And yet an individual can push these people out 
of power, and elect someone else to go and control the armed 
forces. It is incredible, Sir, but it is a declaration of faith 
in human beings; it is justified by the very practice itself, 
and, Sir, if democracy does not have that faith in the leaders 
it will never succeed. And if the leaders do not have that faith 
in the people, there cannot be any democracy. There must be 
mutual confidence between leaders and the people, in any 
democracy. A tyrant, Sir, is usually a person who is frightened 
of the people. It is incompatible with popular leadership, 
because popular leadership is never frightened of the people --it 
is a contradiction in terms. The tyrant is usually one who is 
frightened of the people, and so uses power, because he can no 
longer rely upon the faith of the people....
Then there is the problem of power -- how [much] power do 
you invest in this Head of State. Again, Sir, we have 
difficulties here. Some of the difficulties are difficulties of 
understanding, other difficulties are practical.
The difficulties of understanding again. Take the matter 
of the Civil Service. The President, or let us say the 
Government, is the Government of the country. There are civil 
servants who work for the Government. They execute the policies 
of Government. And then you go and try to explain to our own 
people that the Prime Minister has no power, no power at all to 
appoint even an office boy. Even on this question of 
understanding, we would be asking too much from our people if we 
expected them to understand that Government has no power to 
appoint a civil servant. That, they cannot understand. This is 
the question of understanding, Sir, but I am saying also the 
practical problem, simply practical problems. Here is the
Government, Sir, elected to fulfil a function. We go to the
people, we promised the people that we are going to do X Y Z. 
"If you think we are sensible to do X Y Z, and if you think X Y 
Z are so important that people who are capable of doing X Y Z
ought to get into power, then elect us."
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We are elected, Sir, on the basis of going out to do X Y Z. 
Well, Sir, one would expect that when you get into position of 
power and say to somebody, "Look here, friend, I have come here 
with a mandate from the people to do X Y Z, your function is none 
but to help me to fulfil this pledge to the people", now, Sir, 
supposing this gentleman said, in so many words, "Well, that is 
your own business, I don't really think these things are 
important, Sir" --he can be polite, usually they are very polite- 
- "I don't really think these things are as important as you 
think, Sir". What do I do? Just smile and say, "You go and do 
your best, Sir" or say to him quite seriously, "You have an 
alternative: do what I am telling you, or out, because this is 
what I am here for"? Now, Sir, we talk about this thing and we 
say that this is giving the President too much power. And I am 
not even arguing this on the basis that "because we are a young 
country" and all this business. I don't accept the whole theory. 
A manager of any business has the necessary power over the 
employees of that business --(applause)-- and we really cannot 
see this mystical theory which deprives the manager of a business 
of a nation of the power even to say, "That fellow is good enough 
to be an office boy". This, Sir, we cannot understand. We 
realize the the practical necessity to continue a Civil Service, 
not to play about with this power; to have men of experience in 
the Civil Service, not to go in the Civil Service and wipe out 
everybody and start with a completely new broom, completely 
inexperienced people. That we realize. But that is a completely 
different matter, Sir, from the idea, the philosophy, of a 
Constitution, that the Executive should have no say at all in the 
building of the Civil Service. This, Sir, we do not accept.
The practical necessity of having people of experience in 
the Service, this we see, but when it is necessary for the 
Executive to say, "I think that person could do that job very 
well" the Executive must have that power, and when you deprive 
the Executive of that power, you are depriving the Executive of 
a necessary power to carry out a mandate for which it has taken 
responsibility from the electorate. ("Hear," "Hear" and
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Applause.) And for that reason we are saying that the President 
ought to have these powers.
Now, again, Sir, there is this. I go back to the use of the 
powers as distinct from the powers themselves. Now, there is no 
doubt, Sir, that the President having been given the powers over 
the whole Civil Service, there is nothing illegal that we can do 
as far as employing people in the Civil Service is concerned. 
He has full powers under the Constitution. So that if all that 
mattered was the Constitution, and commonsense was ruled^ decency 
was ruled out, intelligence was ruled out, good sense was ruled 
out; it is just the powers. Sir, this President would have the 
power: we have about 13 Ministers here -- if he had 13 sisters 
he could make all of them Permanent Secretaries. He could, and 
it would be legal! (Laughter.) He has the power under the 
Constitution to make each of his sisters a Permanent Secretary 
in each one of the Ministries if he wanted to. . . . He could, Sir. 
Under the Constitution he has a perfect right to do it. Let us 
use a bit of common-sense. Would he really try? If he tried, 
the people of Tanganyika would simply say, "No". He would not 
do it and I am saying that in the last resort that "No" is really 
what is going to be a safeguard against these powers, which I do 
accept are terrific powers. The ultimate safeguard is how long 
a list the nation of Tanganyika will draw, how long is this list 
going to be, or the things to which they are going to say, "No, 
Bwana, you cannot do that. That is un-Tanganyikan and we cannot 
accept it from anybody". So, Sir, this question of power: again, 
I say that we have -- the Government has-- decided that the 
Executive must have these necessary powers. A long list of 
powers. Commander-in-Chief -- most frightening powers!
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Sir, he could tyrannise, 
he could tyrannise everybody! (Laughter.) But, Sir, the 
Governor-General is also Commander-in-Chief of this country....
Sir, I say again that no constitution is perfect. You 
cannot think of a Constitution without thinking of individuals, 
of people, of human beings. We are going to carry out this
constitution, although I think there are some people here who 
have been trying to frame a constitution without human beings. 
You cannot frame a constitution without human beings. A 
constitution is framed to be worked by human beings and I hope 
the evil of human beings is not to be over exaggerated in this 
consideration. We must consider people and we are going to
entrust them with very important decisions and we will know that
they have some sense of decency.
....Sir, I want to end on the same note on which I started. 
If we really want to spend our time devising something that we 
can offer the people of future generations, something of which 
they will be really proud, it is not a constitution, Sir. 
Constitutions have been treated in many countries just like a 
piece of paper. If we really want to build something that we can 
hand over with pride to future generations we will have to build
ethics of our nation. (Applause.)
(Extracts from Parliamentary Debates, 28 June,1962, cols . 1103-14)
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Appendix B
A SELECTED LIST OF LAWS 
WHICH RESTRICT FREEDOM AMD DEMOCRACY
1. Preventive Detention Act 1962, Cap 490
This law empowers the President to detain a person in 
custody without a trial or a charge in court. It violates 
the right to personal freedom.
2. Deportation Ordinance, Cap 38
Empowers the President to order a person to be deported to 
a particular area, usually a district, and to remain there 
until the order is lifted. A deportee is confined in 
custody while waiting to be, and when being, deported. It 
restricts freedom of movement and personal liberty.
3. Regions and Regional Commissioners Act 1962, Cap 461 and the
District Commissioners Act 1962, Cap 466
The two laws empower Regional and District Commissioners, 
respectively, to detain any person in custody for up to 48 
hours without charge or trial. It violates personal 
freedom.
4 . Collective Punishment Ordinance, Cap 74
Empowers the President to impose collective punishments, by 
way of fines, upon whole or part of villages or any other 
identifiable group or community. It contravenes the 
principles of presumption of innocence and equality before 
the law.
5. Townships (Removal of Undesirable Persons) Ordinance, Cap 104 
Empowers District Commissioners to order removals of 
persons, usually unemployed, from urban areas to rural 
areas. It restricts freedom of movement.
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6. Human Resources Deployment Act 1983
Empowers the Minister to make arrangements for urban 
unemployed to be compulsorily put to work or repatriated to 
rural areas. Denies the right to choice of work, and 
freedom of movement and residence.
7. Registration and Identification of Persons Act 1986
Requires all persons, aged 10 years and above, to be 
registered and issued with identity cards to be carried at 
all times, and failure to carry an identity card is an 
offence. It has been compared to the notorious "Pass Laws" 
of apartheid South Africa [but the operation of this law 
has so far been kept in abeyance].
8. Societies Ordinance, Cap 337
Empowers the President to ban any organisation (including 
company, partnership, cooperative society or any other 
firm) by declaring it an unlawful society; empowers the 
Minister to require any organisation (company, partnership, 
cooperative society or other firm) to register itself under 
this Ordinance or cease operation; and the registrar may 
refuse (or cancel) registration of any society or 
organisation (including one required to register by the 
Minister), and thereby render it unlawful. By this law the 
right to freedom of association is there at the pleasure of 
the government.
9. Newspapers Act 1976
Minister may prohibit the publication of any newspaper and 
the President may prohibit the importation of any 
publication. The law creates offences, including sedition 
and incitement to violence, for which the penalties it 
prescribes include confiscation of all machinery and 
printing facilities of the publication concerned. It is a 
threat to a free press, the right to information and 
freedom of expression.
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10 . Tanzania News Agency Act 1976
Creates the Tanzania News Agency and gives it exclusive 
right collect and disseminate news in the country; other 
people can only do so with the Agency's authorisation, 
which can be withdrawn at any time. It violates freedom of 
expression, right to information and a free press.
11. Local Government Laws: Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act 1982, Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act 
1982, Local Government Finances Act 1982, Local Government 
Service Act 1982, and Urban Authorities (Rating) Act 1983
Under these laws the Minister responsible for local 
government as well as other central government institutions 
have exclusive powers of appointment, discipline and 
control over all employees of local government authorities; 
extensive and detailed control over local government 
finances; and overriding powers over all decisions of local 
government councils. They are an affront to local 
democracy and responsible local government.
12. Organisation of Tanzania Trade Unions Act 1991
Creates a single trade union for the whole country and 
prohibits workers' organisations except as branches or 
otherwise affiliates of this union which in any case can be 
de-registered by the Registrar of Societies, or disbanded 
by the President at any time. The law restricts freedom of 
association and the right of workers to organise.
(Extracted from: Tanzania (1992a) , Tume ya Rais ya Mfumo wa Chama 
Kimoja au Vyama Vingi vya Siasa Tanzania I: Baadhi ya
Sheria Zinazohitaji Kufutwa au Kufanyiwa Marekebisho, Dar 
es Salaam: NPC-KIUTA.
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